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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
No. 92-2534
__________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JULIUS C. BOMAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas
______________________________________________
(November 16, 1993)
Before GARWOOD, DAVIS and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-appellant Julius C. Bomar (Bomar) challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for violation
of a provision of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1940 (the Act), 50 U.S.C. app. § 535(2), (3). Bomar was convicted
of enforcing and attempting to enforce, without seeking court
approval, a lien for storage of a 1985 Chevrolet Camaro owned by
Gordon McNeely (McNeely), a corporal in the United States Army
Reserve Unit who served on active duty in Saudi Arabia during
Operation Desert Storm. He challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm.

Factual Background
McNeely was a corporal in the United States Army Reserves,
serving with the 340th Chemical Company, a chemical decontamination
unit trained to combat the effects of chemical warfare.1 On
November 17, 1990, he received his orders placing him on active
military duty, and his unit was assigned to Fort Hood, Texas, to
prepare for Operation Desert Storm.
Central to this prosecution is a 1985 Chevrolet Camaro which
McNeely bought from his sister, Meredith McNeely Phipher
(Meredith), in July 1988. On December 15, 1990, while on leave
from Fort Hood, McNeely went to Houston, Texas. He was
experiencing problems with his car, which he attributed to the
transmission. He took the car to a local transmission shop, Buy
Direct Transmission (Buy Direct).2 There, the defendant, who
identified himself as "Doc,"3 said he was too busy to look at
1
While stationed in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert
Storm, McNeely was transferred to the 327th Chemical Company, a
sister unit.
2
McNeely testified that he chose Buy Direct on the strength
of an advertisement in a local Green Sheet; Buy Direct was the
only business which promised same-day service.
3
Before the district court, Bomar attempted to show that
references to "Doc" need not implicate him. The defense called
Arturo Perez, an employee of Buy Direct during the relevant time
period. Perez testified that during February, March, and April
1991, a part-time manager named Leo worked for Buy Direct; this
employee occasionally identified himself over the telephone as
"Doc." Perez conceded on cross-examination by the government,
however, that if he thought of "Doc" at Buy Direct, he thought of
Bomar, not Leo; he also stated that he had never heard Leo
discuss McNeely's car with anyone, but that he did know of at
least one occasion when Bomar spoke with someone about the car.
We hold that the evidence is sufficient to conclude that the
person identified as "Doc" is the defendant, Julius Bomar.
2

McNeely's car at that time. McNeely informed Bomar that he was
stationed at Fort Hood and would not be able to bring the car back
the following day. Bomar suggested that McNeely leave the car
there for him to inspect at his (Bomar's) first opportunity.
McNeely agreed, and instructed Bomar to look at the transmission
but to notify him before any work was done on the car; McNeely left
Bomar the telephone number to his unit at Fort Hood in order for
the defendant to reach him with the information about his car.
Several days later, on the 17th, McNeely called Buy Direct
from Fort Hood and asked to speak to Doc. The defendant came to
the phone. McNeely told Bomar not to do any work on the car and
that he would send someone to pick it up. Bomar replied that he
had already disassembled the car's transmission and requested
payment in the amount of $194 for his labor. McNeely asked him to
put the car back together for someone to pick up; Bomar then stated
that if he had to reassemble the vehicle, he would have to charge
approximately $400. Bomar demanded full payment in order to
release the car and hung up the phone.
During the next week, McNeely tried unsuccessfully to call Buy
Direct. During his leave for the Christmas holidays, he went to
Buy Direct to get his car, but the business was closed. Finally,
on January 7, 1991, while again on leave from Fort Hood, McNeely
went to Buy Direct and spoke to Bomar about working out a deal with
him on the car. Because he did not want to pay $400 for nothing
and because his departure for Saudi Arabia was imminent, McNeely
agreed to buy another transmission and pay Bomar $70 to install it.
McNeely left, and later returned to Buy Direct with a transmission
3

