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J. A03002/03
2003 PA Super 233
ROBERT C. TAYLOR t/d/b/a SOUTH
:
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
HILLS JEWELERS,
:
PENNSYLVANIA
:

Appellants :

:

v. :

:

FEDRA INTERNATIONAL, LTD.,
:
:

Appellee
:
No. 1035 WDA 2002

Appeal from the Order entered May 22, 2002
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Civil Division, at No. AR01-7513

BEFORE: DEL SOLE, P.J., MUSMANNO and KELLY, JJ.

OPINION BY DEL SOLE, P.J.:

Filed: June 17, 2003
¶1 Robert Taylor appeals from the trial court's order sustaining Fedra
International, Ltd.'s preliminary objections raising a lack of jurisdiction.
Upon review, we reverse.
¶2 Robert Taylor, t/d/b/a South Hills Jewelers ("Taylor") is in the retail
jewelry sales business. Fedra International, Ltd. ("Fedra") is a wholesaler
selling jewelry to retailers, with its principal place of business in
Massachusetts. In 1997 a sales person who represented Fedra's line of
jewelry, in addition to others, appeared in Taylor's retail store which was
located in Allegheny County. The Fedra representative displayed samples of
Fedra's merchandise to Taylor. Taylor placed an order for Fedra
merchandise which was to be shipped to Taylor's store in Allegheny County.
¶3
In 1998, the parties had a dispute regarding Taylor's right to return
unsold jewelry to Fedra. Taylor asserts that he was under the belief that he

J. A03002/03
was entitled to return to Fedra, for full credit, any items of Fedra's jewelry
that he was unable to sell. Taylor attempted to send back to Fedra the
unsold jewelry, but Fedra refused to accept the package and returned it to
Taylor. Subsequently, Taylor transferred the jewelry to his daughter in
Maryland, instructing her to return the jewelry to Fedra, using her company
name and return address.
¶4
Fedra filed suit against Taylor in Allegheny County for the balance due
for the unsold jewelry. In May 2000, judgment was entered in favor of
Fedra, and Taylor paid the judgment in full.
¶5 In December 2001, Taylor instituted a lawsuit against Fedra in
Allegheny County, seeking a judgment that Taylor is entitled to recover
possession of the unsold jewelry at issue, or alternatively, a money
judgment in the amount of $10,591.15. Fedra filed preliminary objections
challenging the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County over Fedra and the subject matter of the case. The trial court
entered an order sustaining Fedra's preliminary objections. This appeal
followed.
¶6
On appeal, Taylor presents a single issue for our review:
Whether the lower court erred by sustaining the [Appellee's]
preliminary objections raising a lack of jurisdiction when the
[Appellee] admitted to soliciting business in Pennsylvania
through its representatives physically coming into Pennsylvania
and utilized Pennsylvania court to obtain a judgment against the
within [Appellant] several years ago[.]

Appellant's Brief at 4.

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J. A03002/03
¶7 Our standard of review when faced with an appeal from an order
sustaining preliminary objections is well established. "When preliminary
objections, if sustained, would result in the dismissal of an action, such
objections should be sustained only in cases which are clear and free from
doubt." Milam v. Milam, 677 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Pa. Super. 1996). Once
the moving party supports its objections to personal jurisdiction, the burden
of proving personal jurisdiction is upon the party asserting it. Scoggins v.
Scoggins, 555 A.2d 1314, 1317 (Pa. Super. 1989). Only where record
evidence does not fairly support the trial court's disposition of preliminary
objections challenging personal jurisdiction will the case be remanded for
further proceedings. Lox, Stock & Bagels, Inc. v. Kotten Machine Co.,
395 A.2d 954 (Pa. Super. 1978).
¶8 Taylor asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining Fedra's
preliminary objections which raised lack of jurisdiction. Taylor maintains
that the activities undertaken by individuals representing Fedra, as well as
Fedra's actions, subject it to the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts.
Specifically, Taylor argues that Fedra knew that representatives of Fedra
solicited business from retailers in Pennsylvania, and accordingly, sufficient
contacts existed to create jurisdiction. Furthermore, Fedra had previously
sued Taylor in Pennsylvania. Thus, Fedra cannot now claim surprise in being
haled into Pennsylvania courts.

