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Revised November 9, 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
___________________________
No. 97-50995
___________________________
IN THE MATTER OF DAVID H. CROCKETT AND LELA A. CROCKETT,
Debtors,
DAVID H. CROCKETT AND LELA A. CROCKETT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
JOHN PATRICK LOWE,
Trustee-Appellee.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
___________________________________________________
November 3, 1998
Before REAVLEY, DAVIS, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether a wave
runner1 qualifies as exempt personal property in a bankruptcy
proceeding under the "athletic and sporting equipment" exemption
found in TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(8). We conclude that the
appellants' wave runner is not exempt as athletic or sporting
1 A wave runner, generically known as a jet ski, is a small
motorized vehicle designed to transport one or two persons over the
water.

equipment and therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
In January of 1997, Appellants David H. Crockett and Lela A.
Crockett ("the Crocketts") filed a voluntary petition for
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Code.
In their Schedule C, the Crocketts claimed a wave runner and its
trailer as exempt "athletic and sporting equipment" under TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(8). Appellants argue that this exemption
should be interpreted broadly, based on the plain meaning of the
statute, to include their wave runner. The trustee argues that the
Texas legislature did not intend the exemption to include boats
such as the appellants' wave runner. Both the bankruptcy court and
the district court agreed with the trustee and held that the wave
runner was not exempt because the equipment sought to be exempted
was limited to "small items for individual use." This appeal
followed.
II.
We review de novo the district court's legal determination
that a wave runner is not exempt property under TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 42.002(a)(8). See Border v. McDaniel, 70 F.3d 841, 842 (5th
Cir.1995).
The debtors claimed personal property exemptions using the
Texas exemption scheme under TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002. This is
permitted in the Bankruptcy Code under 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b).
Appellants argue that a wave runner is clearly "sporting equipment"
under the Texas statute. Appellants also contend that nothing in
2

the statute limits the size, weight or category (i.e., land use
versus water use) of property deemed "athletic and sporting
equipment." Appellants point to the dictionary meaning of
equipment as "implements used in an operation or activity" and
"all the things used in a given work or useful in effecting a given
end." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1981). Appellants also
rely on the liberal construction Texas courts give exemptions. See
In re Swift, 129 F.2d 792, 801 (5th Cir.1997); In re Baldowski,
191 B.R. 102, 105 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) ("Tracing the evolution
of the Texas exemption statute, it is clear that the Legislature
continually expanded the statutes to cover more property.").
III.
The reported bankruptcy court decisions are in general
agreement that boats and watercraft are not exempt as "athletic and
sporting equipment" under TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(8) or its
predecessor statute § 42.002(3)(E),which also required the item to
be reasonably necessary in order to be exempt. These cases have
given different reasons for this conclusion. In the present case,
for example, the bankruptcy court concluded that "athletic and
sporting equipment" should be limited to small items for individual
use. The district court agreed with the bankruptcy court's
conclusion. Other bankruptcy courts have reached the same result
for this and other reasons. See In re Gibson, 69 B.R. 534, 535
(Bankr.N.D. Tex. 1987) (denying a claim of exemption of a 1968
Rivers boat under under § 42.002(3)(E)of the Texas Property Code,
3

holding that athletic and sporting equipment should be limited to
small items for individual use); In re Griffin, 139 B.R. 415, 417
(Bankr.W.D. Tex. 1992) (denying the exemption of a Hobie sailboat
because it was not a small item for individual use); In re Payton,
73 B.R. 31 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.1987) (stating in dicta that a boat
would not qualify as "sporting goods"); In re Cypert, 68 B.R. 449
(Bankr.N.D. Tex. 1987) (denying the exemption of a Glass Par
fishing boat because the debtors would not be able to show that the
boat was "reasonably necessary"). In addition, a Texas appellate
court case held that a boat was not reasonably necessary for the
debtor under § 42.002(3)(E). Hickey v. Couchman, 797 S.W.2d 103
(Tex.App. Corpus Cristi 1990, writ denied).2
IV.
We find the most persuasive argument in support of the
conclusion reached by the bankruptcy court and the district court
is one that is based on a textual analysis of the Texas statute.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.§ 42.002(a)(1-12) provides a comprehensive
list of the personal property that may be claimed exempt. A
comparison of the language in subsections (4) and (8) of this
section gives us insight into the Texas legislature's intent
regarding boats as exempt property.
Section 42.002(a)(4) exempts "tools, equipment, books, and
apparatus, including boats and motor vehicles used in a trade or
2
Because the statute has been amended to delete the
"reasonably necessary" requirement, these cases are not
particularly helpful.
4

profession."(emphasis added). On the other hand, Section
42.002(a)(8), the subsection relevant to today's case, exempts
"athletic or sporting equipment, including bicycles." (emphasis
added).
The textual structure of Sections 42.002(a)(4) and
42.002(a)(8) is quite similar in that both use the word "equipment"
and both contain a modifying clause designed to include items that
might otherwise be omitted from the exemption. Section
42.002(a)(4)'s modifying clause includes "boats and motor
vehicles," whereas Section 42.002(a)(8)'s modifying clause includes
only "bicycles." The absence of the phrase "boats and motor
vehicles" from Section 42.002(a)(8) is conspicuous. The Texas
legislature was obviously aware of the potential ambiguities
surrounding the word "equipment" with regard to boats and motor
vehicles. It then acted to include those items as "equipment"
where it felt such inclusion was appropriate. The fact that
Section 42.002(a)(8) does not include boats and motor vehicles as
examples of "equipment" leads us to conclude that the Texas
legislature made a conscious choice to omit such items from
subsection (a)(8)'s athletic and sporting equipment exemption.
Because the Texas legislature chose to structure § 42.002 in this
manner, we agree with the bankruptcy court and the district court
that the debtors' wave runner is not exempt property.
For the reasons set out above, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
5