ROMINGER LEGAL
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinions - 9th Circuit
Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS
NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -CLICK HERE
This opinion or court case is from the Ninth Circuit Court or Appeals. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH
COURT REPORTERS
PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS
PROCESS SERVERS
DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS
EXPERT WITNESSES

 

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

 
Web Rominger Legal

Legal News - Legal Headlines

 


US Court of Appeals
FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                     No. 98-50589
Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                     D.C. No.
v.
                                                     CR-98-01010-HBT
OMAR CASTILLO-CASIANO,
                                                     OPINION
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Howard B. Turrentine, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
June 11, 1999--Pasadena, California

Filed December 28, 1999

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Stephen Reinhardt, and
Stephen S. Trott, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

_________________________________________________________________



SUMMARY

The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court,
is copyrighted C 1999 by West Group.
_________________________________________________________________

Criminal Law and Procedure/Sentencing

The court of appeals vacated a sentencing order of the dis-
trict court. The court held that a federal criminal defendant's
failure to challenge the district court's failure to grant a down-
ward departure from a guidelines sentence, based on the
nature and circumstances of an underlying conviction, does
not preclude raising the issue on appeal when an intervening

                               14977


en banc decision of the court of appeals overturns the previ-
ous rule barring such departures.

Appellant Omar Castillo-Casiano pled guilty to being a
deported alien found in the United States. The presentence
report recommended a 16-level enhancement of his base
offense level based on Castillo-Casiano's prior deportation
after convictions for an aggravated felony--possession for
sale of $10 and $20 worth of crack cocaine.

Castillo-Casiano requested a downward departure on vari-
ous grounds, but did not assert that a reduced sentence was
appropriate because of the nature or circumstances of the
aggravated felony underlying the 16-level enhancement. The
district court denied his request and sentenced Castillo-
Casiano to prison.

In United States v. Rios-Favela, 118 F. 3d 653 (9th Cir.
1997), decided before Castillo-Casiano's conviction, a three-
judge panel held that district courts lacked authority to con-
sider the nature of the underlying aggravated felony convic-
tion as a basis for departure.

While Castillo-Casiano's appeal was pending, the Ninth
Circuit decided United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d
556 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), which overruled Rios-Favela.
The court held that district courts have discretion to grant
downward departures on any basis except those specifically
proscribed in the Sentencing Guidelines. Finding that depar-
tures based on the nature of the underlying aggravated felony
were not so proscribed, the court held that a district court may
depart in its discretion based on the nature of or circumstances
of an underlying aggravated felony.

Castillo-Casiano moved to vacate his sentence and remand
to the district court so that the court could exercise its discre-
tion to depart downwardly under Sanchez-Rodriguez. The
government conceded that criminal defendants may take

                               14978


advantage of new rules announced while their appeals are
pending. However, the government asserted that because
Castillo-Casiano did not request the downward departure at
sentencing, he had to establish that the district court's failure
to consider it was plain error.

[1] The plain error rule applies, even though the law fore-
closed the departure in question at the time of sentencing. [2]
Plain error occurs when there is (1) error (2) that is plain, and
(3) the plain error affects substantial rights. When these three
conditions are met, the court of appeals has discretion to cor-
rect the error, but only in cases where the error seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. The government conceded that the first two
prongs of the plain error test were satisfied: there was plain
error.

[3] In most cases, the third prong of the plain error test calls
on the court of appeals to conduct a harmless error inquiry to
determine if the error was prejudicial to the defendant. [4] In
a sentencing case, harmless error analysis is applicable where
the district court errs by failing to consider exercising its dis-
cretion. The court of appeals had to apply the harmless error
standard in this case.

[5] The nature of the harmless error review to be applied
is strictly limited. The special expertise of district courts in
making sentencing determinations makes it impossible for
courts of appeals to exercise the discretion for the district
court, or to define in advance what might constitute an abuse
of that discretion. The harmless error inquiry is limited to the
resolution of two questions: (1) First, whether anything in the
Guidelines would have prevented the district court from
granting the requested departure; (2) Second, whether the
facts surrounding the defendant's conviction and sentence
"might possibly" have supported a departure.

