Warren v. General Motors Corp., 142 NC App 316 (00-155) 02/20/2001
**FINAL**
FRANKLIN WARREN v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, HENRY CLIFTON
BALDWIN, Individually, and LINDA HAYWORTH HYATT, Individually
No. COA00-155
(Filed 20 February 2001)
1. Insurance--automobile accident--unnamed insurer--right to participate in trial
The trial court did not err in a negligence case arising out of an automobile accident by
permitting the unnamed UIM insurance company to participate in the trial when the insurance
company had earlier said it would not participate in the pretrial conference or trial, because: (1)
N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) provides that a UIM insurer has the right to participate in a trial
without being named if application is made and approved by the presiding judge; (2) the
insurance company's counsel filed a notice of appearance which the trial court recognized; and
(3) even though N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 16 precludes a party from participating in a trial if that
party elects not to participate in the pretrial conference, there is no evidence the insurance
company failed to participate in the pretrial conference.
2. Pleadings--amendment to answer--no prejudicial error
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a negligence case arising out of an
automobile accident by allowing the unnamed UIM insurance company and defendant driver to
amend their answers on the first day of trial, because there was no prejudicial error when the jury
found for plaintiff on those issues.
3. Evidence--automobile accident--unnamed insurance company's original answer
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a negligence case arising out of an
automobile accident by refusing to permit plaintiff to offer the unnamed UIM insurance
company's original answer as evidence in the case, because: (1) the trial court found the
probative value of the answers were substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice under
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403; and (2) it is generally not permissible in negligence cases to
introduce evidence of liability insurance or to make any reference of its existence in the presence
of the jury.
4. Evidence--automobile accident--loss of services--expert testimony not required
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a negligence case arising out of an
automobile accident by refusing to permit plaintiff to offer evidence of loss of his own services
through the testimony of an expert witness under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a), because the jury
was capable of rendering a decision on the value of a person's services to himself based on
common knowledge.
5. Damages and Remedies--motion for new trial--alleged low amount--controverted
damages
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a negligence case arising out of an
automobile accident by refusing to grant a new trial under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(6) when
the jury award was allegedly low, because: (1) plaintiff's damages were contested by two
defendants; and (2) plaintiff's own witness testified that many of plaintiff's injuries did not resultfrom the accident at issue.
Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered on 28 May 1999 by
Judge Mark E. Klass in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 11 January 2001.
Twiggs, Abrams, Strickland & Trehy, by Douglas B. Abrams for
plaintiff-appellant
Teague, Rotenstreich & Stanaland, by Stephen G. Teague fordefendant-appellee Hyatt
Burton & Sue, by Walter K. Burton and James D. Secor, III for
unnamed defendant-appellee Allstate
THOMAS, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from a jury verdict of $6,000.00 in a
personal injury action and sets forth six assignments of error.
For reasons discussed herein, we hold the trial court committed no
error.
The facts surrounding the car accident are not in dispute.
Plaintiff was driving south on Randleman Road in Guilford County
when the rear of his vehicle was struck by a vehicle operated by
defendant Henry Baldwin. Baldwin's vehicle was then struck by a
vehicle driven by defendant Linda Hyatt. Plaintiff brought suit
against both Baldwin and Hyatt alleging multiple injuries.
Initially, Hyatt denied liability in her answer to plaintiff's
complaint while unnamed defendant Allstate (the underinsured
motorist insurer) admitted liability. Just before trial began,
plaintiff reached a settlement with Baldwin. Allstate then amended
its answer to deny negligence and Hyatt amended her answer to
allege contributory negligence against plaintiff. The case went totrial during the week of 26 April 1999 and the jury returned a
verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $6,000.00. Plaintiff filed
a motion for a new trial, which was denied. Plaintiff filed notice
of appeal on 24 June 1999. [1]By plaintiff's first assignment of error, he argues the
trial court erred in permitting Allstate to participate in the
trial when it earlier had said it would not participate in the pre-
trial conference or trial. We disagree.
By statute, a UIM insurer has the right to participate in a
trial without being named if application is made and approved by
the presiding trial judge. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(4)
(1999). Allstate's counsel filed a notice of appearance on 27
April 1999, which the court recognized in an order in limine filed
on 28 April 1999. Plaintiff argues the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure preclude a party from participating in a trial if
that party elects not to participate in the pre-trial conference.
N.C. Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule 16 (1999). However, there is no
evidence Allstate failed to participate in the pre-trial
conference. There is evidence the pre-trial conference actually
occurred after Walter Burton appeared before the court as counsel
for Allstate. Thus, this assignment of error is rejected. [2]By plaintiff's second and third assignments of error, he
argues the trial court committed reversible error in allowing
Allstate and Hyatt to amend their answers on the first day of
trial. We disagree.
A motion to amend pleadings is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court; the trial court's ruling is not
reviewable absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Haas v.Kelso, 76 N.C.App. 77, 80, 331 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1985); see also
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15 (1999). "An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court's ruling 'is so arbitrary that it could
not have been the result of a reasoned decision.' " Chicora
Country Club, Inc. v. Town of Erwin, 128 N.C.App. 101, 109, 493
S.E.2d 797, 802 (1997), disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 670, 500
S.E.2d 84 (1998) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324
S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)). No abuse of discretion has been shown.
Additionally, reversible error occurs when the defendant shows
that but for the error a different result would have been reached.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (1999). The jury found for plaintiff
on those issues. By prevailing, even if there were error, and we
conclude there was not, it was not prejudicial and is rendered
moot. [3]By plaintiff's fourth assignment of error, he argues the
trial court erred in refusing to permit plaintiff to offer
Allstate's original answer as evidence in the case. We disagree.
The trial court denied plaintiff's motion in limine, which
sought to offer both the original and amended answers into
evidence. A motion in limine seeks pretrial determination of the
admissibility of evidence proposed to be introduced at trial; its
determination will not be reversed absent a showing of an abuse of
the trial court's discretion. Nunnery v. Baucom, 135 N.C.App.
556, 521 S.E.2d 479 (1999). The trial judge found the probative
value of the answers was substantially outweighed by the danger of
prejudice and confusion of the issues by the jury, pursuant to Rule
403 of the N.C. Rules of Evidence. Moreover, in negligence cases,it is not generally permissible to introduce evidence of liability
insurance or to make any reference of its existence in the presence
of the jury. Carolina Timber Management Co. v. Bell, 21 N.C.App.
143, 203 S.E.2d 339, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 376, 205 S.E.2d 97
(1974). As with assignments of error three and four, plaintiff
prevailed on those issues at trial. Thus, there is no prejudicial
error. [4]By plaintiff's fifth assignment of error, he argues the
trial court erred in refusing to permit plaintiff to offer evidence
of loss of services to himself. We disagree.
Plaintiff attempted to use an economist as his expert witness
to show the value of the plaintiff's loss of his own services. An
expert witness is qualified to testify if scientific, technical or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue[.] N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (1999); State v. Jones, 337 N.C.
198, 209, 446 S.E.2d 32, 39 (1994). The trial court correctly
concluded the jury was capable of rendering a decision on the value
of a person's services to himself because such is a matter of
common knowledge. No abuse of the trial court's discretion has
been shown and, accordingly, we find no error. [5]By plaintiff's sixth and final assignment of error, he
argues the trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial
because the jury award was improperly low. We disagree.
The relevant statute provides that a new trial may be granted
due to [e]xcessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice[.] N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(6) (1999). "A motion for a new trial onthe grounds of inadequate damages is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court[.]" Estate of Smith v. Underwood,
127 N.C.App. 1, 12, 487 S.E.2d 807, 814, disc. review denied, 347
N.C. 398, 494 S.E.2d 410 (1997)(quoting Pelzer v. United Parcel
Service, 126 N.C.App. 305, 484 S.E.2d 849, 853, disc. review
denied, 346 N.C. 549, 488 S.E.2d 808 (1997)). The plaintiff
relies on Robertson v. Stanley, 285 N.C. 561, 206 S.E.2d 190
(1971), which held that uncontroverted damages cannot be
arbitrarily ignored by the jury. However, in the instant case,
plaintiff's damages were contested by defendants Hyatt and
Allstate. Plaintiff's own witness, Dr. Arthur Carter, testified
that many of plaintiff's injuries did not result from the accident
at issue. Plaintiff has not shown an abuse of the trial court's
discretion; thus the assignment of error is rejected.
For the reasons stated herein, we find no error.
NO ERROR.
Judges MARTIN and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.