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J-A08013-01
2001 PA Super 207
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
:
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
Appellee
:
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
:
:
GEORGE CAMERON,
:
Appellant
:
No. 1055 WDA 2000
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of March 30, 2000
In the Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division
Greene County, No. 433 Criminal 1999
BEFORE: ORIE MELVIN, TODD, and KELLY, JJ.
OPINION BY TODD, J.:
Filed: July 16, 2001
¶1
George Cameron appeals the judgment of sentence of March 30, 2000
of life imprisonment without parole entered following his conviction of first-
degree murder. 1 Because we find that the trial court erred in categorically
denying the defense's request to play an audiotape of Cameron's confession
for the jury's consideration as evidence as to its voluntariness, we affirm the
judgment of sentence, but remand for a hearing on the audiotape's
relevance.
¶2
The record reveals the following factual background necessary for our
resolution of this appeal: Cameron was arrested on August 5, 1999 for the
murder of David Cumberledge. Cumberledge apparently had been seeing
Cameron's estranged wife, Lisa Cameron. According to testimony presented
at trial, Cameron had threatened to kill Cumberledge during at least two
separate confrontations with him in the days before the killing. On the day

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502.

J-A08013-01
of the homicide, Cameron was observed by at least two witnesses carrying
two hunting knives on his person. Aware that Cameron wished to see her,
Ms. Cameron had implored Cumberledge to stay away from her. Around
midnight on August 4, Cameron was at his wife's apartment, and according
to his wife, he had been drinking. Following a confrontation with her, as
Cameron was leaving her apartment he found Cumberledge in the hallway.
Cameron suggested they fight and the two disappeared into the hallway
outside of Ms. Cameron's view. Ms. Cameron heard struggling, then heard
Cumberledge scream, and she "heard" stabbing, although she could not see
what was going on. As she went out on her back porch to call for help, she
saw Cameron run past holding a knife. She saw no one else in the
apartment building during this time. Cumberledge, bloodied, stumbled back
into the apartment with approximately 16 stabbing and cutting wounds,2 and
soon died.
¶3
A witness later observed Cameron, shirtless, jumping out of the weeds
on a nearby street. A blood-stained shirt was later recovered in that area.
Also, a knife with the victim's blood on it was discovered in a nearby
dumpster. Cameron was apprehended about an hour later, in the early
hours of August 5, hiding under the trailer of a friend. Cameron was

2 Dr. Leon Rozin, the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on the victim,
testified to the victim's multiple stab or incision wounds: eight on the face and
head; five on the chest, two of which perforated the chest cavity and damaged the
right lung; one on the left forearm; and one on the left thigh. (N.T., 3/28/00, at
430.)
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J-A08013-01
wearing socks which were soaked with a large amount of the victim's blood.
Also, what appeared to be a suicide note was found on him. He smelled of
alcohol and apparently had ingested a large quantity of a prescription
tranquilizer, Librium, which was found to be missing from the trailer.
¶4
Cameron was taken to the Greene County Jail, but the police and the
district attorney declined to interview him at that time because they
concluded he was under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs and in a
"stupor." Several witnesses testified as to his impaired condition at the time
of his arrest. After his arrest, when an officer asked another officer who had
"expired," Cameron blurted out that it was Cumberledge and "that is what
happens when someone pulls a knife on me." (N.T. Trial, 3/28/00, at 70,
95.) At his arraignment at 8:00 a.m. that morning, Cameron was observed
sitting and lying on the floor.
¶5
On August 6, around 4:00 p.m., the police and the district attorney
concluded that Cameron was capable of being interviewed. He was advised
of his Miranda rights and, after waiving his right to counsel, he consented
to an interview by the district attorney and Lieutenant Glenn Bates, and
gave a statement, ultimately confessing to the crime. This interview was
recorded on audiotape.