[6] There is nothing in the Guidelines that prevents a dis-
trict court from departing downward based on the nature of

                               14979


the underlying aggravated felony. The only question was
whether the facts of this case "might possibly " have supported
a district court's decision to engage in such a departure. It
appeared clear that they could have. Castillo-Casiano's sen-
tencing increase was based on prior convictions for the pos-
session for sale of $10 and $20 worth of crack cocaine. There
was no doubt that a district court "might possibly" have con-
cluded that convictions for possession for sale of $10 and $20
worth of crack cocaine did not warrant the full 16-level
increase in base offense level. [7] It could not be concluded
that the district court's belief that it lacked authority to depart
did not affect its selection of the sentence imposed. The error
was not harmless, and Castillo-Casiano satisfied the third
prong of the plain error test.

[8] The erroneous upward departure affected the defen-
dant's substantial rights and the fairness of the proceedings.

[9] Prejudicial sentencing errors undermine the fairness,
integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. Such
errors impose a longer sentence than might have been
imposed had the court not plainly erred. Moreover, there is lit-
tle reason not to correct plain sentencing errors when doing so
is a simple task. Resentencing allows a sentencing court to
make, for the first time, a discretionary determination neces-
sary to arrive at an appropriate sentence. Under those circum-
stances, a failure to allow a district court to correct an obvious
sentencing error that satisfies the three prongs of the plain
error test would itself undermine the fairness, integrity, and
public reputation of judicial proceedings. Castillo-Casiano's
sentence therefore had to be vacated. On remand, the district
court was to exercise its discretion to depart downward under
Sanchez-Rodriguez.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Mark S. Windsor, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San
Diego, California, for the defendant-appellant.

                               14980


Melanie K. Pierson, Assistant United States Attorney, San
Diego, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Omar Castillo-Casiano pled guilty to one count of illegal
reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. S 1326, and now appeals his
sentence. He contends that the district court erred in failing to
depart downward from the sentencing guidelines range on the
basis of the nature and circumstances of his underlying aggra-
vated felony conviction. At the time of his sentencing, Ninth
Circuit law precluded a departure on that basis. An interven-
ing en banc decision of this court overturned the earlier rule,
however, and held that a district court may use the nature of
an underlying conviction as a basis for departure. The govern-
ment asserts on appeal that because Castillo-Casiano failed to
raise the issue below, the plain error standard applies. We
conclude, with hindsight not available to the district judge,
that the district court's failure to consider whether the nature
of the underlying conviction warranted a downward departure
constitutes plain error. We therefore vacate Castillo-Casiano's
sentence and remand for resentencing.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Omar Castillo-Casiano was arrested and pled guilty to one
count of being a deported alien found in the United States
under 8 U.S.C. S 1326. In March 1998, San Diego police offi-
cers made a traffic stop of a vehicle containing three men that
the officers had observed leaving a residence where suspected
drug trafficking was taking place. Castillo-Casiano was a pas-
senger in the car. He had no identification, and told the police
that he had no legal status in the United States. The police
officers contacted Border Patrol agents, who interviewed him

                               14981


and determined that he was in the United States illegally and
that he had a record of prior immigration violations and crimi-
nal convictions. Castillo-Casiano eventually admitted to these
facts and pled guilty to violating S 1326.

The probation officer who prepared Castillo-Casiano's pre-
sentence report assigned a base offense level of eight for a
violation of S 1326. The officer recommended that the offense
level be increased by sixteen levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
S 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), because Castillo-Casiano had been previ-
ously deported after a conviction for an aggravated felony --
possession for sale of crack cocaine. In 1993, Castillo-
Casiano had been convicted of selling $20 worth of crack
cocaine, and in 1994, of selling $10 worth. The probation
officer also recommended that the offense level be reduced
three levels for acceptance of responsibility. This gave
Castillo-Casiano a final offense level of 21.

