ROMINGER LEGAL
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinions - 9th Circuit
Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS
NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -CLICK HERE
This opinion or court case is from the Ninth Circuit Court or Appeals. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

LEGAL RESEARCH
COURT REPORTERS
PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS
PROCESS SERVERS
DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS
EXPERT WITNESSES

 

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

 
Web Rominger Legal

Legal News - Legal Headlines

 


US Court of Appeals
FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,                                   No. 96-50686


v.                                                    D.C. No.
                                                     CR-96-0496-MLH
ADOLFO ALBERTO MARIN-CUEVAS,
aka Jesus Marin-Cuevas,                               OPINION
Defendant-Appellant.


Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding


Submitted December 1, 1997
Pasadena, California*


Filed June 8, 1998

Before: Robert R. Beezer, David R. Thompson, and
Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Circuit Judges.


Opinion by Judge O'Scannlain

_________________________________________________________________

SUMMARY

The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court,
is copyrighted C 1998 by West Group.
_________________________________________________________________


Criminal Law and Procedure/Immigration

The court of appeals affirmed a judgment of conviction.
The court held that in a prosecution of an alien for illegal
reentry after deportation, a jury may determine the defen-
_________________________________________________________________
*The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir. R. 34-4.


                               5617


dant's alienage from a file of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS), showing an immigration judge's finding
of foreign citizenship, when the charge to the jury includes
instruction on the government's burden of proving each ele-
ment of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.


An indictment charged appellant Adolfo Marin-Cuevas
with being an alien who reentered the United States after
deportation for commission of an aggravated felony. Marin-
Cuevas contested the alienage element of the offense, claim-
ing that he was an American citizen because he was the legiti-
mate child of a citizen, his mother, who was physically
present in the United States for the requisite period prior to
his birth.


At trial, the district court admitted an INS file showing that
an immigration judge (IJ) had concluded that Marin-Cuevas
was a Mexican citizen. The prosecutor stressed the IJ's find-
ing during closing argument. The defense did not offer, and
the district court did not give, a limiting instruction. Nor did
the court instruct the jury on the difference between the gov-
ernment's burden of proof in immigration proceedings and
criminal trials.


The district court instructed the jury that the requirements
of derivative citizenship must be presented to the INS, and
that the INS has exclusive authority to issue a certificate of
citizenship. However, the court gave a general instruction on
the burden of proof, and told the jury that the government had
to prove each element of the charged offense beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. The jury found Marin-Cuevas guilty.


At sentencing, the prosecution introduced a presentence
report (PSR) that identified Marin-Cuevas' two misdemeanor
convictions and the corresponding sentences for which there
were no accompanying hard-copy records. The probation offi-
cer explained that because of the age of the convictions, the
records had been purged, and he had to rely on a computer-


                               5618


ized criminal history that was matched to Marin-Cuevas by
fingerprint identification. The district court relied on the com-
puterized records to assign four criminal history points to
Marin-Cuevas.


On appeal, Marin-Cuevas contended that the district court
erred by instructing the jury regarding the INS' authority to
determine citizenship without a limiting instruction. He con-
ceded that the instruction was technically accurate, but
asserted that it may have confused or misled the jury by dis-
guising the fact that in immigration proceedings, the govern-
ment's burden of proof is only clear and convincing, and not
beyond a reasonable doubt. Marin-Cuevas also complained
that the computerized records of his prior misdemeanor con-
victions were insufficient to sustain the district court's assign-
ment of the criminal history points.


[1] Before an appellate court can correct an error not raised
at trial, there must be error that is plain and affects substantial
rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may
exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if
the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public rep-
utation of judicial proceedings. Improper jury instructions will
rarely justify a finding of plain error. Reversal is warranted
only if it is highly probable that the error materially affected
the verdict.


[2] The district court did not err in this case, let alone
plainly err. The test for error is whether the jury instructions
taken as a whole were misleading or represented a statement
inadequate to guide the jury's deliberations. The trial judge
has substantial latitude in tailoring instructions, and chal-
lenges to the formulation adopted by the court are reviewed
for abuse of discretion.


