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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
m 99-30354
_______________
SNYDER OIL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
SAMEDAN OIL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
_________________________
April 13, 2000
Before DAVIS, CYNTHIA HOLCOMB
I.
HALL,* and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Snyder1 and Samedan Oil Corporation
("Samedan") entered into a joint operating
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
agreement ("JOA") for the development of a
federal oil and gas lease granted by the United
States Department of Interior Minerals
Snyder Oil Corporation ("Snyder") appeals
Management Service ("MMS"). The lease
an order granting transfer to the Southern Dis-
covered "Block 261, Main Pass Area, South
trict of Alabama pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
and East Addition," which is located on the
з 1404(a). We affirm.
Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS"). The
* Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
1 Snyder is the parent corporation of SOCO
designation.
Offshore, Inc., and was substituted as the plaintiff.

property is commonly referred to as "Main
the Federal Register such projected lines
Pass 261" or "Block 261."
extending seaward and defining each
such area.
Snyder sued in the Western District of Lou-
isiana, seeking a declaratory judgment
This Congressionally mandated choice of law
regarding the rights of the parties under the
provision trumps any contrary contractual pro-
JOA. Samedan subsequently sued, asserting
visions. See Union Tex. Petroleum Corp. v.
claims in the Southern District of Alabama,
PLT Eng'g, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th
then moved to dismiss or transfer the
Cir. 1990).
Louisiana suit. The court denied the motion to
dismiss but transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
The parties agree that з 1333(a)(2)(A) is
з 1404(a), based on a finding that Alabama
controlling, but Snyder contests the court's
law will govern and that Alabama therefore
application of that section. Because the
has the most interest in the outcome of the
President has not published the "projected
litigation. The court then certified an
lines" required by з 1333(a)(2)(A), the courts
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.
must adjudicate adjacency in private disputes
з 1292(b), and we granted leave to appeal.
governed by OCSLA. We conducted the
required "adjacency determination" in Reeves
The order of transfer was based on a choice
v. B & S Welding, Inc., 897 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.
of law determination, and because Block 261
1990), and the district court and both parties
is located in federal waters on the OCS, the
recognize Reeves as the controlling precedent.
controlling law is found in the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"), 43
The issue is whether the district court's
U.S.C. зз 1331-1356, which vests the United
application of Reeves is correct as a matter of
States with jurisdiction over the soil and
law. The court found Block 261 to be
seabed of the oceans and artificial islands and
"adjacent" to Alabama for purposes of з
fixed structures located thereon, and grants to
1333(a)(2)(A) and therefore held that Alabama
the United States the mineral resources that
law governs the dispute.
are part of the OCS. Section 1333(a)(2)(A) of
that Act provides:
II.
In Reeves, we held that a platform located
To the extent that they are applicable
in the High Island Field in the Gulf of Mexico
. . . the civil and criminal laws of each
was "adjacent" to Texas within the meaning of
adjacent State . . . are hereby declared to
з 1333(a)(2)(A). We considered, inter alia,
be the law of the United States for that
the following evidence:
portion of the subsoil and seabed of the
outer Continental Shelf, and artificial
Testimony and exhibits before the
islands and fixed structures erected
district court showed that [the subject
thereon, which would be within the area
platform] is closer to the Texas coast
of the State if its boundaries were
than to the Louisiana coast. Charts
extended seaward to the outer margin of
submitted by Exxon also indicated that
the outer Continental Shelf, and the
the High Island Field is considered to be
President shall determine and publish in
"adjacent" to Texas, rather than
2

Louisiana, by the United States
would call for more thorough
Department of Interior Bureau of Land
production of evidence and
Management, the United States
consideration by the court. It is also a
Department of Interior Mineral
matter of significant concern to the two
Management Service, the National
states themselves, and they should be
Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration,
heard if that issue were to be litigated.
and the Coast Guard.
