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J-A32034-02
2003 PA Super 13
O.D. ANDERSON, INC., D/B/A
: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ANDERSON COACH AND TOUR,
:
PENNSYLVANIA
AND ANDERSON COACH AND TRAVEL,:
Appellee
:
:
v.
:
:
BENJAMIN CRICKS, RICHARD
:
KOEWACICH AND PREMIER TOUR &
:
TRAVEL, INC.,
:
Appellants
: No. 401 WDA 2002
Appeal from the Order entered February 4, 2002,
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County,
Civil Division at No. 2001-3345
BEFORE: JOYCE, MUSMANNO and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
OPINION BY JOYCE, J.:
Filed: January 14, 2003
¶1
Appellants, Benjamin Cricks, Richard Koewacich and Premier Tour &
Travel, Inc., appeal from the February 4, 2002 order granting a permanent
injunction in favor of Appellee, O.D. Anderson, Inc. d/b/a Anderson Coach
and Tour and Anderson Coach and Travel. This order permanently enjoined
Appellants from contacting or soliciting any of the individuals named in a
retail tour customer list owned by Appellee. Upon review, we affirm. The
relevant facts and procedural history are as follows.
¶2
Benjamin Cricks and Richard Koewacich are former employees of
Bortner Bus and Tours, a tour company in Sharpsville, Pennsylvania. This
company devoted a portion of its business to individual, charter and group
tours. During his employ with Bortner, Cricks developed a close relationship
with the sole proprietor of the company, Edwin Bortner, and eventually

J-A32034-02
ascended to the position of Director of Operations. In this role, Cricks was
placed in charge of the company's tour and bus business and had extensive
access to the company's customer lists. These lists not only contained the
names, addresses and telephone numbers of individuals that had previously
traveled with the company, but also included information on the customers'
previous travel destinations and dates of travel. Over the years, the
customer lists became a very important resource for the company as a
means to generate "repeat" business.
¶3
Throughout his ownership of Bortner Bus and Tours, Edwin Bortner
developed no formal safeguards to preserve the confidentiality of the
customer lists. Nonetheless, Bortner stressed to his employees that the lists
were quite valuable and were not to be given to anyone outside of the
company. To emphasize this point, Bortner sent Cricks to several seminars
that outlined the importance of guarding such lists. Bortner also instructed
his executive secretary, Jan Heaslip, to strictly maintain the confidentiality of
the customer lists.
¶4
In 1997, Edwin Bortner sold his tour company to Travelways, Inc., a
competing tour company operating in western Pennsylvania. As a part of
this sale, Travelways acquired Bortner's group tour customer list and charter
operation customer list. Despite the change in ownership, Cricks retained
his position as the general manager of the Sharpsville office, and Koewacich
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J-A32034-02
and Heaslip continued as employees. After the sale, Travelways augmented
the Bortner customer lists with information possessed by Travelways.
¶5
In November of 1999, Cricks resigned from his position with
Travelways and opened a competing company, Premier Tour & Travel, the
next day. In December of 1999, Koewacich also left Travelways to work
with Cricks. Upon his resignation, Cricks took a variety of materials from
Travelways, including computers disks containing the customer lists. When
Travelways learned of this, it contacted Cricks and demanded that he return
the property. It also specified that it wanted Cricks to return any copies he
had made of the customer lists. Two days later, Cricks sent a letter to
Travelways stating that he intended to return the missing items but
remained silent as to whether he would return any copies. Prior to returning
the disks, Cricks printed and retained a copy of the customer lists for his
own use.
¶6
After the opening of Premier Tour and Travel, Cricks did not
immediately avail himself of the information contained on the customer lists.
Rather, Cricks began to contact several tour group leaders with which he
had a relationship over the years. About the same time, Travelways began
to experience a decline in business but attributed this decline to Cricks'
legitimate connections with people in the industry.
¶7
In the spring of 2000, Travelways decided to sell its Sharpsville office
and approached Cricks about purchasing the operation and the customer
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J-A32034-02
lists. Without advising Travelways that he had retained copies of the lists,
Cricks offered to purchase the retail tour customer list for $50,000.00, an
amount seventy-five percent below other competitive bids. Accordingly,
Travelways rejected Cricks' offer and entered into negotiations with Appellee
for the purchase of the Sharpsville office.
