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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
___________________________
No. 92-3976
___________________________
HUSSAIN SHAKIT, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
M/V FORUM TRADER, in rem, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
____________________________________________________
(August 26, 1993)
Before KING, DAVIS, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
Lexington Shipping Company ("Lexington"), the owner of the M/V
FORUM TRADER, moved to dismiss the in rem plaintiffs' appeal from
an order setting $150,000 bond for the release of the FORUM TRADER.
Because we lack jurisdiction over the appeal, it is dismissed.
I.
Plaintiffs Hussain Shakit, Hamza Hassan, Ibrahim Manik, and
Ibrahim Rasheed, foreign seamen serving aboard the M/V FORUM
TRADER, brought an in rem action against the vessel for nonpayment
of wages and various related torts. The vessel was seized on
November 13, 1992. Following a hearing, the district court set the
release bond at $150,000. On November 25, the owner of the FORUM
TRADER, Lexington Shipping Company ("Lexington"), posted the
required bond, and the vessel was released. Plaintiffs contend the

bond was inadequate and seek to appeal the amount of the bond.
Lexington has moved to dismiss plaintiffs' appeal on two
grounds: (1) the appeal is moot, because the vessel has left the
jurisdiction; and (2) this court does not have jurisdiction over
the appeal from the release bond order. Plaintiffs respond that
this court has jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) and,
alternatively, the collateral order doctrine. Plaintiffs also deny
that the appeal is moot. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction
over the appeal, and thus we do not reach the mootness issue.
II.
A.
We first consider whether the district court's order setting
the bond for release of the FORUM TRADER is an appealable
interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).1
Although the $150,000 bond is substantially lower than
plaintiffs' $6 million claims, the district court's bond order does
not determine the rights and liabilities of the parties as required
by § 1292. Were we to uphold the order, "we would still have to
remand this case for a decision on whether the defendants were
liable." Bucher-Guyer AG v. M/V Incotrans Spirit, 868 F.2d 734,
735 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that a decision to apply the COGSA
limitation on damages is not a decision determining the parties'
1 § 1292(a)(3) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of
this section, the courts of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from: . . .
(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or
the judges thereof determining the rights and
liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which
appeals from final decrees are allowed.
2

rights and liabilities); see also City of Fort Madison, Iowa v.
Emerald Lady, 990 F.2d 1086, 1090 (8th Cir. 1993). The order
fixing the bond at $150,000 does not determine the parties' rights
and liabilities and thus is not an appealable interlocutory order
under § 1292(a)(3).
B.
Plaintiffs argue next that the release bond is an appealable
collateral order under the doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 93 L. Ed. 1258 (1949). An
interlocutory order is appealable under Cohen if it (1)
conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,
and (3) would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment. Incas and Monterey Printing and Packaging, Ltd. v. M/V
Sang Jin, 747 F.2d 958, 962 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom.
Van Weelde Bros. Shipping Ltd. v. I.N.C.A.S., 471 U.S. 1117 (1985).
Plaintiffs argue that this case is similar to Pride Shipping
Corp. v. Tafu Lumber Co., 898 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1990). Pride was
a Rule B(1) maritime attachment and garnishment action in which the
plaintiff shipowner attached fuel bunkers owned by the charterer,
Tafu Lumber, in order to secure jurisdiction over Tafu. The
district court granted Tafu's motion to vacate the attachment.
The Ninth Circuit, applying Cohen, addressed the legal
question of "whether orders vacating Rule B(1) attachments fall
within that small class [of appealable collateral orders], when
personal jurisdiction is later obtained through a general
appearance." Pride, 898 F.2d at 1406. The court, citing Swift &
3

Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 689
(1950), concluded that it had Cohen jurisdiction to review the
order vacating the attachment, but held that the appeal was moot.
This case differs from Pride and Swift in that the district
court here did not reject the plaintiffs' claim that they were
entitled to security. After a hearing, the district court
preliminarily valued the plaintiffs' claims at $150,000 and ordered
the posting of a release bond in that amount. In Swift and Pride,
by contrast, the respective district courts concluded as a matter
of law that the plaintiffs were entitled to no security.
Cohen itself suggests that an interlocutory order involving
the exercise of the court's discretion as to the amount of the
security to be posted is not appealable:
[Not] every order fixing security is subject to appeal.
Here it is the right to security that presents a serious
and unsettled question. If the right were admitted or
clear and the order involved only an exercise of
discretion as to the amount of security, . . .
appealability would present a different question.
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547. The Second Circuit has relied on that
language in Cohen to hold that a court order reducing security in
an admiralty case is not appealable. Bancroft Navigation Co. v.
Chadade Steamship Co., 349 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding the
order not appealable because it "is concerned solely with the
proper exercise of the broad discretionary powers granted to the
district court"). Bancroft distinguished Swift and Cohen:
The security cases considered on appeal by the Supreme
Court before final decision on the merits have revolved
about issues concerning the power of the district court
to render its decision, as distinct from the propriety of
its exercise of discretion.
Id. at 529. In this case, the order setting the release bond at
4

$150,000 is likewise unappealable as an exercise of the district
court's discretion to value the plaintiffs' claims.2
Because we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal, it is
dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
2 Plaintiffs argue that, in light of their $6 million
claim, the $150,000 bond was so low as to constitute a gross
abuse of discretion. Mandamus is of course available for review
of such orders in an appropriate case.
5