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J. A03001/01
2001 PA Super 47
IN RE: ADOPTION OF BABY BOY D.,
:
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
Appellee
:
PENNSYLVANIA
::
APPEAL OF: J.M. AND R.M.,
:
PREADOPTIVE PARENTS
:
No. 2287 EDA 2000
Appeal from the Order in the Court of
Common Pleas of Montgomery County,
Orphan's Court Division, No. 385-1999
BEFORE: EAKIN, ORIE MELVIIN and TAMILIA, JJ.
***Petition for Reargument Filed 03/02/2001***
OPINION BY TAMILIA, J.:
Filed: February 21, 2001
***Petition for Reargument Denied 04/19/2001***
¶1
Appellants, J.M. and R.M., appeal the July 21, 2000 Order denying
their petition to confirm the consent of appellee, L.D., to their adoption of
her son, Baby Boy D., and to terminate her parental rights based on the
consent. On appeal, appellants contend the trial court erred in not applying
Nevada law to the revocation of L.D.'s consent to the adoption.
¶2
On September 6, 1999, L.D. gave birth to Baby Boy D. while
incarcerated in Las Vegas, Nevada. L.D. agreed to the adoption of her son
by appellants, who are residents of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. On
September 10, 1999, L.D. executed both Pennsylvania and Nevada consent
to adoption forms and the supporting papers.1 Appellants returned to

1 Pursuant to Nevada law, the execution of a written consent to a specific
adoption or a relinquishment for adoption is irrevocable. N.R.S. § 127.080,
Consent to specific adoption or relinquishment for adoption cannot
be revoked or nullified; exceptions, (1)(2). In Pennsylvania, the consent
can be revoked until such time as either a decree of termination of parental
rights or adoption is entered. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711, Consents necessary to
adoption, (c), Validity of consent.

J. A03001/01
Pennsylvania with Baby Boy D. and, thereafter, filed a Report of Intention to
Adopt and a petition to confirm the consent of L.D. pursuant to the
Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2910. In December 1999,
L.D. notified the court she wished to revoke her consent to appellants'
adoption of her son, alleging she did not understand the legal ramifications
of signing the documents. Appellants filed a petition for the involuntary
termination of L.D.'s parental rights based upon her execution of the Nevada
consent to adoption. Thereafter, C.P. and R.P., Baby Boy D.'s grandparents,
filed a custody complaint and a petition for permission to intervene in the
proceedings. The court granted the grandparents permission to intervene
and stayed the custody proceedings pending the determination of the
adoption issues. On July 21, 2000, following the court's consideration of the
parties' depositions, submitted in lieu of oral testimony before the court, the
court denied appellants' petition to confirm the consent of L.D. and found
valid her revocation of consent to the adoption.2 This timely appeal
followed.

2 At the time of oral argument in this matter it was indicated to this Court
that a petition to involuntarily terminate L.D.'s parental rights was filed on
December 23, 1999 and amended on January 31, 2000. The trial court had
not addressed said petition at the time of this appeal. We recognize that
only when an involuntary termination of a parent's parental rights to a child
occurs will the consent of that parent not be required for a valid adoption to
occur. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2714, When consent of parent not required.
Based upon the record before us, we make no finding on the petition to
involuntarily terminate parental rights and leave such decision to the trial
court upon return of the record of this case and after a hearing on that
petition should it be pursued by appellants.
- 2 -

J. A03001/01
¶3
On appeal, appellants present one issue for our review, "Whether the
revocability of a consent to adoption signed under the laws of the state of
Nevada should be decided under Nevada law, and accepted for filing in the
Pennsylvania adoption proceedings as evidence of termination of parental
rights." (Appellants' brief at 4.)
¶4
The Adoption Act sets forth specific procedures that must be followed
by a party seeking to adopt a child.
To effect an adoption, the legislative provisions of
the Adoption Act must be strictly complied with. Our
courts have no authority to decree an adoption in the
absence of the statutorily required consents. Nor
may exceptions to the Adoption Act be judicially
created where the Legislature did not see fit to
create them.
In re Adoption of Stickley, 638 A.2d 976, 980 (Pa. Super. 1994) citing In
re Adoption of A., 487 Pa. 152, 409 A.2d 10 (1979).
¶5
Section 2711 of the Adoption Act provides in relevant part:
No consent shall be valid if it was executed prior to
or within 72 hours after the birth of the child. A
putative father may execute a consent at any time
after receiving notice of the expected or actual birth
of the child. Any consent given outside this
Commonwealth shall be valid for purposes of this
section if it was given in accordance with the laws of
the jurisdiction where it was executed. A consent to
an adoption may only be revoked prior to the earlier
of either the entry of a decree of termination of
parental rights or the entry of a decree of adoption.
The revocation of consent shall be in writing and
shall be served upon the agency or adult to whom
the child was relinquished.
- 3 -