¶6
Prior to trial, the trial court denied Cameron's motion to suppress the
statement. At trial, the Commonwealth offered a transcript of the confession
into evidence. The trial court overruled Cameron's objection to the
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J-A08013-01
admission, but ruled that the transcript would not go to the jury and that
such evidence would have to be elicited from the Commonwealth's
witnesses.3 Thereafter, Lieutenant Bates testified to the substance of
Cameron's statement as follows:
He gave several statements, at first he denied he had anything
to do with it, he indicated that possibly there was a third person
in the hallway with David Cumberledge. During the interview he
was asked if he had a knife with him at first he indicated that he
did not stab David Cumberledge that night that it was the third
person in the hallway that did the crime and left. Then he
changed his story during the interview and indicated he did stab
David E. Cumberledge and that it could have been self defense,
the defendant changed his story and did acknowledge stabbing
David Cumberledge.
(N.T. Trial, 3/28/00, at 120-21.) Later, in the presentation of the defense's
case, defense counsel sought to have the tape recording played to the jury
as evidence of his impaired condition at the time of the interview. The trial
court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to this request "at this point
in time at least unless it later becomes relevant," but allowed the tape to be
entered into the record. (N.T. Trial, 3/28/00, at 492-93.) The tape was
never played to the jury.

3 Specifically, the trial court ruled:
The objection is overruled, the Defendant has a right to present
relevant testimony. I will admit Commonwealth's Exhibit 5 into the
record, into evidence at this point in time. The transcript will not be
sent to the jury, we will allow questions on the transcript but the
evidence must come from the witnesses.
(N.T. Trial, 3/28/00, at 119-120.)
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J-A08013-01
¶7
The jury was charged on the crimes of first and third-degree murder
and voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. On March 30, 2000, the jury
found Cameron guilty of first-degree murder and thereafter he was
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Following the denial of his
post-sentence motions, Cameron filed this timely appeal. On appeal,
Cameron asks:
Did the trial judge, who failed to listen to or to read the
transcript of a defendant's statement, abuse his discretion or err
in sustaining Commonwealth's objection to the introduction of
the entire audiotape statement after the Commonwealth
introduced a brief three-sentence paraphrase of the statement in
its case in chief, especially where the statement was relevant to
the issue of the (1) voluntariness of confession, (2) accuracy and
completeness of the policeman's summary, and (3) the
defendant's state of mind in a criminal homicide prosecution?
(Appellant's Brief, p. 4.)
¶8
This Court has consistently held that "[a] trial court's rulings on
evidentiary questions are controlled by the discretion of the trial court and
[an appellate] [c]ourt will reverse only for clear abuse of that discretion."
Commonwealth v. Viera, 659 A.2d 1024, 1028 (Pa. Super. 1995)
(citations omitted). It is well-settled that "[a]n abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of
the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the
result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence or the
record." Commonwealth v. Kubiac, 550 A.2d 219, 223 (Pa. Super. 1988).
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J-A08013-01
¶9
Cameron first argues that the trial court erred in refusing his request
to play the audiotape of the statement, given that the Commonwealth had
introduced a summary of the statement through the testimony of Lieutenant
Bates. His argument is, essentially, that since the Commonwealth had
introduced part of the statement, then he was entitled to have the entire
statement introduced. We disagree.
¶10 Had the Commonwealth introduced portions of the transcript of his
confession, then our conclusion would be different. Rather, without referring
to the transcript, the officer testified as to his recollection of Cameron's
confession to the murder. Therefore, we cannot agree that this testimony
entitled the defense to introduce the entire audiotaped statement. Cameron
was free to cross-examine Lieutenant Bates as to the substance of the
confession and test his observations. Further, Cameron has not suggested
that anything to which Lieutenant Bates testified vis-a-vis the confession
was at all inaccurate. For these reasons, the cases cited by Cameron either
support our conclusion or are inapposite to his claim.4 As a result, we reject
this contention.

4 See Rodgers v. Fleming, 325 Pa. 228, 188 A. 861 (1937) (for purposes of
proving party's admission, cannot admit only part of pleading if result is to give
erroneous impression of what party admits); Weaver v. Welsh, 325 Pa. 571, 575,
191 A. 3, 6 (1937) (approving jury instructions that stated "where a party
undertakes to prove an admission of another party, he must give the whole
admission, and if a portion of it serves the party who made the admission, he must
not leave it out; the whole must be for the consideration of the jury") overruled on
other grounds, Estate of Grossman, 486 Pa. 460, 406 A.2d 726 (1979); Jones v.