he had purchased for the car. Bomar told him it would take about
an hour to install the new transmission, and McNeely left the shop.
McNeely was gone for approximately three hours. During that
time, he called Buy Direct twice to determine if his car was ready;
both times Bomar informed him that it was not ready. McNeely told
Bomar that he was due back at Fort Hood that evening and needed his
car to get there; Bomar assured him that it was almost ready.
McNeely finished up some personal business and went to Buy Direct
where he found that his car still was not repaired. When the car
was finally ready, Bomar told him that he had done some additional
work on the car and that the charges would be $194. McNeely
reminded him of the agreed $70 for the installation, but Bomar
demanded $194 to release the car. McNeely did not have the full
amount in cash, but he offered to pay $100 in cash, write a check
for $94, and let Bomar keep the old transmission. Bomar insisted
on the entire $194 in cash.4 McNeely told him he could get the
remaining money in cash in about fifteen minutes, from his mother
who worked six blocks from the Buy Direct business. Bomar then
told him that he did not want to wait for the money.
At this point, McNeely asked Bomar to call the owner of Buy
Direct; when Bomar refused, McNeely asked him to call the Houston
Police Department. When Bomar declined to do so, McNeely again
asked him to call the owner. Bomar again refused and pulled a
pistol from a desk drawer, cocked it, and said "This is the only
person I need to talk to." McNeely left the store.
4
Buy Direct had a store policy of not accepting checks.
There were signs to this effect around the business premises.
4

McNeely drove in his mother's car to a nearby convenience
store where he attempted to flag down a police car; failing that,
he went to a police substation and filled out the initial report
for an aggravated assault charge. Later, he returned to the
convenience store where he called 911. Two officers responded to
the call, and after McNeely explained the situation to them, they
proceeded to Buy Direct. The shop was closed, and no one was
there.
McNeely picked his mother up and rented a car to get back to
Fort Hood. Within the week, his army unit was sent to Saudi
Arabia. Once in Saudi Arabia, McNeely's unit was sent to the
front, and it was not until March 1991 that he was able to attempt
communication with Buy Direct.
On March 15, he called Buy Direct, asked to speak with Doc,
and told Doc, or Bomar, that he was returning soon to the United
States and wanted to pick up the car. Bomar told him it would cost
approximately $2,000 to redeem the car and informed him that the
money was for storage fees. While he was in Saudi Arabia, McNeely
contacted his mother and sister and requested them to try to get
the car from Buy Direct.
McNeely returned to the United States on April 21, 1991. His
sister informed him that there was a lien on the car. McNeely
consulted an attorney, who advised him to make no attempt to get
his car back.
Meredith testified that she was not aware of any problems with
her brother's car until after he had left for Saudi Arabia. He
called her collect from Saudi Arabia to ask her to ask their mother
5

to get the car from Buy Direct. McNeely's mother (Mrs. McNeely)
telephoned Buy Direct and ascertained that the car was still there.
She spoke with Bomar, who identified himself as "Doc." Mrs.
McNeely explained that she was McNeely's mother and would like to
pick up the car; Bomar told her he wanted $1800 for the car. In
response to questioning by Mrs. McNeely, he explained that $195 was
for repairs and the rest for storage. Meredith also spoke to Bomar
over the telephone; he told her he did not want to talk to her
about the car because it was not her car and she had not brought it
in to him.
Later, Meredith again spoke with Bomar over the telephone. He
told her it would cost $1,800 or $1,900 to get the car back;
according to the defendant, $194.50 was for actual work done, and
the rest of the fee was for storage fees, at $15 per day. Bomar
told her he had sent her some papers, which she had not received
due to a recent move. She gave him her new address.
After Meredith received a paper from U.S. Data Link, a titling
company used by Bomar to process lien requests, she called Bomar.
The paper stated the defendant would have a lien on the car if she
did not pay $194.50. When she subsequently talked to Bomar, he
told her that the $194.50 was for the car repairs, but that storage
fees totalled over $2,000 at that time. He informed her that if
she did not retrieve the car within thirty days by paying the full
bill, he would sell the car at auction. According to Meredith,
Bomar told her if she paid, she could have the car; he did not
quibble over her not being the owner of the car.
Mrs. McNeely went to Buy Direct on March 25, 1991. Bomar was
6

