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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 92-8041
UNITED STATES of AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
David Kinder and Larry Kinder,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
December 21, 1992
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The appellants appeal their sentences because the court
considered the new evaluation of purity of existing evidence. We
find that this evaluation was in accord with this court's remand
and we therefore AFFIRM.
FACTS
The facts of this case are fully reported in U.S. v. Kinder,
946 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1677, 2290 (1992),
in which David and Larry Kinder (David and Larry) appealed their
guilty pleas and sentences. For purposes of this appeal the

following facts are relevant:
Working undercover, Officer Goodwin commenced
negotiations on February 8, 1990 to sell methamphetamine
to Larry. After a few phone calls between Larry, [co-
defendant Sandra Kay] Shook, and Goodwin, Shook went to
Goodwin's hotel room.
* * *
On February 14, 1990 Officer Goodwin was informed
that Larry was "ready to do business" by buying a half-
pound. That evening, Larry and his brother David told
Goodwin that he had not wanted to buy a large amount of
methamphetamine the week before "because he had 17 ounces
of methamphetamine on the street and had not collected
all of the money from the sale of [it]." Larry told
Goodwin that he wanted to buy a half-pound now and would
possibly want more later.
* * *
Larry instructed David to take the half-pound
outside and wait for him (Larry). Officer Goodwin then
gave an arrest signal and Larry and David both were
arrested. Larry and David pled guilty to a one-count
indictment of conspiring to possess more than 100 grams
of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. 壯846 and 841(a)(1). In exchange
for the pleas, the government promised not to prosecute
appellants for any additional offenses. At the
sentencing hearing, the district court denied all of
appellants' objections to the Presentence Investigation
Report (PSR). The court included the non-charged 17
ounces of methamphetamine, of which Larry had spoken,
when calculating the appellants' base offense level.
Larry was sentenced to 210 months imprisonment, five
years supervised release, a $5,000 fine, and a $50
mandatory assessment. David was sentenced as a career
offender to 400 months imprisonment, five years
supervised release, and a $50 mandatory assessment.
Kinder at 365-66 (footnote omitted). This Court affirmed the
district court's judgment with one exception. The Court expressed
concern that the district court had sentenced David and Larry under
subsection (A) (viii), which carried a more severe statutory
penalty than subsection (B) (viii), without finding that the
offense involved at least 100 grams of pure methamphetamine. Id.
at 368. The sentences were vacated and the case remanded for a
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determination whether "the 269 grams of the mixture seized on
February 14 contained 100 grams of pure methamphetamine." Id. at
369.
On remand for resentencing, the district court allowed the
Government to introduce evidence that the methamphetamine was 77%
pure. Thus, the quantity of pure methamphetamine involved in the
offense was 207.1 grams. Government's Exhibit 1: R.6, 7-8. The
district court found no necessity to resentence, and the previous
sentences remained in effect.
ANALYSIS
This court remanded appellants' sentences to the district
court level to find whether the �841(b)(1)(A)(viii) was properly
applied because more than 100 grams of methamphetamine were indeed
involved. The evaluation of the evidence indicated that it was 77%
pure, 207.1 grams of methamphetamine. The appellants contend that
this new information should not have been considered because it
went beyond the record. When this court remanded this case and
ordered the district court to allow the government to point to the
record in order to determine the amount of the drug's purity, it
did not intend to limit them to evidence already in the record. We
seek justice and truth and therefore do not preclude the
introduction of information that is helpful in determining a proper
sentence.
It is a fundamental principle of sentencing that a district
court may conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited
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either as to the kind of information it may consider, or the source
from which such information may come. U.S. v. Robbins, No. 91-
1850, slip op. 1158, 1170 (5th Cir. Nov. 20, 1992); United States
v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
The scope of a remand for resentencing includes new relevant
factors proper in a de novo review. U.S. v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1450
(10th Cir.) cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 225 (1991). "[I]n the
interest of truth and fair sentencing a court should be able on a
sentence remand to take new matter into account on behalf of either
the government or the defendant." U.S. v. Sanchez-Solis, 882 F.2d
693, 699 (2d Cir. 1989). This court "will uphold the district
court's sentence so long as it results from a correct application
of the guidelines to factual findings which are not clearly
erroneous." United States v. Sarasti, 869 F.2d 805, 806 (5th Cir.
1989).
CONCLUSION
We find that the purity evaluation was sufficient evidence and
properly considered in order to properly sentence the appellants.
For the aforementioned reasons, we
AFFIRM.
4