NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF
THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DOCKET NO. 000099-2003
Approved for Publication In the New Jersey Tax Court Reports
HOME IMPRESSIONS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF TAXATION,
Defendant.
_______________________________________
Decided: June 7, 2004
Laurence Reich for plaintiff
(Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, attorneys).
Carol Johnston for defendant
(Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey,
attorney).
BIANCO, J.T.C.
This is the courts determination regarding the Summary Judgment motion filed by plaintiff,
Home Impressions, Inc. (hereinafter Home Impressions), and the cross motion for Summary Judgment
filed by defendant, Director, Division of Taxation (hereinafter the Director).
*
Home Impressions seeks to set aside the Directors Final Determination issued on November
7, 2002, which found that Home Impressions was subject to the New Jersey
Corporation Business Tax Act, N.J.S.A. 54:10A-1 to 40, (hereinafter the Act) and was
required to file tax returns and remit the minimum tax in accordance with
the Act, commencing June 1, 1995 (plus any applicable penalties and interest). N.J.S.A.
54:10A-5(e).
Home Impressions is a for-profit corporation incorporated under the laws of the State
of North Carolina that manufactures and sells mailboxes and mailbox posts. Home Impressions
principal place of business is in North Carolina; it does not own or
rent property, or maintain an office within the State of New Jersey. Home
Impressions solicits orders for its products in New Jersey through independent contractors who
operate as salespeople within the state. Orders taken by these independent contractors (or
salespeople) are forwarded to North Carolina for approval and shipped from Home Impressions
distribution center in Virginia.
On April 20, 2000 the Director sent Home Impressions a letter stating that
it had come to the Directors attention that Home Impressions may be engaged
in activity with individuals or businesses located within the State of New Jersey
that may subject them to one or more state taxes. In that letter,
the Director also requested that Home Impressions complete a Nexus Survey
See footnote 1
and submit
the same to the Director within 45 days. Home Impressions completed the Nexus
Survey and returned it to the Director on or about June 7, 2000.
On July 3, 2000, the Director sent Home Impressions a Proposed Determination
See footnote 2 that
concluded:
In accordance with the provisions of the New Jersey Corporation Business Tax Act
(N.J.S.A. 54:10A-et seq.) and Regulations (N.J.A.C. 18:7-1.6 thru 18:7-1.11), this Company is doing
business in New Jersey by performing the following in-state (New Jersey) activities:
The solicitation of sales in New Jersey by employees, agents, independent contractors or
representatives.
Accordingly, this company is subject to the New Jersey Corporation Business Tax Act
commencing June 1, 1995 and is required to file tax returns as follows:
Return YearFor Period Ending
1995 May 31, 1996
thru
May 31, 1999
After Home Impressions written response to the Proposed Determination, the Director issued Formal
Notice to Home Impressions, in a letter dated September 22, 2000, confirming the
obligation of Home Impressions under the Act to file tax returns commencing June
1, 1995 through May 31, 1999. On December 20, 2000, Home Impressions filed a protest with the Director claiming
that the sole activity of its independent contractors, retained during the period in
issue, was the solicitation of orders for sales of tangible personal property. These
orders were sent outside the State of New Jersey for approval or rejection
by Home Impressions and, if approved, were filled by shipment or delivery from
a point outside the State of New Jersey. This activity, Home Impressions argues,
is specifically precluded from taxation under the Act by Pub.L. 86-272 (codified
as
15 U.S.C.A.
§381 to 384 but generally referred to as Pub.L.
86-272) which provides in pertinent part that:
No State ... shall have power to impose, ... a net income tax
on the income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce
if the only business activities within such State by or on behalf of
such person ... [is]...the solicitation of orders by such person or his representative,
in such State for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent
outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by
shipment or delivery from a point outside the State. . .
[
15 U.S.C.A.
§381(a) (emphasis added).].