Castillo-Casiano received a criminal history score of 12. He
was assigned three points for the 1993 conviction, three points
for the 1994 conviction, and three points for a 1996 convic-
tion for being a deported alien found in the United States. He
received an additional two points because he was on super-
vised release at the time of the instant offense, and an addi-
tional one point because he committed the instant offense less
than two years after completing his term of imprisonment.
With a criminal history score of 12 and an offense level of 21,
Castillo-Casiano's sentencing guidelines range was 70-87
months.

Castillo-Casiano requested downward departure on three
grounds: (1) over-representation of criminal history; (2) cul-
tural assimilation to the United States; and (3) a "unique com-
bination of factors." He did not request a departure based on
the nature or circumstances of the aggravated felony underly-
ing the 16-level S 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) increase. The trial judge
refused to grant the requested downward departures and sen-

                               14982


tenced Castillo-Casiano to the low end of the guideline range,
70 months in prison.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

In United States v. Rios-Favela, 118 F.3d 653 (9th Cir.
1997), decided prior to Castillo-Casiano's conviction and sen-
tencing, the defendant pled guilty to illegal reentry in viola-
tion of 8 U.S.C. S 1326. The defendant's base offense level
was increased sixteen levels because he had previously been
convicted of an aggravated felony -- sale or transportation of
a controlled substance. See id. at 654. The district court
departed downward ten levels, however, in part based on its
finding that "the aggravated felony conviction was not serious
enough to warrant a sixteen-level increase." Id. This court
vacated the sentence, concluding that district courts lack
authority to consider the nature of the underlying aggravated
felony conviction as a basis for departure. Id.  at 660. Rios-
Favela was the controlling law in this circuit at the time of
Castillo-Casiano's sentencing.

While Castillo-Casiano's appeal was pending, this court,
sitting en banc, overruled Rios-Favela in United States v.
Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
banc). The facts of Sanchez-Rodriguez are remarkably similar
to those in the case before us. Like Castillo-Casiano, Sanchez-
Rodriguez pled guilty to reentering the United States illegally
in violation of 8 U.S.C. S 1326(a). His base offense level was
also eight and he too was given a sixteen-level increase
because his previous deportation followed a conviction for an
aggravated felony -- in Sanchez-Rodriguez's case, a convic-
tion for possession for sale of $20 worth of heroin. The dis-
trict court departed downward on three bases, including the
minor nature of the underlying aggravated felony conviction.
See id. at 558-59. The Sanchez-Rodriguez court affirmed,
holding that district courts have the discretion to depart down-
ward "on any basis except for those specifically proscribed in
the Sentencing Guidelines." Id. at 560 (emphasis added).

                               14983


Finding that departures based on the nature of the underlying
aggravated felony were not so proscribed, the court held that
a "district court may depart in its discretion based on the
nature or circumstances of an underlying aggravated felony."
Id.

III. DISCUSSION

[1] Castillo-Casiano requests that we vacate his sentence
and remand so that the district court may exercise its discre-
tion to depart downward under Sanchez-Rodriguez . Although
Sanchez-Rodriguez was announced after Castillo-Casiano was
sentenced, the government rightly concedes that criminal
defendants may take advantage of new rules announced while
their appeals are pending. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479
U.S. 314 (1987). Accordingly, as both parties agree, Castillo-
Casiano is entitled to rely on the rule announced in Sanchez-
Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the government asserts that because
Castillo-Casiano did not at the time of sentencing request the
downward departure in question, he must establish that the
district court's failure to consider the downward departure
was plain error. We agree. See, e.g., United States v. Randall,
162 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Alleged sentencing errors
are reviewed for plain error where the defendant has failed to
object before the district court . . . ."); United States v.
Martinez-Gonzalez, 962 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1992)(re-
viewing the district court's decision to depart upward for
plain error where defendant did not raise objection). The plain
error rule applies, even though the law foreclosed the depar-
ture in question at the time of sentencing. See United States
v. Johnson, 520 U.S. 461 (1997); United States v. Keys, 133
F.3d 1282 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

[2] Plain error occurs where there is (1) error, (2) that is
plain, and (3) the plain error affects substantial rights. See,
e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-35 (1993).
Where these three conditions are met, we have discretion to
correct the error, but only in cases where the error "seriously

                               14984


affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-70
(1997) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the government
explicitly concedes that, given the applicability of Sanchez-
Rodriguez to Castillo-Casiano's sentencing, the first two
prongs of the plain error test are satisfied: there was error, and
the error was plain.1 Given the government's concession, we
need only address the third and fourth prongs of the plain
error test.

