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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
m 98-60692
_______________
AIRBORNE FREIGHT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL,
Defendants,
R.R. MORRISON & SON, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
_________________________
November 23, 1999
Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and
facts, we vacate and remand for purposes of
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
dismissal and of dissolution of the injunction.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
I.
R.R. Morrison & Son, Inc. ("Morrison"),
Airborne Freight Corporation ("Airborne")
seeks dismissal of this interpleader suit and
seeks status as stakeholder to interplead
dissolution of an injunction, on grounds of jur-
Morrison and the Internal Revenue Service
isdiction and equity. Because we agree with
("IRS") to compete for claims to $106,826.36
Morrison that the district court lacked
(the "stake" or "fund") that Airborne owed to
jurisdiction to hear an interpleader on these
GTB Services, Inc. ("GTB"), the insolvent

debtor of Airborne, Morrison, and the IRS.
ture of an interpleader" rather than as a true
After depositing the disputed stake into the
interpleader, because Airborne pleaded its own
registry of the court, Airborne sought
interest in the stake.
dismissal from the interpleader action and an
injunction to prevent Morrison from executing
After final judgment in the prior suit,
a money judgment awarded by another court
denying Airborne's interest in the stake,
against Airborne. The injunction issued.
Airborne disclaimed that interest, filed a mo-
tion to be dismissed from the interpleader ac-
Airborne and GTB were parties to various
tion, and requested an injunction against
contracts in which GTB agreed to provide
Morrison. The interpleader court concluded
cartage services to Airborne. In an unrelated
that the elements of statutory interpleader had
transaction, GTB, to secure credit extended to
been met and noted that absent an injunction
it by Morrison for the purchase of fuel, gave
prohibiting Morrison from executing on the
Morrison a security interest in its accounts re-
prior judgment, Airborne could be subjected to
ceivable due from Airborne under the cartage
double liability. The court then dismissed Air-
contracts.
borne and enjoined Morrison from executing
on its earlier judgment. Morrison appeals,
GTB defaulted on its payments to
asking that we dismiss the interpleader action
Morrison, and as assignee of payments owed
and dissolve the injunction.1
to GTB by Airborne under the cartage
contracts, Morrison sought to enforce its se-
II.
curity interest and gave notice to Airborne.
A.
Airborne refused to pay, claiming it had
The issue is whether the district court had
retained a portion of the accounts payable to
jurisdiction to permit Airborne to maintain an
GTB under a right of setoff in the cartage
interpleader suit involving Morrison and the
contracts.
IRS. We review a district court's assertion of
original jurisdiction de novo, applying the same
Morrison sued Airborne, ultimately obtain-
standard as did the district court. McClelland
ing a $50,000 final, non-appealable general
v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 511 (5th Cir.
money judgment. Both before and after that
1998) (citations omitted).
judgment, the IRS gave statutory notice to
Airborne and Morrison of a tax lien against
B.
GTB in excess of the disputed fund. The IRS
The central prerequisite for a "true"
did not, however, attempt to intervene in the
interpleader actionSSone in which the plaintiff
action between Airborne and Morrison.
is a real stakeholder rather than a
claimant2SSor for an action in the nature of
After the court (the "prior district court")
interpleader, in which the plaintiff-stakeholder
had issued a memorandum opinion, but before
it had issued a final order, Airborne filed the
instant interpleader action, attempting to join
Morrison and the IRS as competing claimants
1 The IRS is not participating in this appeal.
and depositing the disputed fund into the regis-
try of the court. This action arose "in the na-
2 See Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 406-07
(1939) (defining "strict" or "true" interpleader).
2

also makes a claim to the stake,3 is that the
judgment against Airborne.6
plaintiff-stakeholder runs the riskSSbut for
determination in interpleaderSSof multiple
We do not collaterally review and overturn
liability when several claimants assert rights to
orders of other courts that have become final
a single stake.4 The prerequisite arises without
and unappealable, even if we fear the order
regard to whether the plaintiff-stakeholder
may have issued in error.7 Instead, we value
attempts to invoke "rule" interpleader or
finality.8 It follows, then, that Morrison's
"statutory" interpleader.5 Interpleader should
be employed for "the avoidance of the burden
6
of unnecessary litigation or the risk of loss by
The order of the first court cannot reasonably
the establishment of multiple liability when
be read as anything but a general judgment against
only a single obligation is owing." Texas v.
Airborne. Most importantly, the order reads on its
face as a general judgment, satisfiable by any as-
Florida, 306 U.S. at 412.
sets held by Airborne. That court refused to enter
a final order submitted by Airborne that would
Such is not the situation here. Airborne
have limited Morrison's collection rights to the
asserts that Morrison's claim against it must be
accounts-payable fund held by Airborne; the court
drawn from the stake it has tendered to the
refused Airborne's motion to consolidate the IRS's
court. Morrison, however, correctly notes
claim against the fund, because the court thought
that the final order that issued from the prior
the claims of Morrison and the IRS "both . . . seek
court was emphatically not a judgment
money from Airborne, but the similarity in the
collectable against the fund held by Airborne
actions ends there"; and the court made other,
and owed to GTS, but was rather a general
similar manifestations of intent.
It may well be argued that, in rejecting an overt
opportunity to issue a judgment against the fund in
favor of issuing a judgment against Airborne
3 See id. (defining actions in the nature of
generally, the prior court erred. Airborne should,
interpleader).
in fact, have argued exactly that, on appeal of the
prior action. Instead of appealing, however, it
4 See White v. FDIC, 19 F.3d 249, 251 (5th
allowed the general judgment against it to become
Cir. 1994) (defining interpleader as a "procedural
final and unappealable and focused its remedial
device which entitles a person holding money or
efforts on the interpleader action now before us.
property, concededly belonging at least in part to
another, to join in a single suit two or more persons
7 See In Re Teal, 16 F.3d 619, 622 (5th Cir.
asserting mutually exclusive claims to the fund").
1994) (citing Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981)) (noting "the
5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 22 (allowing "plaintiff [to]
well-known rule that a federal court may not abro-
join[] defendants . . . when their claims are such
gate principles of res judicata out of equitable con-
that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or
cerns" and that erroneous legal conclusions do not
multiple liability"); 28 U.S.C. � 1335 (granting
alter the res judicata effect of a final judgment).
original jurisdiction to the district courts in "any
civil action of interpleader or in the nature of
8 See Bennett v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 837,
interpleader" "if two or more adverse claimants . .
839 (5th Cir. 1940), explaining that
. are claiming or may claim to be entitled to such
money or property" as shall have been pleaded into
[r]es judicata is a principle of peace. Under
court).
(continued...)
3