After a hearing was held pursuant to the protest filed by Home Impressions,
the Director issued a Final Determination on November 7, 2002, finding that Home
Impressions was subject to the Act and its minimum tax. This appeal followed.
Home Impressions moved, and the Director cross-moved, for summary judgment.
When deciding a motion for summary judgment under R. 4:462, the court must
determine whether a genuine issue as to any material fact exists. To do
this, it must be determined whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in consideration of the
applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the
alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. Brill v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am.,
142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995). In this case, the
court is not presented with a question of disputed material fact, but rather
with a question of law. Accordingly, the court finds that the case is
ripe for Summary Judgment. R. 4:46-2(c).
The Act imposes a franchise tax on domestic corporations and nonexempt foreign corporations.
N.J.S.A. 54:10A-2. The Act provides in relevant part that:
Every domestic or foreign corporation which is not hereinafter exempted shall pay an
annual franchise tax for each year, as hereinafter provided, for the privilege of
having or exercising its corporate franchise in this State, or for the privilege
of deriving receipts from sources within this State, or for the privilege of
engaging in contacts within this State, or for the privilege of doing business,
employing or owning capital or property, or maintaining an office, in this State.
And such franchise tax shall be in lieu of all other State, county
or local taxation upon or measured by intangible personal property used in business
by corporations liable to taxation under this act. . . .
. . . .
A taxpayers exercise of its franchise in this State is subject to taxation
in this State if the taxpayers business activity in this State is sufficient
to give this State jurisdiction to impose the tax under the Constitution and
statutes of the United States.
[N.J.S.A. 54:10A-2 (emphasis added).].
For the tax years in question, 1995 through 1999, N.J.S.A. 54:10A-5 (1993) (amended
by
L. 1995, c. 246, § 1; L. 1997, c. 40, § 1, eff. March
27, 1997; L. 2001, c. 23, § 1, eff. Feb. 2, 2001; L. 2001,
c. 136, § 2, eff. June 29, 2001; L. 2002, c. 40, § 6, eff.
July 2, 2002),
provided in pertinent part that:
The franchise tax to be annually assessed to and paid by each taxpayer
shall be the sum of the amount computed under subsection (a) hereof, or
in the alternative to the amount computed under subsection (a) hereof, the amount
computed under subsection (f) hereof, and the amount computed under subsection (c) hereof:
. . . .
(c) (1) For a taxpayer that is not a New Jersey S Corporation,
3 1/4 % of its entire net income or such portion thereof as
may be allocable to this State as provided in section 6 of P.L.1945,
c. 162 (C.54:10A-6) plus such portion thereof as is specifically assigned to this
State as provided in section 5 of P.L.1993, c. 173 (C.54:10A-6.1); provided, however,
. . . that with respect to reports covering privilege periods or parts
thereof ending after December 31, 1979, the rate shall be 9%; provided however,
that for a taxpayer that has entire net income of $100,000 or less
for a privilege period and is not a partnership the rate for that
privilege period shall be 7 1/2 % and provided further that for a
taxpayer that has entire net income of $50,000 or less for a privilege
period and is not a partnership the rate for that privilege period shall
be 6 1/2 % .
. . . .
(e) The tax assessed to any taxpayer pursuant to this section shall not
be less than $25 in the case of a domestic corporation, $50 in
the case of a foreign corporation, or $250 in the case of an
investment company or regulated investment company. Provided however, that for privilege periods beginning
in calendar year 1994 and thereafter the minimum taxes for taxpayers other than
an investment company or a regulated investment company shall be as provided in
the following schedule:
Home Impressions argues that its actions inside the State of New Jersey are
only acts of solicitation within the meaning of Pub.L. 86-272 and, therefore,
Home Impressions cannot be subject to the Act because it conflicts with federal
law.
In determining the question of whether the Act conflicts with Pub.L. 86-272,
both parties have argued whether, under the facts of this case, the tax
can survive scrutiny under the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of
the Federal Constitution.