[3] In Olano, the Supreme Court explained the third prong
of the plain error test -- that the plain error affects substantial
rights -- in the following way:

      The third and final limitation on appellate authority
      . . . is that the plain error "affec[t] substantial rights."
      This is the same language employed in [Federal Rule
      of Criminal Procedure] 52(a), and in most cases it
      means that the error must have been prejudicial: It
      must have affected the outcome of the district court
      proceedings. When the defendant has made a timely
      objection to an error and Rule 52(a) applies, a court
_________________________________________________________________
1 Before making this concession, the government argues that the district
court's decision not to depart downward is not appealable because it
amounted to an exercise of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Morales,
898 F.2d 99, 101-02 (9th Cir. 1990). The government asserts that the dis-
trict court "consider[ed] all the facts and circumstances about Castillo-
Casiano that would be relevant to a decision on whether to depart down-
wards based on the nature of Castillo-Casiano's aggravating felonies."
Although the defendant requested that the court consider the nature of the
felonies underlying his criminal history score, there is no evidence that the
court considered a departure from the 16-level increase to Castillo-
Casiano's offense level on the basis of the nature or circumstances of the
underlying aggravating felony. Most important, given the fact that
Castillo-Casiano was sentenced before Sanchez-Rodriguez was decided,
the district court was barred by law from exercising its discretion on this
point. Accordingly, we reject the government's argument that the district
court's decision not to depart downward from theS 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)
increase constituted an exercise of discretion.

                               14985


      of appeals normally engages in a . . . so-called
      "harmless error" inquiry -- to determine whether the
      error was prejudicial. Rule 52(b) normally requires
      the same kind of inquiry, with one important differ-
      ence: It is the defendant rather than the Government
      who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to
      prejudice.

507 U.S. at 734 (internal citations omitted). That is, in most
cases, the third prong of the plain error test calls on the court
of appeals to conduct a harmless error inquiry in order to
determine if the error was prejudicial to the defendant.

[4] We have held that in a sentencing case, harmless error
analysis is applicable where the district court errs by failing
to consider exercising its discretion. See United States v.
Mendoza, 121 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 1997). Mendoza involved
an appeal from the district court's refusal to consider a
downward departure on the ground that the defendant lacked
control over, or knowledge of, the purity of the methamphet-
amine he was charged with delivering. See id.  at 511. The dis-
trict court stated that it lacked discretion to depart on that
ground, but on appeal we reversed, concluding that district
courts have such discretion. See id. at 511-12. After holding
that the district court had the discretion to grant the requested
departure, we conducted a harmless error analysis. See id. at
513-14. We held that "[a] district court's error in application
of the Guidelines is subject to harmless error analysis, and no
remand is required if `the error did not affect the district
court's selection of the sentence imposed.' " Id. (quoting
Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)). Given
the Mendoza court's conclusion that harmless error analysis
is appropriate where a district court's failure to consider exer-
cising its discretion to depart downward is erroneous, we must
apply the harmless error standard here.

[5] Although Mendoza concludes that harmless error analy-
sis is appropriate in cases such as this one, the nature of the

