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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 94-30221
Summary Calendar
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CHRISTOPHER S. LAWRENCE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
C.M. LENSING, Warden, Hunt Correctional
Center, and RICHARD P. IEYOUB, Attorney
General, State of Louisiana,
Respondents-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana
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(December 28, 1994)
Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner-appellant Christopher S. Lawrence (Lawrence)
appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.
Facts and Proceedings Below
On March 5, 1991, after a two-day trial, a Louisiana jury
found Lawrence guilty of forcible rape in violation of LSA-RS
14:42.1 and of attempted aggravated crime against nature in
violation of LSA-RS 14:(27)89.1. Lawrence was sentenced to thirty
years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence for the first two years on the forcible rape
count and to ten years at hard labor on the attempted aggravated
crime against nature count, to be served concurrently. On appeal,
the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed Lawrence's
convictions but remanded the case for resentencing on the attempted
aggravated crime against nature count. State v. Lawrence, 610
So.2d 287 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (table). The trial court then
resentenced Lawrence to five years at hard labor on that count, to
run concurrently with the forcible rape sentence. Lawrence applied
for a writ to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which was denied. State
v. Lawrence, 617 So.2d 931 (La. 1993), reconsideration denied, 620
So.2d 862 (La. 1993).
In a subsequent writ application to the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal, Lawrence asserted that he was prejudiced
in his appeal to that court because page 151 of the trial
transcript was not made part of the appellate record. The Fourth
Circuit granted Lawrence's writ and ordered the court reporter to
provide him with page 151 of the transcript.1 Lawrence then filed
another writ application with the Fourth Circuit, which was denied.
Lawrence subsequently filed this petition in the district
court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
alleging that the prosecutor had failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963),
that he was prejudiced on appeal because page 151 of the trial
1
A review of the trial transcript reveals that page 151 was
made part of the state court record but had been mislabelled as
page 156.
2

transcript was not made part of the appellate record, and that he
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The district court denied
his petition for habeas relief, determining that Lawrence could not
establish a Brady violation and that his right to appeal argument
was meritless. The district court granted a certificate of
probable cause, and this appeal ensued.
Discussion
I.
Brady Claim
Lawrence argues that the prosecution failed to disclose to the
defense a "route sheet" prepared by Dr. Leslie Kram, the emergency
room physician who examined the victim. Lawrence contends that the
victim's trial testimony differed from her version of the events as
documented in the route sheet, and that pretrial disclosure of the
route sheet would have enabled the defense to impeach the victim's
testimony. The prosecution, however, elicited the contents of this
route sheet during its direct examination of Dr. Kram:
"Q. And ma'am, what is a route sheet?
A. A route sheet is a legal document we generate any time a
patient comes to the hospital and is seen in the Emergency
Room.
Q. And did you do a route sheet in this particular case?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. And what information did you receive for your route sheet?
A. Well, my route sheet, I use basically to take history
because the Rape Kit doesn't allow me that much room to put
down what was told me by the patient in specifics. My route
sheet, I basically wrote down what the patient told me in a
narrative fashion.

BY MR. LAWRENCE [Lawrence's attorney]: Excuse me, Your Honor.
I have not seen this.
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BY THE COURT: Would you be kind enough to show it to opposing
counsel?
BY MR. JORDAN [the prosecutor]: Yes, Your Honor, as State's
Exhibit No. 11.
Q:
Doctor, without looking at your route sheet, could
you give the Jury the general gist of what you put on the
route sheet?
A:
Essentially that [the victim] had been waiting at the bus
stop to catch a ride. She saw a male who she said she had
seen on the Campus and around town before. She didn't know
him by name. He pulled over and asked her if she wanted a
ride home. She said Yes. She said in the car he said he
needed to stop at his house and get some money foe [sic] gas.
She said they stopped at his house. She felt a little
uncomfortable, but she did go in and she said once inside,
that she was basically barred from leaving the house."
At trial, the victim testified that she was waiting at the bus
stop when Lawrence approached her on foot, initiated a conversation
with her, and offered her a ride home. During their conversation,
Lawrence told the victim that he had some work left to do at the
Big Easy, a nightclub where he was employed. The victim testified
that she accompanied Lawrence to the Big Easy where she got
something to eat and a soda. Subsequently, the manager of the Big
Easy drove her and Lawrence to Lawrence's apartment. Lawrence said
that he needed to get his car keys from his apartment and offered
her a drink of water. She stated that she accepted his offer of a
glass of water, entered his apartment, and the sexual assault then
ensued. The victim also testified that she did not mention going
to the Big Easy with Lawrence in her initial account of the
incident to police. She stated that she thought she "should stick
to the most important things," but that she informed the police two
days later about the Big Easy. In cross-examining the victim,
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defense counsel emphasized the inconsistencies between her initial
account of the incident and her trial testimony.
Brady v. Maryland, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), requires that the
prosecution disclose to the defense both exculpatory evidence and
evidence that would be useful for impeachment. United States v.