To that argument, the United States Supreme Court in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota,
504 U.S. 298,
112 S. Ct. 1904,
119 L. Ed.2d 91
(1992), examined the states power to impose the obligation on foreign vendors to
collect sales or use taxes on sales into North Dakota under both the
Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. While the two clauses are closely
related, there are distinct differences that limit the states power to tax. Quill,
504 U.S. at 305, 112 S. Ct. at 1909,
119 L. Ed 2d.
at 101. Accordingly, a tax that may be valid under the Due Process
Clause could be invalid under the Commerce Clause. Ibid.
It has been established that a state may assert personal jurisdiction and survive
a due process analysis if the defendant has minimum contacts within the taxing
state. International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310,
66 S. Ct. 154,
90 L. Ed. 95 (1945). Physical presence in the jurisdiction is not required
to establish minimum contacts under this analysis. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462,
105 S. Ct. 2174,
85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985).
See footnote 3
Instead,
there must be some definite link in order to establish minimum contact. Quill,
supra, 504 U.S. at 306, 112 S. Ct. at 1909,
119 L. Ed. 2d at 102. In Quill, the court found minimum contacts when a seller
engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a State. Quill, 504
U.S. at 308, 112 S. Ct. at 1911,
119 L. Ed 2d at
104. In addition, the court stated:
Due process centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity. Thus, at the
most general level, the due process nexus analysis requires that we ask whether
an individuals connections with a State are substantial enough to legitimate the States
exercise of power over him.
[Quill, 504 U.S. at 312, 112 S. Ct. at 1913,
119 L. Ed. 2d at 106].
The present case involves the solicitation of orders by independent contractors in New
Jersey retained by Home Impressions, a foreign corporation. It appears to this court
that Home Impressions activities in New Jersey do amount to the continuous and
widespread solicitation of business [in this state] within the meaning of Quill. According,
the court finds that Home Impressions activities in New Jersey satisfy the minimum
contacts required under the Due Process Clause. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274,
97 S. Ct. 1076,
51 L. Ed.2d 326 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court provided a
four-part test to determine whether the imposition of a tax is prohibited under
the Commerce Clause. The action will be sustained if the tax:
[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and
[4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.
[Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279, 97 S. Ct. at 1079, 51 L.
Ed.
2d at 331 (emphasis added).].
The question in this case is whether Home Impressions activities created a substantial
nexus within the State.
See footnote 4
This requirement is not the same as the Due
Process requirement of minimum contacts. Quill, supra, 504 U.S. at 313, 112 S.
Ct. at 1913, 119 L. Ed.
2d at 107. Rather, in order to
support a finding of substantial nexus, physical presence in the taxing state must
be established.
See footnote 5Quill, supra, 504 U.S. at 311, 112 S. Ct. at 1912,
119 L. Ed.
2d at 106.
The New Jersey Tax Court recently determined that New Jersey may not subject
a foreign corporation to the Act when the corporation merely collects licensing fees
from its clients for use of such intangible property as trademarks, since intangible
property alone is not tantamount to having a physical presence in the State.
Lanco v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
21 N.J. Tax 200 (Tax 2003). Following
the standard in Quill (which addressed sales and use taxes), the Tax Court
in Lanco held that a physical presence is also required for a state
income or franchise tax. Ib. at 207. This court agrees, however, it is
noted that the facts which led to the courts finding of a lack
of physical presence in Lanco are significantly different from the present case, where
independent contractors solicit orders in New Jersey from potential customers of Home Impressions
products.