                               14986


harmless error review to be applied is strictly limited. Accord-
ing to Mendoza, the "special expertise " of district courts in
making sentencing determinations makes it impermissible for
courts of appeals "to exercise the discretion for the district
court, or to define in advance what might constitute an abuse
of that discretion." Id. at 515. Rather than attempting to deter-
mine whether the district court would have granted a depar-
ture had it been aware of its discretion to do so -- that is,
rather than "exercis[ing] the discretion for the district court"
-- in Mendoza we limited our harmless error inquiry to the
resolution of two questions. First, we inquired whether any-
thing in the Guidelines would have prevented the district
court from granting the requested departure. See id. at 514.2
Second, we inquired whether the particular facts surrounding
the defendant's conviction and sentence "might possibly"
have supported a departure. Id. at 515. 3 Because there was
nothing in the Guidelines that foreclosed the departure Men-
doza requested, and because the facts might possibly have
supported such a departure, we held in Mendoza  that it was
not possible to conclude that the district court's erroneous
belief that it lacked discretion to depart " `did not affect the
. . . selection of the sentence imposed.' " Id. at 514 (quoting
Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)). Accord-
ingly, we held that the error was not harmless, and that
remand was necessary in order to allow the district court to
exercise its discretion.
_________________________________________________________________
2 For example, the Mendoza court considered and rejected the govern-
ment's argument that the district court was barred from granting Mendo-
za's requested departure because the Guidelines explicitly consider the
purity of the methamphetamine in establishing the base offense level.
3 For example, the court concluded that defendants who lack knowledge
and control over the purity of the methamphetamine involved in the crime,
such as Mendoza, "might possibly" constitute only a small subset of the
total number of cases encompassed by U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1 -- the guideline
under which Mendoza was sentenced. See id. Accordingly, the court held
that Mendoza might not fall within the heartland ofS 2D1.1 and that,
therefore, the facts could support the requested departure.

                               14987


[6] Here, the first part of the harmless error inquiry
required under Mendoza has already been resolved: Sanchez-
Rodriguez makes clear that there is nothing in the Guidelines
that prevents a district court from departing downward from
a S 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) increase based on the nature of the under-
lying aggravating felony. The only question, therefore, is
whether the facts of this case "might possibly" support a dis-
trict court's decision to engage in such a departure. Again, we
must not "exercise the discretion for the district court": we
may only determine whether the facts could possibly support
such a departure. It appears clear that they could. Castillo-
Casiano's sentencing increase was based on prior convictions
for the possession for sale of $10 and $20 worth of crack
cocaine. Given the range of felonies that can underlie a
S 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) increase, including murder and rape, see 8
U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(A), there is no doubt that a district court
"might possibly" conclude that convictions for possession for
sale of $10 and $20 worth of crack do not warrant the full 16-
level increase in base offense level. Indeed, the district court
in Sanchez-Rodriguez granted its downward departure from
the S 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) increase because the defendant's under-
lying felony conviction was possession for sale of $20 worth
of heroin.

[7] Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the
district court's belief that it lacked authority to depart at the
time of Castillo-Casiano's sentencing "did not affect [its]
selection of the sentence imposed." Mendoza, 121 F.3d at
514. Accordingly, under Mendoza, the error was not harmless,
and Castillo-Casiano has satisfied the third prong of the plain
error test. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.

[8] Because the three prongs of the plain error test are satis-
fied, we will reverse and remand for resentencing if the plain
error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings." Johnson , 520 U.S. at 469-
70. On two recent occasions, we have held that sentencing
errors that might have affected the defendant's sentence

                               14988


undermine the fairness of the sentencing proceedings. See
United States v. Garcia-Sanchez, 189 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.
1999); United States v. Lawton III, 193 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.
1999). In Lawton III, we stated: "We cannot be certain the
application of the [correct guideline] and the appropriate
enhancements, adjustments, and departures would have
resulted in the same offense level. We conclude the erroneous
upward departure affected [the defendants'] substantial rights
and the fairness of the proceedings." 193 F.3d at 1095.

