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United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 96-30583.
TRICO MARINE OPERATORS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
FALCON DRILLING COMPANY, Defendant,
Falrig Offshore Limited, Defendant-Appellant,
Falrig 18, Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit, Movant-Appellant.
June 30, 1997.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana.
Before W. EUGENE DAVIS, STEWART and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the question of whether the appellee is
entitled to a maritime lien for its supply boat services it
provided to an offshore drilling vessel. We agree with the
district court that appellee is entitled to a lien. We therefore
affirm.
I.
In October 1992, Century Offshore Management Corporation
(Century) entered into a "Daywork Drilling Contract" (Contract)
with Falcon Drilling Company (Falcon) which provided in part for
Century's use of the drilling vessel, FALRIG 18. The FALRIG 18 was
owned by Falrig Offshore Limited (Falrig) and operated by Falcon.
The contract, in addition to providing for Century's use of the
FALRIG 18, included passages defining the responsibilities of the
two parties while the vessel was engaged in prospecting for oil in
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the Gulf of Mexico. Century agreed to pay Falcon $15,000 per day
for the use of the vessel with crew. Century personnel, however,
provided general supervision to the crew, such as directing the
vessel where to prospect for oil. The contract also delineated the
necessary equipment and supplies each party was obliged to provide
for the operation of the vessel. For example, Century was required
to provide drinking water for the crew, fuel for the drilling
vessel, and the materials essential for drilling operations such as
pipe casing and drilling fluids. Century was also required to
provide vessels to transport the equipment and supplies to the
FALRIG 18 in the Gulf of Mexico.
Century contracted with appellee Trico Marine Operators Inc.
(Trico) to furnish supply boats to transport supplies and equipment
to the FALRIG 18 while she was drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.
Trico provided either the M/V JAMES RIVER or the M/V BIG HORN RIVER
under a time charter to Century to perform these services. These
vessels transported equipment and supplies to sustain the crew of
the FALRIG 18 and support the vessels's drilling activities. Trico
billed Century for the service of the JAMES RIVER and BIG HORN
RIVER. Century owed Trico for these services when Century filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. In addition to asserting a claim
in Century's bankruptcy proceeding, Trico asserted an in rem claim
against the FALRIG 18. Falcon challenged Trico's right to a
maritime lien on the vessel. The district court overruled Falcon's
objection and recognized Trico's maritime lien. This appeal
followed.
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II.
A.
Under the Maritime Lien Act (the "Act"), a person providing
necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person
authorized by the owner (l ) has a maritime lien on the vessel;
(2) may bring a civil action in rem to enforce the lien; and (3)
is not required to allege or prove that credit was given to the
vessel. 46 U.S.C. � 31342(a)(Supp.1997). The Act also provides
that in addition to the vessel owner, the master or the person
entrusted with the management of the vessel at the port of supply,
an officer or agent appointed by the owner or a "charterer" of a
vessel is presumed to have authority to procure necessaries for the
vessel. 46 U.S.C. � 31341 (Supp.1997).
In order to determine whether Trico is entitled to a maritime
lien for its supply boat services that it provided to the FALRIG
18, we must resolve two questions: (l ) whether Century was
authorized by the owner of the FALRIG 18 to engage the services of
Trico's supply vessels; and, (2) if so, whether the services Trico
provided were "necessaries" within the meaning of the Act.
B.
As indicated above, the Act provides that a "charterer" is
presumed to have authority to procure necessaries for a vessel. We
first consider therefore whether Century is a "charterer" of the
FALRIG 18 within the meaning of the Act.
The Act does not define "charterer." This court, however,
has described a charter as "an arrangement where one person (the
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"charterer') becomes entitled to the use of the whole of a vessel
belonging to another (the "owner')."1 Our definition is consistent
with that of the leading commentators. See e.g., Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law � 11-1 at 169 (2d
Ed.1994)(defining a charter party as a "specialized form of
contract for the hire of an entire ship.... The Party that obtains
the use and service of the ship is called the charterer or
shipper...."); Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, The Law of
Admiralty � 4-1 (2d ed.1975)(defining charter as the "document in
which are set forth the arrangements and contractual engagements
entered into when one person ("the charterer') takes over the use
of the whole of a ship belonging to another (the "owner')"). Based
in part on these definitions of charter, the district court
concluded that Century was a charterer of the FALRIG 18 and
therefore had presumed authority to procure necessaries from Trico
for the vessel. We agree.
Under the terms of the Contract, Falrig, through Falcon,
provided the drilling vessel FALRIG 18 together with the crew and
equipment to Century at an operating rate of $15,000 per day.
Falcon agreed to furnish the rig for the drilling of one well and
granted an option to Century for the use of the rig for drilling an
additional well. In Fontenot v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207
(5th Cir.1986), we characterized a similar contract for the use of
a drilling vessel as a "charter agreement for a vessel" and
described the parties to that agreement as rig owner and rig
1Walker v. Braus, 995 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir.1993).
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charterer. Id. at 1209, 1214. See also Lewis v. Keyes 303, 834
F.Supp. 191, 195 (S.D.Tex.1993)(holding that a "Daywork Drilling
Contract" was an charter agreement because it provided that Union
Oil would have use of a drilling vessel belonging to another,
Marine Drilling Company).
Falrig argues that Century cannot be characterized as a
"charterer" for purposes of the Act because Falcon's arrangement
with Century is neither a time, voyage, nor bareboat charter. We
do not address the merits of this argument, however, because the
Act attaches no significance to the specific type of charter
agreement entered into by the parties. As indicated above, the Act
simply provides that a "charterer" is presumed to have authority to
procure necessaries for the vessel. Century, by contracting to use
a vessel, FALRIG 18, belonging to another, satisfies the definition
of a charterer; as a result, Century is presumed under the Act to
have authority to procure necessaries for the FALRIG 18.2
C.
We turn now to the question of whether the supply boat
services provided by Trico were "necessaries" under the Act. As
stated above, those supplies included drinking water and food for
the crew as well as drilling equipment and supplies to support the
drilling activities conducted by the vessel. The Act gives an
illustrative list of goods and services that are necessaries,
including "repairs, supplies, towage, ... or any other necessaries,
2No language in the contract purports to preclude Century from
incurring a lien.
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to any vessel...." 46 U.S.C. � 31301(4). In Equilease v. M/V
SAMPSON, 793 F.2d 598, 603 (5th Cir.1986)(en banc), this court
explained that necessaries include "most goods or services that are
useful to the vessel, keep her out of danger and enable her to
perform her particular function." Id. See e.g., Farrell Ocean
Services, Inc. v. U.S., 681 F.2d 91, 93 (1st Cir.1982)(holding that
Carriage of one vessel by another is a necessary); Port Ship
Service, Inc. v. Int'l Ship Management & Agencies Service, Inc.,
800 F.2d 1418, 1421 (5th Cir.1986)(holding that water taxi services
give rise to a lien).
We agree with the district court that Trico's services of
transporting the supplies and equipment which were essential to
sustain the crew and operations aboard the FALRIG 18 were
necessaries. See Equilease, 793 F.2d at 604(stating that since
"insurance is essential to keep a vessel in commerce, insurance is
a "necessary' " under the Act).
III.
In sum, we conclude that Century was a charterer of the FALRIG
18 and thus had presumed authority under the Maritime Lien Act to
procure necessaries for the vessel. We also conclude that Trico's
supply boat services were necessaries under the Act. We therefore
hold that Trico is entitled to a lien on the FALRIG 18 for these
services under 46 U.S.C. � 31342(a)(1) of the Maritime Lien Act.
The district court's order is accordingly affirmed.
AFFIRMED.

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