[3] In this case, although the district court neither provided
a limiting instruction nor compared and contrasted the burden
of proof in criminal trials with that in INS proceedings, the


                               5619


court made sufficiently clear that the jury had to decide the
question of whether the government had to prove each ele-
ment of the offense--including alienage--beyond a reason-
able doubt.


[4] The government might have confused the issue some-
what by referring to the INS file and the deportation decision.
However, taking the trial as a whole, it justifiably could be
assumed that the jury knew that INS proceedings are subject
to a lower standard of proof than are criminal trials, and are
not binding on a subsequent criminal trial.


[5] The prosecution admitted that the burden of proof in
INS proceedings is only clear and convincing. [6] In its clos-
ing remarks, the defense reminded the jury that the burden of
proof in a criminal trial is beyond a reasonable doubt. [7] For
the jury to believe that the INS' finding was decisive, the jury
had to think that the bulk of the two-day trial was superfluous.
The lawyers tried to pin down the dates during which Marin-
Cuevas' mother resided in the United States. That would have
been unnecessary if the jury could have simply relied on the
INS' determination. [8] The jury was sufficiently advised that
it had the obligation to determine whether the prosecution had
proven beyond a reasonable doubt Marin-Cuevas' status as an
alien.


[9] Sentencing judges are not restricted to information that
would be admissible at trial. Any information may be consid-
ered, so long as it has sufficient indicia of reliability to sup-
port its probable accuracy.


[10] The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking
into account the PSR. The probation officer obtained his
information from a reliable source--the computerized crimi-
nal history--and had no reason to prevaricate. The probation
officer's attestation therefore bore sufficient indicia of reli-
ability.


                               5620


[11] The government had the burden of proving the exis-
tence of the prior sentences by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. [12] The only evidence presented by either side was
the PSR. Marin-Cuevas never denied that he was convicted of
the misdemeanors. The preponderance of the evidence sus-
tained the district court's finding.


_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Linda Casey Mackey, Bonita, California, for the appellant.

David P. Curnow, Assistant United States Attorney, San
Diego, California, for the appellee.


_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether the jury properly rejected a claim
of United States citizenship by an alleged alien who was
charged with illegally re-entering the United States and
whether the district court may assign criminal-history points
for a prior sentence based solely on the attestation of a proba-
tion officer.


I

Adolfo Marin-Cuevas was convicted of violating 8 U.S.C.
S 1326, which makes it a crime for an alien, who had previ-
ously been convicted of an aggravated felony and deported,
to return to the United States.1 In August 1989, Marin-Cuevas
_________________________________________________________________
1 When Marin-Cuevas reentered the United States in 1995, S 1326 read
in relevant part:


                               5621


had been convicted of possessing phencyclidine for sale, an
aggravated felony in California. See California Health and
Safety Code S 11378.5. Four years later, on the basis of this
conviction and a determination that he was an illegal alien,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") deported
him to Mexico. Marin-Cuevas thereafter returned to the
United States without permission and, in February 1996, was
arrested in the state of Washington. Based on these facts, and
finding Marin-Cuevas to be an alien, the jury rendered a
guilty verdict.


II

On appeal, as he did at trial, Marin-Cuevas asserts he is not
an alien but a citizen of the United States by virtue of
"derivative citizenship": that he is the legitimate child of a cit-
izen, his mother, who was physically present in the United
_________________________________________________________________
      (a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who --


      (1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and
      deported, and thereafter


      (2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the
      United States, . . . .


      shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2
      years, or both.


      (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of
      any alien described in such subsection --


      . . . .

      (2) whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for
      commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be
      fined under such Title, imprisoned not more than 20 years,
      or both.


8 U.S.C. S 1326 (1995). Section 1326 has since been amended. See Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, Div. C., 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996). The recent amendments, however, do not bear upon this appeal.