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J. A03002/03
¶9 Pursuant to the Judiciary Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5301, et seq., our
courts may exercise two types of in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant. Efford v. Jockey Club, 796 A.2d 370, 373 (Pa. Super.
2002). One type of personal jurisdiction is general jurisdiction, which is
founded upon a defendant's general activities within the forum as evidenced
by continuous and systematic contacts with the state. Efford, 796 A.2d at
373. The other type is specific jurisdiction, which has a more defined scope
and is focused upon the particular acts of the defendant that gave rise to the
underlying cause of action. Id.
Regardless of whether general or specific in personam
jurisdiction is asserted, the propriety of such an exercise must
be tested against the Pennsylvania long arm statute, 42
Pa.C.S.A. §5322, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In order to meet constitutional muster, a
defendant's contacts with the forum state must be such that the
defendant could reasonably anticipate being called to defend
itself in the forum. Random, fortuitous and attenuated contacts
cannot reasonably notify a party that it may be called to defend
itself in a foreign forum and, thus, cannot support the exercise of
personal jurisdiction. That is, the defendant must have
purposefully directed its activities to the forum and conducted
itself in a manner indicating that it has availed itself to the
forum's privileges and benefits such that it should also be
subjected to the forum state's laws and regulations.

Id. (citations omitted). The Pennsylvania long arm statute permits
jurisdiction to be exercised "to the fullest extent allowed under the
Constitution of the United States and may be based upon the most minimum

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J. A03002/03
contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the
United States." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322(b).1
¶10 The Pennsylvania Long Arm Statute, provides, in pertinent part:
§5322. Bases of personal jurisdiction over persons outside
this Commonwealth
(a) General rule. -- A tribunal of this Commonwealth
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person (or the
personal representative of a deceased individual who
would be subject to jurisdiction under this subsection if not
deceased) who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause
of action or other matter arising from such person:
(1)
Transacting any business in this
Commonwealth. Without excluding other acts which
may constitute transacting business in this
Commonwealth, any of the following shall constitute
transacting business for the purpose of this
paragraph:
(i) The doing by any person in this
Commonwealth of a series of similar acts for
the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary
benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object.
(ii) The doing of a single act in this
Commonwealth for the purpose of thereby
realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise
accomplishing an object with the intention of
initiating a series of such acts.
(iii) The shipping of merchandise directly or
indirectly into or through this Commonwealth.
(iv) The engaging in any business or profession
within this Commonwealth, whether or not
such business requires license or approval by
any government unit of this Commonwealth.
(v) The ownership, use or possession of any
real property situate within this
Commonwealth.

1 Pennsylvania courts have recognized that this provision renders the reach
of the long arm statute coextensive with that permitted by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Efford, 796 A.2d at 373, n.2.

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J. A03002/03
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322.
¶11 We find that several of the above referenced subsections are
applicable in this case. During his deposition, the President of Fedra testified
that there were at least two representatives, although permanently located
in other states, that traveled into Pennsylvania for purposes of soliciting
business at least annually. It is undisputed that Fedra solicited business
from a Pennsylvania retailer, Taylor, on at least one occasion. Thus, we find
that personal jurisdiction may be exercised over Appellee pursuant to
§ 5322(a)(1)(i) and (ii). Additionally, on at least one occasion Fedra shipped
merchandise directly into this Commonwealth, specifically to Taylor. Thus,
we find 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322(a)(1)(iii) applies. Finally, we find that Fedra
engaged in this business by sending its representatives into Pennsylvania for
the purpose of soliciting business. This action provides a basis for
jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322(a)(1)(iv). Accordingly, we find
Pennsylvania to have jurisdiction over Fedra pursuant to the Pennsylvania
long arm statute.
¶12 Moreover, we find that Fedra has purposefully directed its activities to
the forum and conducted itself in a manner indicating that it has availed
itself of the forum's privileges and benefits such that it should also be
subjected to the forum state's laws and regulations. Fedra has previously
filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Pennsylvania
against Taylor. Thus, Fedra has availed itself of this forum's privileges and

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J. A03002/03
benefits and cannot now claim surprise in being haled into the same court it
utilized in the past in suing Taylor. We find this tribunal has jurisdiction over
Fedra and therefore, the trial court erred in sustaining Fedra's preliminary
objections asserting lack of jurisdiction.
¶13 Order reversed. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this
Opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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