¶8
On September 20, 2000, Appellee purchased various assets of
Travelways d/b/a Bortner Tours. Pursuant to an "Asset Purchase
Agreement," Appellee acquired various retail customer lists, including a
group tour list and a charter operation list. Although Appellee knew that
Cricks had started a competing business in western Pennsylvania, it was
unaware that Cricks possessed a copy of these lists.
¶9
In December of 2000, Jan Heaslip called her former co-worker, Cricks,
and offered to supply him with an updated copy of the retail customer lists.
Recognizing that Appellee had just purchased these lists from Travelways,
Cricks initially declined. Shortly thereafter, Cricks decided to accept the list
and hired Heaslip as an employee at Premier Tour & Travel. Over the next
few months, Appellants mailed retail tour information to the individuals on
the lists in an effort to solicit their business.
¶10 After these mailings, several of Appellee's customers informed
Appellee that they had received unsolicited mailings from Appellants. In
light of this information, Appellee asked a number of its customers whether
it had received similar information. After nearly fifty of Appellee's customers
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J-A32034-02
indicated that they had received this literature, Appellee suspected that
Appellants had obtained a copy of its customer lists.
¶11 On September 21, 2001, Appellee filed a complaint against Appellants
seeking legal damages for misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of
agency duty, theft and interference with business advantage. Additionally,
Appellee also filed a motion seeking temporary and permanent injunctive
relief so Appellants could not solicit those individuals named on the customer
lists. Appellants filed preliminary objection to this complaint, and on
November 6, 2001, the trial court granted a demurrer on the breach of
agency and theft counts. Thereafter, on January 4 and 22, 2002, the trial
court held a hearing on Appellee's petition for a preliminary injunction, and
on January 25, 2002, granted Appellee's petition. The trial court entered an
order enjoining Appellants from contacting any of the names on the list
retained by Cricks after his resignation and any of the individuals contained
on the updated list supplied by Heaslip. The trial court also filed an
Adjudication containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law and
directed Appellants to post bond.
¶12 On January 29, 2002, Appellants posted bond and filed a demand for a
final hearing pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1531(f)(1) alleging that the January 25,
2002 order abridged Appellants' ability to exercise their constitutionally
protected freedoms of commercial speech and expression. On February 1,
2002, the trial court scheduled a final hearing for the same day and
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J-A32034-02
bifurcated Appellee's request for injunctive relief from the remaining
requests contained in its complaint. After the hearing, the trial court issued
an order on February 1, 2002, which adopted the findings of fact and
conclusions of law set forth in its previous Adjudication, and made the
preliminary injunction permanent. The prothonotary later docketed this
order on February 4, 2002. In an opinion filed on February 5, 2002, the trial
court explained that it based its decision upon evidence that the lists
constituted a trade secret, that Appellants wrongfully obtained the lists and
that Appellee had a right to seek relief as the current owner of the lists.
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the February 4, 2002 order.
¶13 Initially, we must decide whether the appeal from the February 4,
2002 order of the trial court is properly before this Court. We may raise the
issue of appealability sua sponte because it affects our jurisdiction. Morgan
Trailer Mfg., Co. v. Hydraroll, Ltd., 804 A.2d 26, 29-30 (Pa. Super.
2002). In this Commonwealth, an appeal may only be taken from: "1) a
final order or one certified by the trial court as final; 2) an interlocutory
order as of right; 3) an interlocutory order by permission; or 4) a collateral
order." Id. at 29. In their brief, Appellants indicate that the instant appeal
from the order granting injunctive relief is interlocutory as of right pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4). Appellants' Brief, at 3. Appellees do not dispute this
contention. Nevertheless, as the appealability of this order implicates the
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J-A32034-02
jurisdiction of this Court, we must review this issue. Morgan Trailer Mfg.
Co., 804 A.2d at 29-30.
¶14 It is important to note that the instant order stems from Appellants'
invocation of Rule 1531(f) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appellants employed this special procedure for obtaining permanent
injunctive relief after asserting that the order effectively restricted their
ability to exercise their freedoms of commercial speech and expression. See
School District of Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers et
al., 486 Pa. 365, 406 A.2d 324 (1979) (stating that freedom of expression is
restrained by a preliminary injunction where the order prohibits certain
communication by an appellant). Rule 1531 provides, in relevant part:
Rule 1531. Special Relief. Injunctions.