                               5622


States prior to his birth for the statutorily required periods of
time.2


A

At trial, Marin-Cuevas presented uncontested evidence that
his mother, Rosa Faye, was indeed born in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia. The question of derivative citizenship, therefore, sim-
ply came down to whether or not she had spent enough time
in the United States prior to Marin-Cuevas's birth. Under 8
U.S.C. S 1401, she had to be physically present in the United
States for at least five years between her fourteenth birthday,
in February 1960, and her giving birth to Marin-Cuevas in
June 1966. See 8 U.S.C. S 1401; see also Immigration Techni-
cal Corrections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-525, S 23(d),
102 Stat. 2609. Stressing a conversation Rosa Faye once had
with the Border Patrol, the prosecution maintained she failed
_________________________________________________________________
2 Section 1401 of Title 8 of the United States Code reads in relevant
part:


      The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States
      at birth:


      . . . .

      (g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the
      United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of
      whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States
      who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present
      in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period
      or periods totalling not less than five years, at least two of
      which were after attaining the age of fourteen years. . . .


8 U.S.C. S 1401. The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of
1986 changed the former ten- and five-year requirements to the current
five- and two-year requirements. See Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, S 12, 100 Stat. 3655. In 1988,
however, Congress specifically noted that these amendments applied only
to those persons born on or after November 14, 1986. See Immigration
Technical Corrections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-525, S 23(d), 102
Stat. 2609. Because Marin-Cuevas was born in 1966, the Amendments of
1986 do not apply to him.


                               5623


to satisfy this requirement; allegedly, Rosa Faye claimed to
have moved to Mexico "when she was very small, and lived
[there] all her life . . . except from 11-1-69." In response,
Marin-Cuevas presented the testimony of his mother's friend
and his uncle. Although the friend claimed to have seen Faye
in San Diego regularly between 1960 and 1965, the uncle tes-
tified that the whole family, including Faye, lived in Mexico
during that period.


At the close of evidence, the district court properly charged
the jury that it must decide each element of the offense --
including the issue of alienage -- beyond a reasonable doubt.
The problem, according to Marin-Cuevas, is that the court
also noted superfluously that evidence of the requirements of
derivative citizenship "must be presented to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, which has exclusive authority
under the law to issue a certificate of citizenship. " Marin-
Cuevas did not object at the time.


Now, however, he specifically challenges the comment that
the INS "has exclusive authority under the law to issue a cer-
tificate of citizenship." According to Marin-Cuevas, although
the instruction is technically accurate as a statement of law,
it might have misled the jury; it might have disguised the fact
that, because the burden of proof in deportation proceedings
is only "clear and convincing" and not "beyond a reasonable
doubt," the INS's conclusion is not decisive for purposes of
a criminal trial. See United States v. Ortiz-Lopez, 24 F.3d 53,
55-56 (9th Cir. 1994). Marin-Cuevas also contends that this
possibility of confusion was compounded, first, by the admis-
sion of his INS file without a limiting instruction, and second,
by the court's failure to instruct the jury as to the difference
in the burden of proof between INS proceedings and criminal
trials. He claims that the government took advantage of these
errors, and further muddied the waters, by referring to the
INS's deportation proceedings during closing arguments.3

_________________________________________________________________
3 For example, the prosecutor said:


      And how did the United States prove that [the defendant was a

                               5624


B

[1] Because Marin-Cuevas neither objected to the jury
instructions at trial nor offered a limiting instruction,4 the
standard of review is plain error. See United States v. Hinton,
31 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Armijo, 5
F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 1993). Under the plain error test:


      [B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not
      raised at trial, there must be (1) "error, " (2) that is
      "plain," and (3) that "affect[s] substantial rights." If
      all three conditions are met, an appellate court may
      then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error,
      but only if (4) the error "seriously affect[s] the fair-
_________________________________________________________________
      native and citizen of Mexico]? We proved that to you first by
      way of his birth certificate from Mexicali showing that he was
      born in Mexico on June 20th, 1966. At a hearing before an Immi-
      gration judge September 9th, 1993 here in San Diego the Immi-
      gration judge believed that the United States had proved that he
      is an alien, and you will see his decision.


Transcript of Trial, Vol. II, at 62. Then, the prosecutor stated in rebuttal:

      The Immigration judge heard this very same argument and he
      made a decision based upon the testimony provided to him.


