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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 94-60481
Summary Calendar
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
JORGE MARISIO-GONZALEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
_________________________
(February 17, 1995)
Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jorge Marisio-Gonzalez ("Gonzalez") appeals the denial of his
motion to correct illegal sentence under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
Gonzalez was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute approximately 900 kilograms of cocaine, possession with
intent to distribute the same amount of cocaine, and interstate
travel in aid of racketeering. He was sentenced to a 168-month

term of imprisonment on the conspiracy charge; a concurrent 120-
month term on the possession charge, followed by a five-year term
of supervised release; and five years of probation to run concur-
rently with his supervised release. Gonzalez's conviction was
affirmed on direct appeal. United States v. Ruiz, 987 F.2d 243
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 163 (1993).
The Parole Commission issued a notice that Gonzalez was
eligible for "presumptive parole" on January 25, 1996. In response
to Gonzalez's request for an administrative remedy, the Commission
subsequently notified him that he was not eligible for parole on
the sentence for conspiracy but only on the sentence for drug
possession.1 Gonzalez's administrative appeal of this decision was
denied.
Gonzalez then filed a motion for clarification of the judgment
imposing his sentence. The district court construed Gonzalez's
motion as one challenging his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.
Gonzalez next filed a motion to correct his sentence under
rule 35. The district court again denied his motion for lack of
jurisdiction for the same reasons. Gonzalez filed another rule 35
motion, challenging the imposition, and not the execution, of his
sentence. The court issued a memorandum opinion holding that
Gonzalez's entire sentence was a pre-guidelines sentence and was
without parole under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act ("ADAA"), which was in
1 Both of the notices issued by the Commission erroneously determined
that Gonzalez was eligible for parole on all or part of his sentence.
2

effect at the time that the offenses were committed. The Commis-
sion subsequently notified Gonzalez that he was not eligible for
parole on any part of his sentence.
Gonzalez then filed the instant rule 35 motion, alleging that
(1) the denial of parole on his entire sentence is a denial of due
process, and (2) his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
rule 35 motion within 120 days of the denial of his certiorari
petition. The district court denied his motion, holding that
Gonzalez's counsel was not ineffective but refusing to reconsider
its decision upholding the validity of Gonzalez's sentence.
II.
Gonzalez argues that the district court erred in holding that
his sentence for the drug conspiracy conviction was without parole
under the pre-guidelines law in effect at the time the offense was
committed. He contends that the district court improperly imposed
a more onerous sentence without parole after he sought clarifica-
tion of the sentence.
Gonzalez was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 900
kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Section 846
then provided that the statutory penalty for a conspiracy under
that provision was the same imprisonment as that prescribed for the
object offense. Bifulco v. United States, 477 U.S. 381, 383
(1980). The "object offense" for which Gonzalez was convicted was
possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841.
3

Gonzalez's involvement in the drug conspiracy continued until
August 1987. At that time, the Sentencing Guidelines had not yet
been enacted. Section 841 of Title 21 was amended by section 1002
of the ADAA, effective on October 27, 1986. See Gozlon-Peretz v.
United States, 498 U.S. 395, 409 (1991); United States v. Robles-
Pantoja, 887 F.2d 1250, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1989). Section 1002
changed § 841(b)(1)(A) to provide that "[n]o person sentenced under
this subparagraph shall be eligible for parole during the term of
imprisonment imposed therein." This version of § 841 remained in
effect until the guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987.
This court has not addressed the issue of whether the "no
parole" provision of § 841, as amended by the ADAA, applies to a
§ 846 drug conspiracy conviction that was committed during the time
that the ADAA was in effect. We have held, however, that the
supervised release provision of § 841, as amended by the ADAA,
applies to a § 846 conspiracy that began in early 1986 and
continued until July 1987. See United States v. Smith, 32 F.3d
194, 196 (5th Cir. 1994).
Other circuits have held that the ADAA's "no parole" provision
applies to § 846 drug conspiracies committed between October 27,
1986, and October 31, 1987. See Dyer v. United States, 23 F.3d
1424, 1425-26 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Giltner,
972 F.2d 1563, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2383 (1993). Because we have previously applied the ADAA's
supervised release provisions to conspiracies committed during the
period in question, and because other circuits have applied the
4

ADAA's "no parole" provision to such conspiracies, we now hold that
the ADAA's "no parole" provision applies to Gonzalez's § 846
conspiracy.2
AFFIRMED.
2 Gonzalez requests appointment of counsel for oral argument. The
interests of justice do not require oral argument or the appointment of
counsel in this case. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(3).
5