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United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 94-50348.
Summary Calendar.
Tommy Lee JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Thomas VANNOY, Chief of Police, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
April 11, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.
Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-Appellant Tommy Lee Jackson ("Jackson"), a Texas
prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed suit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officers John Scharf
("Scharf") and John Palamara ("Palamara") and Chief of Police
Thomas Vannoy ("Vannoy") of the Police Department of Temple, Texas.
Jackson alleged that Scharf and Palamara violated his
constitutional rights when they stopped a car in which he was
riding, seized evidence and arrested him without probable cause.
Jackson also alleged that his rights were impinged because Vannoy
inadequately trained his officers. Jackson argued that the illegal
arrest caused the State's Attorney to seek a revocation of his
previous sentence of probation.
The magistrate judge held a Spears1 hearing to allow Jackson
1Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.1985).
1

an opportunity to expound his claims. At the hearing, Jackson
explained that he was serving a ten-year sentence for indecency
with a child. He initially received a sentence of ten years of
probation, but his probation was revoked because of the charges
arising out of the arrest that gave rise to this lawsuit.
Jackson's parole on other charges was also revoked as a result of
this incident. Jackson complained that he lost his freedom as a
result of the illegal arrest, and he noted than an appeal of the
revocation of his probation was pending.
Jackson filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing
that he was entitled to a judgment regarding the defendants'
liability for false imprisonment. The magistrate judge addressed
the merits of Jackson's claims, recommended that the defendants'
motion to dismiss be granted and recommended that Jackson's motion
for partial summary judgment be denied. The district court adopted
the findings of the magistrate judge, granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss and denied Jackson's motion for partial summary
judgment.
The district court dismissed Jackson's suit pursuant to
FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). We review de novo the dismissal for failure
to state a claim.2
The district court erred in determining that Jackson lacked
standing to challenge the stop of the vehicle by Palamara. In
United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1091 n. 6 (5th Cir.1993),
2See Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dept., 958 F.2d 616,
618 (5th Cir.1992).
2

cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1383, 128 L.Ed.2d 58 (1994),
this Court held that a passenger has standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a vehicle stop because a stop results in a
seizure of the passenger. Nevertheless, we find the district
court's error is harmless because Jackson's testimony at the Spears
hearing reveals that his claim is not ripe under Heck v. Humphrey.3
A complaint, as amended by a Spears hearing,4 may be
dismissed pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by the defendant or by
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) if it lacks an arguable basis in law.5 The
dispositive issue is whether Jackson's § 1983 complaint is ripe.
In Heck, the Supreme Court directed that:
[i]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
--- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2372 (footnote omitted). Heck
requires the district court to consider "whether a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of
3--- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).
4See Adams v. Hansen, 906 F.2d 192, 194 (5th Cir.1990)
(Spears hearing is not a trial on the merits but is in the nature
of an amended complaint or more definite statement).
5Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28, 109 S.Ct. 1827,
1832-33, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); Sullivan v. Internal Affairs
Dep't, No. 93-8771, 25 F.3d 1043 (5th Cir. June 2, 1994)
(unpublished).
3

his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction
or sentence has already been invalidated." Id. In addition to
convictions and sentences, Heck applies to proceedings which call
into question the fact or duration of parole. See Cotton v. Texas
Dep't Criminal Justice, No. 94-10532, 35 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. Aug.
26, 1994) (parole proceeding) (unpublished). Cotton indicates that
Heck should also apply to proceedings that call into question the
fact or duration of probation.
A judgment in favor of Jackson on his illegal seizure claim
would necessarily imply the invalidity of the revocation of his
probation and parole.6 It logically follows that Heck applies to
Jackson's probation and parole revocation proceedings. Jackson has
not demonstrated that his current sentence has already been
invalidated. He does not allege that any revocation proceeding has
been reversed, expunged, set aside by a state court, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Thus, Jackson's action is not cognizable under § 1983 at this time,
and we need not address the arguments Jackson has raised on appeal.
The appeal is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

6See Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d 507, 509
(Tex.Crim.App.1976) (probation); Garrett v. State, 791 S.W.2d
137, 140 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (parole).
4