Id. Therefore, while Reeves instructs that
Reeves, 897 F.2d at 179.
proposed boundary projections are relevant to
a private dispute, it would be improper for a
We also considered that other courts had
court to hold that a given boundary projection
construed platforms located in the High Island
was conclusively established for purposes of
Field to be adjacent to Texas under OCSLA,
з 1333(a)(2)(A).
specifically citing two Louisiana district court
opinions. See id. at 179-80. Lastly, we
Reeves concludes as follows:
discussed four proposed "boundary
projections," two of which would locate the
It is enough that the record evidence be-
platform in Texas waters and two of which
fore the district court confirms that [the
would locate it in Louisiana waters. See id. at
subject platform] is closer to the Texas
180. In other words, if these lines were
coast than the Louisiana coast, that the
promulgated by the President pursuant to
relevant federal agencies consider [the
OCSLA, two of them would result in the
subject platform] to be off the Texas
platform's being "adjacent" to Texas, and two
coast, that other courts have considered
would result in its being "adjacent" to
other High Island platforms to be
Louisiana.
adjacent to Texas, and that the boundary
between Texas and Louisiana projected
We rejected the appellant's projected lines
out into the Gulf in its original direction
as unsupported but considered both of the ap-
from the shore, places [the subject
pellee's projected lines to be plausible, the lat-
platform] within Texas waters. So also
ter two being "fully consistent with the
does a line projected directly southward
existing Texas/Louisiana boundary established
from the Texas three league territorial
by the Supreme Court." Id. We therefore
boundary. We conclude, therefore, that
determined that "[f]or purposes of this case,
the district court did not err in holding
we need not decide which of appellees [sic]
that [the subject platform] is "adjacent"
proposed boundaries is the proper one,"
to Texas for purposes of the OCSLA.
because under either boundary projection the
platform was "adjacent" to Texas. Id.
Id. While we did not articulate a specific test,
we therefore considered four types of evidence
In considering these projected lines, we
in the "adjacency" analysis: (1) geographic
noted that
proximity; (2) which coast federal agencies
consider the subject platform to be "off of";
[i]t would not be proper in this case to
(3) prior court determinations; and (4) project-
adjudicate the boundary itself. That
ed boundaries.
3

interpretation of Reeves would not alter that
III.
holding. Further, Pittencrieff determined
The President has failed to publish the
"adjacency" on the sole ground of geographic
boundary projections required by OCSLA, and
proximity, because "[n]o party to this action
the responsible federal agency, the MMS,
has disputed that Alabama is the closest state
refused the parties' request to make an
geographically, and no party has provided any
adjacency determination. Therefore, the
reason why Louisiana or Florida should be
district court applied the multi-factored Reeves
considered the adjacent state." Id. at 277.
analysis.
This is entirely consistent with the Reeves
multi-factored analysis; if the parties present
While both parties recognize Reeves as
evidence on only one factor, that factor is
controlling, Snyder requests that we "clarify"
controlling.
Reeves to hold that in the absence of an
express determination of "adjacency" pursuant
Snyder also cites 43 U.S.C. з 1333(c),
to з 1333(a)(2)(A) by an authorized federal
which states that
agency, geographic proximity is
determinative.2 To label this request a
[f]or the purposes of the National Labor
"clarification," Snyder cites a related section of
Relations Act . . . any unfair labor
OCSLA and a district court case stressing
practice . . . occurring upon any artificial
proximity, rejects as irrelevant all federal
island . . . referred to in [з 1333(a)] shall
agency determinations not specific to this
be deemed to have occurred within the
statutory section, claims Reeves's
judicial district of the State, the laws of
consideration of other court opinions was
which apply to such artificial island . . .
merely a recitation of comity and stare decisis,
pursuant to [з 1333(a)], except that
and urges that all discussion of projected
until the President determines the areas
boundaries in Reeves was needless dictum. An
within which such State laws are
analysis of these assertions demonstrates the
applicable, the judicial district shall be
errors in Snyder's contentions.
that of the State nearest the place of
location of such artificial island.
Snyder cites Pittencrieff Resources, Inc. v.
Firstland Offshore Exploration Co., 942
If pro ximity were controlling for purposes of
F. Supp. 271 (E.D. La. 1996), for the
з 1333(a)(2)(A) as a statutory matter because
proposition that geographic proximity is
of inclusion of з 1333(c), we would not have
determinative. Pittencrieff held that the
considered other evidence in Reeves: That
subject property was "adjacent" to Alabama
other evidence would have been irrelevant, re-
for purposes of OCSLA because it was nearer
gardless of whether it was consistent or
to the Alabama coast than to the Louisiana
inconsistent with this "controlling" factor.
coast.