(f)(1) When a preliminary or special injunction involving
freedom of expression is issued, either without notice or
after notice and hearing, the court shall hold a final
hearing within three days after demand by the defendant.
A final decree shall be filed in the office of the
prothonotary within twenty-four hours after the close of
the hearing. If the final hearing is not held within the
three-day period, or if the final decree is not filed within
the twenty-four hours after the close of the hearing, the
injunction shall be deemed dissolved.
(2) When the defendant demands such a final
hearing, no further pleadings shall be required and
Rule 1517 relating to adjudication and decree nisi
and Rules 227.1 and 227.3 relating to post-trial
relief shall not apply.
(3) The trial judge shall file a written memorandum
supporting the final decree within five days after it is
filed.
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J-A32034-02
Pa.R.C.P. 1531(f) (emphasis added). This Rule was designed to ensure that
the defendant receives a prompt, final judicial decision when his/her
constitutional rights of expression are implicated. See Explanatory
Comment 1973. See generally Duggan v. 807 Liberty Avenue, 447
Pa. 281, 288 A.2d 750 (1972).
¶15 Pursuant to Appellants' request, the trial court scheduled a final
hearing on Appellee's petition for a permanent injunction on February 1,
2002. After conducting this hearing, the trial court issued an order on
February 4, 2002 that permanently enjoined Appellants from contacting the
individuals on the lists.1 As Rule 1531(f)(2) specifically states that
traditional rules governing decree nisi and post-trial relief do not apply in
this instance, Appellants filed the instant appeal and deemed it "interlocutory
as of right."

1 At the outset, we note that the trial court made every effort to comply with
the requirements of Rule 1531(f). Appellants filed a demand for a hearing
on January 29, 2002, and the trial court conducted this hearing within thirty-
six hours after the receipt of the demand. Additionally, the trial court
fashioned an order granting a permanent injunction on February 1, 2002,
within twenty-four hours after the hearing. Nevertheless, the Prothonotary
failed to docket the order until February 4, 2002, three days after the
hearing. As the instant order was not properly docketed within twenty-four
hours after the hearing, the Rule states that the preliminary injunction
affecting the parties had dissolved prior to the entry of the order.
Notwithstanding, this procedural error has no effect upon the validity and
finality of the permanent injunction, which is before us on appeal. See
Ranck v. Bonal Enterprises, 467 Pa. 569, 576, 359 A.2d 748, 752 (1976)
(stating that Rule 1531(f) only provides for the dissolution of a preliminary
injunction; it does not preclude a subsequent adjudication of the final
complaint).
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J-A32034-02
¶16 Rule 311 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provides for
those instances when a litigant may take an interlocutory appeal as of right.
The Rule states, in relevant part:
Rule 311. Interlocutory Appeals as of Right
(a) General Rule. An appeal may be taken as of right
and without reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from:
. . .
(4) Injunctions. An order granting, continuing, modifying,
refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or
modify injunctions, except for injunctions pursuant to
Sections 3323(f) and 3505(a) of the Divorce Code, 23
Pa.C.S. §§ 3323(f) and 3505(a). A decree nisi granting or
denying an injunction is not appealable as of right under
this rule, unless the decree nisi (i) grants an injunction
effective upon the entry of a decree nisi or (ii) dissolves a
previously granted preliminary injunction effective upon
the entry of a decree nisi.
Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4).
¶17 Recently, our Supreme Court explained the plain meaning of this rule
in Wynnewood Development, Inc. v. Bank and Trust Co. of Old York
Road, 551 Pa. 552, 711 A.2d 1003 (1998). In that case, Wynnewood
Development, Inc. ("Wynnewood") filed a complaint against the Bank and
Trust Co. of Old York Road ("Old York Road") after Old York Road refused to
sell Wynnewood a piece of real estate pursuant to an agreement of sale. Id.
at 554, 711 A.2d at 1004. In its prayer for relief, Wynnewood sought
injunctive relief to prevent Old York Road from transferring Old York Road's
rights to the property in dispute. Id. Wynnewood also sought specific
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J-A32034-02
performance of the contract and compensatory damages. Id. When Old
York Road filed a motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted the
motion as it related to Wynnewood's prayer for equitable relief. Id. at 555,
711 A.2d at 1005. However, the trial court permitted Wynnewood to
proceed with its claim for compensatory damages. Id.
