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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 92-8165
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RICHARD LEE HEINZ, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees,
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas
__________________________________________________________________
(January 26, 1993)
Before JOLLY and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges, and PARKER,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
The question presented by this appeal is whether the district
court erred in concluding that the government's prosecutorial and
investigatory conduct toward defendant-appellees was so improper as
to render taped telephone conversations between Heinz and the
government's agent subject to suppression. The question must be
analyzed by the light of the Sixth Amendment. Upon such analysis,
we hold that the government's conduct did not violate Heinz's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
*Chief Judge, Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.

I
Ted Mitchell is an attorney licensed to practice law in the
State of Texas. The district court found that Mitchell had on
occasions in the past given legal advice in certain civil matters
to Charles Patillo and to defendants-appellees: Richard Lee Heinz,
Michael Scott Wilshursen, and Jack Delano Carsrud.1 However, the
communications between Ted Mitchell and the defendants that the
defendants seek to suppress were communications allegedly in
furtherance of criminal activity--namely, avoiding prosecution for
bank fraud and money laundering.
On December 13, 1989, a series of evidentiary search warrants
were executed on premises controlled by various defendants. No
charges were filed against any of the defendants. The defendants,
however, received grand jury subpoenas requiring them to appear and
testify in January before the grand jury in Austin, Texas.
One of these search warrants was executed in the Corpus
Christi office of Heinz and Wilshursen. At that time, Heinz was
1For example, Mitchell was retained as a lawyer for Texas
Southern Exploration Company, in which company Heinz is a partner
and part owner. See Exhibit "A" to Heinz's Notice of Intent to
Claim Attorney-Client Privilege and Prevent Use of Tapes 96, 97,
and 98 by the Government. Moreover, Heinz consulted with Mitchell
as a lawyer regarding a monetary transaction involving Charles
Patillo's cashing of Heinz's checks in a fraudulent manner at the
NCNB Bank in Austin, Texas. Exhibit "B" to Heinz's Notice of
Intent to Claim Attorney-Client Privilege and Prevent Use of Tapes
96, 97, and 98 by the Government. Other defendants appear to have
sought legal advice from Mitchell. See e.g., Transcript of
March 13, 1992 Hearing on Motions, at 88-92 (testimony of Ted
Mitchell regarding his law-oriented dealings with Carsrud).
-2-

read his "Miranda rights," and he invoked his right to counsel and
right to remain silent--affirmatively refusing to speak with the
investigating agents without the presence of his attorney.2
Another of the search warrants was executed the next day
directed to Ted Mitchell's briefcase, in which agents apparently
found evidence of money laundering. That same day, Mitchell
entered into a plea agreement with prosecutors, in which he agreed
to cooperate in the investigation of the other defendants.3
The government admits that the defendants were targets of a
criminal investigation at the time, and even before the execution
of the search warrants on December 13, 1989. On December 22,
Corpus Christi IRS Agent Wentrcek was contacted by Attorney Rich
Rogers, who informed the agent that he was representing Heinz
regarding the matters before the grand jury. Wentrcek informed
Rogers that he was a special agent in the Criminal Investigation
Division of the Internal Revenue Service working under the
direction of Assistant United States Attorney Blankinship.
On December 26, 1989, Mitchell called IRS Agent Abel Trevino
in Austin, Texas, and told him defendants were planning to commit
perjury before the Austin Grand Jury. (Trevino and Wentrcek
operated as co-"Case agents" on the money laundering and fraud
cases.) Mitchell told Trevino that the defendants knew they were
2See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
3Charles Patillo also pled guilty and agreed to cooperate with
the government.
-3-