not in the office. She waited for two hours until the defendant
arrived. He introduced himself as "Doc." They went into his
office and talked about the price of the car. He told her the
charges for the car were $2,000, $195 for repairs and the remainder
for storage. Mrs. McNeely told him she did not have that much
money with her; she had $300 cash with which she attempted to
negotiate with Bomar. She told him McNeely was in Saudi Arabia and
that she needed to get his car. Bomar arranged to call her the
next morning.
On March 26, when Bomar failed to call her at the arranged
time, Mrs. McNeely went back to Buy Direct. Bomar was not in; she
waited for almost an hour, but he did not appear. She left and
called the business that afternoon and asked for Doc. Bomar came
to the phone and told her she did not have a car there and he did
not want to talk to her, and he hung up the telephone. Mrs.
McNeely testified that Bomar never asked her to provide the title
to the car; he would have let her take the car if she had paid him
the requested amount of money.
Other people contacted Bomar at Buy Direct on McNeely's behalf
to attempt to get his car back. Chris Carnero (Carnero), a worker
for Operation Dependent Shield, a foundation created to help the
families of the reservists who were called to active duty, and Lee
Woods (Woods), the chairman of the foundation, testified for the
government.5 Mrs. McNeely contacted Carnero on March 27 to seek
the foundation's help in recovering the Camaro for McNeely, who was
5
The foundation provided such services as financial aid,
counseling, legal services, medical help, and car repair.
7

still in Saudi Arabia. On April 10, Carnero called Buy Direct and
spoke with a person who identified himself as "Doc." Carnero told
"Doc" that the McNeelys were willing to pay for the repairs on the
Camaro. "Doc" replied that it would cost more than just the
repair; he also wanted approximately $1,200 in storage fees and
would not release the car until the bill was paid in its entirety.
Carnero informed "Doc" that he would be violating federal law, the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act; Bomar responded that he
just wanted his money. "Doc" rejected Carnero's attempt to
negotiate the payment of part of the storage fees; in addition, he
refused to consider holding the car without charging further
storage fees. Following this conversation, Carnero tried to reach
"Doc" again but was unsuccessful. Carnero turned the case over to
Woods.
Woods called Buy Direct on April 16, 1991, and spoke to a
person who identified himself as "Doc." Woods explained the nature
of his call, telling "Doc" that he hoped they could settle the
problem of McNeely's car. "Doc" again insisted on payment of the
full amount he claimed was owed him; he told Woods that there were
storage fees on top of the repair charges, and he indicated that he
had filed a lien on McNeely's car. Woods informed him that the
lien was probably a violation of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act. At this point in the discussion, "Doc" became angry
and ended the conversation.6
6
According to Woods, "Doc" terminated their conversation with
the words: "F--- you. F--- the government. F--- the U.S. Army.
F--- Gordon McNeely."
8

While the McNeelys were attempting to get the Camaro back,
Bomar was taking steps to perfect his interest in the car. Terri
Stewart (Stewart), the office manager for the title division of
U.S. Data Link in Baytown, Texas, testified that Buy Direct
submitted a form authorizing U.S. Data Link to act as its agent in
filing a lien for mechanic and storage fees on McNeely's car.
Although this form expressly requested that storage charges be
added to the lien, starting from January 3, 1991, U.S. Data Link
was unable to obtain a storage lien because, under state
regulations, it was required to obtain a release from the first
lienholder, GMAC, before the mechanic's lien foreclosure could be
processed; U.S. Data Link had not obtained this release and was
therefore not able to obtain a lien for storage.7
On March 13, 1991, U.S. Data Link sent a notice of possessory
lien to Meredith notifying her of its intent to foreclose on the
car. The foreclosure was requested by Buy Direct. The notice
provided that the amount owed was $194.50.
In May 1991, Bomar sold the Camaro for $1,800 to Jeffery
Taylor (Taylor), the owner of J.T. Auto Sales, in Houston. Taylor
had previously purchased two or three cars from Bomar, and Bomar
did transmission work for Taylor's company. Bomar told him he had
done some transmission work on the car and was selling it to
recover his expenses. Taylor considered himself the owner of the
vehicle, although he conceded that he did not have a certificate of
7
It is unclear exactly why U.S. Data Link was unable to
obtain the lien; at the time of the events in question here,
McNeely had paid off the GMAC lien.
9