¶18 Wynnewood filed an immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 311(a)(4),
and a panel of our Court quashed the appeal as interlocutory. Id. On
appeal, our Supreme Court reviewed the language of Rule 311(a)(4) and
determined that an appeal from the dismissal of Appellant's complaint for
injunctive relief was interlocutory as of right. Id. at 556-57, 711 A.2d at
1005. Specifically, the Court stated as follows:
In construing Rule 311(a)(4), this Court is guided by the
rules of statutory construction. Pa.R.A.P. 107. When the
words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the
letter of the words cannot be disregarded under the
pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. 1921(b). This
Court finds that the plain meaning of the words contained
in Rule 311(a)(4) is that an order refusing a request for an
injunction is an interlocutory order appealable as of right
unless the order involves an injunction issued pursuant to
two explicit provisions of the Divorce Code or the order is
in the form of a decree nisi. [FN5]
[FN5] A decree nisi is a "provisional decree, which
will be made absolute on motion unless cause be
shown against it." Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.) at
411.
Here, the denial of Wynnewood's prayer for injunctive
relief was neither made under the Divorce Code nor
entered as a decree nisi. Thus, Rule 311(a)(4) mandates a
finding that the trial court's order granting Old York Road's
motion for summary judgment and dismissing
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J-A32034-02
Wynnewood's prayer for injunctive relief and specific
performance was an interlocutory order appealable as of
right.
Id. at 556-57, 711 A.2d at 1005 (footnote omitted) (italics omitted).
¶19 Upon our reading of Wynnewood and the plain language of Rule
311(a)(4), we find that Appellants properly characterized this appeal as
interlocutory as of right. Our review of the record reveals that the trial court
entered an order that granted Appellee's petition for injunctive relief. The
trial court did not enter this order pursuant to the two explicit provisions of
the Divorce Code. Nor did the instant order constitute a decree nisi. Rather,
pursuant to Rule 1531(f)(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure,
supra, Appellee demanded a final hearing and the trial court entered a final,
not provisional, decree. As the instant appeal qualifies as an interlocutory
appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 311 (a)(4) and Wynnewood, we must
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J-A32034-02
now turn to a review of the underlying issues on appeal.2
¶20 In their brief, Appellants raise the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in permanently and
indefinitely enjoining [Appellants] from contacting any
individuals contained on a tour customer list based upon a
claim of misappropriation of trade secrets when the

2 In making this determination, we are mindful of the Commonwealth Court's
general declaration in Humphreys v. Cain, 474 A.2d 353, 355 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1984) that "the language in Rule 311(a)(4) was meant to apply only to
preliminary injunctions." In Humphreys, the Commonwealth Court
confronted a situation where Humphreys filed an appeal from a decree nisi
that granted permanent injunctive relief in favor of Cain. Id. at 354. The
Court quashed the appeal as premature and explained that "to hold
otherwise, would make those Rules of Civil Procedure meaningless which
require a chancellor to file a decree nisi and to hear filed exceptions." Id. at
355 (italics omitted).
At the time of the court's decision in Humphreys, the language of
Rule 311(a)(4) did not include the provision that addressed the appealability
of a decree nisi, which granted or denied an injunction. When Rule
311(a)(4) was amended in 1996, the Supreme Court specifically addressed
this issue by inserting a provision that limited the appealability of a decree
nisi to two situations. The accompanying note to Rule 311(a)(4) indicated
that the Supreme Court added this language to adopt "the position that
generally an appeal may not be taken from a decree nisi granting or denying
a permanent injunction." At no point, however, did the Note suggest that an
appeal from a final decree, which granted or denied a permanent injunction,
was not appealable under Rule 311(a)(4). Additionally, in 1998, the
Supreme Court in Wynnewood interpreted the language of the Rule to
permit an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying injunctive
relief unless the order involves two explicit provisions of the Divorce Code or
is in the form of a decree nisi. Wynnewood, supra at 556, 711 A.2d at
1005.