claim is against Airborne, not the stake, and
entitled either claimant to ignore the res
that Morrison cannot be forced to attempt to
entirely and satisfy its claims out of the general
satisfy its general judgment against the stake.
property of the stakeholder. See id.
Airborne attempts to defeat this argument
Similarly, in Mutual Life, the relevant
by relying, along with the district court, on a
claimants held general judgments against a
line of precedent, including Treinies v.
debtor and had filed (or perfected)
Sunshine Mining Company, 308 U.S. 66
garnishment and attachment suits against a
(1939), and Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bohart,
stake (an insurance settlement payable to the
743 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1984), that they have
debtor) held by an insurance agency for the
read to hold that "a stakeholder's right to
debtor. See Mutual Life, 743 F.2d at 316-18.
interplead is not necessarily defeated by the
The insurance agency interpleaded the
fact that an interpleaded claimant has an
judgment-holding claimants and enjoined their
outstanding judgment against the stakeholder."
attempts to satisfy adverse claims against the
In so reading, though, the district court and
stake so that those adverse interests in the
Airborne have misinterpreted these precedents.
stake could be determined in a single litigation,
and without creating overlapping liabilities on
the part of the stakeholder. Id.9 No general
In Treinies, for instance, the interpleaded
judgments had issued against the stakeholder.
claimants held outstanding judgments against
the stakeSSin that case, shares of stock, all of
The cases cited by the district court and by
which had been adjudged the property of one
Airborne, then, establish only the proposition
claimant by an Idaho court, and half of which
that a judgment against a stake does not
had been adjudged the property of another
automatically estop the stakeholder from
claimant by a Washington court. See Treinies,
bringing an interpleader action. We find no
308 U.S. at 68-69. Each judgment
fault with this holding but are not faced with
represented a stake in a fixed res that could
such a situation.
not satisfy both claimants; neither judgment
Rather, the circumstance here is that a party
is a general-judgment creditor of a general-
8(...continued)
judgment debtor, which debtor happens to
its influence an end is put to controversies.
hold a stake in which a third party claims an
Parties and their privies are made to abide
interest. Were the general-judgment debtor
definitive and final judgments and litigations
are concluded. Res judicata rests on a rule
of public policy designed to put an end to
mere contentious litigations. Under that rule
9 The issue in Mutual Life was whether the
an issue once finally settled by the judgment
insurer had mis-distributed a portion of the stake
of a court of competent jurisdiction, remains
prior to the advent of the interpleader action. To
settled. Public policy dictates that there be
the extent that it had, it would have been required
an end of litigation; that those who have
to "re-fill" the stake; it was not, however, generally
contested an issue shall be found by the
liable to the claimants for their general judgments
result of the contest; and that matters once
against the debtor, and no general judgments were
tried shall be considered forever settled as
ever filed against the insurer in favor of the
between the parties.
claimants. See Mutual Life, 743 F.2d at 316-18.
4

bankrupt or otherwise bereft of funds other
than those in the stake, then we would not
thwart the claimant's efforts to satisfy his gen-
eral judgment as best he could from the value
of the stake, as a participant in the interpleader
action. We cannot, however, force a judgment
creditor who holds a general judgment against
a judgment debtor to contest with claimants
who hold an interest only in a stake held by the
judgment debtor, if that judgment creditor
elects to satisfy its judgment out of other as-
sets held by the fully solvent judgment debtor.
The judgment creditorSSMorrisonSShad
declined to attempt to satisfy its claim out of
the stake held by Airborne and pleaded into
court. Morrison prefers to satisfy its general
judgment out of other assets held by Airborne,
which assets are not subject to any contest.
Meanwhile, Airborne has acknowledged the
actions of the prior court at least insofar as to
have disclaimed any interest in the stake
Airborne has interpleaded. This leaves only
one claimant to the stake: the IRS.
If there is only one claimant to a stake, then
by definition there are not overlapping and ad-
verse claims to it. Therefore, the central
prerequisite of interpleader has not been met,
interpleader cannot lie, and the injunction
issued pursuant to the grant of interpleader
cannot stand.
Accordingly, the judgment and injunction
are VACATED, and this matter is
REMANDED with instruction to dismiss the
interpleader action.
5