Reeves rejects Snyder's proposed
interpretation. The presence of з 1333(c)
As an initial matter, a district court's
demonstrates that Congress was aware of the
desirability of "default" provisions pending
Presidential action, but it chose not to provide
2 The Block 261 platform is approximately six
such provisions for з 1333(a)(2)(A).
miles closer to Louisiana than to Alabama.
4

Snyder eschews as irrelevant all state and
to Texas.
federal agency actions other than a federal
agency's "actual, express determination of
As long as the President fails to perform
adjacency for purposes of the OCSLA." The
and publish the з 1333(a)(2)(A) calculations,
Reeves court considered charts indicating that
we must follow Reeves in considering all rele-
the following federal agencies considered the
vant evidence. Reeves did not establish a strict
subject platform to be off the Texas coast: the
four-factor test, but instead considered all four
Department of Interior Bureau of Land
categories of relevant evidence before the
Management, MMS, the National Oceanic and
court. Pittencrieff correctly followed Reeves
Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"), and
by considering the one piece of relevant
the Coast Guard.
evidence before it, and the district court
correctly considered all relevant evidence in
The parties agree that MMS would have
making its determination. We cannot apply
authority to issue official projections under
the formalistic test desired by Snyder, for
з 1333(a)(2)(A). If it did so, the
neither logic nor authority allows this court
determination of adjacency would be a
arbitrarily to disregard all relevant evidence
relatively simple matter of application not
except that of geographic proximity.3
requiring the Reeves approach. Until such
official projections are published, however,
IV.
some agency's determination "pursuant" to
Having rejected Snyder's interpretation of
that section is no more relevant than an agen-
Reeves, we must consider whether the district
cy's adjacency determination for some other
court considered categories of evidence that
purpose. The former may be more probative
are legally irrelevant to a з 1333(a)(2)(A) "ad-
if it is believed that the agency more closely
jacency" determination. In its "Reasons for
followed the dictates of з 1333(a)(2)(A), but
Judgment," the district court found that
it is not "more relevant."
references to Alabama in certain Snyder
contracts "sp[oke] volumes as to the intent of
Rule 401, FED. R. EVID., defines "relevant
[Snyder] and thei r [sic] original
evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to
acknowledgment of the location of Block
make the existence of any fact that is of
261." Because з 1333(a)(2)(A) is a
consequence to the determination of the action
mandatory choice of law provision, intent is
more probable or less probable than it would
irrelevant. See Union Texas, 895 F.2d at1043.
be without the evidence." Agency
Although consideration of such intent would
determinations of projected boundaries, or
therefore constitute error, the court's
other determinations of a similar nature, make
statement, read in context, makes plain either
it more probable that if the President does ever
that the court either knew not to consider such
"project boundaries" those boundaries will be
consistent with these other agency
determinations. For example, if all federal
3 Snyder argues that this court should apply a
agencies have, for various reasons, determined
"geographic proximity" test, because its easily dis-
that a platform is off the coast of Texas, it is
cernible nature would save time and money. While
more probable that the President will project a
judicial economy is a concern, it does not give us
boundary such that the platform is "adjacent"
free reign arbitrarily to elevate one bit of relevant
evidence to a determinative position.
5

intent in making its legal determination or that
Alabama waters.5
at least such consideration did not affect that
determination:
A.
The documentary evidence introduced by
After considering [federal agency
Samedan demonstrates that several federal
determinations] along with the other
government agencies, for purposes other than
Reeves factors this court is persuaded
OCSLA, have considered Block 261 to be off
that Main Pass 261 is located offshore
the coast of Alabama. For example, an MMS
Alabama, and, therefore, this matter
chart and diagram illustrates the Mississippi-
should be transferred. It should also be
Alabama boundary and the MMS extension of
noted that in other contracts between
that boundary seaward into federal waters.
