Deterrence of North Korea? Is Kim a rational player?
In the October 17, 2006 Wall Street Journal op ed Paging Dr. Strangelove by Bret Stephens the following question is posited;
Assume for a minute that Kim Jong Il does not just intend his nuclear weapons for purposes of prestige, defense and extortion. Assume he is also prepared to use them. Could he be deterred?
The piece suggest several scenarios where deterrence might not be politicaly feasible or palatable. The suggestion of the author is that we may not be in a position to credibly deter Kim or his ilk, especially as time passes. I agree.
Now a new warning has issued from President Bush that if Pyongyang goes forward with a second nuclear test, there will be consequences.
During a briefing for White House reporters, Snow was asked what the consequences would be of a second North Korean nuclear test. He responded by saying Pyongyang would surely face further isolation.
"What you have seen already in the case of the first test is that the United States and the Chinese are working more closely together than ever before," he said. "And I dare say that they would become even closer as strategic partners in trying to guarantee safety in the Korean peninsula." - White House Warns North Korea Against Another Nuclear Test By Paula Wolfson
The problem is, will those consequences mean anything? Further "isolation" probably won't matter, especially when so many other rouge nations will continue to do business with Pyongyang. So in sum, without military action, I doubt anything we do will leave an impression on Kim, assuming he cares.
One important aspect not grappled with in Stephen's piece is the very idea that deterrence requires a rational player.
Game theory and common sense agree that deterrence only works if the other side wants to survive, and / or cares about the collateral and direct consequences of their own actions. Many indications exist that North Korea is not a rational player, and unlike Krushev there are no moderating forces or powers which make brinkmanship possible. The simple fact is, that Kim's authoritarian rule is not moderated by a party elite.
So in sum, the discussion on deterrence misses an underlying point. If Kim is not rational, or at least cannot be relied upon to act rationally, deterrence is a waste of time.
When a player lacks rationality, deterrence is not the strategy, decapitation of that player, and removal of his command control function is.
