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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________
No. 97-60437
(Summary Calendar)
_________________
GEORGE DUNBAR PREWITT, JR, in his own right
and on behalf of his minor son, R.A.P., Ex
Relator State of Mississippi,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF GREENVILLE, MISSISSIPPI; MIKE MOORE,
Mississippi Attorney General,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
December 4, 1998
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
George Dunbar Prewitt, Jr., appeals the district court's order
directing him to retain counsel or suffer dismissal of this suit
without prejudice. We dismiss two of the issues he raises for lack
of appellate jurisdiction and affirm as to the one matter we can
review.
Prewitt, an attorney, brought numerous lawsuits pro se in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi ("Northern District"). In response, Judge Neil
Biggers, Jr., entered a sanctions order, "endorsed by all members
of the court, [that] barr[ed] . . . Prewitt . . . from filing any
new actions in . . . [the Northern District] without obtaining
prior court approval."1 We affirmed. See Prewitt v. Alexander,
No. 96-60220 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion).
Prewitt filed this civil action pro se in state court after
Judge Biggers entered the sanctions order. The City of Greenville
and Attorney General Moore removed to the Northern District.
Eventually, the case arrived on Judge Biggers' docket. Judge
Biggers then entered an order announcing that he would dismiss
without prejudice if Prewitt failed to retain counsel within thirty
days.2
Prewitt appealed Judge Biggers' latest order.3 In his appeal,
he called for remand to state court based on a failure to plead
standing in the notice of removal and the Eleventh Amendment. He
1
We disagree with Prewitt that his right of access to federal court
was "permanently foreclosed" by the sanctions order. Cf. Martin v. Scott, ___
F.3d ___, ___ n.2, 1998 WL 650992, at *2 n.2 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the
contention that the screening procedure established in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
restricts the constitutional right of access to federal court).
2
Prewitt apparently neither tried to learn about the sanctions order's
impact on this case nor attempted to comply with the sanctions order during the
five months or so that passed between removal and the entry of Judge Biggers'
order.
3
In their brief, Greenville and Moore report that this "case has not
been dismissed" and that "[t]he record does not reflect any advocate has entered
an appearance" on Prewitt's behalf.
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also contended that the removal violated his right of access to
Mississippi's courts. Finally, he maintained that forcing him to
hire an attorney to avert dismissal was an affront to his right to
self-representation.
We initially consider our jurisdiction to hear Prewitt's
appeal. Prewitt bears the burden of establishing appellate
jurisdiction. See Gonzalez v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 563 F.2d
776, 777 (5th Cir. 1977). He asserts that the collateral order
doctrine provides us with jurisdiction. Under the collateral order
doctrine, we may exercise jurisdiction over "appeals of non-final
judgments `that are conclusive, that resolve important questions
completely separate from the merits, and that would render such
important questions effectively unreviewable on appeal from final
judgment in the underlying action.'"4 Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d
1000, 1004 n.7 (5th Cir. 1998).
Prewitt's jurisdictional argument partly succeeds. We are
persuaded that his charge of a denial of the right to proceed pro
se comes within the collateral order doctrine. See Devine v.
4
In his initial brief, Prewitt identifies the collateral order
doctrine as the basis for appellate jurisdiction. However, in his reply brief,
he offers further jurisdictional bases. He contends that Judge Biggers' order
is subject to appellate review as a modification of an injunction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1). He also posits that Judge Biggers' order was immediately
appealable as a final order because it disbarred him unconditionally. See id.
§ 1291. We refuse to consider these additional jurisdictional arguments because
Prewitt was obliged under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 to state the
basis for appellate jurisdiction in his initial brief. See FED. R. APP. P.
28(a)(2). But cf. 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2974.3
(2d ed. 1996) (recognizing that an argument relating to subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised for the first time in a reply brief).
-3-

Indian River County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 578-81 (11th Cir. 1997)
(holding denial of motion to proceed pro se to fall within the
collateral order doctrine); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United
States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (deeming a claim of a
violation of the right to self-representation to come within the
collateral order doctrine); O'Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692
F.2d 863, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding denial of motion to
proceed pro se appealable under the collateral order doctrine);
15B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3914.21 (2d
ed. 1992) (supporting application of the collateral order doctrine
to denials of motions to proceed pro se). We, however, cannot say
the same as to the other two issues Prewitt raises. Prewitt offers
no discussion to support finding the collateral order doctrine
applicable to his challenges to the removal's propriety. See FED.
R. APP. P. 28(a)(2) (requiring more than a bare statement on the
basis of appellate jurisdiction in the appellant's initial brief);
see also 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra (describing the statement of
appellate jurisdiction in the appellant's initial brief as
"elaborate"). As to the claim that the removal interfered with the
right of access to state court, the decision on which Prewitt
relies, Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 800 (11th Cir. 1983),
holds the collateral order doctrine to encompass orders denying
press access to ongoing litigation; Newman evinces silence as to
whether or not orders infringing on the right of access to state
-4-

court may be appealed under the collateral order doctrine.
We now turn to the merits of the issue over which we have
jurisdiction. Prewitt maintains that conditioning the prosecution
of this case on him retaining a lawyer, as Judge Biggers did,
contravened his right to proceed pro se under the Mississippi
Constitution. Article 3, Section 25, of the Mississippi
Constitution provides: "No person shall be debarred from
prosecuting or defending any civil cause for or against him or
herself, before any tribunal in the state, by him or herself, or
counsel, or both." MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 25; see also Bullard v.
Morris, 547 So.2d 789, 790 (Miss. 1989) ("[I]t is without question
that the Mississippi Constitution permits a person to represent
himself, pro se, in a civil proceeding."). In Prewitt's view, this
state constitutional guarantee precluded restricting his federal
right to proceed pro se in a removed case, such as this one. See
28 U.S.C. § 1654 ("In all courts of the United States the parties
may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as,
by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage
and conduct causes therein.").
We find no merit to Prewitt's argument. The right to self-
representation under the Mississippi Constitution loses effect upon
a suit's removal to federal court. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v.
Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of
Alameda County, 415 U.S. 423, 437, 94 S. Ct. 1113, 1123, 39 L. Ed.
-5-

2d 435, ___ (1974) ("[O]nce a case has been removed to federal
court, it is settled that federal rather than state law governs the
future course of proceedings . . . ."). We, therefore, find that
Judge Biggers' order did not deprive Prewitt of his right to self-
representation under the Mississippi Constitution.
We hold that the order directing Prewitt to retain counsel or
suffer dismissal without prejudice did not violate the right of a
civil litigant under the Mississippi Constitution to proceed pro
se. Accordingly, we AFFIRM Judge Biggers' order. We DISMISS all
other questions presented by Prewitt for lack of jurisdiction.
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