title. Bomar gave him the notice of possessory lien, but Taylor
never processed the notice; at first he was not sure what to do
with the form, and later, once informed of the proceedings against
Bomar, he waited until the matter could be cleared up.
Proceedings Below
The single-count indictment charged that Bomar "did knowingly
and willfully enforce and attempt to enforce a lien for storage of
household goods and personal effects of" a person in military
service, "to wit, a 1985 Chevrolet Camaro belonging to" McNeely,
without first seeking an order by a court and return thereto made
and approved by the court, in violation of 50 U.S.C. app. § 535(2),
(3).8 Bomar pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.
Following a two-day trial, the jury found Bomar guilty of the
charged offense. In sentencing the defendant, the district court
accepted the factual findings and sentencing recommendation of the
8
Section 535(2) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
"No person shall exercise any right to foreclose or
enforce any lien for storage of household goods,
furniture, or personal effects of a person in military
service during such person's period of military service
and for three months thereafter except upon an order
previously granted by a court upon application therefor
and a return thereto made and approved by the court."
Section 535(3) provides:
"Any person who shall knowingly take any action
contrary to the provisions of this section, or attempts
so to do, shall be fined as provided in title 18,
United States Code, or imprisoned for not to exceed one
year, or both"
Prior to its March 18, 1991, amendment, section 535(3) was
the same except that the wording following "shall be" was "guilty
of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment not to
exceed one year or by fine not to exceed $1,000, or both."
10

presentence investigation report and sentenced Bomar to 3 years'
probation, with the special conditions of 6 months' home detention
and 250 hours of community service. In addition, the court ordered
him to pay $4,000 in restitution to McNeely and to return the car
to McNeely free of charge.
Bomar appeals his conviction, challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence in three specific respects.
Discussion
Faced with a claim of insufficient evidence to support a
conviction, we review the evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it, in
the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. Salazar,
958 F.2d 1285, 1290-1291 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 185
(1992).
Bomar raises only three challenges to his conviction, claiming
that there was insufficient evidence that he foreclosed or
attempted to enforce a lien for storage, that McNeely was the owner
of the car, and that he (Bomar) had not attempted to gain court
approval of any foreclosure proceedings.
I.
Lien for Storage Charges
Bomar argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that
he foreclosed or attempted to enforce a lien for storage; he claims
first that the lien was not for storage, and second, that he took
no steps to enforce the lien.
In his original brief on appeal, Bomar contends that, to fall
within the meaning of the Act, a lien must be limited to storage
charges:
11

"[t]he plain terms of section 535 of [the Act] indicate
the legislative intent to protect a servicemen's [sic]
household goods, furniture, or personal effects when the
servicemen [sic] left the items with the defendant for
the purpose of storing those items while the serviceman
is on active duty." (Emphasis added.)
Bomar argues that the lien in question here was for mechanics fees,
not for storage, and thus he cannot be guilty of violating the
Act.9 We disagree. The wording of the Act does not include an
express requirement that a lien be solely for storage; rather it
speaks of "any lien for storage." 50 U.S.C. app. § 535(2)
(emphasis added). Nor may we read into the statute a requirement
that the lien be restricted to (as opposed to include) storage
fees. "The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act is always to be
liberally construed to protect those who have been obliged to drop
their own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation." Boone v.
Lightner, 63 S.Ct. 1223, 1231 (1943). Certainly, in order to fall
within the Act, a lien must include charges for storage, but the
lien need not be limited to such fees.
Bomar's position that he did not have a lien for storage is
not supported by Texas law. The Texas Property Code provides that
a garageman with whom a vehicle is left for care has a lien on that
vehicle for the amount of the charges for the care. TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 70.003(c) (Vernon 1993 Supp.). In addition, the Code
9
Bomar concedes that the form sent by Buy Direct authorizing
U.S. Data Link to file a lien on the Camaro expressly listed both
repair charges and storage charges of $15 per day. He argues,
however, that he did not sign the form and thus the request
cannot be attributed to him. The form was signed by Yolanda
McFarland, the secretary at Buy Direct. Although Bomar did not
sign the form himself, the evidence adequately supports the
inference that it was sent at his direction.
12

