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J. A13021/01
2001 PA Super 249
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
:
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
Appellee
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v.
:
:
SEAN ROCHE,
:
Appellant
:
No. 1605 EDA 2000
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of April 25, 2000
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division, No. 99-09-0007
BEFORE: MCEWEN, P.J.E., JOYCE, J., and CERCONE, P.J.E.
***Petition for Reargument Filed 09/10/2001***
OPINION by CERCONE, P.J.E.:
Filed: August 27, 2001
***Petition for Reargument Denied 10/31/2001***
¶ 1
Appellant, Sean Roche, appeals from his judgment of sentence of
eleven and one-half (11-½) months to twenty three (23) months for his
conviction of the offenses of aggravated assault, simple assault and reckless
endangerment of another person.1 After review, we vacate Appellant's
aggravated assault conviction and remand for resentencing on only his
simple assault and reckless endangerment convictions.
¶ 2
The underlying facts, which formed the basis of Appellant's conviction,
as aptly set forth in the opinion of the Honorable Sandy Byrd, and supported
by the certified record, are as follows:
Christian Frenz, the complainant, and his friend Daniel Judge
entered Brownie's, a bar located at Second and Market Street in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on August 7, 1999, between 9:00 and
10:00 p.m. The men remained in the bar drinking alcoholic
beverages until they got up to leave approximately 2:00 a.m. on
August 8, 1999.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701, 2702 and 2705.

J. A13021/01
As Mr. Frenz and Mr. Judge were about to leave the bar
[Appellant] asked Mr. Frenz if he wanted to arm wrestle.
[Appellant] was twice as large and appeared much stronger than
Mr. Frenz. Mr. Frenz declined the offer and headed toward the
exit, whereupon [Appellant] shoved Mr. Frenz. Mr. Frenz was
about to say something in response but Mr. Judge advised him
against it. Immediately after the shoving incident Mr. Frenz and
Mr. Judge left Brownie's and walked along the alleyway toward
their car. After they were about three hundred feet away from
the bar, Mr. Judge turned around and saw [Appellant] and
another male exit Brownie's and proceed to follow them down
the alleyway. [Appellant] caught up to the men and asked the
complainant "Are you a tough guy?" When Mr. Frenz turned
around [Appellant], without provocation, delivered a closed fist
blow to the victim's left eye. Mr. Frenz fell to the ground
unconscious[.] [When Mr. Frenz's head struck the concrete he
sustained a scalp laceration which began to bleed profusely.
N.T. Trial, 2/7/2000 at 39, 58.] . . . Fortunately, a police car
drove by at that moment and Mr. Roche and his companion
turned and ran away.
Mr. Frenz tried to get up, lost his balance and fell back down. An
ambulance subsequently arrived and he was transported to
Thomas Jefferson University Hospital. Doctors determined that
he suffered an orbital blowout, frontal rim and sinus fractures.
During his five day hospitalization, surgery was performed to
attach a plate on the bottom eyelid. Mr. Frenz also received
eight staples to close the wound to the back of his head. At the
time of trial, some six (6) months later, Mr. Frenz still suffered
from straight upward double vision gaze. (N.T., 2/7/00, 55-58).
Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/29/2000, at 2.
¶ 3
Appellant was arrested and proceeded to a bench trial before Judge
Byrd, who found him guilty of the aforementioned offenses. On the
aggravated assault conviction, Judge Byrd sentenced Appellant to a term of
eleven and one-half (11-1/2) to twenty-three (23) months' incarceration
followed by thirteen (13) years of reporting probation. On the simple
assault conviction, Judge Byrd imposed a concurrent term of imprisonment
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J. A13021/01
of eleven and one-half (11-1/2) to twenty-three (23) months. On the
reckless endangerment conviction, Judge Byrd imposed a term of five (5)
years probation to run concurrently with the sentence for aggravated
assault. Judge Byrd also ordered Appellant to pay $41,188.54 in restitution
to the victim for unreimbursed medical expenses.
¶ 4
On appeal to our Court, Appellant presents one issue for our
consideration:
WAS NOT THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT,
GRADED AS A FELONY OF THE FIRST DEGREE, INASMUCH AS
APPELLANT DID NOT ACT WITH THE INTENT TO CAUSE SERIOUS
BODILY INJURY NOR UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES MANIFESTING AN
EXTREME INDIFFERENCE TO THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE WHEN
HE PUNCHED THE COMPLAINANT ONCE IN THE EYE?
Appellant's Brief at 3.
¶ 5
Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
conviction for aggravated assault. While the Appellant concedes that the
victim suffered a serious bodily injury, he contends that this alone is not
enough to justify his conviction. He reasons that the statute requires that
the Commonwealth show that, when Appellant acted, he did so with the
intent to cause serious bodily injury or that his conduct exhibited a reckless
disregard for the possibility that it would cause the victim serious bodily
injury. Therefore, Appellant argues that his single weaponless punch to the
victim's head did not demonstrate the requisite intent on his part to cause
the victim serious bodily injury nor did the single punch evidence a
- 3 -

