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Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw. Original WP 5.1 Version (NOTE: This decision was approved by the court for publication.) This case can also be found at 326 N.J. Super. 265.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
FINANCIAL SERVICES, L.L.C.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
Defendants-Respondents.
________________________________________
Argued October 26, 1999 - Decided December 7, 1999.
Before Judges Muir, Jr., Wallace, Jr., and Cuff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County.
Peter J. Scandariato argued the cause for appellants
(Alampi, Arturi, D'Argenio & Guaglardi, attorneys;
Mr. Scandariato, of counsel and on the brief).
Michael B. Adelhock argued the cause for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MUIR, JR., P.J.A.D.
This appeal requires our review of a decision by defendant
Little Ferry Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board), which denied
plaintiffs' application to permit a check-cashing business in an
existing structure at the site of a gas station located on a
nonconforming lot. The appeal requires interpretation of the
Little Ferry Zoning Ordinance and, alternatively, a determination
as to whether plaintiffs proved entitlement to a use variance under
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d, as explicated in Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J.
1 (1987). The trial court affirmed the decision of the Board, and
plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
Plaintiff Shell Oil Company leases the subject property in Little Ferry for a gas station, which it subleases to the operator of the station. Financial Services proposes to sublease from Shell Oil an existing structure on the property, renovate it, and conduct a check-cashing business. The property fronts on Route 46 and is located in an area zoned "B-H Highway and Regional Business Zone." In pertinent part, the restrictions on uses in the B-H zone are as follows: B. Permitted uses. In the B-H Highway and Regional Business Zone, no buildings or premises shall be used and no building or part of a building shall be erected, constructed or altered which shall be arranged, intended or designed to be used for any purpose other than the following uses:
(1) Regionally oriented retail shopping centers
consisting of integrated developments of such
uses as retail stores and shops and personal
service establishments housed in an enclosed
building or buildings and utilizing such
common facilities as customer parking areas,
pedestrian walks, truck loading and unloading
space, utilities and sanitary facilities and
gasoline filling stations.
(2) Theaters and auditoriums.
C. Conditionally permitted uses.
(1) Uses. Conditionally permitted uses shall be
as follows:
(a) Professional, business and governmental
offices.
(b) Banks and savings and loan institutions.
(c) Post offices.
(d) Hotels and motels and restaurants.
. . . .
E. Prohibited uses. Any uses other than those uses
permitted by Subsections A through D of this
section shall be prohibited without in any way
limiting the generality and prohibition of this
section. Nothing contained in this Article shall
be construed to permit any of the following uses in
any B-H Highway and Regional Business Zone:
. . . .
(7) Gasoline service stations.
. . . .
Other pertinent provisions of the ordinance provide the
following definitions:
1. Conditional Use:
A use permitted in a particular zoning
district only upon a showing that such use in
a specified location will comply with the
conditions and standards for the location or
operation of such use, as contained in the
Zoning Ordinance, and upon the issuance of an
authorization therefor by the Planning Board.
2. Building, Accessory:
A building the use of which is customarily
incidental to that of the main or principal
building and which is located in the same lot
as the principal building.
3. Lot:
One (1) or more contiguous parcels of land
united by a common interest or use, considered
as a unit, occupied by a principal building or
use and its accessory buildings and uses, if
any, including the open spaces on such unit of
land. It may or may not coincide with the
deed description thereof or the boundaries of
the same as shown on the Tax Assessment Map of
the borough or a map filed for record or
otherwise. [Emphasis added.]
4. Use, Accessory:
A use which is customarily incidental and
subordinate to the principal use of a lot or a
building and which is located on the same lot.
5. Use or Structure, Principal:
The primary or predominate use of any lot, or
structure devoted to the principal use.
A use or building which is not allowed or
permitted within a zoning district. The
schedule of district regulations sets forth
the uses or buildings which are permitted
within each district. Those uses or buildings
not permitted are prohibited. Those uses
listed as uses specifically prohibited
reiterate this prohibition regarding those
particular uses to avoid confusion.