under investigation by federal agents and "wanted to get their
story straight."
Between December 27 and 28, 1989, Mitchell--while in the
company of Agent Trevino--had three telephone conversations with
Heinz. Trevino "consensually monitored" these conversations, in
which
Mitchell
acquired
testimonial
evidence
apparently
incriminating to Heinz and Heinz's fellow defendants.4 Carsrud was
with Heinz during at least one of the conversations, but did not
talk to Mitchell. During another of the conversations, Heinz was
apparently speaking from the office of Wilshursen.
Trevino testified that he was personally unaware that Heinz
was represented by counsel at the time he taped these conversations
between Mitchell and Heinz. He admits that his co-"case agent"
Wentrcek knew as of December 22, 1989, that Heinz was represented
by counsel in the grand jury matters, but stated that he himself
"probably didn't know" this--that he did not know this "until just
recently." But during the third tape-recorded conversation,
Mitchell asked Heinz about what "Rogers" has told Heinz, an
apparent reference to Rick Rogers, Heinz's attorney.
In January of 1990, the Austin Grand Jury was convened;
defendants Carsrud and Byron Lewis Thomas testified before the
Grand Jury about the case. On May 10, 1990, the defendants were
4The taped conversations between Heinz and Mitchell focus on
facts underlying the government's money laundering and bank fraud
allegations against defendants.
-4-

indicted for money laundering and bank fraud, perjury and
conspiracy to commit perjury.
On March 13, 1992, the district court conducted an evidentiary
hearing on defendants' suppression motion. At this hearing,
Trevino admitted that the documents he and his teammates discovered
in Mitchell's briefcase on December 13, 1989, reflected Mitchell's
previous representation of Heinz and Patillo.
On March 27, 1992, the district court granted defendants'
motion to suppress from evidence the tape-recorded conversations
between Mitchell and Heinz; the district court concluded that the
government had violated Heinz's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The district court held that, even though Heinz had not been
indicted, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached before
the December 27 and 28 tape-recorded telephone calls--because the
case had reached a "critical state." Examining the facts of the
case, the district court concluded that at the time of the taping,
the government and Heinz had become "adversaries." The district
court relied on Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 106 S.Ct. 477,
484 (1985) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-491, 84
S.Ct. 1758, 1765 (1964). In Moulton, the Supreme Court recognized
that the right to counsel is shaped by the need for counsel, and
noted that the right attaches at "critical" stages in the criminal
justice process before trial. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 170.
Accordingly, the Court held that pursuant to the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments, "a person is entitled to the help of an
-5-

attorney at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been
initiated." Id. (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97
S.Ct. 1232, 1239 (1977)). In Escobedo, the accused had requested
and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the
police had not effectively warned him of his right to remain
silent. The Supreme Court held that the police had violated
Escobedo's right to counsel when the investigation was "no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but ha[d] begun to focus
on a particular suspect, the suspect ha[d] been taken into police
custody; [and] the police carr[ied] out a process of interrogations
lending itself to eliciting incriminating statements." Escobedo,
378 U.S. at 490-491.
II
We reverse the district court on its Sixth Amendment ruling.
Current law teaches that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does
not attach until or after the time formal adversary judicial
proceedings have been initiated. See United States v. Gouveia, 467
U.S. 180, 187-190, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2297-2299 (1984) (Rehnquist,
J.), and authorities cited therein; McNeil v. Wisconsin, ___ U.S.
___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2207-2211 (1991) (Scalia, J.). See also
United States v. Johnson, 954 F.2d 1015, 1019 (5th Cir. 1992);
United states v. McClure, 786 F.2d 1286, 1290-1291 (5th Cir. 1986).
This is so despite the fact that some earlier Supreme Court cases
seem to imply that a more functional test for the attachment of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is appropriate. Compare e.g.,
-6-

Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168-170, 106 S.Ct. 477, 483-484
(1986); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189, 104 S.Ct.
2292, 2298 (1984) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach
until such time as the "`government has committed itself to
prosecute, and . . . the adverse positions of government and
defendant have solidified'") (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1926, 1936 (1967) (Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches only when "the state [becomes] aligned against the
accused."). Compare also United States Ex. Rel. Hall v. Lane, 804
F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The right to counsel attaches only
when a defendant proves that, at the time of the procedure in
question, the government had crossed the constitutionally-
significant divide from fact-finder to adversary.") (Citing
DeAngelo v. Wainwright, 781 F.2d 1516, 1519-1520 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 953, 107 S.Ct. 444 (1986)).
III
Before concluding, we think we have a responsibility to
address the arguments raised in the dissent. The dissent is ill-
advised for several reasons. In the first place, the argument that
the conversations between Mitchell and Heinz should be suppressed
on grounds of a violation of the canons of ethics was not made or
considered below, nor has the argument been made on appeal. The
point has only been raised sua sponte by the dissenting judge.
Furthermore, our research shows that no court has ever
suppressed evidence in a criminal case because a prosecutor on the
-7-