J. A13021/01
heightened degree of recklessness on his part. After careful consideration,
we must agree.
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the test we
apply is whether the evidence, and all reasonable inferences
taken from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, were sufficient to
establish all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 759 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal
denied, ___ Pa. ___, 771 A.2d 1281 (2001); Commonwealth v. Williams,
554 Pa. 1, 9, 720 A.2d 679, 683 (1998).
¶ 6
The relevant section of the Crimes Code under which Appellant was
convicted is Section 2702 (a)(1) which provides:
2702. Aggravated Assault
(a) OFFENSE DEFINED.--A person is guilty of aggravated
assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or
causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702 (a)(1).2 Serious bodily injury is further defined by the
Crimes Code as "[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or
which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or

2 Aggravated assault under this statutory section is graded as a felony of
the first degree punishable by a maximum term of incarceration of twenty
years.
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J. A13021/01
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2301.
¶ 7
In its opinion the Trial Court indicated that it found Appellant guilty of
aggravated assault since "[t]estimony describing the events leading up to
the attack, i.e. the challenge to arm-wrestle, the shoving incident, following
the victim out of the bar and calling out `Are you a tough guy?' support the
conclusion that Mr. Roche attacked Mr. Frenz without provocation and after
sufficient deliberation to form the intent to inflict serious bodily injury." Trial
Court Opinion, filed 11/29/2000, at 4. Because the Trial Court specifically
found that Appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury via his actions,
we are required, in evaluating Appellant's claim, to first ascertain whether
the Commonwealth has "presented sufficient evidence to show that the
defendant intentionally caused, or attempted to cause, serious bodily injury
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."
Commonwealth v. Caterino, 678 A.2d 389, 391 (Pa.Super. 1996), appeal
denied, 546 Pa. 652, 684 A.2d 555 (1996). "A person acts intentionally with
respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves
the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to
engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result." 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
302 (b)(1); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 627 A.2d 183, 186 (Pa.Super.
1993).
¶ 8
As our Court has previously stated:
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J. A13021/01
As intent is a subjective frame of mind, it is of necessity
difficult of direct proof[.] [W]e must look to all the evidence
to establish intent, including, but not limited to, appellant's
conduct as it appeared to his eyes[.] Intent can be proven by
direct or circumstantial evidence; it may be inferred from acts
or conduct or from the attendant circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Little, 614 A.2d 1146, 1154 (Pa.Super. 1992), appeal
denied, 533 Pa. 608, 618 A.2d 399 (1992).
¶ 9
Appellant relies principally on Commonwealth v. Alexander, 447 Pa.
190, 383 A.2d 887 (1978) as support for his contention that his act of
throwing one punch did not demonstrate the requisite intent to justify his
conviction for aggravated assault. In Alexander, the victim was standing
on a street corner when the defendant walked up to him and punched him
once in the face breaking his nose. On appeal, the Commonwealth did not
contend that the victim actually suffered serious bodily injury from this blow;
rather, the Commonwealth contended that the appellant's act of striking the
victim in the face once with a closed fist was enough to demonstrate the
specific intent on his part to cause serious bodily injury. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument and said:
While there can be no dispute about the physiological
significance of the head, where the victim did not actually
sustain the requisite serious bodily injury, we cannot say that
the mere fact that a punch was delivered to that portion of
the body (the head) is sufficient, without more, to support a
finding that appellant intended to inflict serious bodily injury.
Where the injury actually inflicted did not constitute serious
bodily injury, the charge of aggravated assault can be
supported only if the evidence supports a finding that the
blow delivered was accompanied by the intent to inflict
serious bodily injury. Criminal intent may be proved by direct
- 6 -

