Pennsylvania Superior Court Cases - Superior Court Case Law from PA - Pennsylvania Superior Court - unoffical reports

	ROMINGER LEGAL
		Pennsylvania Court Cases and Opinions - PA Legal Research
					Need Legal Help?
					Need Legal Help?
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER
LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER			LEGAL HEADLINES - CASE LAW - LEGAL FORMS	NOT FINDING WHAT YOU NEED? -CLICK HERE

This opinion or court case was taken from the Pennsylvania Courts. Search our site for more cases - CLICK HERE

MOST CURRENT PENNSYLVANIA SUPERIOR COURT CASES

LEGAL RESEARCH

COURT REPORTERS

PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS

PROCESS SERVERS

DOCUMENT RETRIEVERS

EXPERT WITNESSES

Find a Private Investigator

Find an Expert Witness

Find a Process Server

Case Law - save on Lexis / WestLaw.

Legal News - Legal Headlines

J. A12003/00
2000 PA Super 153
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
:
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
:
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
::
v.
::
SHAWN ANDERSEN,
::
Appellant
:
No. 2426 EDA 1999
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 4, 1999,
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County,
Criminal Division at No. 2694/1999.
BEFORE: POPOVICH, TODD and BROSKY, JJ.
OPINION BY POPOVICH, J.:
Filed: May 17, 2000
¶ 1
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of Bucks County on August 4, 1999. Appellant was
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance
(75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(4)(i)), possession of a small quantity of marijuana
for only personal use (35 P.S. § 780-113(31)(i)), and driving while operating
privilege is suspended or revoked (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a)). Appellant was
ordered to pay a fine of $500 and sentenced to a period of incarceration not
less than forty-eight hours nor more than one year. This timely appeal
followed. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of sentence and remand
for a new trial.
¶ 2
Herein, appellant asks the following:
A.
Did the suppression court err when it failed to require the
Commonwealth to establish probable cause to justify a
traffic stop for a motor vehicle violation?

J. A12003/00
B.
Did the suppression court err when it failed to rule that
Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution provides
greater protections from warrantless searches and as such
the police officers' stop of the black Camaro and
subsequent obtaining of evidence requires a showing of
probable cause before making a traffic stop?
C.
Did the suppression court err when it found that the
Commonwealth meets its burden where the basis for the
stop was suspected driving under suspension and the
police did not know who was driving?
Appellant's brief, at 4.
¶ 3
"Where a motion to suppress has been filed, the burden is on the
Commonwealth to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
challenged evidence is admissible." Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 543 Pa.
612, 614, 673 A.2d 915, 916 (1996)(citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 323 (h)). "In
reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, our task is to determine whether
the factual findings are supported by the record." Id. Where, as here, the
defendant challenges an adverse ruling of the suppression court, we will
consider only the evidence for the Commonwealth and whatever evidence
for the defense which is uncontradicted on the record as a whole.
Commonwealth v. Roman, 714 A.2d 440, 442 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeal
denied, 556 Pa. 707, 729 A.2d 1128 (1998)(quoting Commonwealth v.
Vasquez, 703 A.2d 25, 30 (Pa.Super. 1997)). "If there is support on the
record, we are bound by the facts as found by the suppression court, and we
may reverse that court only if the legal conclusions drawn from these facts
are erroneous." Id. "Moreover, even if the suppression court did err in its
- 2 -

J. A12003/00
legal conclusions, the reviewing court may nevertheless affirm its decision
where there are other legitimate grounds for admissibility of the challenged
evidence." Id.
¶ 4
After a careful review of the record, we are satisfied that the trial
court's factual findings are supported by the record. At approximately 2:00
a.m. on April 7, 1999, Police Officers Steven Hillias and Earl Clark of the
Perkasie Borough Police Department, along with other police officers,
responded to a police call concerning a disturbance in the vicinity of a local
tavern. Upon arriving at this location, the police officers encountered
appellant conversing with his girlfriend while he was seated in a black
Camaro. The police officers checked the records of the Camaro and learned
that the automobile was registered to appellant. Furthermore, the record
check revealed that the driving privileges of both appellant and his girlfriend
were currently suspended.
¶ 5
As this encounter progressed, the police officers arrested appellant's
girlfriend for disorderly conduct. Noting the suspension of appellant's driving
privileges, the police officers advised appellant not to drive his vehicle.
Appellant informed the police officers that he would walk to the nearby
residence of his friend and stay there for the night.
¶ 6
Later that day, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Officer Hillias observed
appellant's automobile parked unattended in a different location than where
appellant had left it during the previous encounter. On April 8, 1999, at
- 3 -