prosecutorial team--much less an investigator or an informant--
violated DR 7-104(A)(1) in the course of an investigation and
before the grand jury indicted the defendant. Indeed, the great
weight of the authority is to the contrary: several courts have
held that DR 7-104(A)(1) does not apply "during the investigative
process before the initiation of criminal proceedings." United
States v. Ryan, 903 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1990); see also United
States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v.
Fitterer 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir. 1981). In short, Judge
Parker's conclusion that DR 7-104(A)(1) applies to the facts like
those before us has been explicitly rejected by almost every court
that has considered the issue.
Even assuming, however, that the ethical canons apply to the
period during investigation and before indictment, they are not
applicable in this case. The canons of ethics--unlike
constitutional principles--apply to and control only the attorney's
conduct and not the investigator's or informant's independent
conduct. United States v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 645-646 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. Lemonokis, 485 F.2d 94, 941, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Thus, DR 7-104(A)(1) would only apply to Agent Trevino if he was
acting as Blankinship's alter ego, i.e., Blankinship was directing
his actions. United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.
1962). Because Blankinship did not direct Trevino--indeed, he did
-8-

not even know what Trevino was doing--the ethical canons did not
restrict Trevino's investigation of Heinz.
Moreover, it is absolutely irrelevant that Mitchell is an
attorney. Mitchell was not Heinz's lawyer. Heinz had not retained
Mitchell in any capacity, and Mitchell certainly did not represent
Heinz in this case. Indeed, Mitchell had only advised Heinz on one
or two occasions about totally unrelated civil matters. As far as
this case is concerned, Mitchell was a co-defendant, pure and
simple. The dissent refers to Mitchell as a "covert prosecutor"
and an "alter ego" of the prosecutor. Nothing in the record
supports this unwarranted characterization of Mitchell's role.
The dissent decries that Mitchell "traded on Heinz's trust."
Unfortunately--or indeed fortunately for the public in many cases--
all co-defendants who turn state's evidence and cooperate with the
government, "trade on," or have traded on, their fellow co-
defendant's "trust." This method is the way a lot of criminals get
convicted--legally and properly so. Nor is it exceptional that
using Mitchell to garner information from Heinz was "inherently
deceptive"; little information is acquired by "forthright" dealings
of informers. Mitchell was simply a co-defendant-informant
occupying the quite ordinary role of this breed of folks:
providing incriminating evidence against their co-defendant to save
their own hides.
Even if we could join in with the dissent's conclusion that
the canons of ethics applied in this case, we could find no basis
-9-

to suppress the evidence. The purpose of suppressing evidence is,
primarily, to deter police and other government misconduct. United
States v. Leon, 486 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984). In this case,
there has been no wilful misconduct by law enforcement officials.
Trevino did not know that Heinz was represented by counsel; even if
he had known Heinz was represented, allowing Mitchell to telephone
Heinz would not have violated any obligation the law imposes on
Trevino because the Sixth Amendment does not apply. Furthermore,
Assistant United States Attorney Blankinship did not know that
Heinz had retained an attorney or that Mitchell was making the
phone calls to Heinz. In other words, even if a violation of the
canon of ethics occurred here pursuant to the "prosecutor team"
theory of the dissent, the law enforcement officials did not engage
in a wilful and knowing violation of the canon of ethics.
Consequently, under the good faith exception, the facts in this
case do not justify our suppression of the evidence.
Finally, we think the position the dissent advances is unwise
because of its consequences. The dullest imagination can
comprehend the devastating effect that such a rule would have on
undercover operations. Any potential defendant with an attorney
would be insulated from any undercover operation; any potential
defendant without an attorney would hire an attorney (if he could
afford to do so) in order to build a wall between himself and the
government's investigators. It's effect would not be limited to
undercover operations of course, but would impede, obstruct, and
-10-