J. A13021/01
or circumstantial evidence. In the instant case, the only
direct evidence of appellant's intent is his testimony to the
effect that he did not intend to seriously injure the victim.
Thus, any evidence of his intent to inflict serious bodily injury
must be gleaned from the other circumstances surrounding
appellant's attack on the victim. In this case, there simply
are no such circumstances to support a finding that appellant
harbored the requisite intent. There is no evidence that
appellant was disproportionately larger or stronger than the
victim; appellant was not restrained from escalating his
attack upon the victim; appellant had no weapon or other
implement to aid his attack; appellant made no statements
before, during, or after the attack which might indicate his
intent to inflict further injury upon the victim. Appellant
delivered one punch and walked away. See Commonwealth
v. Alexander, supra, 237 Pa.Super. at 118-20, 346 A.2d at
322-23 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
To accept the Commonwealth's argument in this case would
be to allow an admitted simple assault to be bootstrapped up
to an aggravated assault. We hasten to add that a simple
assault combined with other surrounding circumstances may,
in a proper case, be sufficient to support a finding that an
assailant attempted to inflict serious bodily injury, thereby
constituting aggravated assault. All we hold is that the
evidence in the instant case is insufficient to support such a
finding.
Id. at 194, 383 A.2d at 889 (citations omitted).
¶ 10 The Commonwealth chiefly distinguishes Alexander on the basis that
the victim in Alexander did not suffer serious bodily injury, whereas, in the
case at bar, the victim did in fact suffer serious bodily injury. While it is
indisputable that the victim in this case suffered serious bodily injury from
the single blow delivered by Appellant, the attendant facts and
circumstances do not suggest that Appellant delivered that lone blow with
the specific intent of inflicting serious bodily injury upon the victim. Simply
- 7 -

J. A13021/01
showing that the victim sustained a serious bodily injury is not enough to
sustain a conviction for aggravated assault. The aggravated assault statute
is not a strict liability statute. To sustain a conviction the Commonwealth
must also prove that the Appellant acted with the requisite mens rea or
criminal state of mind.
¶ 11 The Commonwealth argues that Appellant's intent can be inferred from
the circumstances of his conduct in initiating the fight and then pursuing the
victim. The Commonwealth notes the Appellant was approximately twice the
size of his victim. In addition, the Commonwealth contends the Appellant's
belligerent words and actions indicate that the attack would have continued
if a police car did not pull up to the scene. However, based solely on these
facts alone, we do not believe that an inference of Appellant's intent to cause
death or serious bodily injury can be drawn. Appellant's belligerent words
and the throwing of one punch are in and of themselves insufficient factors
to support the conclusion that Appellant had the requisite intent to cause
serious bodily injury when he struck the victim.
¶ 12 During the initial encounter in the bar, Appellant did not threaten the
victim with harm or injury but merely challenged him to arm wrestle and
briefly pushed the victim when the victim declined his offer. When the
victim exited the bar and Appellant followed, Appellant again did not
specifically threaten the victim with injury or insinuate that he would cause
physical harm to the victim, aside from Appellant's childish inquiry as to
- 8 -

J. A13021/01
whether the victim thought he was a "tough guy." After Appellant delivered
his lone, ill-advised punch with his hand, he ceased his attack immediately
and did not engage in further physical contact with the victim. Though the
victim was defenseless, Appellant did not continue to strike the victim while
the victim was lying motionless on the ground nor did Appellant pursue or
extend his attack to the victim's companion.3 Appellant offered no indication
that he intended to inflict further harm. Moreover, and importantly,
Appellant did not possess or use a weapon or other instrumentality of harm
at any time before or during this attack. In short, Appellant merely
delivered one punch to the victim's face with his hand and walked away.
While Appellant's actions certainly demonstrated the sufficient requisite
intent to sustain his conviction for simple assault, in that they showed that
he acted with the intent to cause Appellant bodily injury,4 they were not so

3 While it is true, as the Commonwealth asserts, that the police arrived on
the scene shortly after Appellant struck the victim, the record nevertheless
demonstrates that Appellant had the clear opportunity to continue the attack
prior to the appearance of the police. Indeed, after Appellant had struck the
victim, the victim's friend stated that he cursed the Appellant, and Appellant
respnded by asking him what he was going to do. N.T. Trial 2/7/2000 at 36.
Appellant subsequently called the victim's friend a "little piece of crap" but
Appellant did not move from his prior position. Id. Appellant then noticed a
police car coming down the street and left the scene. Thus, there existed a
clear temporal break between the time of the initial punch and the arrival of
the police car on the street, during which Appellant could have continued the
attack on the victim had he elected to do so.
4 See e.g. Commonwealth v. Torres, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 766 A.2d 342,
344 (2001) ("A person commits simple assault if he attempts to cause or
(Footnote continued on next page).
- 9 -

