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IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
James Howard Smith
::
v.
:
NO. 101 C.D. 2001
:
SUBMITTED: July 13, 2001
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
:
Department of Transportation,
:
Bureau of Driver Licensing,
:
Appellant
:
BEFORE:
HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, President Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge
HONORABLE CHARLES P. MIRARCHI, JR., Senior Judge
OPINION BY
JUDGE LEADBETTER
FILED: June 20, 2002
The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
(Department), appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie
County that sustained James Howard Smith's appeal from a one-year license
suspension imposed as a result of Smith's conviction in Kentucky for driving
under the influence of alcohol. Common pleas sustained Smith's appeal due to the
lack of evidence that Kentucky is a member of and has enacted the Driver License
Compact. After review, we affirm.
In January of 2000, Smith was convicted of driving under the
influence in violation of Kentucky Revised Statute § 189A.010. Kentucky's
licensing authority notified the Department of Smith's conviction, which in turn,
notified Smith that his operating privilege was suspended for one year pursuant to
Section 1532(b) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1532(b). Smith appealed and a

hearing de novo before common pleas followed. In conjunction with other
documentary evidence offered in support of its case, the Department offered into
evidence a photocopy of a letter, certified by the Director of the Department's
Bureau of Driver Licensing. The letter, dated June 21, 1996, and written on
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators' letterhead (hereinafter the
AAMVA letter),1 was addressed to Charles Brown, Director of Kentucky's
Division of Driver Licensing and signed by Michael Calvin, DLC Secretariat and
Director of Driver Services. The letter stated in, pertinent part, "On behalf of [the]
Chairman of the DLC/NRVC Executive Board, I am pleased to confirm
Kentucky's entry into the Drivers License Compact (DLC). Compact regulations
require 60 days notice to member jurisdictions. Therefore, your effective entry date
is August 26, 1996." Common pleas held that the AAMVA letter was insufficient
to demonstrate Kentucky's entrance into and enactment of the Compact and
sustained the appeal without addressing the other issues raised. The present appeal
followed.

In a similar appeal, Schuetz v. Department of Transportation, Bureau
of Driver Licensing, 753 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000), we held that the
Department was precluded from treating a conviction in Kentucky for driving
under the influence of alcohol as though it occurred in Pennsylvania since there
was insufficient evidence demonstrating that Kentucky had adopted the Compact.
In Schuetz, the Department offered a "Notice of Confirmation" as evidence that
Kentucky had enacted the Compact. We concluded that the Notice was insufficient
because it indicated only that Kentucky had the authority to enact the Compact.

1 The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators is located in Arlington,
Virginia.
2

There was no evidence, however, that Kentucky had, in fact, enacted the Compact.2
In addition, the court in Schuetz further relied upon Sullivan v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 550 Pa. 639, 708 A.2d 481 (1998), to
opine that Kentucky could become a party to the compact only through legislation.
In Sullivan our Supreme Court noted that as a contract between States,
the Compact's terms must be interpreted according to their plain meaning. Id. at
645, 708 A.2d 484. Article VIII of the Compact dictates that it "shall enter into
force and become effective as to any state when it has enacted the same into law."
75 Pa. C.S. § 1581. As the Supreme Court noted, "enactment" is "[t]he method or
process by which a bill in the Legislature becomes law." Id. at 645-46, 708 A.2d at
484, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 526 (6th ed. 1990). Similarly, a party State
may withdraw from the Compact by "enacting a statute repealing the same." 75 Pa.
C.S. § 1581. Based upon the requirement of "enactment" to enter into and
withdraw from the Compact, the Supreme Court concluded that the Compact was
not yet effective in Pennsylvania because the legislature had not enacted a statute
specifically adopting the Compact. As a result, the court concluded that common
pleas properly sustained the licensee's appeal. See also Scott v. Department of
Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, ___ Pa. ___, ___ n.1, 790 A.2d 291, 292 n.1
(2002). Here, as in Schuetz, the Department has failed to direct us to any legislation
enacted by Kentucky adopting the Compact, and our own research confirms the
absence of any such statutes.
The Department puts forward two arguments in an attempt to
distinguish Schuetz. First, it contends that Sullivan has been superceded by our

2 We also noted in Schuetz that our own research failed to indicate that Kentucky had
adopted the Compact.
3

Supreme Court's decision in Department of Transportation v. McCafferty, 563 Pa.
146, 758 A.2d 1155 (2000), which states that the Compact should be construed
broadly to effectuate its purposes. The Department further argues that in
McCafferty, the Supreme Court opined that the Commonwealth has an interest in
protecting its citizens from licensed Pennsylvania drivers who are convicted of
driving under the influence of alcohol in another jurisdiction and that such drivers
violate the sovereignty of the Commonwealth when they drive under the influence
in another State. McCafferty, however, does not touch upon the issue at hand, and
therefore does not conflict with or undermine the premise announced in Sullivan
that a State must pass legislation to become a party to the Compact and authorized
to enforce its provisions.
The Department also argues that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the United States Constitution requires that we accept the manner in which
Kentucky has entered the Compact. The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1. Pursuant thereto, the following was enacted:
Such Acts [of the legislature of any State], records and
judicial proceedings [of any court of any such State] or
copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States ...
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State
...
4

28 U.S.C. § 1738. However, we have not been directed to any statute, record or
judicial proceeding from Kentucky which we might recognize. If competent
evidence, case law or other record of which we could take judicial notice showed
that Kentucky had taken some action to join the Compact (other than by
legislation) which Kentucky law recognized as valid, an interesting issue would be
presented whether Kentucky or Pennsylvania law [i.e., Sullivan] would control the
issue. However, we have been presented with insufficient factual basis to make the
legal question relevant. We do not know what official action, if any, Kentucky has
taken, let alone whether it is recognized by Kentucky law as a proper way to
become a member State. All we have is a letter from an entity of unknown
authority stating that in its opinion, Kentucky has entered the Compact in some
unspecified manner.3 Common pleas admitted this evidence, but found it to be
insufficient to establish the factual foundation upon which to base a conclusion that
Kentucky is a party to the Compact.4 We agree.
Accordingly, the order of the court of common pleas is affirmed.
________________________________________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge

3 The record is devoid of any evidence regarding the nature of AAMVA. The AAMVA
website (which is obviously de hors the record) describes the organization as a voluntary,
nonprofit, tax-exempt, educational organization representing "the state and provincial officials in
the United States and Canada who administer and enforce motor vehicle laws. The association's
programs encourage uniformity and reciprocity among the states and provinces, and liaisons with
other levels of government and the private sector." See www.aamva.org/about/
4 As the opinion is written, it is not possible to ascertain whether common pleas weighed the
evidence as fact-finder and found it unpersuasive, or concluded that it was insufficient as a
matter of law. Although we would apply different standards of review to these alternative
determinations, we find no error under either the substantial evidence or plenary review standard.
5

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
James Howard Smith
::
v.
:
NO. 101 C.D. 2001
:
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
:
Department of Transportation,
:
Bureau of Driver Licensing,
:
Appellant
:
O R D E R
AND NOW, this 20th day of June, 2002, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Erie County in the above captioned matter is AFFIRMED.
________________________________________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge