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J. A05040/03

2003 PA Super 213
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
:
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
Appellee
:

PENNSYLVANIA

:

v.

:

:
ALONSO
MAYFIELD,
:
No. 1197 MDA 2002

:
APPEAL OF: CAPITAL BONDING
:

CORPORATION
:

:

:

Appeal from the Order entered June 28, 2002
Court of Common Pleas, Montour County,
Criminal Division at No. 30 CR 2001.

BEFORE: JOHNSON, JOYCE, and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.

OPINION BY JOHNSON, J.:

Filed: May 30, 2003
¶1
Capital Bonding Corporation (Capital) appeals the trial court's order
denying its motion to vacate bail forfeiture after defendant Alonso Mayfield
was arrested on new charges in violation of the conditions of a bail bond
Capital had posted for Mayfield's release on existing charges. Capital argues
that because the bond was issued principally to secure Mayfield's
appearance, and because Mayfield appeared as required, the trial court
abused its discretion in sustaining the bail forfeiture based on the new
arrest. Following careful consideration of the record in light of applicable
law, we conclude that the trial court did abuse its discretion. Accordingly,
we reverse the court's order.

J. A05040/03

¶2
This matter commenced following Mayfield's initial arrest in Montour
County on charges of Theft by Unlawful Taking and Theft by Receiving
Stolen Property, for which the trial court set bail in the amount of $150,000.
Subsequently, the court reduced bail to $50,000, and on July 6, 2001,
Capital posted a bond in that amount and filed a Certificate of Bail and
Discharge and a Power of Attorney with the Montour County Clerk of Courts.
The bond specified the conditions of release as follows: "Defendant must
report to bonding company on a weekly basis; remain in county of residence
and abide by all conditions of bail agreement until case is finalized; must
remain arrest free." Capital Bonding Corporation's Petition to Vacate
Forfeiture, Exhibit A, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 40a.
¶3
Upon his release, on July 25, 2001, Mayfield went to the home of his
paramour, Linette Ludwig, and sought to retrieve his personal belongings.
Before Ludwig would grant Mayfield access, however, she demanded that he
repay a sum of $3,100 that she had posted as bond for his release on other
charges. Mayfield refused to repay the money and allegedly struck Ludwig
in the face, fracturing her nose. In response to this apparent ruckus, a
neighbor called the police, who arrested Mayfield for Simple Assault, thus
establishing his violation of the conditions of the bail bond posted by Capital.
¶4
Following the arrest, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke
Mayfield's bail. After a hearing on December 10, 2001, the court granted the

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J. A05040/03

Commonwealth's motion and ordered forfeiture to Montour County of
Capital's $50,000 bond based on Mayfield's violation of the conditions of
release. Thereafter, on January 15, 2002, Capital filed a petition to vacate
the forfeiture. After oral argument, the court denied Capital's petition by
order of June 28, 2002, finding that Capital "did not respond to the action
requesting the forfeiture nor timely seek redress." Order of Court, 6/28/02,
at 1. The court concluded, in addition, that "[t]he testimony at the forfeiture
hearing adequately supported violations of the bail piece and justified
forfeiture." Order of Court, 6/28/02, at 1.
¶5
Capital now files this appeal, raising the following questions for our
review:
A.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DETERMINING
THAT APPELLANT/PETITIONER DID NOT TIMELY SEEK
REDRESS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER FORFEITING BAIL
WHEN THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE DO NOT RESTRICT THE TIME PERIOD IN
WHICH TO PETITION THE COURT TO VACATE THE
FORFEITURE?

B.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DETERMINING
THAT A CORPORATE SURETY POSTING AN APPEARANCE
BOND IS A GUARANTOR OF A DEFENDANT'S BEHAVIOR?

C.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DETERMINING
THAT FORFEITURE OF A CORPORATE SURETY'S BOND IS
PROPER WHEN A DEFENDANT ON BOND IS REARRESTED
BUT NOT YET CONVICTED OF A CRIME?

Brief for Appellant at 4.