The gas station is located on a nonconforming lot. The lot is
not only some 46,000 square feet below the required minimum area
but also has insufficient depth, and the structures of the gas
station violate both front and rear yard setback requirements.
B. There was no testimony or evidence to indicate any
harm to the owner if the relief was not granted;
C. The location is a non-conforming, undersized lot
presently being utilized with two non-conforming
uses;
D. The application failed to demonstrate hardship or
the presence of enhanced special reasons for the
proposed check cashing use;
E. The proposed use and site plan changes would cause
a significant negative impact upon the master plan
and surrounding neighbors, including an increase in
traffic volume, on an undersized property, and with
negative impact upon the adjacent residential
street; the third use on the undersized lot would
increase the hardship to the adjacent neighbors
pursuant to the testimony regarding potential
increase of customers doubling the traffic on and
off the site during peak hours; the potential of
tractor trailer vehicles entering the property on
the undersized lot, the need for parking spaces
during peak hours causing potential illegal
parking;
F. The proposed use is not a conditional use in that
the testimony elicited that the check cashing [sic]
is not a bank, nor can the prerequisite conditions
to allow the use be satisfied;
G. The enhanced special reasons were not presented by
the applicant;
H. The proposed mixed use conflicts with the purpose
of the master plan in defining the redevelopment of
the Route 46 corridor for increased property lot
sizes and uses enumerated in the B-H zone;
I. The proposed location is not suitable and alternate
properties in the corridor could accommodate such a
use without increasing the number of uses and
intensity on an undersized lot.
Based on its findings, the Board concluded it could not grant
the relief requested "without substantial detriment to the public
good and without substantially impairing the intent and purposes of
the zone plan and zoning ordinances of the Borough of Little
Ferry."
Plaintiffs propound several grounds to support their claim the trial judge and the Board erred. First, they argue a check-cashing business is a use accessory to the gas station, which they contend is a permitted use in the B-H zone. Alternatively, they argue, because a check-cashing business is the equivalent of a bank or savings and loan association, the proposed use is a permitted conditional use. Relying on the conditional use premise, plaintiffs then argue they were required only to satisfy the criteria of a conditional use variance (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-7d(3)) and not the criteria of a use variance (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-7d(1)). See Coventry Square, Inc. v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 138 N.J. 285 (1994). Finally, failing success on the latter arguments, they contend their proofs before the Board met the criteria for a use variance. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(1); Medici, supra. We address each of these issues and, in the course of doing so, highlight a basic misconception interwoven through plaintiffs' interpretation of the zoning ordinance. We turn first to the zoning ordinance interpretations advocated. We find the plaintiffs mistaken. Consistent with the zoning authority vested by the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -129, particularly N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 and -65, the Borough of Little Ferry Zoning Ordinance specifies the uses permitted in the B-H zone. At the same time, the ordinance generally restricts the extent of those uses. Plaintiffs misconstrue the zoning ordinance in both areas. Municipal zoning ordinances are judicially construed under the standards applicable to statutory construction. See AMN, Inc. v. South Brunswick Tp. Rent Leveling Bd., 93 N.J. 518, 524-25 (1983). Our principal duty is to ascertain legislative intent. Id. at 525. The initial predicate of that inquiry is the plain language of the ordinance applied to the facts. See Watt v. Mayor and Council, Borough of Franklin Lakes, 21 N.J. 274, 277 (1956). Concomitantly, the language used must be given its ordinary meaning. The plain language of the ordinance makes it clear a cash checking business is not an accessory use to a permitted use, nor is it a conditional use and, most significantly, it is not a use that can exist on the subject lot with the current nonconforming principal use, a gasoline station. In Charlie Brown v. Chatham Bd. of Adjustment, 202 N.J. Super. 