Fifth Circuit Court Cases - Case Law and Opinions from the 5th Circuit Federal Court - Court of Appeals

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinions - 5th Circuit
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -CLICK HERE

This opinion or court case is from the Fifth Circuit Court or Appeals. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 94-40082
and
No. 94-40083
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
JOHN R. JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(August 16, 1994)
Before GARWOOD, SMITH and DEMOSS, Circuit Judges.
DEMOSS, Circuit Judge:
Jackson was indicted for manufacturing marijuana, possessing
an illegal firearm, and using a firearm in relation to a drug
trafficking offense. The indictment was filed on July 25, 1991,
and became Case No. 91-10008-01 in the Western District of
Louisiana. The court set trial to begin on October 26, 1992.
Jackson moved to quash the indictment because the government had
failed to prosecute his case in accordance with the Speedy Trial
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The government conceded the validity

of Jackson's motion but argued that any dismissal should be without
prejudice. The district court treated Jackson's motion to quash as
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
12(a) and dismissed the case without prejudice in October 1992.
The court, however, provided little insight as to the basis for its
conclusion. It simply listed the factors the Speedy Trial Act
requires courts to consider when dismissing indictments and stated
that it had "considered all relevant facts in light of the factors
set forth" in the Act.
Jackson moved the district court to amend its judgment to
dismiss the case "with prejudice." Jackson argued that the
district court erred in dismissing the indictment without prejudice
because the court did not sufficiently articulate the reasons for
its ruling, as required by the Speedy Trial Act. In United States
v. Willis, 958 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1992), we noted that the
Speedy Trial Act requires district courts to consider certain
factors in determining whether to dismiss an indictment with or
without prejudice for violation of the Act. The factors are the
seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case
which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a re-prosecution on
the administration of the Speedy Trial Act and on the
administration of justice. Id. at 64 (citing 18 U.S.C. §
3162(a)(2)).
After the district court denied Jackson's motion to amend in
November 1992, he timely appealed the dismissal without prejudice.
In June 1993, we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
2

because appellate review of a dismissal without prejudice must
await final judgment after re-indictment. United States v.
Jackson, No. 92-5182 (5th Cir. June 24, 1993) (citing United States
v. Welborn, 849 F.2d 980, 984 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988) ("A dismissal
without prejudice is not a `final judgment' for purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and ordinarily does not fall within the collateral
order exception. Appellate review of a dismissal without prejudice
must therefore await a final judgment entered after re-
indictment.")).
Meanwhile, on November 4, 1992, Jackson was reindicted on the
same counts: manufacturing marijuana, possessing an illegal
shotgun, and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking
crime. The indictment was filed in the same district court and
became Case No. 92-10022-01. Jackson never moved to dismiss the
1992 indictment on the grounds that the 1991 indictment should have
been dismissed with prejudice. Instead, in November 1993, Jackson
entered a guilty plea to the marijuana count of the 1992
indictment. The plea agreement, however, contained the following
language:
In consideration of said plea, the Government acknowledges
that said plea is a conditional plea, as set forth in Rule
11(a)(2), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that
Defendant reserves his rights to appeal the Court's adverse
ruling as to JOHN R. JACKSON'S Motion to Dismiss and, should
such appeal be successful, Defendant shall be allowed to
withdraw his guilty plea, the Court shall then reinstate the
Indictment which was dismissed and speedy trial requirements
will start anew from the date of the Indictment being
reinstated.
The district court sentenced Jackson to six months of imprisonment
and suspended the sentence in January 1994.
3

