Fifth Circuit Court Cases - Case Law and Opinions from the 5th Circuit Federal Court - Court of Appeals

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinions - 5th Circuit
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -CLICK HERE

This opinion or court case is from the Fifth Circuit Court or Appeals. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 94-60526.
Abel ALONZO, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI, a Texas Jurisdiction, et al., Defendants-
Appellees.
Nov. 10, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas.
Before KING, DAVIS and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The plaintiffs, Hispanic citizens of Corpus Christi, Texas and
the League of United Latin American Citizens, challenge the
district court's determination that this case was properly removed
to federal court and further assert that the district court erred
in finding that they failed to show that the current election
process for Corpus Christi City officials violates the Texas ERA or
the Voting Rights Act. We affirm.
I. FACTS
Prior to 1982, all members of the Corpus Christi City Council
were elected in at-large elections. In Alonzo v. Jones, C.A. No.
C-81-227 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 3, 1983), (Alonzo I ) the plaintiffs
successfully challenged this method of electing city council
members as discriminatory against Mexican Americans. The court
entered a consent decree ordering Corpus Christi (the City) to
conduct elections under the so-called 5-3-1 system currently in
1

place. Under the 5-3-1 system, five members of the city council
are elected from single member districts, three are elected at
large and the mayor is elected at large. The Alonzo I court
declared that this system would "insure to Plaintiffs and to the
class they represent an equal opportunity with other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
city councilmen of their choice." Id.
In 1991, the plaintiffs filed this suit in Texas State
District Court challenging the apportionment of the single member
districts and the overall composition of the 5-3-1 election system
under the Texas ERA. The City removed this suit to federal court
on the ground that a state court judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs would conflict with the federal court's consent decree
in Alonzo I.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Removal
The district court held that this case was properly removed
under the "refusal clause" of 28 U.S.C. § 1443(2).1 The "refusal
1Section 1443 provides:
1443 Civil rights cases
Any of the following civil actions or criminal
prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed
by the defendant to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the
place wherein it is pending:
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from
any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to
do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent
with such law.
2

clause" allows state officials to remove civil rights actions
against them to federal court when they demonstrate:
a colorable conflict between state and federal law leading to
[their] refusal to follow plaintiff's interpretation of state
law because of a good faith belief that to do so would violate
federal law.
White v. Wellington, 627 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir.1980) (quotation
omitted). If no colorable conflict between state and federal law
exists then removal is improper. News-Texan Inc. v. City of
Garland, Texas, 814 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir.1987) (affirming remand
to state court on the ground that city's assertion of conflict was
patently invalid).
In this case, the district court found that the City alleged
a colorable conflict between the consent decree from Alonzo I which
mandates the 5-3-1 system and the Texas ERA which, according to the
plaintiffs' interpretation, requires the City to hold elections
under some other system. The district court noted that if this
case were decided by the state court in favor of the plaintiffs,
the City would be in the "intolerable position" of having to choose
which of the conflicting court orders to follow in upholding its
residents' civil rights.
We agree. The 5-3-1 system was implemented under federal
court supervision for the express purpose of guaranteeing "Hispanic
residents of the City of Corpus Christi, Texas equal access to the
political procedures leading to nomination or election of City
Council members and Mayor and an equal opportunity with other
28 U.S.C.A. § 1443 (West 1994) (emphasis added).
3

members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice." Alonzo I, C.A. No.
C-81-227 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 3, 1983). Any challenge of the City's use
of this system in its elections necessarily implicates the rights
of all voters in Corpus Christi and could change the balance of
rights that the federal court found required the 5-3-1 system.
This presents a colorable conflict between state and federal law
sufficient to justify removal under § 1443(2).
B. ERA and the Voting Rights Act.
The district court viewed the plaintiffs' evidence in the
totality of the circumstances and held that it failed to establish
that the 5-3-1 plan violates the Voting Rights Act or the Texas
ERA. Plaintiffs' allegations of discrimination were based on the
relatively few Mexican-American candidates who have been elected to
City positions. However, the district court did not err in
concluding that these election results are better explained by
factors other than discrimination such as low voter turnout among
Mexican-Americans and the fact that in many of the elections, the
first choice of Mexican-American voters was not the Mexican-
American candidate. Indeed, the City produced evidence that the
first choice of Mexican-American voters is often elected. The fact
that this candidate is not also a Mexican-American does not lead
inexorably to the conclusion that the City's system of electing
officials is discriminatory.2
2Neither party argued before the district court that Shaw v.
Reno should inform the court's analysis. See Shaw v. Reno, ---
U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (race-based
4

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
* * * * * *

redistricting subject to strict scrutiny). See also Miller v.
Johnson, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995)
(decided after the district court's judgment in this case;
holding that an allegation that race was the dominant reason for
drawing district lines was sufficient to require strict scrutiny
analysis). Because we affirm the district court, we need not
consider the possibility that these cases undermine plaintiffs'
claims.
5