J. A03001/01
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711, Consents necessary to adoption, (c), Validity of
consent.
¶6
Pursuant to section 2502, Relinquishment to adult intending to
adopt child, and section 2504, Alternative procedure for
relinquishment, when a parent consents to an adoption he or she can
petition for permission to relinquish forever all parental rights or, if the
petition is not filed within forty (40) days, the intermediary or party
intending to adopt the child may petition for a confirmation of the parent's
intent to relinquish parental rights. Only when the consent is confirmed may
the court terminate parental rights and proceed to the adoption provisions
under section 2901, Time of entry of decree of adoption, and 2902,
Requirements and form of decree of adoption.
¶7
In determining whether to apply Pennsylvania or Nevada law to L.D.'s
revocation of her consent to the adoption, the trial court reviewed cases
annotated in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 289, Law
Governing Adoption, which states "A court applies its own local law in
determining whether to grant an adoption." In its Opinion, the trial court
concluded:
[W]e find that an out-of-state consent may be filed
in this Commonwealth in conjunction with an
adoption proceeding as long as it was given in
accordance with the laws of the other jurisdiction;
however, the same "valid" consent is still subject to
revocation under Pennsylvania law until such time as
a decree of termination or adoption is entered.
Otherwise stated, although a consent will be deemed
- 4 -

J. A03001/01
initially to be valid or not upon consideration of the
law of the other jurisdiction, the issue of revocation
if it arises must be decided by reference to
Pennsylvania law.
(Trial Court Opinion, Ott, J., 7/21/00, at 20-21.)
¶8
The court's discussion of In re Adoption of a Child by T.W.C., 636
A.2d 1083 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), is analogous to our resolution of
the issues herein. In T.W.C., the mother, a New York resident, placed her
newborn son for adoption by a New Jersey couple, who commenced an
adoption proceeding in New Jersey. After the 45-day period for revocation
under New York law expired, the mother gave notice to the New Jersey court
that she revoked her consent to the adoption. The trial court determined
that New Jersey had jurisdiction and that New Jersey law applied. The result
was that the adoption was denied and the child was returned to the mother.
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the trial court's Order
and stated:
The Family Part correctly held that New Jersey law
was to be applied. The Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts of Law, § 289 (1971) states the sound and
generally applied rule: "A court applies its own local
law in determining whether to grant an adoption."
That rule properly recognizes the dominant interest
of the forum state in fixing the prospective adoptive
child's status and relationships. As already
discussed, a state can only assert original adoption
jurisdiction if it has a significant relationship with the
child; indeed, the UCCJA [Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act] and PKPA [Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act] are designed to assure that original
jurisdiction is in the state where "the child and his
family have the closest connection." The very same
- 5 -

J. A03001/01
considerations that permit the exercise of jurisdiction
support the use of the law of the forum. If a state
properly exercises jurisdiction over the adoption, it
should not ordinarily be expected or required to
apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction in deciding the
issues.
T.W.C., 636 A.2d at 1090 (citations omitted).
¶9
Applying the rationale of T.W.C., we conclude Pennsylvania has the
overriding and continuing interest in establishing Baby Boy D.'s status and
relationships. When the consents were executed in Nevada, the parties
were aware the adoption would be finalized in Pennsylvania. Furthermore,
appellants and Baby Boy D. are residing in Pennsylvania and appellants
chose to avail themselves of the laws of Pennsylvania by filing a report of
their intention to adopt the child with the lower court. The problems
presented in a bifurcated proceeding might have been avoided in this case
had the adoption been pursued in its entirety under Nevada law. Because
appellants elected to finalize adoption in Pennsylvania, it is not feasible or
reasonable to subject the most critical and important aspect of the adoption
proceeding, termination of parental rights, to a foreign jurisdiction, which
has less stringent safeguards to the biological parent than Pennsylvania.
This increasingly becomes a cause for concern when we witness "internet
adoptions", which are capable of eliminating carefully designed legislative
and regulatory procedures to assure the best interest of the child and the
protection of the rights of biological and adopting parents, and to guard
against the sale of children.
- 6 -

J. A03001/01
¶10 In addition, we recognize the public policy considerations present in
this case. Nearly 50 years ago, in Adoption of Harvey, 375 Pa. 1, 99 A.2d
276 (1953), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court attended to the judicial
philosophy to be applied in adoption cases.
Proceedings for the adoption of a child must be
carefully differentiated from those involving merely a
question of its custody; they are of far greater
import and involve more serious consequences.
Custody may be awarded for a more or less
temporary duration, but a decree of adoption
terminates forever all relations between the child and
its natural parents, severs it entirely from its own
family tree and engrafts it upon that of its new
parentage. For all purposes, legal and practical, the
child thenceforth is dead to the mother who gave it
birth; she has lost the right ever to see her child
again or even to know of its whereabouts. Because,
therefore, of these direful results of an adverse
adoption proceeding the rights of the natural parent
should not be terminated unless the record clearly
warrants such a decree.
Id. at 3-4, 99 A.2d at 277-78 (citations omitted). In Nevada, however,
"public policy demands that the adoption act should not be nullified by a
decision that causes the public to fear the consequences of adopting a child
with the full knowledge that their efforts are at the whim and caprice of a
natural parent." Ex parte Schultz, 64 Nev. 264, 272, 181 P.2d 585, ___
(1947). While we may agree with the sentiment of Nevada law, that the
procreation and nurturing of children are placed above the emotions and
impulses of the adults involved, we find the application of Pennsylvania law
- 7 -

J. A03001/01
in this case achieves the objectives and fulfills the policy of the legislature in
enacting section 2711 of the Pennsylvania Adoption Act.
¶11 In light of the foregoing discussion, we find the trial court properly
applied Pennsylvania law to the consent to adoption forms and that L.D.'s
revocation of her consent to the adoption of her son is valid.
¶12 Order affirmed.
- 8 -