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United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit
No. 96-50615.
Joe Calderon CAMPOS, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellee.
Aug. 25, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joe Calderon Campos appeals the denial of his petition for
release under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He contends that the United States
Parole Commission does not have the statutory authority to return
him to prison because the Commission's jurisdiction over him ended
after the expiration of the two-year term of imprisonment imposed
after the revocation of his term of special parole.
Under former 21 U.S.C. § 841(c),1 the Commission may revoke a
term of special parole if the parolee violates the terms and
conditions of parole. We have held, however, that "when the USPC
cancels or rescinds a term of special parole, nothing in former
1Although Congress has repealed the relevant portion of the
statute, it continues to govern defendants convicted of criminal
conduct that occurred before November 1, 1987. Munguia v. United
States Parole Comm'n, 871 F.2d 517, 521 n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 856, 110 S.Ct. 161, 107 L.Ed.2d 119 (1989);
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, tit.
II, § 224(a)(2), 98 Stat.1987, 2030 (1984) (formerly § 224(a)(6),
renumbered by Pub.L. No. 99-570, tit. I, § 1005(a)(2), 100 Stat.
3207, 3207-6 (1986)).
1

section 841(c) provides it with additional authority to impose a
second term." Artuso v. Hall, 74 F.3d 68, 71 (5th Cir.1996).
Without this authority, Campos contends, the government was
required to release him when his extra two-year term of
imprisonment expired.
Artuso did not reach the question of the Commission's powers
beyond imposing a second term of special parole. We agree with the
government that former § 841(c) does not entirely eliminate the
Commission's jurisdiction upon revocation of special parole. The
statute states that once special parole is revoked,
the original term of imprisonment shall be increased by the
period of the special parole term and the resulting new term
of imprisonment shall not be diminished by the time which was
spent on special parole. A person whose special parole term
has been revoked may be required to serve all or part of the
remainder of the new term of imprisonment.
In other words, when Campos violated the terms of his special
parole, a 25-year term of imprisonment automatically took its
place. The fact that the Commission initially required Campos to
serve only two years of this 25-year term did not extinguish the
remainder of the expanded sentence. The Commission retains
jurisdiction over Campos until the end of the new 25-year term.
Our understanding of § 841(c) puts us in agreement with other
circuits that have considered the question. See Fowler v. United
States Parole Comm'n, 94 F.3d 835, 839-40 (3d Cir.1996) (treating
release from incarceration after revocation of special parole as
"traditional" parole); Evans v. United States Parole Comm'n, 78
F.3d 262, 264 (7th Cir.1996) ("[T]he first revocation turns special
parole into regular imprisonment, release from which is normal
2