Spidle, 446 Pa. 103, 286 A.2d 366 (1971) (citing Weaver for proposition that
party against whom admission is entered by opponent is entitled to have entirety of
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J-A08013-01
¶11 Cameron next argues that, as the voluntariness of the confession was
an issue for the jury's consideration, the trial court erred in failing to allow
him to introduce the taped confession as evidence as to its voluntariness.
This would appear to be a matter of first impression for this Court, as we
have located no cases, nor does Cameron or the trial court cite to any, which
address a trial court's denial of a defendant's request to admit a taped
confession on the issue of its voluntariness.
¶12 Despite a pretrial ruling that a confession is voluntary, as occurred
here, a criminal defendant nonetheless is entitled to a second opportunity to
test the voluntariness of his statement by introducing evidence at trial
relating to voluntariness and have the jury consider the question.

admission entered into evidence, including any portion that may favor party);
Commonwealth v. Burdell, 107 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. 1954) (entire conversation
between defendant and jailmate properly entered because defense withdrew
objection to admission), rev'd on other grounds, 380 Pa. 43, 110 A.2d 193 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Brandler, 81 Pa. Super. 585 (1923) (while written confession
"should have been admitted or rejected as a whole," defendant's objection to
partial admission unfounded where entire confession later admitted);
Commonwealth v. Hipple, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A.2d 353 (1939) (entire confession was
admissible, despite the defendant's objection, even though part of it concerned an
unrelated crime); Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A.2d 389 (1941)
(same, citing Hipple ); Commonwealth v. McCabe, 498 A.2d 933 (Pa. Super.
1985) (defendant opened door to Commonwealth's questions on re-direct about
defendant's statement by asking police officer whether defendant denied crime);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 374 Pa. 220, 97 A.2d 25 (1953) (officer's testimony
identifying elements of confession did not violate best evidence rule and entire
written confession was entered into evidence at any rate); Commonwealth v.
Cruz, 489 Pa. 559, 414 A.2d 1032 (1980) (officer's entire prior consistent
statement was properly introduced for rehabilitation purposes); Catina v. Maree,
415 A.2d 413 (Pa. Super. 1979) (entire statement read into record), rev'd on other
grounds, 498 Pa. 443, 447 A.2d 228 (1982); Commonwealth v. Marino, 245
A.2d 868 (Pa. Super. 1968) (statement properly admitted as evidence of prior
consistent statement), aff'd, 435 Pa. 245, 255 A.2d 911 (1969).
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J-A08013-01
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 471 Pa. 577, 590-91, 370 A.2d 1172,
1179 (1977); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(J).5 In this situation, the jury may
not assess the evidentiary weight of the confession "until it first makes an
independent finding that the confession was voluntarily made." Id. at 591,
370 A.2d at 1179.6 Nevertheless, the trial court still has the responsibility to
determine the relevance and admissibility of any voluntariness evidence
proffered by the defense. Id. at 591-92, 370 A.2d at 1179.
¶13 Cameron did not appeal the pretrial ruling that the confession was
voluntary and admissible. Thus, the issue before us is not the "admissibility"
of the confession i.e., whether the jury properly heard evidence of
Cameron's confession.7 To the contrary, this case presents the unique

5 Formerly Rule 323. Effective April 1, 2001, this rule was renumbered as Rule
581.
6 This procedure has been explained as follows:
The rights of a defendant in this area are, in our opinion, adequately
protected by Rule 323 [now Rule 581] of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 19 P.S. (1975 Pamphlet), relating to the
suppression of evidence. That rule is modelled after the so-called
Massachusetts or 'humane' rule approved by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12
L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). It provides that prior to trial, upon motion of the
defendant to suppress evidence allegedly obtained unconstitutionally,
a hearing shall be held to determine the admissibility of the challenged
evidence. If the evidence is found to be admissible, the defendant is
foreclosed only from challenging its admissibility at trial; he may still
contest the validity of such evidence notwithstanding its admission.