-3-

J. A05040/03

¶6
All of Capital's questions challenge the trial court's refusal to vacate its
order granting forfeiture of Mayfield's bail in favor of Montour County. "[T]he
decision to allow or deny a remission of bail forfeiture lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court." Commonwealth v. Mrozek, 703 A.2d 1052,
1053 (Pa. Super. 1997). Accordingly, our review is limited to determination
of whether the court abused its discretion in refusing to vacate the
underlying forfeiture order. See Commonwealth v. Atkins, 644 A.2d 751,
752 (Pa. Super. 1994). To establish such an abuse, the aggrieved party
must show that the court misapplied the law, exercised manifestly
unreasonable judgment, or acted on the basis of bias, partiality, or ill-will to
that party's detriment. See id.
¶7
In support of its first question, Capital contends that the trial court
deemed its petition to vacate bail forfeiture to be untimely filed. Brief for
Appellant at 10. Capital filed its petition 32 days after the trial court entered
its order of record. Capital argues that because the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure do not specify a window of time within which such a
petition must be filed, the trial court abused its discretion in treating the
petition as untimely. Brief for Appellant at 10. The Commonwealth argues
that the court did not in fact dispose of Capital's petition on the basis of
timeliness, but instead, disposed of the matter on the merits. Brief for
Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at 6. Montour County argues that

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J. A05040/03

the trial court did dispose of Capital's petition on the basis of timeliness but
cites no authority to establish that the 32 days at issue here exceeded any
time prescribed by the Rules of Court. Brief for Appellee County of Montour
at 6-7. The trial court has not filed the required Rule 1925(a) opinion to
explain its basis for decision. Accordingly, we can rely only on the language
of the order itself to discern the court's intent.
¶8
The order provides, in its entirety, as follows:
AND NOW, this June 28, 2002, upon consideration of the
testimony and briefs of counsel regarding the Petition of Capital
Bonding Corporation to Vacate our Order of Forfeiture of Bail,
the Petition is denied. The testimony reveals that the Bonding
Company did not respond to the action requesting the forfeiture
nor timely seek redress following this court's granting the
forfeiture. This court will not now grant relief from the order.
The testimony at the forfeiture hearing adequately supported
violations of the bail piece and justified forfeiture.

Order of Court, 6/28/02, at 1.

¶9
Upon consideration of this language, we cannot conclude that the
purported untimeliness of the petition stands independently as the basis of
the court's disposition. Although the court's language suggests its
dissatisfaction at the timing of Capital's response to the forfeiture order, it
also documents the court's reliance on testimony and its conclusion that the
record justified forfeiture on the merits. Accordingly, we disagree with
Capital's assertion that the court disposed of its petition due to untimely
filing.

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J. A05040/03

¶10 To the extent that the court's order does rely on the purported
untimeliness of Capital's petition, we find no authority for its conclusion.
Neither the court nor any party identifies provisions of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure that limit the period of time in which an aggrieved party may seek
remission of bail forfeiture. In addition, the record contains no evidence
relating Capital's diligence, or lack thereof, in filing its motion to vacate bail
forfeiture. In the absence of any evidence concerning Capital's diligence, and
in the absence of a controlling Rule of Court, we find no basis in law to
support a conclusion of untimeliness. Cf. Smith v. Gallagher, 185 A.2d
135, 146 (Pa. 1962), overruled on other grounds by Application of
Biester, 409 A.2d 848, 852 (Pa. 1979) (concluding that trial judge must
pass on questions presented in accordance with established procedure rather
than his or her personal estimate of highly specialized situation). We
conclude accordingly that to the extent the court disposed of Capital's
petition on the basis of untimeliness without evidence on record to support
its finding or conclusion, it abused its discretion.
¶11 In support of its second question, Capital contends that the primary
purpose of bail is to secure a defendant's appearance at trial and that the
court erred in granting forfeiture for violation of other bail conditions. Brief
for Appellant at 12. Capital argues further that "Pennsylvania [caselaw]
demonstrates that neither the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nor this Court

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J. A05040/03

would permit forfeiture for violation of any condition of bail other than
appearance." Brief for Appellant at 12. Nevertheless, Capital acknowledges
that the issue of whether bail is properly forfeited for violation of conditions
not related to appearance is a matter of first impression in this
Commonwealth.
¶12 "Bail has long been recognized as a procedure whereby an individual
defendant provides a form of collateral `in exchange for the defendant's
release from custody; it secures his future appearance and other
requirements of his bond . . . .'" Commonwealth v. Chopak, 615 A.2d 696,
702 (Pa. 1992) (quoting Commonwealth v. McDonald, 382 A.2d 124, 126
(Pa. 1978)). Although the fundamental purpose of the bail bond remains to
assure the defendant's appearance, see Ruckinger v. Weicht, 514 A.2d
948, 949 (Pa. Super. 1986), the Rules of Criminal Procedure specify "other
requirements" to accompany every bond:
Rule 526. Conditions of Bail Bond
(A) In every case in which a defendant is released on bail, the
conditions of the bail bond shall be that the defendant will:

(1) appear at all times required until full and final
disposition of the case;

(2) obey all further orders of the bail authority;

(3) give written notice to the bail authority, the clerk of
courts, the district attorney, and the court bail
agency or other designated court bail officer, of any

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J. A05040/03

change of address within 48 hours of the date of the
change;

(4) neither do, nor cause to be done, nor permit to be
done on his or her behalf, any act proscribed by
Section 4952 of the Crimes Code (relating to
intimidation of witnesses or victims) or by Section
4953 (relating to retaliation against witnesses or
victims), 18 Pa.C.S. § 4952, 4953; and

(5) refrain from criminal activity.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 526. In addition, the bail authority may establish other
conditions in accordance with Criminal Rules 524 (Types of Release on Bail),
527 (Nonmonetary Conditions of Release on Bail), and 528 (Monetary
Condition of Release on Bail). See Pa.R.Crim.P. 526(B).
¶13
In the event that a defendant violates the conditions of bail, the trial
court has substantial discretion to grant forfeiture of the bail bond. Criminal
Rule 536 delineates that discretion, in pertinent part, as follows:
Rule 536. Procedures Upon Violation of Conditions:
Revocation of Release and Forfeiture; Bail Pieces;
Exoneration of Surety

(A) Sanctions
* * * *
(2) Forfeiture
(a) When a monetary condition of release has been
imposed and the defendant has violated a condition
of the bail bond, the bail authority may order the
cash or other security forfeited and shall state in
writing or on the record the reasons for so doing.

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J. A05040/03

* * * *

(d) The bail authority may direct that a forfeiture be set
aside or remitted if justice does not require the full
enforcement of the forfeiture order.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(2)(a), (d). Significantly, the language of this Rule does
not limit application of forfeiture merely to failure of the defendant to
appear. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(2)(a). Rather, the Rule allows forfeiture
for any violation subject to remission "if justice does not require the full
enforcement of the forfeiture order." See Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(2)(d). Thus,
Rule 536, when considered in conjunction with Rule 526, infra, would
appear to allow forfeiture for a defendant's failure to appear, to obey orders
of the bail authority, to give timely written notice of a change of address,
and to refrain from criminal activity generally. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 526(A)(1),
(2), (3), (5). Forfeiture may also be appropriate if the defendant engages in
intimidation or retaliation against witnesses, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 526(A)(4), or
violates other conditions established in accordance with Criminal Rules 524,
527, and 528, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 526(B).
¶14
Nevertheless, the trial court's discretion to grant bail forfeiture is not
unbounded; an award of forfeiture is subject to remission "if justice does not
require the full enforcement of the forfeiture order." See Pa.R.Crim.P.
536(A)(2)(d). We have held previously that the trial court's discretion to

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J. A05040/03

determine the interests of justice is properly guided by the three-part
standard enunciated by the United States District Court in United States v.
Ciotti, 579 F.Supp. 276, 278 (W.D.Pa. 1984). See Mrozek, 703 A.2d at
1054; Atkins, 644 A.2d at 752-53. Although our prior applications of the
standard occurred in cases where the bail violation at issue was the
defendant's failure to appear, we find the standard equally applicable
regardless of the violation alleged.
¶15 In
Ciotti, the court provided the following reasoning, focused
substantially on prejudice to the government occasioned by the defendant's
violation of the conditions of the bail bond:
When a defendant breaches a bail bond, without a
justifiable excuse, and the government is prejudiced in any
manner, the forfeiture should be enforced unless justice requires
otherwise. When considering whether or not justice requires the
enforcement of a forfeiture, a court must look at several factors,
including: 1) the willfulness of the defendant's breach of the
bond, 2) the cost, inconvenience and prejudice suffered by the
government, and 3) any explanation or mitigating factors.