J. A13021/01
egregious or sustained to suggest that he legally possessed the specific
intent to inflict serious bodily harm when he punched Appellant once.
¶ 13 We recognize that, when, as here, the victim sustains serious bodily
injury, the absence of a demonstration of specific intent is not, in and of
itself, wholly fatal to the Commonwealth's case. The Commonwealth may
also meet its burden of proof by showing that a defendant acted recklessly
under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of
human life. Commonwealth v. Nichols, 692 A.2d 181, 185 (Pa.Super.
1997); Commonwealth v. Magnelli, 502 A.2d 241, 243 (Pa.Super. 1985).
Nevertheless, the above referenced factual circumstances of this case do not
establish that Appellant acted with such a degree of recklessness which
would justify his conviction for aggravated assault.
¶ 14 In Commonwealth v. O'Hanlon, 539 Pa. 478, 653 A.2d 616 (1995)
our Supreme Court had occasion to discuss the nature of the criminal
conduct which much be exhibited by a defendant which would constitute
recklessness for the purposes of our aggravated assault statute. The
appellant in that case, driving while inebriated, ran a red light and struck
another vehicle, seriously injuring both the driver and himself. He was
convicted of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. On appeal,

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.")
(citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701 (a)(1)).
- 10 -

J. A13021/01
appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict as
the requisite mens rea of recklessness was not established.
¶ 15 Our Supreme Court agreed and stated:
[M]ere recklessness is insufficient to support a conviction for
aggravated assault, which requires a higher degree of
culpability, i.e., that which considers and then disregards the
threat necessarily posed to human life by the offending
conduct. There must be an element of deliberation or
conscious disregard of danger not present to the same extent
in, e.g., either reckless endangerment, to which appellant
admits, or driving while intoxicated. Aggravated assault is a
second degree felony, reckless endangerment and driving
under the influence of alcohol are second degree
misdemeanors. The difference in grading reflects the relative
seriousness of the crimes, and the differing levels of criminal
intent involved. The quantum of recklessness required to
prove the misdemeanors will not serve to support the felony.
* * * * *
[F]or the degree of recklessness contained in the aggravated
assault statute to occur, the offensive act must be performed
under circumstances which almost assure that injury or death
will ensue. The recklessness must, therefore, be such that life
threatening injury is essentially certain to occur. This state of
mind is, accordingly, equivalent to that which seeks to cause
injury. Examples of such behavior make the distinction clear.
In Commonwealth v. Daniels, 467 Pa. 35, 354 A.2d 538
(1976), appellant had fired a gun into a crowd; in
Commonwealth v. Laing, 310 Pa. Super. 105, 456 A.2d
204 (1983), appellant drove his car into a crowd, after having
aimed it at an individual; in Scofield, the appellant drove at
a pedestrian. See also, Commonwealth v. Hlatky, 426 Pa.
Super. 66, 626 A.2d 575 (1993); Commonwealth v.
Rohach, 344 Pa. Super. 229, 496 A.2d 768 (1985). In each
of these instances, the defendant could reasonably anticipate
that serious bodily injury or death would be the likely and
logical consequence of his actions. In each case, the
consequence was ignored.
* * * * *
- 11 -

J. A13021/01
Aggravated assault is, indeed, the functional
equivalent of a murder in which, for some reason,
death fails to occur.
Id. at 482-483, 653 A.2d at 618 (emphasis supplied); Accord
Commonwealth v. Comer, 552 Pa. 527, 716 A.2d 593 (1998);
Commonwealth v. Dellavecchia, 725 A.2d 186, 188 (Pa.Super. 1998).
¶ 16 Appellant's act of throwing one punch after using belligerent words
was clearly insufficient to establish that he acted with such a heightened
degree of recklessness that he was virtually assured that death or serous
injury would occur from his act. Appellant was not, nor could he be, virtually
or even reasonably certain that death or serious injury would be the likely
and logical result of his lone punch. This was not the functional equivalent of
a murder in which for whatever reason death failed to occur.5