Jackson then appealed. His notice of appeal states that he is
appealing "the order dismissing his indictment without prejudice.
Said order was entered in this action on the 5TH day of November,
1992 with final Judgment and sentence imposed January 13, 1994."
Jackson, however, drafted the notice as an appeal from the first
case, i.e., case number 91-10008-01, and filed it with the court on
January 18, 1994. The notice also was filed on January 20, 1994,
as an appeal from the second case, i.e., case number 92-10022-01.1
Jackson, in effect, has attempted to appeal both cases.
I.
We obviously are barred from reconsidering Jackson's appeal of
the first case. The notice of appeal was filed in January 1994,
more than year after the district court denied his motion to amend.
Pursuant to federal rules, Jackson had ten days to file his appeal,
see FED. R. APP. P. 4(b), which he clearly exceeded. We
additionally note that, even if Jackson's appeal had been timely,
we simply would have reiterated what we said in June 1993:
appellate review of a dismissal without prejudice must await final
judgment after re-indictment. We therefore must dismiss appeal
number 94-40082, which relates to the 1991 indictment.
1It is unclear from the record who filed the notice with the
second case. The notice clearly was drafted as an appeal from
the first case because "CRIMINAL DOCKET NO. 91-10008-01" is
legibly typed at the top. The notice contained in the record for
the second case, however, has been doctored by hand to
specifically reference the second case number.
4

II.
We now address his appeal from the second case, which is
appeal number 94-40083. Jackson now argues that, when the district
court dismissed his indictment without prejudice in the first case,
the court abused its discretion by not elaborating on the reasons
for its conclusion. We note that Jackson's argument is a
legitimate one. In discussing whether to dismiss an indictment
with or without prejudice, a district court cannot gloss over the
factors spelled out in the Speedy Trial Act. In United States v.
Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988), the Supreme Court specifically defined
the district courts' duties in dismissing indictments pursuant to
the Speedy Trial Act. The Court stated:
Where, as here, Congress has declared that a decision
will be governed by consideration of particular factors,
a district court must carefully consider those factors as
applied to the particular case and, whatever its
decision, clearly articulate their effect in order to
permit meaningful appellate review. Only then can an
appellate court ascertain whether a district court has
ignored or slighted a factor that Congress has deemed
pertinent to the choice of remedy, thereby failing to act
within the limits prescribed by Congress.
Id. at 336-37 (emphasis added).
The district court below clearly failed to comply with the
Supreme Court's instructions in Taylor. The district court's terse
comment that it had "considered all relevant facts in light of the
factors set forth in the" Act affords us no material to gauge the
appropriateness of its ruling. The court erred.2
2Jackson, and the government, believe that that alleged
error is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The abuse of
discretion standard would apply if Jackson conceded that the
court adequately stated its Willis findings and challenged only
5

We conclude, however, that Jackson has waived his right to
dismissal of the second indictment. The Speedy Trial Act expressly
states that "[f]ailure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior
to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall
constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section."
18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). While Jackson properly moved for dismissal
of the 1991 indictment, he never moved for dismissal of the 1992
indictment. Jackson should have moved for dismissal of the 1992
indictment prior to his entry of the conditional guilty plea to one
count in that indictment. Had he done so, he could have then
argued, as he does now before us, that the district court erred in
dismissing the first indictment without prejudice and that the
district court should correct that error by dismissing the second
indictment with prejudice. This would have permitted the district
court to re-address the issue of compliance with the Speedy Trial
Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Taylor. Jackson,
however, failed to do that, and, pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act,
he waived his rights. We therefore must dismiss appeal number 94-
40083, which relates to the 1992 indictment.
its decision to dismiss the indictment without prejudice. See,
e.g., United States v. Cobb, 975 F.2d 152, 157 (5th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Melguizo, 824 F.2d 370, 371-72 (5th Cir. 1987).
But that is not the gist of Jackson's appeal. Instead, he is
arguing that the district court failed to comply with dictates of
the Speedy Trial Act. The court's compliance, or failure to
comply, with the Act is strictly a matter of law. We therefore
review such proceedings de novo. Taylor, 487 U.S. at 337 ("A
judgment that must be arrived at by considering and applying
statutory criteria, however, constitutes the application of law
to fact and requires the reviewing court to undertake more
substantive scrutiny to ensure that the judgment is supported in
terms of the factors identified in the statute.").
6