J. A12003/00
approximately 2:30 a.m., Officer Clark communicated to Officer Hillias via
radio that he was following the "same ones from last night." Although
Officer Hillias understood this reference to mean appellant and appellant's
girlfriend, Officer Clark had yet to identify either driver. Officer Hillias
proceeded in his marked police car to Officer Clark's location.
¶ 7
Officer Clark had been following a black Camaro and a white Sable.
Before the arrival of Officer Hillias, Officer Clark activated his emergency
lights in an attempt to stop both vehicles. At his point, Officer Clark had not
observed who was driving the Camaro or the Sable. The Camaro pulled over
and the Sable continued driving with Officer Clark in pursuit. The record
indicates that Officer Clark observed appellant as the driver of the Camaro
as he passed appellant's automobile in pursuit of the Sable. However, the
record provides no indication that Officer Clark communicated this
observation to Officer Hillias. After stopping the Sable, Officer Clark
determined the driver to be appellant's girlfriend.
¶ 8
When Officer Hillias arrived, he observed from a distance that Officer
Clark's vehicle was stopped by the side of the road with its emergency lights
in operation. In addition, Officer Hillias saw a black Camaro bearing the
same license plate as appellant's automobile. The Camaro was traveling at a
slow rate of speed towards Officer Clark's position. Although Officer Hillias
did not observe the driver of the Camaro, he activated the emergency lights
of his police car and proceeded to stop the Camaro. Officer Hillias
- 4 -

J. A12003/00
determined that appellant was the driver of the Camaro and detected a
strong odor of alcohol emanating from appellant's automobile. Officer Hillias
administered several field sobriety tests upon appellant who failed each one.
During the course of the sobriety tests, Officer Hillias observed a bulge in
appellant's sock that turned out to be a baggie containing 1.09 grams of
marijuana. After appellant was arrested he underwent a blood test that
revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.16 percent.
¶ 9
Appellant filed a pre-trial motion seeking to suppress all evidence
gained as a result of his alleged illegal traffic stop. A suppression hearing
was conducted on August 4, 1999, and appellant's motion to suppress was
denied. After the denial of appellant's motion to suppress, this matter
proceeded to a bench trial.
¶ 10 We begin by addressing appellant's contention that the trial court
erred by failing to require the Commonwealth to establish probable cause to
justify a stop based upon a violation of the Vehicle Code. We note that
confusion had arisen in case law as to whether, in order to stop a vehicle for
a traffic violation, a police officer must possess "probable cause to believe"
or a "reasonable suspicion to believe" that a violation of the Vehicle Code
had occurred. In an effort to end the confusion surrounding this issue, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the difference in the two
phrases was merely semantic and concluded that police officers may stop a
vehicle "whenever they have articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect
- 5 -

J. A12003/00
that a violation of the Vehicle Code had occurred." Hamilton, 673 A.2d at
918 (1996)(citing Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 668 A.2d
1113 (1995); 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b)). Therefore, the trial court applied the
correct standard by requiring the Commonwealth to justify the traffic stop by
demonstrating that the police had articulable and reasonable grounds to
suspect that appellant violated the Vehicle Code.
¶ 11 We now address appellant's challenge to the legality of the traffic stops
conducted by Officers Clark and Hillias. "When [a] police [officer] stop[s] a
vehicle in this Commonwealth for investigatory purposes, the vehicle, and its
occupants, are considered `seized' and this seizure is subject to
constitutional constraints." Commonwealth v. Bowersox, 675 A.2d 718,
720 (Pa.Super. 1996)(quoting Commonwealth v. Knotts, 663 A.2d 216,
218 (Pa.Super. 1995)). Here, when Officer Clark and Officer Hillias stopped
appellant's vehicle, appellant and his vehicle were clearly "seized."
Accordingly, we must determine whether the seizure was justified. Namely,
we must determine whether the information available to Officers Clark and
Hillias at the time they stopped appellant's vehicle created articulable and
reasonable grounds to suspect that a violation of the Vehicle Code had
occurred.
¶ 12 In support of the traffic stops, the Commonwealth offers the radio
transmission from Officer Clark to Officer Hillias that indicated that Officer
Clark was "following the same ones as last night." However, the record
- 6 -