      The Board of Immigration Appeals heard the argument over
      again and this Defendant heard each of those decisions. He heard
      the Immigration Judge and he received a copy of it from the
      Board of Immigration Appeals.


      He appealed to the Ninth circuit and they said,"You're not a
      U.S. citizen. Thank you."


Id. at 84-85.
4 Marin-Cuevas noted in his reply brief that his attorney did object at
trial to the admission of INS documents. This objection cannot, however,
double as an objection to the jury instructions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 ("No
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction
unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its ver-
dict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the
objection.") (emphasis added).


                               5625


      ness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
      proceedings."


Johnson v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997) (quot-
ing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)) (cita-
tions omitted) (alterations in original). This test is most
stringent: "Improper jury instructions will rarely justify a
finding of plain error." Armijo, 5 F.3d at 1232. Reversal is
warranted only if it is "highly probable that the error materi-
ally affected the verdict." United States v. Kessi, 868 F.2d
1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 1989).


[2] Moreover, the district court did not even err in this case,
let alone plainly err. The test for error is whether the jury
instructions "taken as a whole were misleading or represented
a statement inadequate to guide the jury's deliberations." Id.
at 1101 (quoting Stoker v. United States, 587 F.2d 438, 440
(9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (emphasis added). "The trial judge has substantial lati-
tude in tailoring the instructions, and challenges to the
formulation adopted by the court are reviewed for abuse of
discretion." United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208,
1214 (9th Cir. 1989).


[3] In this case, to avoid misleading the jury, the district
court instructed: "The Government has the burden of proving
every element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If it
fails to do so, you must return a not guilty verdict." The judge
then proceeded to explain that one of the requisite elements
was that the defendant was an "alien." Finally, at the very end
of the instructions, the judge reiterated:


      The Government must prove each element beyond a
      reasonable doubt. If it fails to do so, you must return
      a not guilty verdict. Your consideration of a single
      element should not prejudice your consideration of
      any other element.


                               5626


Trial Transcript, Vol. II, at 61. Thus, although the judge nei-
ther provided a limiting instruction nor compared and con-
trasted the burden of proof in criminal trials with that in INS
proceedings, he did make sufficiently clear that the jury had
to decide the question of whether the government had proven
each element of the offense -- including the element of alien-
age -- beyond a reasonable doubt.


[4] To be sure, the government might have confused the
issue somewhat by referring to the INS file and the deporta-
tion decision. Although the government did not refer to the
now-challenged portion of the jury instructions, the govern-
ment's rhetoric in its closing arguments could have made the
issue of Marin-Cuevas's derivative citizenship murkier than it
had to be. However, taking the trial as a whole, we can justifi-
ably assume the jury knew that INS proceedings are subject
to a lower standard of proof than are criminal trials, and are
thus not binding on a subsequent criminal trial. The reasons
are threefold.


[5] First, the prosecution admitted that the burden of proof
in INS proceedings is only clear and convincing. During its
closing argument, the government read from the Immigration
Judge's decision, which concluded that there was clear and
convincing evidence that the facts alleged in the order to show
cause for deportation are true. The government also reported
that the BIA had found that Marin-Cuevas's "deportability as
an alien ha[d] been established by clear, convincing, and
unequivocal evidence."


[6] Second, in its closing remarks, the defense reminded the
jury that the burden of proof in a criminal trial is beyond a
reasonable doubt:


      The burden of proof that the U.S. Government has
      -- not to prove probably that my client is not a U.S.
      citizen, that his mother in other words didn't meet
      these requirements, not clearly and convincingly that


                               5627


      Rosa Faye didn't meet these requirements to convey
      her citizenship to my client. The burden of the U.S.
      Government is to produce or prove beyond a reason-
      able doubt. They've got to prove beyond a reason-
      able doubt -- beyond a reasonable doubt that these
      things didn't happen.


Trial Transcript, Vol. II, at 74 (emphasis added).