In view of the post-Humphreys amendment to Rule 311(a)(4) and
the interpretation of this amended rule in Wynnewood, we decline to follow
the general declaration in Humphreys that Rule 311(a)(4) was only meant
to apply to preliminary injunctions. See Yoder v. American Travellers
Life Ins. Co., 2002 WL 31846188, *2 (Pa. Super. Dec. 20, 2002) (holding
that the decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on the
Superior Court). Nothing in the language of Rule 311(a)(4) or our Supreme
Court's decision in Wynnewood bars the instant appeal from a final decree
granting permanent injunctive relief.
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J-A32034-02
customer list had been compromised and was no longer
confidential prior to its purchase by [Appellee].
2. Whether the trial court erred in permanently and
indefinitely enjoining [Appellants] from contacting any
individuals contained on a tour customer list purchased by
[Appellee] based upon a claim of misappropriation of trade
secrets when the trial court failed to find the existence of
either a restrictive covenant or an employer/employee
relationship between the parties?
Appellants' Brief, at 3.
¶21 Our scope of review from an order granting a permanent injunction is
limited. RESPA of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Skillman, 768 A.2d 335, 339
(Pa. Super. 2001). We must accept the chancellor's factual findings and
accord them the weight of a jury verdict if they are supported by competent
evidence. Id. "We are not, however, bound by conclusions drawn from
those facts or by legal conclusions and may reverse for abuse of discretion
or error of law." Id.
¶22 In their first issue, Appellants assert that the trial court erred in
granting a permanent injunction since Appellee failed to establish that the
customer lists obtained from Travelways constituted trade secrets.
Appellants' Brief, at 13. Specifically, Appellants contend that Appellee could
not demonstrate that it maintained the confidentiality of the lists. Id. We
disagree.
¶23 The courts of this Commonwealth have generally accepted Section 757
of the Restatement of Torts as the basic outline for our trade secrets law.
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J-A32034-02
Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1228 (Pa.
Super. 1989). Section 757 states that
[a] trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,
device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.
Id. (citing Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b). The crucial indicia for
determining whether certain information constitutes a trade secret are
"substantial secrecy and competitive value to the owner." Id. It is not the
character of the information that is relevant under Pennsylvania law. Id.
Rather, the determination of whether the information is a trade secret must
be made on a case-by-case basis. Id. We do note, however, that other
courts in this Commonwealth have determined that customer lists constitute
a trade secret. See Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa.
618, 624, 136 A.2d 838, 842 (1957) (lists of confidential and valuable
customer data constituted trade secrets); A.M. Skier Agency, Inc. v. Gold,
747 A.2d 936, 941 (Pa. Super. 2000) (trial court did not abuse discretion in
issuing a preliminary injunction for misappropriation of trade secrets where
employee stole a directory listing client names and contact information).
¶24 In the instant case, Appellants argue that the customer lists purchased
by Appellee do not constitute trade secrets because Appellee knew, at the
time of purchase, that the lists were no longer confidential. Despite this
assertion, our review of the record and relevant case law demonstrates the
contrary.
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J-A32034-02
¶25 Foremost, Douglas Anderson testified that Appellee regarded the
customer lists as the most valuable asset that it purchased from Travelways.
N.T. Injunction Hearing, 1/4/02, at 202-03. Anderson testified that
customer lists were frequently used for the solicitation of business and that
Appellee spent a lot of "time, money and effort in developing them." Id.
These lists, which detailed the names, addresses, phone numbers and tour
preferences of previous customers, were valuable since they helped to target
the most likely customers for future tours. Id. at 19. Specifically, Anderson
testified that ninety to ninety-five percent of Appellee's business was
generated by repeat customers and that forty-five percent of its business
stemmed from repeat customers contained on its retail tour lists. Id. at
138-9.
¶26 Additionally, Anderson emphasized during the hearing that the value of
the customer lists stems from their confidentiality. Id. at 203. In view of
this, Appellee restricted the access to its lists, id. at 142, and even had the
lists password-protected. Id. at 218. Anderson also testified that when it
purchased its lists from Travelways that Appellee had no reason to believe
that the lists had been compromised. Id. at 151.
