IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
----ooOoo----
Alex Ray Cota,
)
AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION1
)
(Not For Official Publication)
Petitioner and Appellant,
)
)
Case No. 20050063-CA
v.
)
)
F I L E D
State of Utah,
)
(August 4, 2005)
)
Respondant and Appellee.
)
2005 UT App 343
-----
Second District, Farmington Department
The Honorable Michael G. Allphin
Attorneys:
Alex Ray Cota, Draper, Appellant Pro Se
Mark L. Shurtleff and Christopher Ballard, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee
-----
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Alex Ray Cota appeals the trial court's dismissal
of his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. In his petition,
Cota claimed that his counsel was ineffective because he talked
to the prosecutor rather than seeking a ruling on whether the
Davis County forgery charges, to which he pleaded guilty, should
have been dismissed based on the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (IAD). In counsel's discussions, the prosecurtor
offered a plea agreement, but indicated that the offer would be
withdrawn if counsel further pursued the IAD issue. Cota also
claimed, in his petition, that new evidence, i.e., the Board of
Pardon's (Board) warrant, further demonstrates that the Davis
County charges should have been dismissed. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the State.
_________________________________________________________________
1. This Amended Memorandum Decision replaces the Memorandum
Decision in Case No. 20050063-CA issued on May 26, 2005.

---

Cota was on parole from November of 2001 until May of 2003,
when he failed to report to Adult Probation and Parole. At about
the same time, Cota was charged by information with four forgery
counts in Davis County. He was also charged with forgery and
attempted theft by deception in Salt Lake County. Also in May of
2003, Cota went to California and was incarcerated on charges
there. The Board issued a warrant for Cota's arrest and filed a
detainer pursuant to the warrant. The Board's warrant alleged a
parole violation of absconding from parole supervision, theft of
a vehicle, and forgery. Cota was notified that a detainer had
been filed. In response Cota filed a request for disposition
based on the IAD. In the request, Cota indicated that the
charges were pending in Salt Lake County, and he had the request
sent to the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office.
The Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office responded
with a letter indicating that it would not be filing a detainer.
No request was sent to Davis County, and Davis County never
placed a detainer on Cota. The only detainer was from the Board.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires "two
components" that must be satisfied to successfully make a claim.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, Cota
must show that counsel's performance was "deficient." Id.
Second, Cota must demonstrate that the deficient performance of
counsel "prejudiced the defense." Id. To demonstrate prejudice,
Cota must show that there is a "reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different." State v. Archuleta, 747
P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1987).
In order to determine if counsel's performance was
deficient, we must consider whether counsel erred by failing to
obtain a ruling from the trial court. Whether counsel erred by
failing to obtain a ruling depends on whether Cota is correct
that the Davis County charges could have been dismissed based on
his IAD request. We determine that the Davis County charges
could not have been dismissed based on the IAD request because
the IAD was not triggered with respect to the Davis County
charges.
Article III of the IAD provides that the IAD is only
triggered if there is a detainer lodged and the inmate sends
written notice to "the prosecuting officer and the appropriate
court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann.
20050063-CA
2

---

§ 77-29-5, Art. III(a) (2003). With respect to the Davis County
charges, Davis County never lodged a detainer and, therefore, the
IAD was not triggered. Furthermore, Cota never sent the required
notice to Davis County.2 The request sent to Salt Lake County
listed the offenses in the Board warrant, i.e., absconding,
"grand theft auto," and forgery, indicating these charges were
being pursued by the Salt Lake City Police Department. As a
result, the trial court correctly concluded that the IAD did not
apply to the Davis County forgery charges.3
It stands to reason that, if the IAD did not apply to the
Davis County charges, counsel was not deficient in failing to
obtain a ruling on the issue. Moreover, the failure to obtain a
ruling did not prejudice Cota because there was no reasonable
chance of a different result. In fact, as the trial court
pointed out in its ruling, Cota's position may well have been
worse had counsel obtained a ruling because of the threat to
withdraw the plea offer if counsel pursued a ruling on the issue.
Counsel, therefore, was not ineffective.
With respect to Cota's claim that new evidence, i.e., the
Board's warrant, further demonstrates that the Davis County
charges should have been dismissed pursuant to the IAD, the trial
court correctly concluded the issue was meritless. The Board's
warrant alleges violation of parole by absconding supervision,
"theft of a vehicle," and "forgery." The charges pursued against
Cota in Davis County were four forgeries. The Salt Lake County
case involved one count of forgery and one count of attempted
theft by deception, involving a forged or stolen check. Further,
as the trial court correctly pointed out, the IAD is not
applicable to Board detainers alleging parole violations. See
State v. Kahl, 814 P.2d 1151, 1154 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The
IAD applies only to an "untried indictment, information, or
complaint." Id.
2The trial court based this finding on an affidavit of the
Davis County Attorney. Cota did not dispute the affidavit.
3In a motion for reconsideration, Cota noted that the
Board's "Warrant Request and Parole Violation Report" alleged a
parole violation by committing the offense of receiving or
transferring a stolen vehicle in Davis County. However, Cota
concedes that this charge was not prosecuted against him by Davis
County. References to that offense in the Board's warrant do not
change our analysis or disposition.
20050063-CA
3

---

The trial court's dismissal of the Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief is affirmed.
______________________________
Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge
______________________________
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
______________________________
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
20050063-CA
4

---