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J-A02012-03
2003 PA Super 387
MARYFRANCES CASSELL,

:
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

:

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant
:

:

v.

:

:
LANCASTER MENNONITE

:
CONFERENCE,
:

:
Appellee
: No.
521
MDA
2002

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2002
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Civil at No.: 2220 of 1989

BEFORE: STEVENS, GRACI, and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.

OPINION BY STEVENS, J.:

Filed: October 17, 2003
¶ 1 This is an appeal from the order entered by the Court of Common
Pleas of Lancaster County granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant/Appellee Lancaster Mennonite Conference (The Conference), after
the court excluded plaintiff/Appellant Maryfrances Cassell's (Cassell) medical
expert witness after a Frye1 hearing. For the following reasons, we reverse
and remand.
¶ 2 This Court's memorandum decision, Cassell v. Lancaster Mennonite
Conference, No. 3084 Philadelphia 1995, unpublished memorandum (Pa.
Super. Filed July 17, 1996), aptly summarizes the earlier factual history of
this case:
[Maryfrances] Cassell, who is a Christian Scientist, operated the
A. Arlene Miller Studio of Pianoforte in Mount Joy, Pennsylvania,

1 Frye v. United States, 54 U.S. App. D.C. 46, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

J-A02012-03
in conjunction with A. Arlene Miller, a Mennonite, from 1964 to
1980. Miller resided with Cassell while the studio was in
operation. The personal relationship between Cassell and Miller
ended at the same time their business association ended.
Cassell alleges that at that time the Conference decided to force
Cassell to leave Mount Joy. She also alleges that members of
the Conference, in furtherance of this intention, removed certain
items of Cassell's personal property from her home, demanded
that Cassell pay Miller an unspecified sum of money, and
demanded that Cassell leave the area.

Cassell alleges various other related incidents involving the
Conference, including a 1985 public presentation of anti-
Christian Science views and the mailing of an allegedly
defamatory letter, in February 1992, to Cassell's church in
Boston, Massachusetts. [In 1988, Cassell and the minister of the
Mount Joy Mennonite Church executed a document containing
retractions of statements in the allegedly defamatory letter. A
separate "Statement of Retractions" signed by a Mennonite
District Bishop was witnessed by Cassell].

This case was initiated by writ of summons on May 26, 1989 . . .
. [After this Court reversed an order dismissing Cassell's
eventual pro se complaint and remanded to permit Cassell to
obtain legal counsel to file a subsequent Complaint], Cassell filed
her Third Amended Complaint on January 28, 1994, with the
assistance of counsel. This complaint sought relief from the
Conference for the following: [alleged breach of contract,
defamation], and intentional infliction of emotional distress upon
Cassell by the Conference and its agents. [The trial court,
however, sustained the Conference's demurrer to the contract
counts and struck the remaining counts of the complaint. On
appeal, we affirmed the order of the trial court with the
exception of its striking Cassell's count of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, which, we held, contained allegations
sufficient to make out her cause of action. We thus reversed
and remanded to allow Cassell to advance her emotional distress
claim].

Cassell, supra at 1-3.
¶ 3 Four years passed with little activity on the docket, and the trial court
listed the case for a termination hearing. Cassell's counsel, however,

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J-A02012-03
avoided termination of the case by listing it as ready for trial. On May 2,
2001, the trial court conducted a pre-trial conference and afterwards
entered a Certification Order scheduling trial for December 10, 2001 and
directing any motions in limine to be filed no later than sixty days before the
scheduled trial date. On May 3, 2001, The Conference filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment, which the trial court denied on June 12, 2001.
¶ 4 Five days before the scheduled trial date, the parties took the
videotape trial testimony of Cassell's proposed expert witness, licensed
psychologist Dr. Margaret Kay, whose "adjustment disorder" 2 diagnosis of
Cassell is the basis for Cassell's claimed emotional distress. The next day,
The Conference filed a "Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Dr. Margaret
Kay on Frye/Daubert Standard." The trial court continued the trial from
December 10, 2001 because of a scheduling conflict and issued a second
Certification Order setting March 18, 2002 as the new trial date and
establishing a new deadline, sixty days before trial, for any motions in
limine. On January 16, 2002, The Conference incorporated its Frye
challenge to Dr. Kay's testimony into a comprehensive motion in limine.
Cassell filed an answer and brief opposing the motion as untimely filed and
without merit.