authorized him to retain possession of the vehicle until the amount
due under the repair contract, or reasonable and usual compensation
in the event there is no contract amount, is paid. Id., §
70.001(a) (Vernon 1984). The statute provides for the possessory
lienholder, such as Bomar, to give notice of his interest in the
car to the last known registered owner and each lienholder of
record. Id., § 70.004(a) (Vernon 1993 Supp.). Most importantly,
the statute entitles the possessory lienholder to "reasonable
storage fees for up to 5 days before the day the notice is mailed"
and after the notice is mailed to "reasonable storage and
preservation fees until the motor vehicle . . . is removed and
accrued charges are paid." Id., § 70.004(c) (Vernon 1993 Supp.).
Thus, under Texas law, Bomar had valid grounds for asserting
a lien for the storage of the Camaro.
Bomar next contends that he did not ultimately enforce the
lien because he did not complete the steps necessary to foreclose
the storage part of the lien. He argues that U.S. Data Link was
unable to obtain a lien for storage on the Camaro because of the
existence of a first lienholder. However, although the title
search revealed a GMAC lien on the car, the lien had been paid off
before these events occurred.
Bomar's argument ignores the fact that he can be liable under
the "or attempts so to do" language of section 535(3) (see note 8,
supra) for attempting to foreclose or enforce the lien. The
evidence of such an attempt is overwhelming. On several occasions,
McNeely's mother and sister, as well as the representatives of
Operation Defendant Shield, approached Bomar with offers to pay the
13

repair charges due on the Camaro, as well as part of the accrued
storage fees. Each time, Bomar refused to negotiate and demanded
payment in full of amounts as high as $1,800 or $2,000.10 These
amounts far exceed the repair charges of $194.50, which were
excessive to begin with and based, at least originally, on work
which McNeely never authorized. Finally, when Bomar sold the car
to Taylor for $1,800, he pocketed the entire amount.11 He gave
Taylor the notice of possessory lien, the form necessary to begin
foreclosure proceedings on the car.
This evidence is clearly sufficient for a reasonable jury to
determine that Bomar attempted to enforce a lien for storage of
McNeely's Camaro.
II.
Ownership of the Car
Bomar's next challenge to his conviction is that Meredith, not
McNeely, was the owner of the Camaro; because she was not in
military service, he argues, any attempt to foreclose on a storage
lien on her car could not be a violation of the Act. McNeely
conceded at trial that the title to the car was still in Meredith's
name; neither he nor his sister had taken steps to transfer the
10
Bomar attempts to argue that he would not release the car to
McNeely's mother or sister because they were not the owner of the
car or had not brought the car in for service. Not only does
this argument contradict his contention that Meredith, not
McNeely, was the owner of the car, it conflicts with testimony
that Bomar would have released the car if paid the full amount he
claimed was due.
11
Ms. Stewart at U.S. Data Link testified that the mechanic's
lien here was for $194.50; if the vehicle sold for any figure
over that amount, the excess would go to the first lienholder
(here, GMAC), if the first lien was outstanding, and then to the
owner of the car. In the event that the owner could not be
located, the money would go to the state.
14

title to him.
Under Texas law, bona fide car sales are valid as between
buyer and seller even when they have not complied with the
provisions of the Texas Certificate of Title Act, TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1 (Vernon 1977). See United States v. Gunter,
876 F.2d 1113, 1117 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 198
(1989). Although McNeely admittedly did not comply with the legal
requirements of transferring the title, the jury could have
concluded that he owned the vehicle. There was no dispute at trial
between McNeely and Meredith that McNeely had purchased the car in
1988. McNeely testified that he made cash payments to his sister
for her remaining payments to GMAC; the car was paid off in March
1990. Prior to December 15, 1990, McNeely had paid all outstanding
debt on the car to GMAC or Meredith. McNeely, with his mother's
help, paid for all repairs needed. After selling the car to her
brother, Meredith did not use her own money for payments, nor did
she pay for gas, repairs, or insurance for the vehicle. McNeely
explained the failure to transfer the title as an attempt to avoid
paying additional finance charges to GMAC. There was sufficient
evidence for the jury to find that McNeely owned the Camaro at the
time he took it to Buy Direct for repairs.
III. Court Records
Bomar claims that the government did not prove that he failed
to apply for a court order allowing foreclosure on the lien on
McNeely's car or to receive court approval for such a proceeding.
At trial, the government called Maria O. Makinen, a small
claims court clerk at Precinct One, Position Two, in Harris County,
15