J. A12003/00
reveals that Officer Clark did not actually determine the identity of the
drivers until after both vehicles had been pulled over.1 Likewise, Officer
Hillias did not actually know who was driving appellant's vehicle when he
stopped it. The Commonwealth further supports the legality of the traffic
stops by pointing to the following additional information: 1) Officer Hillias
observed that the Camaro he was following possessed the same license plate
as appellant's vehicle; 2) the traffic stop occurred on the same street as the
tavern near where the police encountered appellant and his girlfriend the
day before; 3) Officer Hillias observed appellant's vehicle traveling at a slow
rate of speed towards Officer Clark's vehicle.
¶ 13 In reviewing the facts set forth by the Commonwealth, we note that
neither Officer Clark nor Officer Hillias specifically observed appellant's
vehicle violate the Vehicle Code prior to the traffic stops. In addition, we fail
to recognize the significance of the fact that appellant's vehicle was being
driven near a location where the police previously had encountered
appellant. The only relevant information possessed by Officers Clark and
Hillias prior to the traffic stops was that appellant's driving privileges were
suspended and that the Camaro registered to appellant was being operated.
Thus, both traffic stops were based on the mere assumption that appellant
was driving the black Camaro.

1 The trial court observed that the record provides no explanation of what
the police officers may have known about the Sable prior to pulling it over.
- 7 -

J. A12003/00
¶ 14 Although a police officer need not establish that an actual violation of
the Vehicle Code has occurred prior to stopping a vehicle, a police officer
must provide a reasonable basis for his or her belief that the Vehicle Code
was being violated in order to validate the stop. Bowersox, 675 A.2d at
721 (citing Commonwealth v. Benton, 655 A.2d 1030 (Pa.Super. 1995)).
"This reasonable basis must be linked with his observation of suspicious or
irregular behavior on behalf of the particular . . . individuals stopped." Id.
(quoting Commonwealth v. Espada, 528 A.2d 968, 970 (Pa.Super.
1987)). "Moreover, the reasonable basis necessary to justify a stop is less
stringent than probable cause, but the detaining officer must have more
than a mere hunch as the basis for the stop." Id. (citing In Interest of
S.D., 633 A.2d 172, 174 (Pa.Super. 1993)).
¶ 15 We conclude that the knowledge a vehicle is owned by an individual
whose driving privileges are suspended coupled with the mere assumption
that the owner is driving the vehicle, does not give rise to articulable and
reasonable grounds to suspect that a violation of the Vehicle Code is
occurring every time this vehicle is operated during the owner's suspension.
Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, we cannot find that
Officers Clark and Hillias had articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect
that a violation of the Vehicle Code had occurred. Accordingly, we find that
the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence gained from the
traffic stop conducted by Officer Hillias. See Commonwealth v. Gibson,
- 8 -

J. A12003/00
536 Pa. 123, 131, 638 A.2d 203, 206-207 (1994)(if either a search or a
seizure is found to be illegal, the remedy is to exclude all evidence derived
from the illegal governmental activity).
¶ 16 Holding otherwise would subject drivers who lawfully operate vehicles
owned or previously operated by a person with a suspended license to
unnecessary traffic stops. The example of the family car demonstrates this
point. Although a family car may be registered in the name of one
individual, numerous additional drivers may be licensed and insured to
operate the same vehicle. If we allow the police to stop any vehicle for the
mere fact that it is owned or once operated by an individual whose operating
privileges are suspended, then each additionally insured driver of the family
car could be subject to traffic stops while lawfully operating the family car
simply because the license of another operator of the vehicle is suspended.
The lack of articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of the
Vehicle Code when such a stop occurs without knowing the identity of the
driver is patent.
¶ 17 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of sentence and
remand for a new trial.
¶ 18 Judgment of sentence reversed. Remanded for new trial. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
- 9 -