Bagley, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380 (1985). To prevail on his Brady
claim, Lawrence must show that (1) the prosecution suppressed
evidence, (2) the evidence was favorable to the defense, and (3)
the evidence was material. Drew v. Collins, 964 F.2d 411, 419 (5th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 3044 (1993). The district
court held that Lawrence's allegations failed to satisfy the
materiality standard required to state a Brady claim. See Bagley,
105 S.Ct. at 3383 ("The evidence is material only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.").
While we agree with the district court's plainly correct
holding that Lawrence failed to satisfy the materiality standard,
we also hold that Lawrence cannot allege a Brady violation because
the prosecution did not suppress any evidence. Brady claims
involve "the discovery, after trial of information which had been
known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense." United
States v. Agurs, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397 (1976). Because we find that
the existence and contents of the route sheet were disclosed at
trial, we hold that the prosecution did not suppress any evidence.
See United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d 911, 918 (2d Cir. 1993)
("Evidence is not 'suppressed' if the defendant either knew, or
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should have known, of the essential facts permitting him to take
advantage of any exculpatory evidence.") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); United States v. McKinney, 758 F.2d 1036,
1049-50 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the prosecution did not
suppress evidence where Brady materials were disclosed at trial and
reasoning that "[i]f the defendant received the material in time to
put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be
reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might
have, and indeed, should have been"). See also United States v.
Randall, 887 F.2d 1262, 1269 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 255 (5th Cir. 1985).
In United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 113 S.Ct. 1111 (1993), the prosecution
elicited the fact that one of its key witnesses was a paranoid
schizophrenic and heroin addict at the close of his direct
testimony. Defense counsel protested that it was surprised by this
revelation and asserted that its impeachment of the witness would
be hampered by the government's failure to disclose this
information prior to trial. In response, the district court
advised defendant that the witness's schizophrenia and addiction
could be explored on cross-examination, a suggestion defense
counsel ignored. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
defendant's Brady claim, stressing that the defendant did not
request a continuance. Id. at 182. Moreover, the court observed,
"though the exculpatory evidence may not have been presented as
fully as Dunnigan would have liked (though she does not say what
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she would now offer), the jury did in fact hear it." Id.2
Similarly, the jury in Lawrence's case heard Dr. Kram testify about
the version of the victim's account contained in the route sheet.3
Upon learning of the existence of the route sheet at trial,
Lawrence could have moved for a recess or continuance in order to
prepare his impeachment of the victim. See, e.g., United States v.
Kelly, 14 F.3d 1169, 1176 (7th Cir. 1994) ("In situations . . . in
which a Brady disclosure is made during trial, the defendant can
seek a continuance of the trial to allow the defense to examine or
investigate . . . ."). Because the prosecution did not suppress
any evidence, Lawrence cannot convert his tactical decision not to
seek a recess or continuance into a Brady claim in this habeas
2
The court suggested that the defendant might "have a better
argument if the government had withheld the information from the
jury." Id.
3
Lawrence complains about two discrepancies between the
victim's account in the route sheet and her trial testimony.
First, the victim did not mention the stop at the Big Easy in her
statement contained in the route sheet. As the district court
observed, the trial transcript reflects that defense counsel was
aware that the victim gave inconsistent statements as to whether
they went directly to Lawrence's apartment or whether they went
to the Big Easy first. The victim explained why she did not
mention the Big Easy in her initial account. Moreover, defense
counsel cross-examined the victim on this inconsistency.
The second discrepancy is that the victim initially said
that Lawrence went to his apartment to get some gas money, but at
trial, the victim testified that he went into his apartment to
get his car keys. While testifying about the contents of the
route sheet, Dr. Kram recounted the victim's statement that they
went into Lawrence's apartment to get money for gas. The
district court also noted that this discrepancy was known to the
defense prior to trial because defense counsel had a copy of the
application for the search warrant for Lawrence's apartment.
This application indicated that the victim told the police that
Lawrence brought her to his apartment under the pretext of
getting money.
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petition.
II. Right to Appeal Claim
Lawrence claims that he was prejudiced in appealing his case
to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal because page 151 of
the trial transcript was not made part of the record and that this
constituted a denial of his right to appeal. He asserts that he
suffered prejudice because the Louisiana appellate court determined
that his failure to raise a contemporaneous objection precluded
review of the Brady issue, and that page 151 of the trial
transcript would have demonstrated that defense counsel objected
during Dr. Kram's testimony.4
The United States Constitution does not generally mandate the
right to appeal a criminal conviction. Griffin v. Illinois, 76
S.Ct. 585, 591-92 (1956). Louisiana, however, provides convicted
defendants with a statutory right to appeal. LSA-C.Cr.P. art.
912.1. A state prisoner seeking federal court review of his
conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must assert a violation of
a federal constitutional right. Gray v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265, 268 (5th
Cir. 1993). It is questionable that Lawrence's right to appeal
argument raises a federal constitutional claim. In any event, a
review of the trial transcript reveals that page 151 was made part
of the state court record but was mislabelled as page 156.
Furthermore, defense counsel made no objection to Dr. Kram's
4
Although the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal found
that Lawrence had failed to raise a contemporaneous objection,
the court nevertheless addressed his claim on the merits and
found that he had suffered no prejudice. We agree.
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testimony on page 151. Accordingly, we find Lawrence's argument
without merit.
III. Evidentiary Hearing
Lawrence's last contention is that he is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing in the district court. An evidentiary hearing
is not "required when the record is complete or the petitioner
raised only legal claims that can be resolved without the taking of
additional evidence." Ellis v. Lynaugh, 873 F.2d 830, 840 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 970 (1989). Based on our review of
the record, we hold that no evidentiary hearing was required.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
AFFIRMED.
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