Texas; Abe Martinez, the chief assistant of the Harris County
District Court Clerk's office; and Melissa Steinbacher, the
operations manager for the Clerk's Office for the United States
District Court. Each of these witnesses testified that searches of
the records of their respective courts for the months of December
1990 through May 1991 had revealed neither an application for, nor
a court order granting, permission for Bomar or Buy Direct to
foreclose upon a lien against any person. Bomar challenges the
completeness of this evidence.12
We conclude that the evidence submitted by the government is
sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Bomar did not
take steps to attain court approval of any foreclosure proceedings.
The jury had before it voluminous evidence of Bomar's course of
conduct in this matter, including evidence that although warned
that his actions could constitute a violation of the Act he
continued to pursue the full payment of storage fees. None of this
evidence contains any hint of any actual, contemplated, threatened,
or claimed court proceedings.
We hold that, taken in its entirety, the evidence was
12
Bomar argues that the small claims court was not the proper
venue and would not have had any records of such a proceeding.
In addition, Abe Martinez admitted on cross-examination that his
office contained records only for the civil district courts in
Harris County, not the county courts. Ms. Steinbacher conceded
that her search of the federal court records would not have
located the enforcement proceeding if it was ancillary to another
court matter. Finally, Bomar tries to discredit Ms.
Steinbacher's testimony on the technical grounds that she failed
to indicate the particular district for which she held the
position. Counsel did not elicit a clarification of this matter.
Presumably, she is the operations manager for the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the district
court which encompasses Houston.
16

sufficient in this respect.
IV.
Household Goods, Furniture, or Personal Effects
Finally, although this issue was not raised by the defendant
either before the district court or on appeal, we consider the
question of whether McNeely's Camaro is within the Act's coverage
of "household goods, furniture or personal effects." 13 This is
a question of first impression.14 As noted, the Act is to be
liberally construed to protect those in military service. Boone.
In Arthur v. Morgan, 5 S.Ct. 241 (1884), the Court held that
a family's carriage was covered by the term "household effects" as
used in the statute exempting from customs duties "Books, household
effects, or libraries, or parts of libraries, in use, of persons or
families from foreign countries." In Hillhouse v. United States,
152 Fed. 163 (2d Cir. 1907), the Court, relying on Arthur, held
that an automobile was "household effects" within the then more
recent statutory exemption from customs duties for "Books,
librarises [sic], usual and reasonable furniture, and similar
household effects of persons or families from foreign countries .
. . not intended for any other person or persons, nor for sale." 15
13
Counsel for the defendant at oral argument stated that she
considered the car to be a personal effect.
14
Indeed, to our knowledge, there are no cases discussing a
violation of this particular section of the Act at all.
15
In United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 166 F. 748 (2d Cir.
1909), the court distinguished Hillhouse and held that under the
quoted statute an automobile was not exempt, stating:
"The insertion of the word 'similar' indicates that
Congress intended to do away with the exemption of
household effects generally, and to restrict it to such
as should be like books, libraries, or household
17

We can see no substantial difference between "household goods," as
used in section 535(2), and "household effects" as used in the
statute under consideration in Arthur.16
We note that while the term "personal effects" has in some
state decisions, principally will cases, been construed to exclude
automobiles on the theory that the term is restricted to tangible
property worn or carried about the person or having some intimate
relationship to the person, Matter of Estate of Roddy, 784 P.2d
841, 843 (Col. App. 1989), in other such cases the term has been
held to include automobiles. See, e.g., In re Jones' Estate, 128
Misc. 244, 218 N.Y.S. 380 (N.Y. Surrogate Ct. 1926) (two
automobiles within the will's bequest of "'personal effects'"); In
re Ginnever's Estate, 69 N.Y.S.2d 452 (N.Y. Surrogate Ct. 1945)
(motor boot within bequest of "'my other personal and household
effects'"). The decisions go both ways and are likely not entirely
reconcilable. See Ann. 30 A.L.R. 3d 797 at 825-26, 836-38 (1970).
17 As has been pointed out, much depends on the context. See In re
furniture. We think that automobiles cannot be said to
be similar to books, libraries, or to usual and
reasonable household furniture, or either of them."
Id. at 749.
Here, however, the Act plainly does encompass household goods
"generally."
16
See, e.g., In re Mitchell's Will, 38 N.Y.S.2d 673, 675 (N.Y.
Surrogate Ct. 1942) ("[t]he word 'effects' is nearly synonymous
with 'goods' . . .").
17
This annotation states "[a] number of cases have held that
the term 'personal effects' or 'effects' . . . in the wills being
construed, passed automobiles or other motor vehicles," id. at
836, and "[a] number of cases have held that the term 'personal
effects' . . . in the wills being construed, did not pass
automobiles or other motor vehicles." Id. at 838.
18

