[42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8331(a) (West 1998) (emphasis added).]

To qualify for immunity under Pennsylvania’s statute, the Good Samaritan must hold “a reasonable opinion that the immediacy of the situation is such that the rendering of care should not be postponed until the patient is hospitalized.” Id. § 8331(b) (emphasis added). One statute explicitly extends coverage to emergency care given “wherever required.” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 76, § 5(a)(1) (West 2002). Others simply immunize “emergency medical or professional assistance to a person in need thereof,” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557b(a) (West Supp. 2002); “emergency care without fee” provided “in good faith,” 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 49/25 (West Supp. 2002); “emergency care or assistance in an emergency,” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.500(1) (2001); or “aid or assistance necessary or helpful in the circumstances to other persons who have been injured or are ill as the result of an accident or illness, or . . . trauma,” N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.1-01 (1996), without mentioning any geographic limitations. ^{See footnote 5}
Of the twenty-nine states with general statutes like New Jersey’s, five have enacted additional specific immunity provisions applicable to emergency obstetrical care. Those statutes include Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-1473 (West Supp. 2001) (applying enhanced “clear and convincing” burden of proof in malpractice actions against health care facility and physicians providing emergency treatment during labor and delivery who have not previously treated patient); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-734 (2001) (immunizing hospital, nurse or physician rendering “emergency obstetrical care” to “a patient of a direct-entry midwife in an emergency situation”); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.505(3) (2001) (immunizing medical facility and physician who has not previously treated patient and who in good faith “renders emergency obstetrical care or assistance to a pregnant woman during labor or the delivery of the child” where injuries are primarily caused by lack of prenatal care); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.1-02.1 (1996) (immunizing physician who “renders emergency obstetrical care or assistance to a pregnant female in active labor who has not previously been cared for in connection with the pregnancy by the physician”); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-225(A)(2) (Michie 2000) (immunizing “any person” who “renders emergency obstetrical care or assistance to a female in active labor who has not previously been cared for in connection with the pregnancy by such person”). None of those statutes expressly excludes obstetrical care provided within a hospital; in fact, most assume that such care is provided within a medical facility.
Finally, some general-language jurisdictions (including New Jersey) provide express immunity for medical care rendered while transporting an injured person from “the scene” to a hospital. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 613.17 (West 1999) (“at the place of an emergency or accident or while the person is in transit to or from the emergency or accident”); N.D. Cent. Code § 39-08-04.1 (1997) (“en route [from the scene of an accident, disaster, or other emergency] to a treatment facility”); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-225(A)(1) (“en route therefrom [from the scene of an accident, fire or any life-threatening emergency] to any hospital, medical clinic or doctor’s office”); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.300 (West 1988) (“in transporting, not for compensation, therefrom [from the scene of an emergency] an injured person or persons for emergency medical treatment”).
In 1996 and 1998, our Legislature added two new Good Samaritan provisions specifically protecting law enforcement officers and firefighters, respectively. N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1.1 and -1.2. Each of those sections immunizes good faith emergency care given “at the scene of an accident or emergency to any victim thereof, or in transporting any such victim to a hospital or other facility where treatment is to be rendered[.]” Ibid. (emphasis added).
The few judicial decisions interpreting the category of statutes that neither expressly excludes nor expressly includes in-hospital emergency medical care are in equipoise. On the one hand, cases from Arizona, Indiana and Oklahoma support the proposition that Good Samaritan statutes do not immunize emergency care provided in a hospital to a patient. Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 537 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Ariz. 1975); Steffey v. King, 614 N.E.2d 615, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Jackson v. Mercy Health Ctr., Inc., 864 P.2d 839, 844 (Okla. 1993). On the other, courts in Georgia, Illinois, and Utah have interpreted their state’s Good Samaritan statutes as protecting physicians who render emergency medical care in a hospital setting. Clayton v. Kelly, 357 S.E.2d 865, 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Johnson v. Matviuw, 531 N.E.2d 970, 972, 975-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 537 N.E.2d 810 (Ill. 1989); Hirpa v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 948 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1997). The difference in outcome between the cases is based, in great measure, on whether the statutes were broadly or narrowly interpreted.
    In any event, it would be fair to say that there is no universal interpretation of general statutory language among our sister jurisdictions, no roadmap to follow. Thus, to the extent that the parties in this case rely on the weight of out-of-state authority in support of their positions, they have vastly overstated the case.

[Ibid. (quoting 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 61.01, at 77 (4th ed. 1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565, 25 L. Ed. 892, 894 (1880))).]

