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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-50544

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RICHARD ANDREW URRABAZO,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
--------------------
December 5, 2000
Before BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.*
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
A jury convicted Appellant Richard Urrabazo of seven counts
of sexual misconduct in a federal prison. Urrabazo now appeals,
arguing that the district court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over this prosecution. Because the cell block of a
federal courthouse falls within Congress' definition of a federal
prison in 18 U.S.C. з 2246(1), we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.

* Judge Vela, District Judge of the Southern District of
Texas, was a member of the panel that heard oral arguments but
did not participate in the decision. This case is being decided
by a quorum, 28 U.S.C. з 46(d).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As a Deputy United States Marshal, Richard Urrabazo
supervised detainees in the cell block of the U.S. Marshals'
Service Office located in the John Wood Federal Courthouse in San
Antonio, Texas. The cell block primarily houses federal
arrestees and prisoners while they await court appearances.
On November 18, 1998, a grand jury returned a seven count
indictment against Urrabazo charging abusive sexual conduct with
female detainees and a court security officer in violation of 18
U.S.C. з 2244. That section proscribes sexual misconduct of
varying severity that takes place within "the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal
prison." 18 U.S.C. з 2244 (2000). On March 17, 1999, a jury
convicted Urrabazo on all counts of the indictment;1 the district
court sentenced Urrabazo to 51 months in federal prison.
Prior to trial, the district court denied Urrabazo's motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the
cell block at the federal courthouse in San Antonio to be a
1 Specifically, Urrabazo was convicted of 5 counts of sexual
abuse under section 2244(b) and two counts under section
2244(a)(2). A person violates section 2244(b) by knowingly
engaging in sexual contact with another person without that other
person's permission. 18 U.S.C. з 2244(b) (2000). A person
violates section 2244(a)(2) by knowingly engaging in or causing
sexual contact with or by another person by "threatening or
placing that other person in fear." 18 U.S.C. зз 2244(a)(2),
2242 (2000). At trial, Urrabazo did not dispute that the alleged
violations took place in the cell block of the federal
courthouse.
2

"Federal prison." Based on this ruling, the court instructed the
jury that "the entire holding area on the second floor of the
federal courthouse at 655 East Durango in San Antonio, Texas, is
considered a federal prison because it is a federal detention
facility." At the close of evidence, the defendant filed a Rule
29 motion for judgment of acquittal based on lack of
jurisdiction. The district court denied this motion.
DISCUSSION
The jurisdictional element of section 2244 offers two
independent jurisdictional hooks: "the special territorial and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States" or "Federal prison."
In this appeal, Urrabazo contends that the government failed to
prove either. Primarily, Urrabazo argues that the cell block of
the federal courthouse in San Antonio does not constitute a
"prison" because it does not permanently house prisoners.
Additionally, Urrabazo maintains that the Government did not
comply with statutory requirements for obtaining jurisdiction to
regulate the courthouse building as a whole, or the holding cell
specifically, as part of "the special maritime or territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." For these reasons, Urrabazo
contends that the district court did not have jurisdiction to try
him under section 2244, or in any event, should have granted his
Rule 29 motion for acquittal based on the government's failure to
prove the jurisdictional element of the crime.
3