Burnside's Will, 185 Misc. 808, 59 N.Y.S.2d 829 (N.Y. Surrogate Ct.
1945).18 For this reason, the Supreme Court in Arthur observed that
18
In Burnside the court held that the thirty-fourth clause of
the will leaving to seven different persons "'the residue of my
household goods and personal effects'" did not include an
automobile, because the preceding thirty-three clauses made
specific bequests of specific items such as rugs, tables, spoons,
a bracelet, a mirror, a vase, a bureau, etc. The court observed:
"After having laboriously distributed among many
persons carefully selected items of household goods and
personal effects, the testatrix reached the thirty-
fourth clause, and to several different persons gave
'the residue of my household goods and personal
effects.'
The Court is irresistibly drawn to the conclusion
that the household goods and personal effects which the
testatrix had in mind when she reached the thirty-
fourth clause were in the same class as those
particularly itemized in the preceding clauses. We
conclude that she did not intend to include the
automobile in the thirty-fourth clause. In numerous
decisions, expressions such as 'personal effects' and
'household goods' have received a wider or narrower
interpretation by reason of other provisions in the
will, the doctrine of ejusdem generis being applied.
See Estate of Lippincott, 173 Pa. 368, 34 A. 58; Matter
of Steimes' Estate, 150 Misc. 279, 270 N.Y.S. 339;
Child v. Orton, 119 N.J.Ea. 438, 183 A. 709, supra.
It appears from the records of this court that
many of the personal effects specifically itemized are
of comparatively slight value, while the automobile in
question has been sold for sixteen hundred dollars
($1,600). The testatrix could not expect seven persons
widely separated to enjoy jointly one automobile. One
machine cannot be divided among seven persons, and the
residue of household goods and personal effects is not
sufficiently valuable so that the automobile might be
allotted to one person and still make a proportionate
distribution to the other six." Id. 59 N.Y.S.2d at
832-33.
However, the court recognized that absent such special
contextual considerations, the result would have been otherwise.
Thus, it stated:
"When disassociated from other provisions in the
will, the expression 'personal effects' clearly
includes an automobile owned and used by a testator at
the time of his death. See Matter of Jones' Estate,
19

"no material aid can be derived from decisions in regard to wills"
as the construction there "often depends largely on the meaning of
words in other provisions in the will." Id. 5 S.Ct. at 243. We do
note, however, that a recognized legal dictionary defines "personal
effects" so as to include automobiles,19 and we have so used the
term in several of our opinions.20 Certainly, the presence of the
128 Misc. 244, 218 N.Y.S. 380; Matter of Winburn's
Estate, 139 Misc. 5, 247 N.Y.S. 584; Matter of
Thompson's Estate, 218 App.Div. 130, 217 N.Y.S. 865
affirmed on other grounds, 245 N.Y. 565, 157 N.E. 859.
Similarly, the expression 'household effects' has been
construed as including an automobile (Hillhouse v.
United States, 2 Cir., 152 F. 163) or a carriage
(Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed.
825).The expression 'household goods' may narrowly be
construed as applying only to articles in the house as
distinguished from those in a garage or other
outbuilding, but this narrow interpretation has not
always prevailed, and an automobile kept in a detached
garage has been held to be 'household goods.' Matter
of Mitchell's Will, Sur., 38 N.Y.S. 673. Similarly, a
will giving 'my house (homestead) and contents of all
kinds' has been interpreted as including an automobile
and tools which were kept in a stable which was
situated on the testator's homestead premises. Cowan
v. Cowan, 90 N.H. 198, 6 A.2d 179, 180. Also a will
bequeathing 'articles of personal, domestic, or
household use' has been thought to include an
automobile." Id. 59 N.Y.S.2d at 831-32.
19
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990):
"Personal effects. Articles associated with person, as
property having more or less intimate relation to
person of possessor; 'effects' meaning movable or
chattel property of any kind. Usual reference is to
such items as the following owned by a decedent at the
time of death: clothing, furniture, jewelry, stamp and
coin collections, silverware, china, crystal, cooking
utensils, books, cars, televisions, radios, etc." Id.
at 1143 (emphasis added).
20
See, e.g., In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226, 1228 (5th Cir. 1980)
(in divorce context, describing transfer of "certain personal
effects, including . . . an automobile"), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct.
20