even eliminate many continuing investigations of organized crime,
racketeering, and drug dealing. The impact of such a rule would
severely alter investigative operations in all criminal cases,
except those investigations focused on run-of-the-mill criminals
who cannot afford lawyers to serve as a wall between them and law
enforcement.
This point raises a second and anomalous consequence of
adopting this rule: The beneficiaries of Judge Parker's proposed
holding would be the big time criminals with lawyers at their
elbows to protect their rights, while such protection as the rule
may provide against an overreaching government would not trickle
down to those who cannot afford lawyers.
For these reasons, we respectfully reject the dissent.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's suppression
order is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Robert M. Parker, District Judge, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority's Sixth Amendment analysis. However,
I am concerned about the prosecution team's utilization of a
prosecutorial alter ego to secure statements from a target
defendant who was, at the time of the clandestine interrogation,
-11-

represented by counsel on the matters about which the prosecutorial
alter ego inquired. In my view, this conduct on the part of the
government violated the courts' ethical canons. I would utilize
this Court's inherent supervisory power -- to safeguard the
integrity of the judicial process -- in order to suppress Heinz's
statements on this alternative ground. The majority does not share
my opinion in this regard, so I must dissent.
Some clarification is in order. First, Appellees' Brief
raised the ethical canons argument on appeal. See e.g., Brief for
Appellees Richard Heinz and Scott Wilshusen, at pp. 14-18 ("the
issue, the government's knowing violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides an alternative basis for
affirmance."); id. at p. 16 ("The Court has supervisory authority
over government attorneys and may in its discretion order
suppression of evidence obtained in violation of a disciplinary
rule.") (citing United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.
1988)).
Furthermore, while it is true that no court has yet suppressed
evidence because a prosecutor, investigator or informant violated
DR 7-104(A)(1) in the course of an investigation -- and before a
grand jury actually indicted a target -- my research has not found
a single case factually "on all fours" with this one. And the body
of caselaw partially referenced by the majority actually recognizes
that a case-by-case analytical approach is to be utilized by courts
contemplating whether their supervisory suppression authority is
-12-
12

warranted. See e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 840
(2d Cir. 1988) (Kaufman, J.).1 In short: my conclusion that DR 7-
104 (A)(1) applies to the facts before us, and counsels suppression
of the tape recorded "conversations" between Mitchell and Heinz,
has never been addressed -- let alone "explicitly rejected" -- by
other courts construing the Rule.2 The peculiar, prosecutorial
alter ego facts of this case make it a truly exceptional one. The
holding I espouse in this dissent is indeed quite narrow -- and
incapable of producing the impediments to prosecution about which
the majority has expressed concern.
Also, contrary to the majority's assertion and as I will
explain, it is extremely relevant that Mitchell is an attorney.
Mitchell is not "pure[ly] and simpl[y]" a "co-defendant." First,
in that Heinz had not been indicted at the time in question,
Mitchell was no "co-defendant" of Heinz's. Second, Mitchell is an
attorney who had performed legal services for Heinz in the past.
1 This point too was made in the Appellees' Appellate Brief,
at p. 16 ("In Hammad, the court declined to establish a bright line
rule for determining whether suppression would be appropriate.
Instead, Hammad utilized a case by case analysis.").
2 Also, in response to the majority's no-other-court-
precedent-for-suppression argument, it is worth noting that the
government's conduct in this case appears to have been motivated by
a relatively recent phenomenon: the June 8, 1989, "Thornburgh
Memorandum." The Thornburgh Memorandum closes with the categorical
statement: "the 'authorized by law' exemption to DR 7-104 applies
to all communications with represented individuals by Department
attorneys or by others acting at their direction." Memorandum To
All Justice Department Litigators From Dick Thornburgh, Attorney
General, June 8, 1989, at p.7 (emphasis added).
-13-
13

This is a special sort of trust that Mitchell traded on -- i.e.,
one that does not exist in the typical informant investigation.
And most important is the fact that, because he is an attorney,
Mitchell was able to act as a prosecutorial alter ego for the
government. True, if it had been a non-lawyer doing the
questioning of Heinz, the prosecutorial alter ego doctrine would
require that person's questions and actions to be "directed" by a
prosecutor. But by using a lawyer like Mitchell, the government
attempted (and apparently has effectuated) an "end run" around the
well-established prosecutorial alter ego doctrine -- and in so
doing, has violated the integrity of the courts. Here is why.
In this case, when Heinz took steps to secure counsel, the
government took impermissible steps in response; it moved to
undercut Heinz's decision by using a lawyer to essentially
interrogate Heinz about the matters for which he had retained
counsel. Moreover, the government used a lawyer with whom Heinz
had
previously
established
an
attorney-client
trust.
Impermissibly, Agent-Attorney Mitchell traded on Heinz's attorney-
client trust when he accepted the government's job of covert
prosecutor against Heinz. Compare e.g., United States v.
Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (code provisions
appear designed in part to avoid the damage of "artful" legal
questions; informant was not the alter ego of the U.S. Attorney's
Office, so there was no ethical breach by the U.S. Attorneys
prosecuting the case -- and thus, no need for the court to reach
-14-
14

the question of what legal consequences might flow had the ethics
conclusion been otherwise), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989, 94 S.Ct.
1586 (1974); United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22, 28-29 (2d
Cir. 1989) (as part of an on-going criminal investigation, the
defendant had been lawfully subpoenaed to testify before the grand
jury; "[h]e [was] not the target of that investigation, his
testimony [was] immunized pursuant to § 6002, and he [could]
consult with his counsel any time outside the grand jury room.
Accordingly, the prosecutor's direct questioning of Schwimmer
before the grand jury outside the presence of [the latter's]
counsel [was] authorized by law and therefore [did] not violate the
Code of Professional Responsibility."), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1071, 110 S.Ct. 1114 (1990). Compare also United States v. Jamil,
707 F.2d 638, 645-646 (2d Cir. 1983) (in pre-indictment context,
where government investigators were not acting as alter egos of
prosecutor and prosecutor only became aware of recording after it
was made, Customs' agent's action in wiring [non-lawyer] informant
and recording conversation with represented suspect did not violate
DR 7-104; DR 7-104 (A)(1) protects the defendant from the danger of
being "tricked" by opposing counsel's artfully crafted questions
into giving his case away.); United States v. Buda, 718 F. Supp.
1094, 1095-1096 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (distinguishing Hammad; prosecutor
did not direct the (nonlawyer) informant to arrange and record
informant's conversations with the defendant, and in no way
attempted to direct the content of, or script, the informant's
-15-
15

conversation with the defendant so as to "beguile" the defendant
into giving his case away to an alter ego of the prosecutor).
Starting on December 13, 1989 -- when he pleaded guilty and
agreed to cooperate with law enforcement authorities -- Attorney
Mitchell was a government agent. He was acting as a government
agent during the December 27 and 28 telephone "conversations" at
issue. See generally United States v. Johnson, 954 F.2d 1015, 1019
(5th Cir. 1992) (co-defendant who has pled guilty and agreed to
cooperate with prosecutors is an agent of the government). But
Attorney Mitchell was not a typical, or "simple" "co-defendant-
informant" during these "conversations." His training enabled him
to act, and he did act, as a special sort of deceptive government
agent -- to wit: the covert, interrogating, prosecutorial alter
ego.
IRS Agent Trevino is presumed to have known that Defendant
Heinz was represented by counsel as of December 22, 1989 on the
money laundering and bank fraud matters discussed in the taped
telephone "conversations," and that Mitchell was a lawyer who had
represented Heinz in the past. Such information was available to
Trevino. See e.g., United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 57 (5th
Cir. 1973), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Henry, 749
F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984) (different arms of government, especially
when closely connected for the purpose of a case, are not separate
entities insulated from the knowledge and information possessed by
-16-
16