Ciotti, 579 F.Supp. at 278 (citations omitted). We note that the language
the court used is both mandatory ("must look at several factors"), and
conjunctive ("and"). Although this language of the district court does not
control our disposition, we do find it persuasive and therefore reaffirm its
application to claims for remission of bail forfeiture regardless of the breach
of bail condition from which they arise. See Mrozek, 703 A.2d at 1054

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J. A05040/03

(applying Ciotti standard to claim for remission of forfeiture after defendant
failed to appear); Atkins, 644 A.2d at 752-53 (same).
¶16
Upon review of the record in this case, we find no indication that the
trial court considered any of the factors in Ciotti prior to its order refusing
remission of the bail forfeiture. Unfortunately, the court did not file an
Appellate Rule 1925(a) opinion. Accordingly, we can discern its rationale
only from the text of its order quoted above. In this regard, the court stated
that "[t]he testimony at the forfeiture hearing adequately supported
violations of the bail piece and justified forfeiture." Order of Court, 6/28/02,
at 1. Following consideration of the forfeiture hearing transcript, we agree
that the testimony establishes Mayfield's violation of the condition of bail that
he remain "arrest free." However, in view of the three-factor test established
in Ciotti, we do not find this testimony adequate to sustain a complete
forfeiture following Capital's request for remission.
¶17
We acknowledge, initially, that the record does provide evidence that
Mayfield's arrest, which violated the condition of his bail that he "remain
arrest free," resulted from willful conduct. Consequently, sufficient evidence
is present to establish "the willfulness of defendant's breach," as specified by
the first factor in Ciotti. See 579 F.Supp. at 278. Nevertheless, the record
is devoid of any evidence to establish the second factor in Ciotti, "the cost,
inconvenience and prejudice suffered by the government" resulting from

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J. A05040/03

Mayfield's arrest. See id. Given the conjunctive, mandatory language the
Ciotti standard employs, we find this discrepancy controlling. In the
absence of material evidence, we can only conclude that any such cost,
inconvenience or prejudice was no more than nominal. Police arrested
Mayfield promptly following his infraction and he was recommitted to the
Montour County jail, the same facility in which he had been housed prior to
his bail-release. Unlike the usual disappearance of the defendant following a
failure to appear, Mayfield's arrest did not require substantial investigative
resources and did not require a delay in disposition of the underlying
charges. In the absence of at least some demonstrated detriment to
Montour County, the Commonwealth, or the trial court, we conclude, as a
matter of law, that the record fails to establish a legally cognizable basis for
the total forfeiture the trial court ordered. Accordingly, we conclude that the
second factor of the three-factor test in Ciotti is not met. See 579 F.Supp.
at 278. We are compelled to conclude accordingly that the trial court erred
in refusing to grant remission of the bail forfeiture in favor of Capital.
¶18
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's order.
¶19 Order
REVERSED. Case REMANDED with direction to remit bail
forfeiture in favor of Capital Bonding Corporation. Jurisdiction
RELINQUISHED.
¶20
Judge Olszewski files a Dissenting Statement.

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J. A05040/03

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
:
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
Appellee
:

PENNSYLVANIA

:

v.

:

:
ALONSO
MAYFIELD,
:
No. 1197 MDA 2002

:
APPEAL OF: CAPITAL BONDING
:

CORPORATION
:

Appeal from the Order entered June 28, 2002
Court of Common Pleas, Montour County,
Criminal Division at No. 30 CR 2001.

BEFORE: JOHNSON, JOYCE, and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.

DISSENTING STATEMENT BY OLSZEWSKI, J.:
¶1
While the expression of the majority view provides a persuasive
analysis and sound rationale, I am obliged to differ and respectively dissent.
¶2
Appellant's release, upon posting bond, was conditional. As stated by
the majority, the conditions were as follows: "[appellant] must report to
bonding company on a weekly basis; remain in county of residence and
abide by all conditions of bail agreement until case is finalized; must remain
free of arrest." Majority at 2. If any of these conditions were violated, the
bond would be forfeited. Further, all parties involved were aware of these
conditions and of the fact that if violated the bond is forfeited.
¶3
On the very same day that appellant was released on bond, appellant
was arrested for new charges. This violated the conditions of his bond.
Thus, the trial court did not err in its decision to forfeit the bond.

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J. A05040/03

¶4
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's decision.

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