5 A good contrasting case which does highlight the level of recklessness
necessary to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault is the case of
Commonwealth v. Davis, 406 A.2d 1087 (Pa.Super. 1979). In Davis the
defendant punched his girlfriend once in the face, causing her to bleed
profusely, and then proceeded to chase her out of the house. The defendant
dove through the air and landed on an automobile smashing its windshield
and breaking the radio antenna. When the girlfriend sought refuge in a car,
the defendant jumped on the hood of car and broke its window with his fist.
The girlfriend next sought shelter in a bus, but was denied admission to the
bus by the driver, whereupon the defendant caught up to his hapless victim
and again began to beat her. The girlfriend broke free and hid in yet
another car. In response to a question from the driver of this car, the
defendant struck the driver in the face knocking her unconscious and
breaking her jaw. We examined the defendant's overall conduct, which
included his frenzied pursuit of his girlfriend, and concluded that the entirety
of defendant's behavior during this episode showed that he acted with
extreme disregard of the value of human life, and, hence, with the
(Footnote continued on next page).
- 12 -

J. A13021/01
¶ 17 This was instead an all too common situation in which an individual, no
doubt overcome by visions of his pugilistic prowess induced by consumption
of alcohol, struck another individual with his fist outside of a bar. The law
justifiably sanctions such reprehensible behavior as that which Appellant
demonstrated through the offenses of simple assault and reckless
endangerment, offenses for which Appellant was rightfully convicted.
Appellant correctly does not challenge his convictions for those offenses as
the evidence amply supports his conviction for them. Appellant is not,
however, a failed murderer, and his conviction for aggravated assault
therefore cannot stand.
¶
18 In conclusion, we must vacate Appellant's aggravated assault
conviction; however, because we may have disturbed the Trial Judge's
overall sentencing arrangement, we remand for Appellant's resentencing on
the convictions of simple assault and reckless endangerment alone. See
Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 512 Pa. 587, 517 A.2d 1280 (1986)
(where appellate court vacates one of multiple convictions and thereby alters
the sentencing scheme of the trial court, it is within the appellate court's
authority to remand the matter for resentencing); Commonwealth v.

heightened degree of recklessness contemplated by the aggravated assault
statute. No such frenzied and sustained manic pursuit was undertaken by
Appellant in this case as his actions were limited to the throwing of a single
punch.
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J. A13021/01
Fisher, 682 A.2d 811, 819 (Pa.Super. 1996), appeal denied, 546 Pa. 691,
687 A.2d 376 (1996) (same).
¶ 19 Judgment of sentence on the aggravated assault conviction is vacated,
and Appellant is discharged as to that offense. In all other respects
judgment of sentence is affirmed and case remanded for resentencing.
¶ 20 Jurisdiction relinquished.
¶ 21 Joyce, J. files a Dissenting Opinion.
- 14 -

J-A13021-01
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
Appellee
:
PENNSYLVANIA
:
v.
:
:
SEAN ROCHE,
:
Appellant
: No. 1605 EDA 2000
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence dated April 25, 2000,
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No. 99-09-0007
BEFORE: MCEWEN, P.J.E., JOYCE, J. and CERCONE, P.J.E.
DISSENTING OPINION BY JOYCE, J.:
¶ 1
I respectfully dissent from my esteemed colleagues' conclusion that
the evidence in this case was insufficient to support Appellant's conviction
for aggravated assault. As the Majority properly notes, it is indisputable that
the victim in this case suffered serious bodily injury, specifically, an orbital
blowout and frontal rim and sinus fractures. Thus, the determination is
solely whether Appellant had the requisite intent to inflict serious bodily
injury.
¶ 2
In Commonwealth v. Alexander, 383 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1978), upon
which the Majority relies, our Supreme Court found that a single punch to
the victim's head without more was insufficient to establish intent to inflict
serious bodily injury. However, the holding was also premised on the fact
that the victim did not sustain serious bodily injury, a fact that was conceded
to by the Commonwealth. Furthermore, the Court noted that intent may be
established by the circumstances surrounding the assault, and that no such

J-A13021-01
circumstances existed in that case.6 I find Alexander to be distinguishable
for two reasons: first, unlike Alexander, we are presented with a situation
where the victim indisputably suffered serious bodily injury. Second, and
more importantly, it is my opinion that the circumstances surrounding the
attack are sufficient to establish Appellant's intent. See also
Commonwealth v. Caterino, 678 A.2d 389 (Pa. Super. 1996), appeal
denied, 684 A.2d 555 (Pa. 1997)(for purposes of establishing the offense of
aggravated assault, intent to cause serious bodily harm may be shown by
the circumstances surrounding the incident); Commonwealth v. Cassidy,
668 A.2d 1143 (Pa. Super. 1995), appeal denied, 681 A.2d 176 (Pa. 1996)
(intent to cause serious bodily injury can be inferred from circumstantial
evidence).
¶ 3
My review of the record reveals that as the victim and his friend were
leaving the bar, Appellant, who was twice the size of the victim, asked him if
he wanted to arm wrestle. The victim stated that he did not and proceeded
towards the exit of the bar where Appellant pushed him. The victim did not
retaliate but simply left the bar only to realize that Appellant and his