Coincident with that interpretive canon is our tradition of giving “narrow range” to statutes granting immunity from tort liability because they leave “unredressed injury and loss resulting from wrongful conduct.” Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., 80 N.J. 391, 401 (1979) (construing strictly landowner’s immunity statute). See also Renz v. Penn Cent. Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 457-58 (1981) (holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 487-88 (1970) (construing strictly marital immunity statute); cf. Hallacker v. National Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 488, 490-93 (3d Cir. 1986) (construing strictly New Jersey Landowner’s Liability Act).
    With those general principles in mind, we look now to our Good Samaritan statute, enacted in 1963, following California’s lead. Originally, the statute included only health care practitioners; it was amended in 1968 to extend immunity to “any individual,”
including a person licensed to practice any method of treatment of human ailments, disease, pain, injury, deformity, mental or physical condition, or licensed to render services ancillary thereto, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency to the victim or victims thereof . . . .

[N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1.]

Thus, in derogation of the basic common law principle that one who volunteers to render assistance must do so reasonably, anyone who rendered care at the scene of an accident or emergency was immunized from civil liability.
Although the statute in its original form was silent regarding whether “the scene of an accident or emergency” is limited in any way, it was most recently amended to “clarify” that volunteer members of a first aid or ambulance squad are granted “the same immunity” as all other individuals. Assembly Law, Public Safety, Defense & Corrections Committee Statement accompanying Bill No. 2467--L. 1987, c. 296 (emphasis added). In its present form, the statute immunizes any Good Samaritan who “renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency to the victim or victims thereof, or while transporting the victim or victims thereof to a hospital or other facility where treatment or care is to be rendered.” N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1.
The Appellate Division read that new language as revelatory of a legislative understanding that “the scene of an accident or emergency” is somewhere other than a hospital or treatment facility, which is staffed and equipped to render medical care. Velazquez, supra, 336 N.J. Super. at 48. That is certainly one fair interpretation of the statute, which scholars have approved. “By distinguishing between these two types of places, the legislature operationally defined ‘scene of an emergency’ as a place other than a hospital . . . .” Roger L. Tuttle, Hospital Emergency Rooms--Application of Good Samaritan Laws, 31 Med. Trial Tech. Q. 145, 157 (Fred Lane ed., 1985) (discussing Miss. Code Ann. § 73-25-37). More fundamental to us is the notion that if the Legislature had intended the locationally unlimited immunity urged by Dr. Ranzini, it simply could have said so. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 76, § 5(a)(1) (immunizing medical practitioner who “voluntarily and without compensation, renders or attempts to render emergency care to an injured person or any person who is in need of immediate medical aid, wherever required”) (emphasis added). There would have been no reason for it to include, at the Act’s inception, the limiting language “at the scene of an accident or emergency.” There likewise would have been no subsequent need to extend immunity explicitly to persons rendering emergency care while transporting a victim to a medical facility. All of those circumstances would have been encompassed by a statute that immunized anyone rendering emergency medical care. The Legislature apparently intended a circumscription of Good Samaritan immunity as evidenced by the limiting language it chose.
That narrowly tailored interpretation does the least violence to our citizens’ common-law right to institute tort actions against those whose negligence injures them. It thus conforms to our rules regarding the interpretation of statutes in derogation of the common law and statutes granting immunity.
Moreover, it gives full throat to the goals underlying the legislation: to encourage the rendering of medical care to those who would not otherwise receive it, by physicians who come upon such patients by chance, without the benefit of the expertise, assistance, equipment or sanitation that is available in a hospital or medical setting. Colby v. Schwartz, supra, 78 Cal. App. 3d at 892, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 628; Reuter, supra, 20 J. Legal Med. at 189; Groninger, supra, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. at 364; Burke, supra, 1 Annals Health L. at 140; Dyke, supra, 15 How. L.J. at 676; Note, supra, 64 Colum. L. Rev. at 1307.
Obviously, in enacting our Good Samaritan law, the Legislature was aware that a hospital patient is present in that venue for the very purpose of receiving medical care and is not a person who ordinarily would lack care in the absence of Good Samaritan immunity. Further, physicians in a hospital ordinarily do not come upon a hospital patient “by chance” as would be the case if an accident or emergency occurred on a roadway. Most importantly, our Legislature knew that the fundamental problem facing a Good Samaritan on the street (the ability to do little more than render first aid under less than optimal circumstances) is not present in a fully staffed and equipped facility like a hospital, whose very purpose is “to make available[] the human skill and physical materiel of medical science to the end that the patient’s health be restored.” Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (N.Y. 1954). As Stewart R. Reuter has observed in “Physicians as Good Samaritans,” 20 J. Legal Med. 157, 189 (1999):
[P]hysicians who care for patients in hospitals are not volunteers in the sense of the person who by chance comes upon the scene of an accident. Moreover, physicians who provide emergency care in hospitals have at their disposal all the modern diagnostic and therapeutic equipment. Granted, they may not be familiar with the patient's medical history or disease and are at somewhat of a disadvantage when compared with the patient's personal physician. However, this disadvantage does not rise to the level of the difficulty that confronts the physician who stops at the site of a roadside accident, who can provide little more than first-aid until the EMS team arrives. In many cases, the physician or surgeon whose expertise is being requested in a hospital emergency will work with a physician or with hospital personnel who have excellent knowledge of the patient's condition and problems. Even if no other physician is already involved in the emergency, the duration of care provided generally is short--until the hospital's trained Code Blue team arrives.