[9] It is easy to see why prejudicial sentencing errors under-
mine the "fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial
proceedings:" such errors impose a longer sentence than
might have been imposed had the court not plainly erred.
Defendants like Castillo-Casiano may be kept in jail for a
number of years on account of a plain error by a court, rather
than because their wrongful conduct warranted that period of
incarceration. Moreover, there is little reason not to correct
plain sentencing errors when doing so is so simple a task. In
the context of convictions, it is the potential costs of error cor-
rection -- undoing a jury verdict or an entire trial, or letting
a guilty defendant go free -- that have led courts on occasion
to decline to "notice" plain errors where the evidence of guilt
was overwhelming. See., e.g., Johnson , 520 U.S. at 470;
United States v. Leon-Reyes, 177 F.3d 816, 821-22 (9th Cir.
1999); United States v. Uchimura, 125 F.3d 1282, 1287 (9th
Cir. 1997). In the sentencing context, however, these costs are
not present. Reversing a sentence does not require that a
defendant be released or retried, but simply allows a district
court to exercise properly its authority to impose a legally
appropriate sentence. Nor does reversing a sentence require a
district court to revisit an issue the outcome of which is abun-
dantly clear. Rather, it allows a sentencing court to make, for
the first time, a discretionary determination necessary to
arrive at an appropriate sentence. Under these circumstances,
a failure to exercise our discretion in order to allow a district
court to correct an obvious sentencing error that satisfies the
three prongs of the plain error test would in itself undermine

                               14989


the "fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial
proceedings." We therefore vacate Castillo-Casiano's sen-
tence, and remand to the district court for the sole purpose of
allowing it to exercise its discretion to depart downward
under Sanchez-Rodriguez.

VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings in
accordance with the opinion.

                               14990



Go to top

Ask a Lawyer

 

 

FREE CASE REVIEW BY A LOCAL LAWYER!
|
|
\/

Personal Injury Law
Accidents
Dog Bite
Legal Malpractice
Medical Malpractice
Other Professional Malpractice
Libel & Slander
Product Liability
Slip & Fall
Torts
Workplace Injury
Wrongful Death
Auto Accidents
Motorcycle Accidents
Bankruptcy
Chapter 7
Chapter 11
Business/Corporate Law
Business Formation
Business Planning
Franchising
Tax Planning
Traffic/Transportation Law
Moving Violations
Routine Infractions
Lemon Law
Manufacturer Defects
Securities Law
Securities Litigation
Shareholder Disputes
Insider Trading
Foreign Investment
Wills & Estates

Wills

Trusts
Estate Planning
Family Law
Adoption
Child Abuse
Child Custody
Child Support
Divorce - Contested
Divorce - Uncontested
Juvenile Criminal Law
Premarital Agreements
Spousal Support
Labor/Employment Law
Wrongful Termination
Sexual Harassment
Age Discrimination
Workers Compensation
Real Estate/Property Law
Condemnation / Eminent Domain
Broker Litigation
Title Litigation
Landlord/Tenant
Buying/Selling/Leasing
Foreclosures
Residential Real Estate Litigation
Commercial Real Estate Litigation
Construction Litigation
Banking/Finance Law
Debtor/Creditor
Consumer Protection
Venture Capital
Constitutional Law
Discrimination
Police Misconduct
Sexual Harassment
Privacy Rights
Criminal Law
DUI / DWI / DOI
Assault & Battery
White Collar Crimes
Sex Crimes
Homocide Defense
Civil Law
Insurance Bad Faith
Civil Rights
Contracts
Estate Planning, Wills & Trusts
Litigation/Trials
Social Security
Worker's Compensation
Probate, Will & Trusts
Intellectual Property
Patents
Trademarks
Copyrights
Tax Law
IRS Disputes
Filing/Compliance
Tax Planning
Tax Power of Attorney
Health Care Law
Disability
Elder Law
Government/Specialty Law
Immigration
Education
Trade Law
Agricultural/Environmental
IRS Issues

 


Google
Search Rominger Legal


 


LEGAL HELP FORUM - Potential Client ? Post your question.
LEGAL HELP FORUM - Attorney? Answer Questions, Maybe get hired!

NOW - CASE LAW - All 50 States - Federal Courts - Try it for FREE


 


Get Legal News
Enter your Email


Preview

We now have full text legal news
drawn from all the major sources!!

ADD A SEARCH ENGINE TO YOUR PAGE!!!

TELL A FRIEND ABOUT ROMINGER LEGAL

Ask Your Legal Question Now.

Pennsylvania Lawyer Help Board

Find An Attorney

TERMS OF USE - DISCLAIMER - LINKING POLICIES

Created and Developed by
Rominger Legal
Copyright 1997 - 2010.

A Division of
ROMINGER, INC.