	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinions - 5th Circuit
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -CLICK HERE

This opinion or court case is from the Fifth Circuit Court or Appeals. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-60304

GERALDINE GAMMAGE
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WEST JASPER SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION; WEST JASPER SCHOOL DISTRICT
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Mississippi

June 28, 1999
Before POLITZ, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
Geraldine Gammage urges that the district court erred in
disposing of her ADA claim on summary judgment on grounds of claim
and issue preclusion. We conclude that issue preclusion bars
Gammage's federal ADA claim, so we AFFIRM.
I.
In February 1995, Principal Elijah J. Buckley delivered a
memorandum to Geraldine Gammage, a veteran teacher in the West
Jasper County School District, advising her that he would recommend
to the School Board that her contract not be renewed for the
following school year. Then, in March 1995, Principal Buckley and
Superintendent Charles Lyle informed Gammage that the West Jasper

School District Board of Trustees had voted to accept Principal
Buckley's recommendation not to renew her contract.
Then, pursuant to Gammage's request and in accordance with
Mississippi's School Employment Procedures Act ("SEPA"), MISS. CODE
ANN. § 37-9-101 et seq., an extensive nonrenewal hearing was
conducted. The hearing covered a period of 11 days and generated
a transcript numbering 2170 pages. In addition, over 60 exhibits
were introduced. Gammage and the school district were both
represented by counsel. On December 22, 1995, the hearing officer
rendered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, wherein he
upheld the nonrenewal decision. The School District's Board of
Trustees subsequently reviewed and adopted the hearing record and
the hearing officer's decision.
On February 8, 1996, Gammage appealed the Board's decision to
the Jasper County Chancery Court, in accordance with the review
mechanisms provided by SEPA. While her appeal to the Chancery
Court was pending, she filed a lawsuit in federal district court
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102,
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 20003, charging
that the School Board and the School District had terminated her
employment on account of a disabling kidney disorder from which she
suffered and for which, she alleged, they had failed to make
reasonable accommodation. On June 11, 1997, the defendants in the
federal suit filed a motion urging the district court to abstain
pursuant to the abstention principles of Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny. On June 24, 1997, while that
2

motion was still pending, the Chancery Court upheld the School
Board's decision. Gammage then filed a notice of appeal to the
Mississippi Supreme Court. On October 2, 1997, the district court
granted the defendants' abstention motion.
Eventually, Gammage voluntarily dismissed her state appeal,
and, as a result, on April 13, 1998, the district court lifted its
stay. Then, on April 22, 1998, the district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the
claim preclusive and issue preclusive effect of the state court
judgment barred Gammage's federal ADA claim. Gammage filed a
timely appeal.
II.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 governs the preclusive effect to be
given the judgments of state courts: a federal court must give to
a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given
that judgment under the law of the state in which the judgment was
rendered. The preclusion doctrines of Mississippi apply here, and
Mississippi law precludes a party from relitigating "a specific
issue actually litigated, determined by, and essential to the
judgment in a former action, even though a different cause of
action is the subject of the subsequent action." Dunaway v. W.H.
Hopper & Assocs., Inc., 422 So. 2d 749, 751 (Miss. 1982).
Gammage's ADA claim rests primarily on a theory of failure to
provide reasonable accomodation. In addition, Gammage's federal
complaint, read generously, alleges an ADA violation on a theory of
animus discrimination. Gammage's complaint also appears to allege
3

an ADA violation based on the School Board's and School District's
use of standards or other criteria that constitute disability
discrimination.
In its opinion, the Chancery Court addressed all three of
Gammage's theories for recovery under the ADA. The court stated
that Gammage's argument for reversal of the Board's decision was
"abject Handicap Discrimination." The Chancery Court continued:
"[T]he Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff has wholly failed to
establish the existence of `abject Handicap Discrimination.'" In
reaching this conclusion, the Chancery Court referred to a section
in its findings of fact that pertained to Gammage's claim of
handicap discrimination. In that section, the Chancery Court
stated:
No witness in these proceedings has testified that
Plaintiff advised Principal Buckley, Superintendent Lyle
or any other member of the faculty or staff of Defendant
of any alleged medical problem which would prevent her
from performing her assigned duties. Plaintiff did not,
in fact, testify to same in her affidavit filed after
completion of the hearing. Exhibit 44 is a letter from
Philip Rogers, M.D., Hattiesburg Clinic, wherein Dr.
Rogers indicates that "After Ms. Gammage has been on
dialysis for approximately 12-13 treatments she should be
reasonably stable and should be able to continue to
function in her classroom as well as she ever has." At
that time, she was taking treatments three times per week
and had already completed some of these 12-13 treatments.
Therefore, it is the conclusion of the Court that any
deficiencies in Plaintiff's job performance was [sic] not
related in any way to her health. There is no evidence
that Mrs. Gammage was discriminated against due to her
health.
Thus, the Chancery Court found that, while the administration
knew of Gammage's disability from the doctor's letter, Gammage had
failed to prove that the administration knew of any work-related
4

limitations that Gammage would experience as a result of her
disability that necessitated accomodation. This court has noted
that the term "discriminate" in the context of the ADA "includes
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability . . . ." Riel v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d
678, 681 (5th Cir. 1996)(emphasis added)(citing 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A)). And, "[f]or purposes of proving ADA
discrimination, it is important to distinguish between an
employer's knowledge of an employee's disability versus an
employer's knowledge of any limitations experienced by the employee
as a result of that disability. This distinction is important
because the ADA requires employers to reasonably accommodate
limitations, not disabilities." Taylor v. Principal Financial
Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the
ADA does not require an employer to assume that an employee with a
disability suffers from a limitation; as a result, it is incumbent
upon the ADA plaintiff to assert not only a disability, but also
any limitation resulting therefrom. See id. Thus, the Chancery
Court's determination on the knowledge issue -- that the School
Board and School District did not know of any limitations stemming
from Gammage's condition which required accomodation -- is relevant
to Gammage's federal ADA lawsuit because, in order to bring a
successful ADA claim based on failure to provide reasonable
accomodation, an employee must prove that the employer knew of the
employee's substantial physical limitation.
5

Furthermore, the Chancery Court concluded in its opinion that
there was no merit to a claim of animus discrimination when it
stated that there was no evidence that the School Board or School
District had discriminated against Gammage due to her health. The
court also negated Gammage's argument that the School Board and
School District instituted standards that screened her out because
of her disability when it determined that the deficiencies that led
to her nonrenewal were unrelated to her condition.
The Chancery Court's conclusions on these issues have
preclusive effect, thereby barring Gammage's federal ADA claim, if
the issues were fully litigated in the administrative proceedings
and if the court's conclusions were essential to its judgment. We
find that the extensive administrative hearing satisfies the
requirement that the issues have been fully litigated. Moreover,
the determinations were essential to the judgment because the
Chancery Court's obligation to review the decision of the School
Board included a statutorily mandated review to determine whether
the decision of the Board violated some statutory or constitutional
right of the employee. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-113 (stating that
the scope of review of the Chancery Court includes a review to
determine if the nonrenewal decision was "in violation of some
statutory or constitutional right of the employee"). That is, the
Chancery Court had to determine whether the nonrenewal decision
violated Gammage's right to be free from disability discrimination,
and the court's conclusions on each of Gammage's alleged grounds
6

for ADA violations were essential to determining that Gammage's
rights were not violated.
III.
In sum, we find that the Chancery Court's determinations
regarding handicap discrimination are issue preclusive and bar
Gammage's federal ADA claim. AFFIRMED.
7