[Snyder] and other parties, [Snyder]
Snyder does not dispute that a continuation of
refers to Main Pass 261 and Block 261
that line places Block 261 in Alabama waters.
as being located "offshore Alabama."
Likewise, an MMS notice to lessees articulates
that activities in the Block 261 area affect only
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, contrary to
Alabama.
Snyder's assertion, the court did not
improperly consider "intent" evidence.
Also introduced was an NOAA report con-
taining the NOAA's extension of boundaries
Samedan submitted charts, maps, notices,
for a now-defunct federal program; it is
and reports published by the MMS, the Bureau
undisputed that the Louisiana-Mississippi
of Land Management, NOAA, and the Coast
boundary so extended is significantly west of
Guard, supporting the conclusion that Block
Block 261.6 A chart demonstrated that Block
261 is considered to be off the coast of
261 falls within the jurisdiction of the Alabama
Alabama.4 Samedan also presented evidence
district of the Coast Guard Captain of the Port
that the Louisiana State Lands Office does not
Zone,7 and a U.S. Geological Survey report
consider Block 261 to be off the coast of Lou-
refers to the area of Block 261 as the "Mis-
isiana, but that Alabama state agencies do con-
sissippi-Alabama" OCS.
sider it to be o ff Alabama. Lastly, Samedan
presented evidence that if the Mississippi-
Alabama border is extended seaward from the
5 As in Reeves, considering this last piece of
three mile line through the OCS, either due
evidence is not adjudicating the Mississippi-
south or in the natural southeasterly direction
Alabama border. It merely recognizes the
of the common boundary (the two projections
probative value of the fact that either proposed
favorably considered in Reeves), Block 261
extension, if used by the President, would place the
lies eastward of the extension and hence is in
platform "adjacent" to Alabama.
6 Snyder, while contesting its relevance, did
argue that a straight-line extension of the Lou-
isiana-Mississippi boundary would instead run
north of Block 261.
4 The phrase "off the coast of" avoids use of the
term "adjacent," as the agency determinations at
7 In particular, it falls within the Mobile,
issue are not adjacency determinations pursuant to
Alabama, District instead of the New Orleans,
з 1333(a)(2)(A).
Louisiana, District.
6

Citing Rhoads v. Virginia-Florida Corp.,
admissibility, the initial step is always to
476 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1973), Snyder argues
determine the purpose for which the
that this documentary evidence is irrelevant
documents are being offered. See 22 CHARLES
without testimony as to what the documents
A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
were intended to convey. Rhoads held that
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE з 5164,
private surveyor drawings that had not been
at 38 (1978). Rhoads notes that in Florida a
verified by testimony were not admissible for
private survey could be used as direct
testimonial use. We stated that
evidence, but only if it was shown to be "a
resurvey tieing into or based on lines, calls and
[b]efore the documents could be
measurements previously established by the
admitted for "testimonial use," that is,
official U.S. government survey, if there is
where the documents themselves would
one, and if not, the oldest private survey under
"testify" as direct evidence on a material
which property rights in the area were
disputed issue of fact, they were
originally acquired." Rhoads, 476 F.2d at 85
required to be verified. "[W]henever
n.5. We observed that without testimony,
such a document is offered as proving a
"[t]here [was] no evidence that lines, calls and
thing to be as therein represented, then
monuments portrayed on the drawings were
it is offered testimonially, and it must be
based on or tied in to [sic], or derived from, an
associated with a testifier." 3 Wigmore,
official survey or the oldest private survey."
On Evidence, з 790, at 218 (Chadbourn
Id. at 85.
ed. 1970). Verification required at the
minimum a showing by the testimony of
Taken in context, the quotation by Wig-
some competent witness that the lines of
more relied on in Rhoads is as follows:
t h e d r a w i n g s w e r e c o r r e c t
representations of the actual physical
It may, sometimes, to be sure, not be of-
characteristics of the land and objects
fered as a source of evidence, but only
which they purported to show.
as a document whose existence and ten-
or are material in the substantive law ap-
Rhoads, 476 F.2d at 85.
plicable to the case, as where . . . in
ejectment for land conveyed by deed
Although Samedan does not distinguish its
containing a map, the map is to be used
proffers from those in Rhoads, they are
irrespective of the correctness of the
distinguishable.8 When co nsidering
drawing; here we do not believe
anything because the map represents it.
