Fifth Circuit Court Cases - Case Law and Opinions from the 5th Circuit Federal Court - Court of Appeals

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinions - 5th Circuit
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -CLICK HERE

This opinion or court case is from the Fifth Circuit Court or Appeals. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

REVISED
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 96-50508
_______________
PEDRO MUNIZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
VERSUS
GARY L. JOHNSON, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division,
Respondent-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
_________________________
May 20, 1997
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Pedro Muniz, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals the denial
of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We vacate the district
court's certificate of probable cause ("CPC") and remand the entire
case to allow the district court to decide whether a certificate of
appealability ("COA"), specifying which issues warrant review,
should issue.
I.

In February 1986, Muniz was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death for the 1977 murder and rape of a college
student. See Muniz v. Texas, 851 S.W.2d 238, 242-43, 246 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993). After Muniz unsuccessfully sought state habeas
review, he filed a federal habeas petition, raising twenty-two
claims for relief. The district court denied the writ in a
comprehensive, 101-page opinion on June 6, 1996, and a few days
later granted Muniz a CPC.
II.
Prior to the enactment of § 102 of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214, 1217-18 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2253), a
habeas petitioner had to receive a CPC to appeal. See 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2253 (West 1994). Section 2253, as amended by the AEDPA, now
requires the petitioner to receive a COA, and this requirement
applies to petitioners who did not receive a CPC prior to April 24,
1996, the effective date of the AEDPA. See Drinkard v. Johnson, 97
F.3d 751, 755-56 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1114
(1997).
The standard for obtaining a COA is the same as for a CPC.
See id. at 756. There is, nonetheless, at least one significant
difference: A COA, unlike a CPC, must "indicate which specific
issue or issues satisfy the showing required . . . ." 28 U.S.C.
2

§ 2253(c)(3).1
The district court, acting before we decided Drinkard, granted
Muniz a CPC that did not specify which issues, if any, warrant
appellate review. This CPC does not comply with § 2253(c)(3) and,
therefore, is insufficient to vest jurisdiction in this court.
Requiring the state to respond to Muniz's appeal without the
benefit of knowing which issues are worthy of appeal "would . . .
nullify this newly amended section by transforming the application
for a COA into an appeal on the merits." Lucas v. Johnson, 101
F.3d 1045, 1046 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
III.
We must determine whether we should decide ourselves whether
a COA should issue or, instead, should remand to the district
court.2 First, we turn to the text of FED. R. APP. P. 22(b), as
amended by § 103 of the AEDPA. Rule 22(b) states:
1 A limited exception applies where the petitioner presented only one issue
to the district court. In such a case, we do not require the technicality of
specifying that lone issue. See Else v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 82, 83 (5th Cir. 1997)
(per curiam) (on reconsideration).
2 We previously ordered the state to file a brief addressing whether, and
on which issues, a COA should issue. At the time we issued this briefing order,
it would have been imprudent to remand, as this court had not decided whether
district courts have the power to issue COA's. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)
("Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate or appealability, an
appeal may not be taken . . . .") with FED. R. APP. P. 22(b) ("[T]he district
judge who rendered the judgment shall either issue a certificate of appealability
or state the reasons why such a certificate should not issue."). We now know
that district courts have the power to issue COA's. See Else, 104 F.3d at 83;
accord United States v. Asrar, 108 F.3d 217, 218 (9th Cir. 1997) (order); Houchin
v. Zavaras, 107 F.3d 1465, 1468-69 (10th Cir. 1997); Lozada v. United States, 107
F.3d 1011, 1015-16 (2d Cir. 1997); Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d
1063, 1067-73 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3648 (U.S. May 12, 1997)
(No. 96-1461); Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1573-83 (11th Cir. 1996)
(en banc), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3648 (U.S. May 12, 1997) (No. 96-1443).
3

If an appeal is taken by the applicant, the district
judge who rendered the judgment shall either issue a
certificate of appealability or state the reasons why
such a certificate should not issue. The certificate or
the statement shall be forwarded to the court of appeals
with the notice of appeal and the file of the proceedings
in the district court. If the district judge has denied
the certificate, the applicant for the writ may then
request issuance of the certificate by a circuit
judge. . . .
A district court must deny the COA before a petitioner can request
one from this court. The rule contemplates that the district court
will make the first judgment whether a COA should issue and on
which issues, and that the circuit court will be informed by the
district court's determination in its own decisionmaking. Cf.
Lyons, 105 F.3d at 1076 n.18 ("The Rule does not, however, give us
the authority to correct a faulty certificate sua sponte.").
Second, deciding the COA issue ourselves risks inconsistent
adjudication. Conceivably, we might decide that none of Muniz's
claims for relief "make[s] a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right," and deny the COA. Yet, the district court
presumably must have found that at least one of his claims meetS
this standard, or it would not have issued the CPC. It would be
ironic, in other words, if the district court's failure to
anticipate Drinkard resulted in Muniz's losing his right to appeal.
Third, we are cognizant of the district court's superior
familiarity with this habeas petition. Its considerable experience
with this case should allow it accurately to determine which issues
satisfy the COA requirement.
Finally, we note that two of our sister circuits have taken
the same action in almost identical situations. See Porter v.
4

Gramley, No. 96-2205, 1997 WL 202199, at *3 (7th Cir. Apr. 25,
1997); Lyons, 105 F.3d at 1076 & n.18. Therefore, we conclude that
when a district court issues a CPC or COA that does not specify the
issue or issues warranting review, as required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(3), the proper course of action is to remand to allow the
district court to issue a proper COA, if one is warranted.3
The CPC is VACATED, and this matter is REMANDED for further
consideration, as we have directed.
3 Although we assume the district court will issue a COA, we do not intend
to bind the court's hands. Recent caselaw, especially our holding that the
standards of review contained in § 104 of the AEDPA apply to pending habeas
petitions, see Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 764-66, may lead the district court to
reconsider its earlier decision.
5