6 The Supreme Court provided examples of circumstances that might support the finding of
the requisite intent, noting that they were not present in that case. Examples included
instances in which "appellant was not disproportionately larger or stronger than the victim;
appellant was not restrained from escalating his attack upon the victim; appellant had no
weapon or other implement to aid his attack; appellant made no statements before, during
or after the attack which might indicate his intent to inflict further injury upon the victim."
Alexander, supra, 383 A.2d at 889.
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J-A13021-01
companion were pursuing him. Appellant overtook the victim from behind in
an alley and tauntingly asked him whether "he thought he was a tough guy."
When the victim turned around, Appellant delivered a closed fist punch to
the victim's eye, a vulnerable organ. This punch was so powerful it caused
the victim to lose consciousness, fall backwards, and crack his head open
when he hit the cement. When cursed at by the victim's friend, Appellant
then turned his aggressiveness to that individual and challenged him as to
what he was going to do about it. Appellant's conduct was only thwarted by
the fortuitous arrival of the police. Appellant demonstrated his
consciousness of guilt by fleeing upon observing the approaching police
vehicle.
¶ 4
These facts indicate that the victim did nothing to instigate this attack.
Rather, the victim tried to avoid this confrontation by first backing down
from Appellant's challenge to arm wrestle, then walking away from Appellant
when he was shoved in the bar and then again by continuing to walk away
as Appellant pursued him down the sidewalk. Clearly, Appellant had one
item on his agenda: to engage in a physical altercation with a stranger who
was half his size and who did nothing to warrant the attack. His provoking
actions, to which the victim did not succumb, escalated to the point where
he struck the victim in the vulnerable organ of the eye with such force that
he caused an orbital blowout and bone fractures to such an extent that the
victim had to be hospitalized for five days, undergo surgery and still suffered
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J-A13021-01
from straight upward double vision gaze six months later. It is difficult to
imagine a situation where Appellant's attempt to inflict serious bodily injury
is more apparent. Furthermore, even if it could be argued that Appellant did
not intentionally cause the serious bodily injury, the fact-finder could have
easily determined that Appellant acted recklessly. See Commonwealth v.
Hlatky, 626 A.2d 575, (Pa. Super. 1993), appeal denied, 644 A.2d 1200
(Pa. 1994).
¶ 5
That Appellant acted with the requisite intent to sustain his conviction
is also supported by Commonwealth v. Davis, 406 A.2d 1087 (Pa. Super.
1979). In that case, Mr. Davis was engaged in the assault of his girlfriend.
During the altercation, Mrs. Amos, the victim, attempted to provide safety to
the appellant's girlfriend by sheltering her in her vehicle. As a result of her
assistance, "in one motion, appellant swiveled and punched Mrs. Amos in the
face causing her to black out. ... Mrs. Amos suffered multiple fractures to her
lower jaw which forced her to spend four days in the hospital and six weeks
with her jaw wired shut." Id. at 1088. In finding the evidence sufficient to
sustain the appellant's conviction, this Court distinguished Alexander on the
basis that there was no serious bodily injury in Alexander and that the
Commonwealth instead argued that a jury could infer extreme indifference
to the value of human life simply by the fact that the punch was to the
victim's face. Id. at 1089. Our Court further relied on the appellant's
overall conduct as evidence of his intent. Id. See also, Commonwealth v.
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J-A13021-01
Cassidy, 668 A.2d 1143 (Pa. Super. 1995), (evidence was sufficient for
aggravated assault conviction where defendant was larger and stronger than
victim, and that in course of argument defendant threw victim into wall
causing loss of consciousness, hospitalization for two days, and victim had to
wear body brace and wrist cast for two months).
¶ 6
In conclusion, I would find that Appellant acted intentionally when he
caused serious bodily injury to the victim and that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault. My conclusion is
based on Appellant's manifestation of his intent when he initiated the
encounter with the victim, a man half of his physical size, asked him to arm
wrestle, shoved him, pursued him outside the bar, and then engaged in an
unprovoked attack in a belligerent and aggressive manner. Thus, I would
affirm the judgement of sentence.
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