2 According to the evidence, an "adjustment disorder" is an abnormal or
maladaptive reaction to an identified stressor proximate in time, and which
may cause personal distress and/or inhibit social, occupational, or academic
functioning.

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J-A02012-03
¶ 5 The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on March 19, 2002, at
which Dr. Kay and defense expert psychiatrist Dr. James Morrison, M.D.
gave differing testimonies about the proper methodology for diagnosing an
"adjustment disorder." Both practitioners cited the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual IV ("DSM"), published by the American Psychiatric Association, as
the preeminent treatise on diagnosing mental disorders, but they disagreed
on how to use the DSM to reach diagnosis. Specifically, Dr. Kay relied on
DSM language allowing for a methodology using more subjective discretion
in making a diagnosis, while Dr. Morrison would rely on the objective
criteria-based methodology also specified in the DSM. At the conclusion of
testimony and argument, the trial court entered an order excluding the
testimony of Dr. Kay for its failure to reflect a scientific method and practice
generally accepted in the field of psychology. With no expert to support
Cassell's claim, the trial court then entered an order granting The
Conference's oral motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
¶ 6 Cassell raises three issues for our review:
I.
DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN CONDUCTING A
HEARING ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF APPELLANT'S
EXPERT WITNESS WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT
FILED A TIMELY MOTION IN LIMINE?

II.
DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE
EXPERT TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT'S EXPERT
WITNESS, DR. MARGARET J. KAY, PURSUANT TO
FRYE V. UNITED STATES...?

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J-A02012-03
III. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE
DEFENDANT'S COMPREHENSIVE MOTION IN
LIMINE?

Brief for Appellant at 4.
Our scope of review of a trial court's order disposing of a motion
for summary judgment is plenary. Accordingly, we must
consider the order in the context of the entire record. Our
standard of review is the same as that of the trial court; thus,
we determine whether the record documents a question of
material fact concerning an element of the claim or defense at
issue. If no such question appears, the court must then
determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment on
the basis of substantive law. Conversely, if a question of
material fact is apparent, the court must defer the question for
consideration of a jury and deny the motion for summary
judgment. We will reverse the resulting order only where it is
established that the court committed an error of law or clearly
abused its discretion.

Stanton v. Lackawanna Energy, Ltd., 822 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. Super.
2003).
¶ 7 Cassell contends first that the court erred in conducting a Frye
hearing when The Conference never challenged the admissibility of Dr. Kay's
testimony in a motion in limine filed under the first Certification order. Yet,
the record is clear that the trial court postponed the original trial date and
entered a corresponding second Certification order setting a new deadline
for motions in limine. Cassell never objected to the court's order, and offers
no authority or persuasive reason to prohibit the filing of motions under a
new deadline well in advance of trial. Accordingly, we find no error with the
trial court's conducting the March 18, 2002 evidentiary hearing on The
Conference's motion in limine and the Frye challenge therein incorporated.

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J-A02012-03
¶ 8 Cassell next argues that the court erred when it excluded under Frye
her expert testimony regarding her alleged condition of emotional distress.3
As we have recently held:
The Frye test sets forth an exclusionary rule of evidence that
applies only when a party wishes to introduce novel scientific
evidence obtained from the conclusions of an expert scientific
witness. Under Frye, a party wishing to introduce such
evidence must demonstrate to the trial court that the relevant
scientific community has reached general acceptance of the
principles and methodology employed by the expert witness
before the trial court will allow the expert witness to testify
regarding his conclusions. However, the conclusions reached by
the expert witness from generally accepted principles and
methodologies need not also be generally accepted. Thus, a
court's inquiry into whether a particular scientific process is
"generally accepted" is an effort to ensure that the result of the
scientific process, i.e., the proffered evidence, stems from
"scientific research which has been conducted in a fashion that
is generally recognized as being sound, and is not the fanciful
creations [sic] of a renegade researcher."

M.C.M. v. Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr. Of the Pa. State Univ., 2003 Pa.
Super. Lexis 3149, at *8 (Pa. Super. September 15, 2003) (citations
omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
¶ 9 Here, the trial court determined that Dr. Kay reached her "adjustment
disorder" diagnosis of Cassell through a methodology not generally accepted
in the medical community, and cited two findings to support this
determination. First, Dr. Kay obtained information on the relevant

3 Expert medical testimony is necessary to establish that a plaintiff actually
suffered the claimed emotional distress. See Kazatsky v. King David
Memorial Park, 515 Pa. 183, 527 A.2d 988 (1987); Paves v. Corson, 765
A.2d 1128, 1134 (Pa. Super. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 569 Pa. 171,
801 A.2d 546 (2002).