one another for purposes of Brady; the prosecution was deemed in
possession of material that was contained in the files of the
United States Postal Service); Williams v. Whitley, 940 F.2d 132,
133 (5th Cir. 1991) (to the same effect). See also United States
v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir.) ("The enforcement
officials [who interviewed defendant in violation of the canons of
ethics governing the actions of attorneys in all United States
Courts in the circuit] are agents of the prosecuting party"), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 932, 93 S.Ct. 2758 (1973). And clearly, Agent-
Attorney Mitchell actually knew Heinz was represented by counsel in
the criminal investigation at issue. Mitchell said so at the
district court's hearing on Defendants' motion to suppress.
Transcript of March 13, 1992, Hearing on Motions (Testimony of
Witnesses), at pp. 76-77 (Testimony of Ted Mitchell -- to the
effect that before the recorded telephone conversations took place,
Mitchell was aware that Defendant-Appellee Heinz had retained a
lawyer by the name of Rogers).
More importantly, though: Agents Trevino and Mitchell's
information and conduct is imputed to the case prosecutor,
Blankinship. See e.g., United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 569
(5th Cir. 1979) ("Had the investigators been federal, their
knowledge would have been imputed to the prosecution. In
considering use of perjured testimony this Court has declined to
draw a distinction between different agencies under the same
government, focusing instead upon the 'prosecution team' which
-17-
17

includes both investigative and prosecutorial personnel.")
(emphasis added); United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478, 481 (5th
Cir. 1980) (holding that the prosecutor's lack of actual knowledge
was not a valid excuse for a Brady violation: "[i]n the interests
of inherent fairness," the prosecution is obligated to produce
certain evidence actually or constructively in its possession or
accessible to it; to hold otherwise would be "inviting and placing
a premium on conduct unworthy of representatives of the United
States Government."); Thomas, supra, at 112 ("The enforcement
officials [who interviewed defendant in violation of the canons of
ethics governing the actions of attorneys in all United States
Courts in the circuit] are agents of the prosecuting party").
The prosecution team in this case traversed DR 7-104(a)(1) by
thwarting the attorney-client relationship between Heinz and his
defense counsel, in order to trick Heinz into incriminating himself
to a covert prosecutor about matters for which Heinz had secured
counsel.3 The courts possess inherent supervisory power to
3 The government has argued to this Court that the
investigatory subject of the monitoring was perjury. See e.g.,
Brief for the United States of America, at 16 ("The purpose of the
taping was not to acquire information regarding the money-
laundering and bank-fraud offenses, but rather for these embryonic
potential cover-up offenses.") (emphasis added). However, the
government recently supplemented the record (in response to a
request by this Court) to include the application for (IRS)
supervisory approval of the monitoring. And this application
focuses on: 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Laundering of monetary instruments);
31 U.S.C. § 5324 [Structuring transactions to evade reporting
requirement (of 31 U.S.C. §5313(a) (Reports on domestic coins and
currency transactions)) prohibited]; and 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (Attempt
to evade or defeat tax). Box 19 ("Primary Alleged Offense(s)").
-18-
18

safeguard
the
criminal
justice
system
from
overzealous
prosecutorial and investigative activities; they possess the power
to safeguard the fair administration of justice. See e.g., United
States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988) (balancing the twin
administrative goals of respecting the protection provided by DR 7-
104(A)(1), which goes beyond the protection provided by the Sixth
Amendment, and of "imposing adequate safeguards without crippling
law enforcement."), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 111 S.Ct. 192 (1990)
(emphasis added); United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) (to the same effect). The supervisory power theory "is
premised on the inherent ability of the federal courts to
'formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the
Constitution or the Congress.'" United States v. McClintock, 748
F.2d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Hasting,
461 U.S. 499, 505, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1978 (1983) (Burger, C.J.)),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75 (1985). See McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340, 63 S.Ct. 608, 612 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J.) (the Constitution defines only the "minimal
historic safeguards" defendants must receive, rather than the outer
bounds of those courts may afford them).
While the application's narrative explanation of the would-be
monitoring discloses that one of the topics of the calls was
anticipated to be the "fabricating [of] testimony to provide an
alibi concerning [the currency-oriented] criminal acts," the
explanation concludes with the sweeping statement: "[t]he subjects
to be monitored are involved in violation of the[se] above noted
statutes." (emphasis added)
-19-
19