[7] Third, as the government argues in its brief, in order for
the jury to believe that the INS's finding was decisive, the
jury would have had to think that the bulk of the two-day trial
was superfluous. The central issue at trial was whether Marin-
Cuevas obtained derivative citizenship. Through their exami-
nation of witnesses and presentation of documents, the law-
yers tried to pin down the particular dates during which Rosa
Faye, the defendant's mother, resided in the United States. All
of that would have been unnecessary if the jury could have
simply relied on the INS's previous determination.


[8] We therefore conclude that the jury was not misled.
Despite the challenged jury instructions, the absence of a lim-
iting instruction, and the government's various references to
the INS's findings, we believe the jury was sufficiently
advised that it had the independent obligation to determine
whether the prosecution had proven -- beyond a reasonable
doubt -- Marin-Cuevas's status as an alien. The district court
did not err.


III

Marin-Cuevas also contends that the district court erred in
assigning criminal-history points for prior sentences the only
evidence of which was the attestation of the probation officer.


At sentencing, the government introduced a Presentence
Report that identified, among other prior sentences, two mis-
demeanors for which there were no accompanying hard-copy


                               5628


records. As the probation officer explained, because of the
age of the convictions, the records had been purged and he
instead had to rely on a computerized criminal history, which
was matched to Marin-Cuevas by means of a fingerprint iden-
tification. Although the government never provided the dis-
trict court with a printout of these computerized records, the
court assigned four points to Marin-Cuevas's criminal history,
two for each misdemeanor sentence, as called for by
S 4A1.1(b) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.5
Marin-Cuevas contends that, in the absence of any hard-copy
records or computer printouts, there was insufficient evidence
establishing he had ever been convicted and sentenced for the
misdemeanors, and thus it was error for the court to assign
these points.6


[9] We must address two questions in evaluating the merit
of this argument: first, whether the probation officer's report
was sufficiently reliable even to be considered at sentencing;
and second, if so, whether it was enough to sustain the assign-
ment of the criminal-history points. As for the first question,
the Sentencing Guidelines make clear that "sentencing judges
_________________________________________________________________
5 Section 4A1.1 states in relevant part:


      The total points from items (a) through (f) determine the criminal
      history category in the Sentencing Table in Chapter Five, Part A.


      (a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment
      exceeding one year and one month.


      (b) Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at
      least sixty days not counted in (a).


      . . . .

USSG S 4A1.1.
6 Marin-Cuevas does not challenge the reliability of the computerized
databases on which the Presentence Report relied, databases which were
maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the California Bureau
of Criminal Identification and Investigation, the Department of Motor
Vehicles, and local law enforcement agencies. Rather, the claimed error
is simply that no copies of the computerized report (or the original
records) were submitted to the court.


                               5629


are not restricted to information that would be admissible at
trial." S 6A1.3, comment. Indeed, "[a]ny information may be
considered, so long as it has `sufficient indicia of reliability
to support its probable accuracy.' " Id. (quoting United States
v. Marshall, 519 F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Wis. 1981), aff'd, 719
F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1983)). A district court judge's determina-
tion that a particular item of evidence is sufficiently reliable
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Pinto,
48 F.3d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 1995).


[10] Although this court has not squarely addressed the
specific issue at hand, persuasive authority suggests that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by taking into
account the Presentence Report. First, this court has previ-
ously held that an investigative report prepared by Secret Ser-
vice agents is admissible at sentencing. See United States v.
Burns, 894 F.2d 334, 336-37 (9th Cir. 1990). Second, two of
our sister circuits have permitted sentencing judges to take
into account officers' uncorroborated reports. See United
States v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 1991) (detention
officer's affidavit); United States v. Cuellar-Flores, 891 F.2d
92, 93 (5th Cir. 1989) (probation officer's testimony). Like
the Secret Service agents in Burns and the officers in Aymelek
and Cuellar-Flores, the probation officer who prepared
Marin-Cuevas's Presentence Report obtained his information
from a reliable source -- the computerized criminal history
-- and had no reason to prevaricate. Therefore, the probation

officer's attestation similarly bore "sufficient indicia of
reliability," and the district court did not err in considering it
at sentencing.


[11] The question then becomes whether this evidence was
enough to sustain the district court's finding that Marin-
Cuevas had in fact been convicted and sentenced for those
misdemeanors. The government had the burden of proving the
existence of these prior sentences by a "preponderance of the
evidence." United States v. Newman, 912 F.2d 1119, 1122
(9th Cir. 1990). The reviewing court should affirm the district


                               5630


court's factual determination unless the district court clearly
erred. See United States v. Gillock, 886 F.2d 220, 222 (9th
Cir. 1989).


[12] In this case, the only evidence presented by either side
was the presentence report. As the district court explained,
Marin-Cuevas has never denied he was convicted of those
misdemeanors. He has argued only that the government failed
to provide sufficient evidence. Because the only evidence
before the sentencing court was the Presentence Report, the
preponderance of the evidence sustains the district court's
finding. Thus, the district court did not err, let alone clearly
err.


IV

For the foregoing reasons, we uphold Marin-Cuevas's con-
viction and sentence.


AFFIRMED.

                               5631





Go to top

Ask a Lawyer

 

 

FREE CASE REVIEW BY A LOCAL LAWYER!
|
|
\/

Personal Injury Law
Accidents
Dog Bite
Legal Malpractice
Medical Malpractice
Other Professional Malpractice
Libel & Slander
Product Liability
Slip & Fall
Torts
Workplace Injury
Wrongful Death
Auto Accidents
Motorcycle Accidents
Bankruptcy
Chapter 7
Chapter 11
Business/Corporate Law
Business Formation
Business Planning
Franchising
Tax Planning
Traffic/Transportation Law
Moving Violations
Routine Infractions
Lemon Law
Manufacturer Defects
Securities Law
Securities Litigation
Shareholder Disputes
Insider Trading
Foreign Investment
Wills & Estates

Wills

Trusts
Estate Planning
Family Law
Adoption
Child Abuse
Child Custody
Child Support
Divorce - Contested
Divorce - Uncontested
Juvenile Criminal Law
Premarital Agreements
Spousal Support
Labor/Employment Law
Wrongful Termination
Sexual Harassment
Age Discrimination
Workers Compensation
Real Estate/Property Law
Condemnation / Eminent Domain
Broker Litigation
Title Litigation
Landlord/Tenant
Buying/Selling/Leasing
Foreclosures
Residential Real Estate Litigation
Commercial Real Estate Litigation
Construction Litigation
Banking/Finance Law
Debtor/Creditor
Consumer Protection
Venture Capital
Constitutional Law
Discrimination
Police Misconduct
Sexual Harassment
Privacy Rights
Criminal Law
DUI / DWI / DOI
Assault & Battery
White Collar Crimes
Sex Crimes
Homocide Defense
Civil Law
Insurance Bad Faith
Civil Rights
Contracts
Estate Planning, Wills & Trusts
Litigation/Trials
Social Security
Worker's Compensation
Probate, Will & Trusts
Intellectual Property
Patents
Trademarks
Copyrights
Tax Law
IRS Disputes
Filing/Compliance
Tax Planning
Tax Power of Attorney
Health Care Law
Disability
Elder Law
Government/Specialty Law
Immigration
Education
Trade Law
Agricultural/Environmental
IRS Issues

 


Google
Search Rominger Legal


 


LEGAL HELP FORUM - Potential Client ? Post your question.
LEGAL HELP FORUM - Attorney? Answer Questions, Maybe get hired!

NOW - CASE LAW - All 50 States - Federal Courts - Try it for FREE


 


Get Legal News
Enter your Email


Preview

We now have full text legal news
drawn from all the major sources!!

ADD A SEARCH ENGINE TO YOUR PAGE!!!

TELL A FRIEND ABOUT ROMINGER LEGAL

Ask Your Legal Question Now.

Pennsylvania Lawyer Help Board

Find An Attorney

TERMS OF USE - DISCLAIMER - LINKING POLICIES

Created and Developed by
Rominger Legal
Copyright 1997 - 2010.

A Division of
ROMINGER, INC.