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J-A02012-03
underlying events solely from Cassell during a clinical interview, without
further consulting collateral sources. Second, Dr. Kay opted against using
objective, "axial" standards for diagnosing an "adjustment disorder" that are
provided in the DSM.4 Instead, Dr. Kay relied on apparent language in the
DSM preamble that gives mental health professionals the option of
diagnosing without use of the axial standard. In that vein, Dr. Kay simply
relied on her professional experience to assess and, ultimately, diagnose
Cassell's reactions to the events that she had reported.

4 An "Adjustment Disorder" is a DSM Axis I mental disorder. To diagnose a
patient with this disorder under the axis method, five criteria must be
satisfied:

A.
The development of emotional or behavioral symptoms in
response to an identifiable stressor(s) occurring within
three months of the onset of the stressor(s).

B.
These symptoms or behaviors are clinically significant as
evidenced by either of the following:

(1) marked distress that is in excess of what would be
expected from exposure to the stressor(s).
(2) significant impairment in social or occupational
(academic) functioning.

C.
The stress-related disturbance does not meet the criteria
for another specific Axis I disorder and is not merely an
exacerbation of a preexisting Axis I or Axis II disorder.

D.
The symptoms do not represent bereavement.

E.
Once the stressor or its consequences has terminated, the
symptoms do not persist for more than an additional six
months.

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J-A02012-03
¶
10 The evidence supplied by both parties at the Frye hearing
acknowledges that, depending on the circumstances, a clinical interview
alone may represent a generally accepted methodology to producing an
accurate diagnosis. See N.T. 3/19/2002 at 6, 81, 91. To the extent that the
trial court's opinion tends to foreclose this possibility as a matter of law, we
must reject it. Moreover, the hearing established that the interview
employed by Dr. Kay followed a prescribed form, and was not simply a
freelance, subjective process unrecognized in the mental health field.
Therefore, we find that the interview tracked generally accepted methods
under our standard of review.
¶ 11 Moreover, we disagree with the trial court that Dr. Kay's "non-axial"
methodology in this case failed to meet generally accepted standards for
diagnosing an adjustment disorder. The record shows that the axial method,
which specifically delineates five criteria requisite to an adjustment disorder,
does not represent the only generally accepted methodology for reaching
diagnosis. Indeed, Dr. Kay adequately supported this position when she
read the following excerpt from the DSM:
Clinicians who do not wish to use the multiaxial format may
simply list the appropriate diagnoses. Those choosing this
option should follow the general rule of recording as many
coexisting mental disorders, general medical conditions, and
other factors as are relevant to the care and treatment of the
individual. The principal diagnosis or the reason for the visit
should be listed first.

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J-A02012-03
N.T. 3/19/2002 at 20. The DSM thus appears to permit mental health
practitioners the discretion to diagnose outside of the specified strictures of
the axial methodology, provided they also record all other factors and
conditions pertinent to a particular case.
¶ 12 The record shows that Dr. Kay followed this "non-axial" methodology
in making the diagnosis at issue. It thus appears sufficient that Dr. Kay
relied on her professional experience to assess Cassell's reactions to events
reported in a properly structured clinical interview, and then to determine
those reactions were so maladaptive as to constitute an "adjustment
disorder." Therefore, we find Dr. Kay's methodology is generally recognized
as sound, and not the "fanciful creation of a renegade researcher."
¶ 13 We stress that our inquiry does not go to the persuasiveness of Dr.
Kay's conclusions; it goes only to whether her methodology enjoys general
recognition in her field. Under the DSM's own language, it appears that it
does. Nor does the Frye standard even require an optimal methodology,
just an accepted one. It is for a jury, and not the trial court, to attach
weight to a diagnosis which is based largely on Cassell's own description of
her ongoing relationship with The Conference, and which deviates in part
from the more objective, criteria-driven axial methodology.
¶ 14 Finally, we agree with Cassell that the record before us on the order
granting The Conference's comprehensive motion in limine, in so far as it
also requested exclusion of seven other documents on grounds of hearsay

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J-A02012-03
and irrelevance, is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review.
Accordingly, we vacate that order and remand for a hearing as to the
exclusion of such proffered evidence.
¶ 15 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand.
¶ 16 Order reversed. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this
decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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