It is well established that a federal court may use its
supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment on the basis of
governmental misconduct. See e.g., United States v. Owen, 580 F.2d
365, 367 (9th Cir. 1978). But this remedy is disfavored. United
States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1076-1077 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing:
United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 1419
(1966); United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir.
1988)). In determining whether the government misconduct in a
particular case is sufficiently egregious to warrant dismissal of
an indictment, courts have been guided by two important
considerations. First, courts frequently look to whether there is
a pattern of similar government misconduct, on the theory that such
widespread misconduct increases the threat to judicial integrity.
See e.g., United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837, 106 S.Ct. 114 (1985); United
States v. Rosenfield, 780 F.2d 10, 11 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1004, 106 S.Ct. 3294 (1986); United States v. Brown, 602
F.2d 1073, 1076-1078 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 952, 100
S.Ct. 427 (1979). Second, courts look to whether there is an
alternative remedy the court may use to preserve judicial integrity
and deter future government misconduct. See e.g., United States v.
Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991) (Nelson, J.,
concurring). If there is an effective alternative remedy, the
extreme remedy of dismissal is not justified. See e.g., United
States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1460 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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The suppression of evidence is a remedy less drastic than the
dismissal of an indictment -- and in my opinion it is the
appropriate remedy for the prosecutorial misconduct in this case.
See United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir.) (actions
by U.S. Attorney's Office were "highly improper and unethical;"
"[s]uppression of the statements would probably have been the
appropriate sanction in this case, were it not for the refusal of
the government to use the statements.") (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1021, 101 S.Ct. 3014 (1981). Compare United
States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 111-112 (10th Cir.) (suppression
may be the appropriate response of judiciary to prosecutorial
violations of courts' canons of ethics), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
932, 93 S.Ct. 2758 (1973).
The applicable ethical rules of the Western District of Texas
condemn the actions of the government toward Defendants. DR 7-104
(A)(1) provides:
During the course of his representation of a client a
lawyer shall not: (1) Communicate or cause another to
communicate on the subject of the representation with a
party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that
matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer
representing such other party or is authorized by law to
do so. . . . 4
4 ABA DR 7-104(A)(1), ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct
4.2, and Rule 4.02(a) of the Texas Code of Professional
Responsibility share common language and purpose. For this reason,
this Court will utilize authority and sources concerning all three
in the course of this opinion (all three are adopted as standards
by the Western District of Texas Local Rule AT-4 (Standards of
Profession Conduct)).
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The purpose underlying DR 7-104 (A)(1) and its analogues -- to
protect the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship and by so
doing, safeguard the integrity of the profession and preserve
public confidence in our system of justice -- looms large within
the context of the criminal justice system, in light of the gravity
of the interests at stake in this system. The Sixth Amendment and
the disciplinary rule serve separate, albeit similar purposes.
United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 839, 843 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, -- U.S. --, 111 S.Ct. 192 (1990). As already noted, the
disciplinary rule secures protection not prescribed in the
Constitution. Id.
The use of informants to gather evidence against a suspect
will generally, if not almost always, fall within the ambit of the
"authorized by law" exception to DR 7-104 (a)(1). Hammad, supra,
858 F.2d at 839. See e.g., United States v. Chestman, 704 F. Supp.
Model Rule 4.2 states:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate
about the subject of the representation with a party the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
And Texas Code of Professional Responsibility Rule 4.02(a)
provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate
or cause or encourage another to communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person, organization
or entity of government the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer regarding that subject,
unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or
is authorized by law to do so.