See also Theodore Flowers & William J. Kennedy, Note, Good Samaritan Legislation: An Analysis and a Proposal, 38 Temp. L. Q. 418, 425 (1965) (suggesting that Good Samaritan immunity be limited to places other than hospital or physician’s office to “confine protection to those situations where it is needed most; where neither proper equipment nor adequate facilities are available”). In other words, the “scene of an accident or emergency” reasonably should be understood to incorporate only those locations at which the provision of adequate and necessary medical care is compromised by the existing conditions.
    Dr. Ranzini’s suggestion that she qualifies as a Good Samaritan because she had no prior duty to Mrs. Velazquez misconceives the Good Samaritan Act entirely. Although the absence of a pre-existing duty is one element that volunteers must establish to qualify for Good Samaritan immunity, Praet v. Borough of Sayreville, 218 N.J. Super. 218, 223 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 681 (1987), standing alone it does not satisfy the statute. It is the reduced circumstances in which the volunteer finds himself or herself that the Legislature recognized, and it is the rendering of care in the face of those restrictions that it desired to immunize from suit. Had the Legislature intended to insulate anyone rendering emergency care under any circumstances where no pre-existing duty to render aid exists, it could have done so simply and directly. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557b(a) (West Supp. 2002) (immunizing medical practitioner “who, voluntarily and gratuitously and other than in the ordinary course of such person’s employment or practice, renders emergency medical or professional assistance to a person in need thereof”); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.500(1) (2001) (immunizing “any person in this state who renders emergency care or assistance in an emergency, gratuitously and in good faith”).
    We think it is important as well that five out of the seven state statutes that now expressly immunize emergency care in a hospital setting contained, at their inception, general language like ours. Supra at __ n.3 (Slip op. at 14, n.3). Likewise, the legislatures in states that have immunized obstetrical care rendered in a hospital have done so with a specific enactment, altering or supplementing a general statute like our own. Supra at __-__ (Slip op. at 17-18). Presumably, the legislatures of those states recognized that in-hospital emergency care is not within the contemplation of a general language Good Samaritan act. Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide Emergency Care, 26 Hous. L. Rev. 21, 72 (1989) (noting that Virginia emergency obstetrical care provision, adopted after general statute, was enacted in response to obstetricians’ threats to boycott on-call emergency room services).
Dr. Ranzini’s contention that by not extending Good Samaritan immunity to a hospital we will encourage physicians to simply stand by and allow patients to suffer or die is equally unpersuasive. First, we will not impute such conduct to the highly respected medical profession. Moreover, we note that scholars suggest that physicians’ contracts, hospital protocols, ethical rules, regulatory standards and physicians’ personal relationships operate to make that potential extremely unrealistic relative to a hospital patient. Reuter, supra, 20 J. Leg. Med. at 187, 189. To be sure, the Legislature is free to immunize all persons who render emergency medical treatment without a prior duty to do so, including those who volunteer to act within the walls of a hospital. We tilt neither against nor in favor of such an extension of immunity. We simply are persuaded that the choice is one for the Legislature, and we are unconvinced that the current statute reflects a legislative choice in favor of such immunity.
In sum, Good Samaritan immunity under N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1 encompasses only those situations in which a physician (or other volunteer) comes, by chance, upon a victim who requires immediate emergency medical care, at a location compromised by lack of adequate facilities, equipment, expertise, sanitation and staff. A hospital or medical center does not qualify under the terms of the Good Samaritan Act in its present form.