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United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 95-20646.
Raymond REECE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
April 10, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas.
Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Reece is an employee of HL & P, subject to a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) which contains a mandatory grievance and
arbitration procedure. Reece filed suit against HL & P in state
court, alleging that, on the basis of his race, he was (1) denied
promotions and training; (2) retaliated against for engaging in a
protected activity; and (3) subjected to the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Reece never filed a grievance
under the CBA, and the time for doing so has run.
HL & P answered and removed the case to federal court. The
district court denied Reece's motion to remand, concluding that §
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) preempted Reece's
causes of action. See 29 U.S.C. § 141, et seq. The district court
then granted HL & P's motion for summary judgment, finding that
Reece's claims were barred because of his failure to exhaust his
mandatory administrative remedies under the CBA.
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Reece appeals only the remand issue.
II. ANALYSIS
At issue is whether the district court properly concluded
that § 301 of the LMRA preempted Reece's claims. Preemption is a
question of law reviewed de novo. Baker v. Farmers Elec. Coop.,
Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir.1994). If the resolution of
Reece's claims will require "interpretation" of the CBA, then the
state-law remedies upon which Reece relies are preempted by § 301
of the LMRA. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S.
399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). Thus, the dispute is
whether the CBA must be interpreted in resolving Reece's claims.
A. Discrimination Claim:
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
Texas Labor Code, Reece would have to prove that he (1) was a
member of a protected class; (2) suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) was treated dissimilarly from non-protected
employees. Farrington v. Sysco Food Serv., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247,
251 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). If Reece
were to establish a prima facie case, HL & P would then have the
burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the allegedly unequal treatment. Id. Then the burden would shift
back to Reece to prove that the articulated reason was a pretext
for unlawful discrimination. Id.
Reece's discrimination claim turns on questions of promotion,
seniority, and assignment to training programs, all of which are
provided for in the CBA. HL & P will undoubtedly rely on the CBA
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as its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Reece's treatment.
When Reece then attempts to show that HL & P's stated reason is
pretextual, the CBA would have to be interpreted because Reece
would have to challenge HL & P's rights under the CBA. Thus, the
interpretation of the CBA "is made necessary by an employer
defense." Rebecca Hanner White, Preemption of State Law Claims:
A Model for Analysis, 41 Ala.L.Rev. 377, 427 (1989).
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim:
For Reece to sustain his claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Texas law, he must prove that (1) HL & P
acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) HL & P's conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (3) such conduct caused emotional
distress; and (4) such distress was severe. Baker, 34 F.3d at
280. In order to evaluate whether HL & P's conduct was
"outrageous," the conduct must be measured against the CBA.
Thus, the resolution of Reece's claims will require
interpretation of the CBA. Therefore, the claims are pre-empted by
§ 301 of the LMRA.
We acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit has taken a much more
lenient view of preemption of state law discrimination claims.
See, e.g., Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743,
748 (9th Cir.1993) ("In every case in which we have considered an
action brought under the California Employment Act, we have held
that it is not preempted by section 301.") (collecting cases).
Nevertheless, we find that Lingle mandates our analysis.
This result is strengthened by the policies behind preemption
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in this context. The Supreme Court has recognized the unique need
for uniformity in the interpretation of labor contracts:
The possibility that individual contract terms might have
different meanings under state and federal law would
inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the
negotiation and administration of collective agreements.
Because neither party could be certain of the rights which it
had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an
agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by the
necessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in such
a way as to contain the same meaning under two or more systems
of law which might someday be invoked in enforcing the
contract.... The ordering and adjusting of competing
interests through a process of free and voluntary collective
bargaining is the keystone of the federal scheme to promote
industrial peace. State law which frustrates the effort of
Congress to stimulate the smooth functioning of that process
thus strikes at the very core of federal labor policy.
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04, 82
S.Ct. 571, 577, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962) (citations omitted).
Reece argues that the right to be free of discrimination is
a non-negotiable state-law right that cannot be altered or waived
by agreement. Nevertheless, Lingle forecloses such an argument:
"It is conceivable that a State could create a remedy that,
although nonnegotiable, nonetheless turned on an interpretation of
a collective-bargaining agreement for its application. Such a
remedy would be pre-empted by § 301." Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407 n.
7, 108 S.Ct. at 1882 n. 7. The situation described by the Lingle
Court is the situation presented in this case.
The district court's denial of the motion to remand is
therefore AFFIRMED.

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