312, 324 (App. Div. 1985), we identified the proof required to satisfy the Chatham Zoning Ordinance definition of accessory use, a definition that is nearly identical to that in the Little Ferry Zoning Ordinance. In Charlie Brown, we explained that to qualify as an accessory use, the proposed use had to be one customarily incidental and subordinate to a permitted principal use. The terms, customarily incidental and subordinate, entail proof a proposed use is of minor significance and a use commonly, habitually, and by long-standing practice established as reasonably associated with the permitted principal use. Ibid. We find no proof to satisfy a conclusion a check-cashing business is a use accessory to a gas station operation. The proposed commercial operation is not only not subordinate to the gas station use and is not of minor significance, but it is also not a use that has any common, habitual, or long-standing association with a gas station. Its failure to qualify as an accessory use makes it a principal use. Beyond that, the Shell station at issue is a nonconforming use in the B-H zone. The B-H zone permits gas stations only as a part of regionally oriented shopping centers. Otherwise, gas stations are expressly prohibited uses. The ordinance specifically provides uses expressly prohibited are not permitted. The Shell station is not part of a shopping center. It is, therefore, a prohibited use and, consequently, a nonconforming use. At the same time, it is the principal use on the subject lot. Given the Shell station's nonconforming, principal use status, the ordinance proscribes a second principal use, the check-cashing business on the same property. The zoning ordinance by definition of building lot, particularly when read with the definition of principal use, limits the use of a building lot to a principal use and its accessory uses. The common meaning of "a" is one. Consequently, the ordinance does not permit two principal uses on the lot in question. Simply put, two principal uses are not permitted on any building lot under circumstances that do not constitute a regional shopping center. Installation of a second principal use would intensify the use beyond the restrictions contained in the ordinance. The intensified use would qualify as a violation of the ordinance restrictions fostering need for a use variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-7d(1). Moreover, even if the check cashing could be deemed a use accessory to the gas station, the proposed use would amount to the expansion of a nonconforming use, which would also require a variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d. See Cox, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, § 10.5, p. 207 (1998). The dual principal use restrictions make the proposed use, conditional or not, a use not permitted under the Little Ferry Zoning Ordinance. Even so, we are satisfied a check-cashing business has insufficient comparability to a bank to qualify as a conditional use under the ordinance. The comprehensive nature of a bank, when compared to that of the check-cashing business, demonstrates the lack of comparability.
Finally, we reject plaintiffs' contention they presented sufficient evidence to the Board to satisfy the criteria governing a use variance. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(1); Medici, supra. The Supreme Court in Medici addressed the scope of proof required to satisfy the statutory special needs standard when a use variance application relates to a commercial use. That standard has generally been defined in relation to the purposes of zoning, see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2, and our decisions have emphasized the promotion of the general welfare as the zoning purpose that most clearly amplifies the meaning of special reasons. Although certain commercial uses may inherently serve the general welfare in a particular community, the typical commercial use can be better described as a convenience to its patrons than as an inherent benefit to the general welfare. For such uses, any benefit to the general welfare derives not from the use itself but from the development of a site in the community that is particularly appropriate for that very enterprise.
[Id. at 18 (citation omitted).]
Additionally, Medici held that to satisfy the negative
criteria of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70, when the application relates to a
commercial venture, an applicant must demonstrate "an enhanced
quality of proof . . . that the variance sought is not inconsistent
with the intent and purpose of the master plan and zoning
ordinance." Medici, supra, 107 N.J. at 21.
In sum, we hold a check-cashing business in the Borough of
Little Ferry business highway zone, on a lot that is nonconforming
and contains a nonconforming use, is a use prohibited by the terms
of the Borough's Zoning Ordinance. This is so predominantly
because the proposed use would constitute a second principal use on
the lot in question. Therefore, a use variance was required, and
the record supports the conclusion plaintiffs failed to satisfy
their burden of proving entitlement to that variance.
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