In line with the present facts, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Scripto, Inc.
v. Carson,
362 U.S. 207,
80 S. Ct. 619,
4 L. Ed.2d 660 (1960), upheld the requirement that an out of state vendor must collect
a use tax based upon the fact that the sellers in-state solicitation was
performed by independent contractors who had a physical presence within the State. SeeRylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp.,
18 S.W.3d 296, 297-98 (Tex. App. 2000)
(where the Texas Court of Appeals held that a company that only solicited
sales in the taxing state and did not rely on salespeople or independent
contractors within the state did not conduct enough activity to create a franchise
tax nexus.). SeealsoClairol Inc. v. Pennsylvania,
518 A.2d 1165, 1166
(Pa. 1986) (where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that a company soliciting sales
while employing four district managers and thirty-one salespeople in the taxing state subjected
itself to a franchise tax.)
In the present case, Home Impressions contracts with independent contractors within the taxing
state. The fact that these independent contractors are not traditional employees, however, is
not a distinction of any constitutional significance. Scripto,supra, 362 U.S. at 211,
80 S. Ct. at 621, 22, 4 L. Ed.
2d at 664. The
formal shift in the contractual tagging of the salesman as independent neither results
in changing his local function of solicitation nor bears upon its effectiveness in
securing a substantial flow of goods into [this state]. Ibid. The showing of
a sufficient nexus cannot be defeated by the argument that the taxpayers representative
was properly characterized as an independent contractor rather than an agent. Tyler Pipe
Indus. v. Washington State Dept of Revenue,
483 U.S. 232,
107 S. Ct. 2810,
97 L. Ed.2d 199 (1987). Here, the court finds that the
physical presence of the Home Impressions independent contractors within New Jersey constitutes a
substantial nexus required by the Commerce Clause.
Having addressed the constitutional arguments raised under Due Process Clause and the Commerce
Clause, the court now turns to the applicability of the Act in relation
to Pub.L. 86-272. Home Impressions argues that the corporation business tax (hereinafter
CBT) imposed by the Act conflicts with Pub.L. 86-272 in that, the
CBT is measured by net income and is therefore invalid.
For the years in question the tax imposed by the Act was measured
by a percentage of the taxpayers net income or a flat minimum tax,
whichever was greater. N.J.S.A. 54:10A-5. By the Acts own terms, the CBT is
a franchise tax intended to reach foreign corporations doing business
See footnote 6 in New Jersey
as far as could constitutionally be done.
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Director, Div.
of Taxation,
50 N.J. 471, 483 (1967). There is no dispute here that
Home Impressions has performed business activities in the State of New Jersey through
the solicitation of orders. Under the Act and N.J.A.C. 18:7-1.6 thru 18:7-1.11, a
company is doing business in New Jersey when it solicits sales in New
Jersey by using employees, agents, independent contractors or representatives. Furthermore, our Supreme Court
has determined that a franchise tax may be properly applied to an exclusively
interstate business. Roadway Express, supra, 50 N.J. at 485.
Home Impressions contends, however, that the protections afforded by Pub.L. 86-272
should
also apply to the minimum flat tax that may be levied on foreign
corporations under the Act. Home Impressions points to the income reporting requirements of
the Act claiming that the minimum flat tax is really based on income
regardless of its label as a franchise tax. The Director argues that the
protection does not apply here because the flat tax is not measured as
a percentage of net income.
New Jersey recognized the applicability of and protections afforded by Pub.L. 86-272
in N.J.A.C. 18:7-1.9(d) which states:
If the only business activity of a foreign corporation within New Jersey consists
of the solicitation of orders for sales of its tangible personal property, which
orders are to be sent outside the State for acceptance or rejection and,
if accepted, are to be filed [sic] by shipment or delivery from a
point outside the State, then such corporation is doing business in New Jersey
and is subject to the tax. Unless it has additional contacts with New
Jersey, however, it will not be liable for any tax measured by the
income of the corporation. (See P.L. 86-272,
15 U.S.C.
§381). The corporation will
be liable for filing a return and payment of the minimum tax.
[N.J.A.C. 18:7-1.9(d) (emphasis added).]
Home Impressions relies on the Tax Courts decision in Pomco Graphics, Inc. v.