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451, 453-454 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (use of corporate insider informant to
tape conversations with defendant accused of "insider trading" of
stocks falls within the "authorized by law" exception). But this
practice does not do so per se. The question of what prosecutorial
conduct constitutes an ethical violation is to be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Hammad, supra, 858 F.2d at 836.
The prosecution team's questioning of Heinz was an
illegitimate investigative-prosecutorial technique -- due to the
deleterious consequences for the integrity of the administration of
justice
inhering
in
Government
Agent-Attorney
Mitchell's
surreptitious, prosecutorial alter ego interrogation of Heinz.5
The courts' canons of ethics prohibit prosecution teams from using
alter egos to do what the prosecutors themselves cannot do. Such
utilization is certainly not "authorized by law." United States v.
Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 645 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Ryans,
903 F.2d 731, 735 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 111 S.Ct.
152 (1990). No alleged "chinese wall" should be allowed to provide
team prosecutors access to the ill-gotten gains from such
prosecutorial alter ego interrogations. In today's world of
advanced technology, such a rule runs an undue and unacceptable
5 The recording transcripts reflect that Mitchell was an
active questioner of Heinz in the three "conversations" at issue.
It is also apparent that Trevino and Mitchell initiated the first
recorded telephone "conversation" with Heinz, at 11:40 a.m. on
December 27, 1989. Transcripts of Consensually Monitored
Conversation Between Ted Mitchell and Rick Heinz of 12/27/89 and
12/28/89 (TC 96, TC 97, and TC 98).
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risk of sanctioning Orwellian investigative techniques and creating
Kafkaesque judicial administration.6
In short: in his taped "conversations" with Heinz, Government
Agent-Attorney Mitchell was acting as a clandestine prosecutor --
conducting an inherently deceptive (prosecutorial) interrogation.
By enabling Lawyer-Agent Mitchell's breach of his own ethical duty
not to contact Heinz -- who was known to be represented by counsel
in the matters Mitchell sought to discuss with Heinz -- the
prosecution team traversed the district court's ethical rules, and
subverted the integrity of the criminal justice system. And I
simply do not think the government should enjoy a "windfall" -- in
the form of a citizen's rights and liberties -- from the misconduct
of its prosecution team. See United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d
206, 210 (5th Cir.) (actions by U.S. Attorney's Office violated DR
7-104(A)(1); and "suppression of the statements would probably have
been the appropriate sanction in this case, were it not for the
refusal of the government to use the statements.") (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021, 101 S.Ct. 3014 (1981). As the
majority purports to recognize: "[t]he purpose of suppressing
evidence is, primarily, to deter police and other government
6 See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949); FRANZ KAFKA, THE
TRIAL (1925). Compare Richard Lacayo, Nowhere to Hide: Using
Computers, High-Tech Gadgets and Mountains of Data, an Army of
Snoops is Assaulting Our Privacy, TIME, Nov. 11, 1991, at 34 (cover
story).
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misconduct. United States v. Leon, 486 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405
(1984)."
The Appellees' Brief says: "Although the district court did
not reach the issue, the government's knowing violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides an alternative basis for
affirmance." Brief for Appellees Richard Heinz and Scott
Wilshusen, at pp. 14-15 (emphasis added). An examination of the
record, however, reveals that a more accurate characterization
would be that Defense Counsel failed to frame an attorney-client
privilege issue for the district court in a manner clearly
implicating the courts' ethical canons; and thus, the district
court's order of March 27, 1992, addresses the defendants' motion
to claim an attorney-client privilege between Defendants and
Mitchell, while saying nothing about the (attorney-client) ethical
rule violations addressed in this dissent. Still, the DR 7-
104(A)(1) argument was clearly presented to this Court. And while
it is rare for this Court to address an issue not taken up in the
district court, issues involving the courts' canons of ethics are
unique. The courts -- both, trial courts and the courts of appeal
-- have a significant, vested interest in safeguarding the
integrity of the judicial system. Indeed, judicial responses to
prosecutorial violations of the courts' canons of ethics are not
waivable by defendants alone. United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d
110, 112 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932, 93 S.Ct. 2758
(1973).
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For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the district court's
suppression order on the ground that the government's conduct in
this case infringed judicial integrity.

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