¶27 In support of this testimony, Joseph Scott, President of Travelways,
testified that his company placed a very high value on the integrity of its
customer lists. Id. at 62. When it learned that Cricks had taken company
property upon his resignation, it immediately demanded its return. Id. at
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J-A32034-02
19-22. When Cricks returned the items, he informed Travelways that he had
given back all of its property. Id. Later, when Travelways began to
experience financial difficulties, Cricks even offered to purchase Travelways'
assets, which included the same lists, for $50,000.00. Id.
¶28 Upon our consideration of this testimony, we do not find that the trial
court abused its discretion when it determined that the customer lists
constituted trade secrets. Appellee presented testimony that these
extensive compilations were both valuable and strictly maintained.
Additionally, Appellee had no reason to believe, in view of Cricks'
representations and offer to purchase the lists, that he had retained copies
of the lists after his resignation. Accordingly, we find no merit to Appellants'
first issue.
¶29 In their second issue, Appellants assert that the trial court erred when
it determined that Appellee had demonstrated a valid claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets. Appellant's Brief, at 16. Appellants
contend that they cannot be charged with misappropriation because they
were never involved in an employee/employer relationship with Appellee and
because they never signed a restrictive covenant. Id. Upon review, we
disagree.
¶30 Traditionally, a claim asserting the misappropriation of trade secrets
arises in the context of an employer/employee relationship. In recognition
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J-A32034-02
of this, courts of our Commonwealth have designed the following test for
misappropriation:
(1) that there was a trade secret . . .; (2) that it was of
value to employer and important in the conduct of his
business; (3) that by reason of discovery of ownership the
employer had the right to the use and enjoyment of the
secret; and (4) that the secret was communicated to the
employee while he was in a position of trust and
confidence under such circumstances as to make it
inequitable and unjust for him to disclose it to others, or to
make use of it himself, to the prejudice of his employer.
A.M. Skier, 747 A.2d at 940.3 Nevertheless, in Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. v.
Siemens Cap. Corp., 566 A.2d at 1214, a panel of our Court suggested
that a claim for misappropriation may be permissible in a wider context. It
stated:
Sections (a) and (b) of Section 757, also adopted in
Pennsylvania, provide the following grounds for a
misappropriation of trade secrets action:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret,
without a privilege to do so, is liable to another if:
(a) he discovered the secret by improper
means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of
confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing
the secret to him.
Thus, the existence of a trade secret is a prerequisite.
However, Pennsylvania law also requires the existence of a

3 Although it is not crucial to the resolution of this issue, we reject
Appellants' contention that a claim for misappropriation cannot exist where
the employee did not sign a confidentiality agreement or covenant not to
compete. See Christopher's Hand Poured Fudge, Inc. v. Hennon, 699
A.2d 1272, 1276 (Pa. Super. 1997).
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confidential relationship or discovery of the trade secret by
improper means. Thus, the conduct of the defendant is
not irrelevant. It must also be analyzed to ascertain
whether the conduct is in breach of a confidential
relationship or, lacking such relationship, was
"improper."
Id. at 1228-29 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
¶31 In the instant case, it is undisputed that Appellants were never
involved in an employer/employee relationship with Appellee. Appellee
acquired the assets of Travelways after Cricks and Koewacich resigned and
after the formation of their competing business, Premier Tour & Travel.
Nevertheless, it is also clear that Appellants obtained the customer lists by
improper means; they stole the lists from Travelways and utilized them to
solicit customers for their own business. Further, the record demonstrates
that Cricks knew his actions were improper. He had been instructed by
former employers to preserve the confidentiality of the lists and even
admitted at the hearing that he would never give the list to a competitor.
N.T. Injunction Hearing, 1/4/02, at 87. As further support, we note that
Cricks intentionally deceived Travelways by informing them that he had
returned all of its property when he had not. In view of these actions,
Appellee, as the owner of the lists, has established a valid claim for
misappropriation under Den-Tal-Ez. Accordingly, we do not find that the
trial court abused its discretion in entering a permanent injunction on this
claim.
¶32 Order affirmed.
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