words "personal effects" and "furniture" in section 535(2) does not
suggest a narrow construction for their companion phrase there
"household goods."
It appears to us that, taken together, section 535(2)'s
reference to "household goods, furniture, or personal effects" is
intended to embrace a broad category of tangible personal property
held by military personnel for their personal use, as opposed to
for business or investment use.21 In this context, it is entirely
appropriate to follow Arthur and Hillhouse and conclude that a
soldier's personal automobile is part of his "household goods" for
purposes of section 535(2).22
100 (1981); Smoot v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 299 F.2d
525, 529 n.8 (5th Cir. 1962) (quoting complaint referring to
automobile "and other personal effects") (emphasis added);
Scofield v. Mauritz, 206 F.2d 135, 137 n.2 (5th Cir. 1953)
(quoting district court findings concerning "personal effects
like . . . personal automobiles") (emphasis added).
21
See also Estate of Bloomingdale, 142 N.Y.S.2d 781 (N.Y.
Surrogate Ct. 1955) (bequest of "all my personal belongings and
effects, and all my household and house furnishings and effects"
included yacht and six automobiles); In re Mitchell's Will, 38
N.Y.S.2d 673 (N.Y. Surrogate Ct. 1942) (bequest of "All of my
jewelry, clothing, personal effects, bric-a-brac, paintings,
works of art and all household goods and household furnishings of
every description" includes automobile; apparently as "a part of
her 'household goods.'" Id. at 675); Goggans v. Simmons, 319
S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. Ft. Worth, 1958, n.r.e.) (provision in
will concerning "the furnishings therein [referring to house
described in will] and, all my personal belongings" covers
testator's automobile).
22
We recognize that the term "household goods" in 11 U.S.C. §
522(f)(2)(A) has been held not to include motor vehicles. See,
e.g., Smith v. Avco Financial Services, 29 B.R. 345 (Bankr.
M.D.Pa. 1983). But, this is because 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2)
expressly covers "one motor vehicle," and that is hence clearly
excluded from 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3), which (except for "jewelry,"
which is specified in § 522(d)(4)) lists the very same items as
are listed in § 522(f)(2)(A). Moreover, the extensive
21

We hold a soldier's personal automobile, such as McNeely's
Camaro, is within the Act's coverage of "household goods,
furniture, or personal effects."
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, Bomar's conviction and sentence are
AFFIRMED.
particularized listing in § 522(f)(2)(A) ("household furnishings,
household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals,
crops, musical instruments, or jewelry . . . held primarily for
the personal, family or household are . . .") is also thought to
point to the same result. See Smith at 346 ("'the inclusion of
the debtor's interest in a motor vehicle in § 522(d)(2), and the
omission of any mention of a motor vehicle in § 522(f)'" and
"'[s]ince the statute lists goods to be included within the
meaning of "household goods," the statute necessarily must be
narrowly construed'"). See also In re Vale, 110 B.R. 396, 404
(Bankr. N.D.Ind. 1989) ("motor vehicles are expressly provided
for in § 522(d)(2), while § 522(f)(2)(A), (B) and (C) makes no
reference to motor vehicles"). We do not quarrel with any of
these cases. However, none of the considerations which were
influential in them are present here.
22