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United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 94-20528
Summary Calendar.
Michael EASTON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Clema SANDERS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Oct. 20, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas.
Before KING, SMITH, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Easton ("Easton") appeals pro se the district court's
order granting Defendants-Appellees' motion for enforcement of a
consent decree requiring Easton to surrender his Texas Private
Investigator's License to the Texas Board of Private Investigators
and Private Security Agencies. We affirm.
I.
Easton was convicted in Texas state court in 1990 of theft.
His sentence was vacated and he was resentenced in 1993 to a
ten-year term of probation.1 Easton also pleaded guilty in federal
court to making a false statement to a government agency and
knowingly and falsely representing his social security number to
procure a loan. He was sentenced to two concurrent three-year
terms of supervised probation. United States v. Easton, 937 F.2d
1See Easton v. Rains, 866 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex.Ct.App.1993).
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160, 161 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1045, 112 S.Ct.
906, 116 L.Ed.2d 807 (1992). We affirmed Easton's federal
conviction and sentence. Id.; United States v. Easton, 980 F.2d
1444 (5th Cir.1992) (unpublished), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113
S.Ct. 2388, 124 L.Ed.2d 291 (1993).
The Texas Board of Private Investigators and Private Security
Agencies ("Board") ordered Easton's Texas Private Investigator's
License revoked. On April 29, 1991, Easton filed a § 1983 suit in
federal court against the members and executive director of the
Board and the Attorney General of Texas, alleging that they had
violated his federal civil rights and state law.
On December 3, 1992, the district court entered a consent
decree signed by Easton and Defendants-Appellees, which included a
final judgment and provided for dismissal of the case with
prejudice. Under the stipulations of the consent decree,
Defendants-Appellees agreed not to suspend or revoke Easton's
license while his direct appeals were pending, or so long as there
was no final judgment. Easton agreed to surrender his license as
soon as either of his convictions became final. The parties also
agreed that Texas law would control any legal questions regarding
the finality of Easton's convictions.
On December 20, 1993, Defendants-Appellees filed a motion with
the district court for enforcement of the consent decree,
contending that Easton's federal conviction had become final and
that he must surrender his license. They argued that the fact that
Easton had been placed on probation did not render his convictions
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non-final. Easton argued that: 1) the district court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction because it had dismissed Easton's
complaint in 1992; 2) under Texas law his successful completion of
probation nullified his convictions; and 3) the defendants were
estopped from seeking enforcement of the consent decree because
they renewed his license after the Supreme Court denied certiorari
to review his federal conviction. The district court granted
Defendant-Appellees' motion and ordered Easton to surrender his
license.
Easton filed a Rule 59(e) motion requesting that the district
court vacate the enforcement order or, in the alternative, stay the
order pending appeal. When Easton failed to surrender his license,
the court set a show cause hearing for July 14, 1994. On July 19,
1994, the court signed an order denying Easton's Rule 59(e) motion
and alternative motion to stay. After Easton filed his notice of
appeal with this Court, he filed a motion for stay pending appeal,
which was denied.
II.
The only question before us in this appeal is whether Easton's
federal conviction is final under Texas state law.2 Easton
contends that his federal conviction was never final under Texas
law and could not support enforcement of the consent decree. He
argues that a probationer is not convicted under Texas law until
the sentence of probation is revoked. He cites cases from the
2In his reply brief, Easton has explicitly abandoned any
issues other than the finality of his federal conviction for
purposes of revoking his Texas Private Investigator's License.
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Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court for his
evident contention that convictions that result in probation are
never final convictions for any purposes.
The consent decree provided that the Defendants-Appellees
would not suspend or revoke Easton's license while his appellate
proceedings were pending, or until his convictions became final.
The decree provided that Texas law would determine the finality of
Easton's convictions. We determine issues of state law as we
believe the highest state court would determine them. United Fire
and Cas. Co. v. Reeder, 9 F.3d 15, 17 (5th Cir.1993).
Easton pleaded guilty of making a false statement, a federal
felony. See Easton, 937 F.2d at 161; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001,
3581(b)(4). The relevant Texas statute permits the Board to revoke
the license of any private investigator who, inter alia, "has
committed any act resulting in conviction of a felony[.]"
TEX.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4413(29bb) § 11B(a)(2) (West Supp.1995).
We have uncovered no Texas case that directly addresses the
question of whether a conviction that results in probation is final
for the purpose of revoking a Texas Private Investigator's License.
For some purposes a conviction resulting in probation is not
treated as final, such as for conferring habeas corpus jurisdiction
on a Texas state court, Ex parte Renier, 734 S.W.2d 349, 351
(Tex.Crim.App.1987); impeachment of a witness, Jackson v. Granite
State Ins. Co., 685 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Tex.1985); or enhancement of a
sentence for a subsequent conviction. Davis v. Estelle, 529 F.2d
437, 440-41 (5th Cir.1976). However, Texas intermediate appellate
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courts have declined to apply such an interpretation to a civil
licensing statute or to the Texas Election Code's eligibility
requirements for holding public office. See Dallas County Bail
Bond Bd. v. Stein, 771 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex.Ct.App.1989) (holding
that a conviction resulting in probation is final for the purpose
of revoking a bail bondsman's license); Welch v. State ex rel.
Long, 880 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex.Ct.App.1994, error denied) (holding
that a conviction resulting in probation is final for the purpose
of removing a county constable from office).
The holdings in Stein and Welch indicate that Texas courts
would hold final a conviction resulting in probation for the
purpose of revoking a Texas Private Investigator's License. As the
court states in Welch:
These cases, statutes, and interpretive opinions reveal a
clear pattern; whenever a "final conviction" disqualifies one
from holding an office, exercising a privilege, or obtaining
a license, the term should be understood as including all
judgments involving an express adjudication of guilt, even if
the punishment is suspended and the convicted individual is
given probation.
880 S.W.2d at 82. This interpretation is even more applicable to
the instant case because the language of the relevant licensing
statute omits the word "final," thereby allowing revocation for the
commission of an act resulting only in a "conviction of a felony."
TEX.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4413(29bb) § 11B(a)(2) (West Supp.1995). "The
"finality' of such a conviction, in this context, has nothing to do
with whether the punishment assessed is suspended or probation
granted." Welch, 880 S.W.2d at 81. Clearly, it is the
adjudication of guilt for a felony offense that triggers the
5

Board's right to revoke a private investigator's license, not the
probated sentence. See id. Accordingly, we find that the district
court did not err in ordering the enforcement of the consent decree
and Easton's surrender of his Texas Private Investigator's License
to the Board.
III.
For the reasons articulated above, the order of the district
court granting Defendants-Appellees' motion to enforce the consent
decree and ordering Easton to surrender his Texas Private
Investigator's License is AFFIRMED.

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