Director, Div. of Taxation,
13 N.J. Tax 578 (Tax 1993) where the court
found that a company that only solicits sales in New Jersey could not
be taxed under the Act with respect to its net income.
The
Pomco
Graphics decision echoed the legislative intent of the law and held that, without
additional contact, a tax measured by net income, could not be imposed. Pomco
Graphics, supra, 13 N.J. Tax at 578. Seealso,
Wisconsin Dept of Revenue
v. Wrigley,
505 U.S. 214, 232,
112 S. Ct. 2447, 2458,
120 L.
Ed.2d 174, 191 (1992) (holding
that t
he applicability of
Pub.L. 86-272
depends upon whether that activity establishes a nontrivial additional connection with the taxing
State.); and Gillette Co. v. State Tax Commn,
393 N.Y.S.2d 186 (App. Div.
1977), affd,
382 N.E.2d 764 (N.Y. 1978) (finding that more than mere solicitation
is needed to overcome the exemption of
Pub.L. 86-272
).
This court however, need not address whether additional contacts exist so as to
overcome the applicability of and protections afforded by
Pub.L. 86-272, as the
claims here do not involve an assessment based directly on the net income
of Home Impressions. The more narrow issue, and the only issue in controversy
before this court is whether, as Home Impressions claims, the minimum flat tax
is a tax based on net income.
See footnote 7
To that issue, t
he court notes
that Pomco Graphics, upon which Home Impressions significantly relies, does not address whether
Pub.L. 86-272 protects foreign businesses from the minimum flat tax of the
Act.
Before the introduction of the flat tax (as an alternative under the Act),
the CBT was measured by both net income and net worth. In Tamko
Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Glaser,
5 N.J. Tax 446 (Tax 1983), the taxpayer
argued that Pub.L. 86-272 prohibited the imposition of the CBT on corporations
engaged only in the solicitation of orders within New Jersey. The Tax Court
found that (1) the taxpayer was engaged in more than mere solicitation, and
(2) the protection of Pub.L. 86-272 was limited to taxes that measured
only net income and therefore the statute did not apply to that portion
of the Act that was measured by net worth.
See footnote 8Id. at 456. Seealso, Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley,
109 N.J. Super. 22, 28 (App. Div.), affd
o.b.,
57 N.J. 199 (1970) (holding that Pub.L. 86-272
only applies to
taxes on or measured by net income, and thus had no effect on
the net worth portion of the tax.)
The Acts tax reporting requirements permit the Division of Taxation to identify the
activities of corporations doing business in New Jersey by examining their accounting records
on a report. N.J.S.A. 54:10A-15(c). Merely imposing a reporting requirement on out-of-state corporations
does not conflict with Pub.L. 86-272. Associates Consumer Disc. Co. v. Bozzarello,
149 N.J. Super 358 (App. Div. 1977). SeealsoGillette Co. v. Department
of Treasury,
497 N.W.2d 595 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), appealdenied,
519 W.W.2d 156, cert.den.,
513 U.S. 1103,
115 S. Ct. 779,
130 L. Ed. 2d 673 (1995) (holding that Pub.L. 86-272 was not applicable to its
corporate tax because it was not measured by net income although business income
was a starting point for calculation of the tax base.)
In this case, the Director is using the activity of the Home Impressions
in New Jersey as a reporting requirement under the Act and not as
a means of calculating the amount of the minimum flat tax due. Accordingly,
the court finds that the protections afforded by Pub.L. 86-272
do not
protect foreign corporations from the minimum flat tax imposed under the Act since
the minimum tax is not based on net income.
See footnote 9
Home Impressions motion for
summary judgment is therefore denied. The Directors cross-motion for summary judgment is granted.
Home Impressions shall file tax returns and remit the minimum tax for the
years in question.
Footnote: 1
The Nexus Survey is a two-page questionnaire inquiring about the business activities of
a company to determine whether the company is doing business in New Jersey.