But whenever such a document is
offered as proving a thing to be as
8 Instead, Samedan relies on the inference that
therein represented, then it is offered
Reeves considered similar evidence without
testimonially, and it must be associated
testimony, supported by the fact that Reeves notes
with a testifier.
"[t]estimony and exhibits" concerning geographic
proximity but only "[c]harts" concerning federal
agency determinations. See Reeves, 897 F.2d
at 179. Because relevancy objections can be
waived, however, we must review the admissibility
8(...continued)
(continued...)
of such documents.
7

WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE з 790, at 218 (Chad-
and, more importantly, because the reports are
bourn ed. 1970). The documentary evidence
relevant irrespective of whether they are
presented by Samedan is admissible for
"correct," the court properly considered the
reasons akin to the ejectment example given by
documentary evidence.
Wigmore. The district court did not use the
evidence of agency determinations because it
B.
believed that information to be "correct,"
Snyder contends that Samedan's affidavit
whatever that would mean where an infinite
and deposition testimony are irrelevant.9 Mr.
number of boundary projections are possible.
Mayeux, a registered land surveyor in five
Instead, the court considered the evidence be-
states, examined the agency maps and charts
cause irrespective of whether it is "correct" in
submitted by Samedan. He confirmed the lo-
some abstract sense, the fact that the agencies
cation of Block 261 thereon and concluded
consider the location to be off the coast of Al-
that an extension of the Mississippi-Alabama
abama makes it more probable that the
boundary, whether due south or in its natural
President will "project" a boundary that agrees
southeasterly direction, results in Block 261's
with this result.
falling on the Alabama side of the extension.
Mr. St. Romain, Administrator of the
The admissibility of the documentary
Louisiana State Lands Office, stated that
evidence is further supported by Wigmore's
Block 261 is not "considered by the Louisiana
treatment of official reports. Wigmore
State Land Office to be located in waters
favorably recommends the Uniform Official
adjacent to the State of Louisiana." Mr. Gane,
Reports as Evidence Act (1936), which
Chief of Coastal Programs for the Alabama
provides as follows:
Department of Environmental Management,
stated that that agency considers Block 261 to
Written reports or findings of fact made
be subject to its management. Mr. Griggs,
by officers of this State on a matter
director of the Alabama Department of
within the scope of their duty as defined
Conservation and Natural Resources, Land
by statute shall, in so far as relevant, be
Division, stated that the Land Division
admitted as evidence of the matters stat-
considers Block 261 to be located adjacent to
ed therein. . . . Any adverse party may
Alabama. Mr. Easterly, who represented
cross-examine any person making such
Louisiana in the development of the NOAA
reports or findings or any person fur-
report proffered by Samedan, stated that the
nishing information used therein; but the
fact that such testimony may not be ob-
9
tainable shall not affect the admissibility
Snyder also objected based on hearsay, lack of
of the report or finding, unless, in the
personal knowledge, and lack of expertise. These
opinion of the Court, the adverse party
specific evidentiary determinations are not at issue
in this interlocutory appeal, in which Snyder argues
is unfairly prejudiced thereby.
that certain categories of evidence are inadmissible
as a matter of law. Furthermore, Snyder fails even
WIGMORE, supra, з 1673 at 822.
to articulate, let alone establish, the legal standard
that the court abused its discretion on any of these
Therefore, because official reports are in-
other grounds. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
herently more reliable than are private reports,
522 U.S. 136 (1997); Curtis v. M&S Petroleum,
Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1999).
8

program defined adjacency by using an
extended lateral seaward boundary of the
state.
These categories of evidence are
admissible. Experts may examine and discuss
federal agency reports. While not considered
by the court in Reeves, there is likewise no
reason to deem irrelevant the opinions of
affected state agenciesSSthey may be less
probative than are opinions of federal
agencies, but they are not irrelevant. In the
absence of Presidential action pursuant to
з 1333(a)(2)(A), it is relevant what affected
federal and state agencies have determined,
regardless of whether their determinations are
"correct" in some abstract sense.
AFFIRMED.
9