We review legal determinations regarding the subject matter
jurisdiction of a district court de novo. United States v.
Alvarado, 201 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2000). Since the
indictment specifies that Urrabazo's criminal conduct took place
in a federal prison, and the district court decided the
jurisdictional issue on that basis, we begin by deciding whether
the cell block is a federal prison as defined by Congress.2
Urrabazo's primary argument focuses on whether the Marshals'
Service cell block qualifies as a "prison." In this regard,
Urrabazo insists, without authority, that to be a prison, a
facility must house inmates for periods lasting more than a few
2 The indictment also listed section 7(3) of title 18, which
defines "special territorial and maritime jurisdiction," as part
of the statutory foundation for each count. Perhaps relying on
the presence of section 7(3) in the indictment, Urrabazo expends
considerable energy in his brief discussing the section 7(3)
definition, as well as statutory limits on that jurisdictional
hook. See 40 U.S.C. з 255. Following oral argument, we
understand that Urrabazo discussed this alternative basis for
jurisdiction "to be thorough" so that, should we agree with his
interpretation of federal prison, we would not be persuaded to
use the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction" as an
alternative basis for finding subject matter jurisdiction. At no
point in his brief or during oral argument has Urrabazo alleged
that section 7(3)'s definition of "special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction" limits the scope of "Federal prison."
Moreover, Urrabazo has never argued that alleged constitutional
or statutory limits on the "special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States" have any impact on the federal
government's jurisdiction to regulate its prisons. In fact,
Urrabazo's counsel conceded at oral argument that this court may
take judicial notice that the courthouse and cell block are
"federal."
4

hours.3 For Urrabazo, a prison requires beds, a library, a
medical center and other similar tools of daily life. These
items are not required by the statute, however. The chapter on
sexual abuse defines "prison" as "a correctional, detention, or
penal facility." 18 U.S.C. з 2246(1) (2000). This court gives
the words used by Congress their ordinary meaning. United States
v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1997). "Detention" means
"the act or fact of holding a person in custody." See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 459 (7th ed. 1999). "Facility" means, inter alia,
"something designed, built, installed, etc., to serve a specific
purpose or perform a particular service." RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 473 (1980). Thus, a "detention facility" is a place
designed or intended to hold persons in custody. We agree with
the district court that the Marshals' Service cell block in this
case qualifies as a "detention facility" because prisoners were,
by design, held in custody there. Moreover, as Urrabazo conceded
at oral argument, we may take judicial notice that the cell block
3 Urrabazo points to a series of cases that allegedly
support his position that to be a prison, a facility must house
prisoners permanently. See Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819 (5th Cir.
1996); Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1977). Not one
of these cases supports Urrabazo's argument, however. At best,
the cases generally distinguish a "prison" from a "detention
facility" in contexts that do not involve section 2246(1)'s
definition of "prison." At any rate, section 2246(1) expressly
includes both penal and detention facilities within its
definition, so the distinction raised in the cases does not
advance Urrabazo's argument.
5

is "federal."4 Thus, the district court properly concluded that
the cell block is a "Federal prison." We need not address
whether the cell block also falls within the special territorial
and maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
Urrabazo argues that our ruling causes any facility or
property on which a federal prisoner happens to be located to
become a federal prison. We disagree. The term "detention
facility" is not limitless - it includes only those facilities
designed or intended to detain prisoners. A federal courtroom
does not become a federal detention facility simply because a
prisoner is held in custody there during a trial or sentencing
hearing. In contrast, the federal government intended the
Marshals' Service cell block to detain prisoners in the San
Antonio federal courthouse, albeit for short periods. As a
consequence, the cell block is a detention facility that
qualifies as a federal prison under 18 U.S.C. з 2246(1).

CONCLUSION
4 Even assuming that Urrabazo had not conceded this point,
our decision in United States v. Gliatta commands the conclusion
that when Congress passes an appropriations act granting funds
for the regulation of specific property, the United States has
jurisdiction to regulate that property. See United States v.
Gliatta, 580 F.2d 156, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1978). In this case,
Congress has passed an appropriations bill that allocates funds
for the construction and maintenance of Marshals' Service
detention facilities. See 107 Stat. 1164 (1993), codified at 28
U.S.C. з 524 (1993). On this basis, we can conclude that
Marshals' Service holding cells are properly subject to federal
jurisdiction.
6

The Marshals' Service cell block in San Antonio's John Wood
federal courthouse was clearly intended to detain federal
prisoners. As a detention facility, the cell block falls
squarely within Congress' definition of "prison." 18 U.S.C.
2246(1). Moreover, both the courthouse and cell block are
federal facilities, as conceded by Urrabazo. Therefore, we
affirm the district court's judgment that it had subject matter
jurisdiction over this case.
7