Footnote: 2
The Proposed Determination is a letter from the Nexus Audit Group of the
Division of Taxation finding that Home Impressions was doing business in New Jersey
because of its solicitation of sales through independent contractors within the State. Footnote: 3
The court went on the say that [j]urisdiction in these circumstances may not
be avoided merely because the defendant did not
physically enter the forum State.
Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S. Ct. at 2184, 85
L. Ed.
2d at 543. Footnote: 4
Failure to meet the remaining three standards of the test
set forth
in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274,
97 S. Ct. 1076,
51 L. Ed.2d 326 (1977), has not been alleged in this
case.
Accordingly, this court will focus solely on the first standard (i.e.
substantial nexus)
.
SeegenerallyAmericanTrucking Assns, Inc. v. Scheiner,483
U.S. 266,
107 S.
Ct. 2829,
97 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987), and
Container Corp. ofAmerica
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 159,
103 S. Ct. 2933,
77 L.
Ed.2d 545 (1983). Footnote: 5
In
Quill, the court failed to find a substantial nexus in the
context of a use tax. 504 U.S. at 313,
112 S. Ct. 1904,
1913-14,
119 L. Ed.2d 91, 107. In the present case, the court,
having found no reason to conclude that a franchise tax should be analyzed
in a different manner, will apply the standard in Quill, requiring Home Impressions
to have a substantial nexus within the state. SeeJ.C. Penney Natl Bank
v. Johnson,
19 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), cert.den.,
531 U.S. 927,
121 S. Ct. 305,
148 L. Ed.2d 245 (2000).
Butsee,Mayer & Schweitzer, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
20 N.J.
Tax 217, 231 (Tax 2002), citingQuill, supra, 504 U.S. at 307-08, 112
S. Ct. at 1910-11, 119 L. Ed.
2d at 103 (noting that concepts
of nexus do not require physical presence in a state if a foreign
corporation avails itself of the benefits of an economic market); Bradley W. Joondeph,
Rethinking Commerce Clause Nexus,
31 State Tax Notes 1001, 1003 (March 22, 2004)
(concluding that it might be time to discard the concept of Commerce Clause
nexus).
Footnote: 6
The term doing business as defined in N.J.A.C. 18:7-1.9 includes:
[A]ll activities which occupy the time or labor of men for profit ...
Whether a foreign corporation is doing business in New Jersey is determined by
the facts in each case. Consideration is given to such factors as:
1. The nature and extent of the activities of the corporation in New
Jersey;
2. The location of its offices and other places of business;
3. The continuity, frequency and regularity of the activities of the corporation in
New Jersey;
4. The employment in New Jersey of agents, officers and employees;
5. The location of the actual seat of management or control of the
corporation.
[N.J.A.C. 18:7-1.9.]
SeealsoLinear Films, Inc. v. Oklahoma,
876 P.2d 301, 307 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that, [d]oing business need be no more than the act
of solicitation by a corporation for franchise tax purposes. In contrast, income tax
is a tax on the net income or profit derived from doing business.)
Footnote: 7
No inferences or conclusions should be made from the courts decision in this
matter with regard to the non-flat tax aspects of the Act. No allegations
have been made and, accordingly, this opinion does not address the nature or
basis of any other tax imposed by the Act. Footnote: 8 The tax measured by net worth has since been replaced with a
minimum flat tax.
N.J.S.A. 54:10A-5,
amended
L. 1982 c. 55. Seealso, Hess
Realty Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
10 N.J. Tax 63, 65 n.
1 (Tax 1988) (noting that the Legislature has phased-out the net worth provision
of the Act). Footnote: 9
The court notes the Senate Minority View Statement to
Pub.L. 86-272
:
It should be borne in mind that the subject of this bill is
a tax on net income or a tax measured by net income. We
are not here considering licensing or franchise regulations
Albert Gore, Eugene J. McCarthy, S.Rep.No. 86-658, at 2556.