For example, in the case of a confession, the challenge to it on
involuntariness grounds may be renewed at trial.
Commonwealth v. Green, 464 Pa. 557, 561-62, 347 A.2d 682, 684 (1975)
(citations omitted).
7 For this reason, we are not confronted with the issue of whether the trial court
may have erred in ruling the confession admissible in the first instance.
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J-A08013-01
situation where the defendant sought to have the jury hear the taped
confession. The issue, therefore, is whether the jury was properly prohibited
from hearing the tape which Cameron asserts reflects on the voluntariness
of his confession.
¶14 Once the Commonwealth introduced Cameron's confession through the
testimony of Lieutenant Bates, Cameron was entitled to present to the jury
evidence rebutting the voluntariness of the confession subject, of course, to
relevancy and other evidentiary rulings of the trial court. Cunningham,
471 Pa. at 591-92, 370 A.2d at 1179. In fact, the defense sought to
establish Cameron's impaired state at arrest and after the confession
through the testimony of several witnesses.
¶15 It is well-established that, in order to determine voluntariness, the
totality of the circumstances must be considered:
Although there is no single litmus-paper test for determining the
voluntariness of a confession, it must be established that the
decision to speak was a product of a free and unconstrained
choice of its maker . . . All attending circumstances must be
considered in this determination. These include the duration and
methods of interrogation; the length of delay between arrest and
arraignment; the conditions of detainment; the attitudes of the
police toward defendant; defendant's physical and psychological
state; and all other conditions present which may serve to drain
one's power of resistance to suggestion or to undermine one's
self-determination.
Commonwealth v. Meachum, 711 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Pa. Super. 1998)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 442, 555 A.2d 1264,
1273 (1989)). The demeanor of the defendant, including the sound of his
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J-A08013-01
voice, as is revealed on the audiotape is clearly an "attending circumstance"
that bears on the voluntariness of his confession. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Nester, 551 Pa. 157, 167, 709 A.2d 879, 884 (1998)
(among other things, that defendant's "speech was coherent" was
consideration in assessing voluntariness of confession); Commonwealth v.
Williams, 504 Pa. 511, 522, 475 A.2d 1283, 1288 (1984) (in assessing
voluntariness of confession, noting that "there was nothing unusual about
[defendant's] manner of speech"); Commonwealth v. Vitzen, 425 Pa. 574,
577, 229 A.2d 746, 748 (1967) (despite signs of defendant's intoxication,
confession found voluntary where, among other things, his speech was
coherent); United States v. Waxman, 572 F. Supp. 1136, 1152-53 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (Trial judge noted that "[h]aving listened to the recording of the
confession I conclude defendant's tone of voice was strong and
conversational, his responses clear and coherent, his memory for detail
remarkable, and he was not in fear."), aff'd 745 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1984); cf.
Carter v. State, 730 N.E.2d 155 (Ind. 2000) (among other factors, in
concluding that confession was voluntary, judge compared defendant's voice
on audiotape to his testimony at hearing).
¶16 Nonetheless, the trial court denied Cameron's request to play the
audiotape, and later explained its decision as follows:
This court ruled, pursuant to Pennsylvania law, that the tape
could be played to the jury if the defendant testified that he did
not make a voluntary waiver of his rights under Miranda, or that
he was not cognizant of the fact that he was making an
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J-A08013-01
admission to the investigating officer. The defendant chose to
exercise his constitutional right not to testify at the time of trial.
Without his testimony to place into issue the admission made to
the investigating officer, the audiotape is not relevant and
therefore could not have been properly presented to the jury by
the defendant. Had the court ruled in the defendant's favor, this
would have given the defendant the opportunity to place his
statements on record without being subject to cross
examination, an exercise contrary to Pennsylvania law.
(Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/00, at 3-4.) We cannot agree with this
conclusion. We can find no authority, and the trial court cites none, which
dictates that the defendant must place the voluntariness of his confession at
issue at trial through his own testimony, as the trial court seems to imply.
Regardless of whether or not Cameron testified, his vocal demeanor may
have been relevant to the jury's determination of whether or not his
confession was voluntary. The trial court, in effect, penalized Cameron for
the exercise of his constitutional right not to testify by circumscribing the
evidence he could present on this point. We cannot agree with the trial
court that, simply because the proffered evidence consisted of the
defendant's voice, it was categorically inadmissible because he did not
testify.
¶17 It is undisputed that the trial court did not listen to the tape. Rather,
as the above excerpt from its opinion makes clear, the court ruled that the
audiotape was categorically inadmissible without the defendant's testimony.
We conclude that this was an abuse of discretion and that exclusion on this
basis was error. The decision of our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
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J-A08013-01
Myers, 472 Pa. 200, 371 A.2d 1279 (1977), supports this conclusion.
There, the defendant claimed his confession was involuntary due to the
Commonwealth's post-confession delay in arraigning him and he sought to
present evidence on this point to the jury. The trial judge restricted
defendant's evidence on voluntariness to the time period between his arrest
and his confession. Our Supreme Court held that this restriction was
improper. 8 In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court said: "We
cannot interfere with the jury's province to determine voluntariness based
upon all factors because we do not know what facts would influence the
outcome of their deliberation on that issue." Id. at 216, 371 A.2d at 1287.
Likewise, in the instant case, we conclude the trial judge erred in
categorically restricting the scope of Cameron's presentation of evidence on
the voluntariness issue, without first reviewing the tape and assessing its
relevance.
¶18 Further, we cannot conclude that this error was harmless.
Concededly, the evidence in support of Cameron's involvement in this crime
is overwhelming. His estranged wife testified as to the fight between
Cameron and Cumberledge. She heard the struggle and the stabbing, and
she saw Cameron run away with a knife. Cameron was later apprehended

8 The Court noted that a delay post-confession is considered relevant to assessing
the voluntariness of a confession as it reflects upon the general respect that the
police show to procedural safeguards. Id. at 216, 371 A.2d at 1286-87 (quoting
Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 155, 239 A.2d 426, 433
(1968)).
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J-A08013-01
with the victim's blood on his socks. Further, evidence that the crime was
premeditated is substantial. Witnesses testified as to Cameron's threats to
kill Cumberledge and that he was, on the day of the murder, carrying two
knives with him. Finally, the victim's multiple stab and incision wounds are
arguably inconsistent with a self-defense claim by Cameron.
¶19 Nevertheless, we find that the audiotape raises serious concerns about
Cameron's condition at the time of his confession. Had the jury heard the
audiotape of Cameron's confession, it could have concluded that the
confession was involuntarily given and, as a result, it would have been
obliged to ignore or discount that evidence. Under these circumstances, we
cannot be certain that the jury would have convicted Cameron of first-
degree murder, and would not have opted instead to convict on a lesser
offense. For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the trial court's
categorical exclusion of the audiotape from the jury was harmless.
¶20 As a result, we affirm Cameron's judgment of sentence, but remand
this case for a hearing on the relevance of the audiotape when compared to
Cameron's normal speaking voice, as the ultimate import of the audiotape
can only be assessed by such comparison. The trial court, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, will need to devise an appropriate method for making
this comparison, whether by allowing the defense to offer a sample of the
Cameron's normal voice, or otherwise. If, on remand, the trial court
concludes that the audiotape is relevant to a jury's consideration of the
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J-A08013-01
voluntariness of Cameron's confession, his sentence should be vacated and a
new trial granted. If the trial court on remand finds the audiotape
irrelevant, however, Cameron shall have a right to appeal this finding within
30 days of the entry of the trial court's order. See Commonwealth v.
Pearson, 685 A.2d 551, 559 (1996) (en banc) (employing the same
procedure on remand for a hearing on counsel's ineffectiveness).
¶21 Judgment of sentence affirmed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
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