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United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 925539
Summary Calendar.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., PlaintiffAppellee,
v.
Teddy O. WHITE, DefendantAppellee,
v.
Leslie W. Yohey, DefendantAppellant.
Sept. 15, 1992.
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Texas.
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, HIGGINBOTHAM and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
POLITZ, Chief Judge:
Leslie W. Yohey appeals an adverse summary judgment dismissing his claim for life insurance
proceeds against Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. Finding no error, we affirm.
Background
Terri Yohey was the named insured under a group life insurance policy issued by Metropolitan
under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA).1 At the time of her death she had
not designated a beneficiary. Her widower, Leslie Yohey, was convicted of her murder. The Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Supreme Judicial District of Texas affirmed the conviction in 1990, and the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused to review the case in 1991.
Metropolitan brought this declaratory judgment action to determine the policy beneficiary.
The district court held that under Texas law Leslie Yohey's interest in the policy was forfeited
because of the murder conviction. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan
15 U.S.C. ЇЇ 870116.

and declared Terri Yohey's father, Teddy O. White, to be the beneficiary. Leslie Yohey timely
appeals.
Analysis
We review the district court's grant of a summary judgment de novo. Summary judgment is
appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, sho w that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."2
Under both the policy and the FEGLIA, insurance proceeds are payable to an insured's widow
or widower in the absence of a designated beneficiary.3 The term widower is not defined by either
the policy or the FEGLIA. This court has held, however, that in the absence of a policy or a FEGLIA
definition, the term "widow" means "lawful widow" as defined by state law.4 Section 21.23 of the
Texas Insurance Code provides that "the interest of a beneficiary in a life insurance policy ... shall be
forfeited when the beneficiary is the principal or an accomplice in willfully bringing about the death
of the insured."5 Similarly, the Texas Probate Code states that one who is convicted and sentenced
for willfully bringing about the death of an insured is ineligible to collect life insurance proceeds as
a beneficiary.6 The district court held, therefore, that Leslie Yohey's claim to the life insurance was
2Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
3See 5 U.S.C. Ї 8705(a).
4Spearman v. Spearman, 482 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir.1973) (Where two wives claimed widow
status with regard to a FEGLIA policy, state law determined who was the "lawful widow."); see
also Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Rupe, 908 F.2d 977 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied,
U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 762, 112 L.Ed.2d 781 (1991) (table: unpublished disposition without
controlling authority in the Ninth Circuit) (citing Spearman and holding that California law
prohibiting a murderer from collecting as a life insurance beneficiary applies to a FEGLIA policy);
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Manning, 568 F.2d 922 (2d Cir.1977) (state law definition of
marriage applies to a FEGLIA claim).
5TEX.INS.CODE art. 21.23 (Vernon Supp.1992).
6TEX.PROB.CODE Ї 41(d) (Vernon 1980).

forfeited.
Yohey contends that Texas law cannot be used to disqualify him from a federal statutory right
granted in the FEGLIA. He misperceives our holdings. In Spearman we held that the FEGLIA
should be interpreted consistent with state terms defining domestic relations,7 citing the Supreme
Court's decision in De Sylva v. Ballentine.8 In applying the state definition of "children" to federal
copyright law, the De Sylva Court explained:
The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but that does not mean that its
content is not to be determined by state, rather than federal law. This is especially true where
a statute deals with a familial relationship; there is no federal law of domestic relations, which
is primarily a matter of state concern.9
Our colleagues in the Seventh Circuit have held, for example, that the test for incorporation of a state
law into the FEGLIA is determined by a balancing of the need for uniform national law to achieve
a federal statutory purpose and the state's interest in the resolution of a particular case.10 Applying
this test, they then used state constructive trust principles to resolve a FEGLIA dispute.
Even if the homicide forfeiture rule were not the type of state domestic relations law that
supplements the FEGLIA, that would not be dispo sitive herein, however, because the federal
common law provides the same bar to recovery of life insurance proceeds by the murderer of the
insured.11 We similarly dismiss Leslie Yohey's alternative arguments urging the application of the
7Spearman, 482 F.2d at 120405.
8351 U.S. 570, 76 S.Ct. 974, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956).
9351 U.S. at 580, 76 S.Ct. at 980 (citations omitted).
10Rollins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 863 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir.1988) (citing United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947)).
11New York Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 6 S.Ct. 877, 29 L.Ed. 997
(1886); see also Moore v. Moore, 228 Ga. 489, 186 S.E.2d 531 (1971) (regardless of whether
state law or federal law applies in a FEGLIA case, federal common law provides the same bar to a
murderer's recovery); Insurance--Homicide & Beneficiary, 27 A.L.R.3d 794, 802 (1969)
(proclaiming general rule).

laws of either New York or the District of Columbia; both jurisdictions provide that a conviction for
killing the insured vitiates beneficiary status.12
Leslie Yohey also maintains that his criminal trial was constitutionally infirm and that the
district court erred in relying upon it for proof of his conviction. Yohey has exhausted his direct
appeal; his conviction is final.13 The conviction alone triggers the forfeiture rule as a matter of state
law,14 and, in addition, is conclusive as a matter of federal law.15
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

12See In re Estate of Brown, 132 Misc.2d 171, 503 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1986); Napoleon v. Heard,
455 A.2d 901 (D.C.App.1983).
13See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989).
14See TEX.PROB.CODE Ї 41(d).
15Hardin v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 384 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
971, 88 S.Ct. 2047, 20 L.Ed.2d 886 (1968) (conviction for transportation of stolen moneys was
conclusive proof of claimant's inability to collect burglary insurance in subsequent civil
proceeding); see also Howard v. I.N.S., 930 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.1991) (finding in criminal case
triggers doctrine of collateral estoppel in later deportation proceedings); U.S. v. "Monkey," 725
F.2d 1007 (5th Cir.1984) (criminal judgment precluded relitigation of issue in subsequent
forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir.1983) ("Because of
the existence of a higher standard of proof and greater procedural protection in a criminal
prosecution, a conviction is conclusive as to an issue arising against the criminal defendant in a
subsequent civil action.").