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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
JERRY WEST,
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant,
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v.
CASE NO. 1D03-0114
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
___________________________/
Opinion filed June 2, 2003.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Suwannee County.
Thomas J. Kennon, Jr., Judge.
Appellant, pro se.
Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges the trial court's order summarily denying his
postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
Because the trial court correctly denied the appellant's motion alleging that his
consecutive sentences violate Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993), we affirm.
The appellant was convicted of four counts of burglary, four counts of grand

theft, one count of possession of burglary tools, and one count of aggravated fleeing
and eluding a law enforcement officer. The appellant was sentenced as a habitual
felony offender to ten years' imprisonment on each count. In the appellant's motion
for postconviction relief, the appellant challenges the trial court's imposition of
consecutive sentences for two counts of burglary. The appellant argues that because
his crimes were deemed to be part of one criminal episode for the purposes of
consolidation at trial, then his crimes should also be deemed part of one criminal
episode for the purposes of Hale analysis. However, separate offenses may be joined
or consolidated for trial without precluding the trial court from imposing consecutive
habitual offender sentences.
In order to join or consolidate cases, the cases must be connected in time, in
location, by their nature, and by the manner in which they were perpetrated or there
must be a significant causal link between the cases. Smithers v. State, 826 So. 2d 916,
923 (Fla. 2002). However, in determining whether a court may impose consecutive
habitual offender sentences, "the court must consider whether separate victims are
involved, whether the crimes occur in separate locations, and whether there has been
a temporal break between the incidents." Woods v. State, 615 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla.
1st DCA 1993).
Thus, joinder is an issue when there is a series of crimes that are linked in a
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significant way, see e.g., Smithers v. State, 826 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2002); Fotopoulos
v. State, 608 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1992); Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1984)
abrogated on other grounds by Fenelon v. State, 594 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1992); and
consecutive habitual offender sentences may not be imposed when one incident or
simultaneous actions support convictions for multiple crimes. See e.g., Hale v. State,
630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993) (holding that a defendant cannot receive consecutive
habitual offender sentences for sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine with the
intent to sell for the same piece of cocaine); Whitfield v. State, 804 So. 2d 1274 (Fla.
5th DCA 2002) (holding that a defendant cannot receive consecutive habitual offender
sentences for battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with
violence for the same altercation); Valdes v. State, 765 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 1st DCA
2000). Because joinder and the imposition of consecutive habitual offender sentences
depend on separate standards, the fact that the appellant's crimes were properly joined
does not necessarily prevent the trial court from imposing consecutive habitual
offender sentences.
In the instant case, the appellant was charged with the burglary of four
convenience stores on June 12, 1998, June 16, 1998, and June 24, 1998. These
offenses were properly joined because the burglaries occurred over a short time span,
they all occurred in the same county, they were all convenience stores, and the locks
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were removed in a unique manner. The trial court's decision to run one of the
appellant's sentences for burglary consecutively to another burglary sentence was also
proper. In the first count, the appellant was charged with the burglary of a Jiffy Food
Store on June 24, 1998, and in the other count, the appellant was charged with burglary
of a Jiffy Food Store on June 12, 1998. Thus, the convictions arose out of separate
acts on separate dates. In contrast, if the trial court had imposed consecutive habitual
offender sentences for the burglary convictions and the grand theft convictions that
arose out of each incident, then the appellant's sentence would have violated the
rationale of Hale. Thus, it was proper for the trial court to deny the appellant's motion
for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
WOLF, LEWIS and POLSTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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