2005 UT 53
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Abdul Afridi,
No. 20040683
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile
F I L E D
Insurance Company,

Defendant and Appellee.
August 23, 2005
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Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn
No. 040900961
Attorneys: Daniel F. Bertch, Kevin K. Robson, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff

Paul M. Belnap, A. Joseph Sano, Salt Lake City,
for defendant

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WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice:
¶1
The question before us on appeal is whether an insurer
properly denied an insured's claim for comprehensive collision
coverage based on a driver exclusion agreement, when the
insured's son, the excluded driver, was involved in an automobile
accident in the insured's vehicle. The district court granted
the insurer's Motion for Summary Judgment in the matter, and we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State
Farm") insures two personal vehicles owned by plaintiff Abdul
Afridi ("Abdul"). The insurance policy provides comprehensive
collision coverage for a 2000 Lincoln Navigator. In November
2002, State Farm required Abdul to execute a driver exclusion
agreement, if he wanted State Farm to continue insuring his
vehicles. The agreement excluded Abdul's son, Altaf, from
coverage because of Altaf's poor driving record and contains the
following language:

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IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PREMIUM CHARGED FOR
YOUR POLICY IT IS AGREED WE SHALL NOT BE
LIABLE AND NO LIABILITY OR OBLIGATION OF ANY
KIND SHALL ATTACH TO US FOR BODILY INJURY,
LOSS OR DAMAGE UNDER ANY OF THE COVERAGES OF
THE POLICY WHILE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE IS
OPERATED BY Altaf Afridi.

As the named insured, I understand and
certify that the named person excluded from
coverage, has in fact, satisfied the owner's
and operators [sic] security requirement of
Section 41-12a-301, independently of the
named insured's proof of owner's or operators
[sic] security.
The document was signed by both Abdul and Altaf.

¶3
In July 2003, Altaf was involved in an automobile
accident while driving his father's Lincoln Navigator. The
collision caused more than $4000 in damages to the vehicle, and
Abdul made a claim to State Farm requesting indemnification for
the cost of the damages. State Farm denied the claim based on
the driver exclusion agreement.

¶4
In January 2004, Abdul filed a complaint against State
Farm for failure to indemnify him for the damage to his vehicle.
State Farm filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that it
properly denied Abdul coverage based on the driver exclusion
agreement. The district court granted the Motion, and Abdul now
appeals that decision.

ANALYSIS
¶5
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment
for correctness and afford no deference to that court's legal
conclusions. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235
(Utah 1993). "[W]e may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any
ground available to the [district] court, even if it is one not
relied on below." Id.
¶6
Abdul advances two arguments for reversal. First, he
asserts that under Utah's driver exclusion statute, State Farm
was required to obtain proof that the excluded driver, Altaf, had
acquired independent insurance before it could properly exclude
him from coverage. Second, he claims that the driver exclusion
agreement was only intended to limit third-party liability
coverage of Altaf; it was never intended to limit State Farm's
No. 20040683
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obligation to indemnify Abdul for damage to his vehicle. We will
address each argument in turn.

¶7
In approaching Abdul's first argument concerning the
requirements of Utah's driver exclusion statute, we first look
among the plain language of that statute, as we do with all
statutes, to find meaning. See LKL Assocs., Inc. v. Farley, 2004
UT 51, ¶ 7, 94 P.3d 279. The driver exclusion statute provides
the following:
(7) A policy of motor vehicle liability
coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1) may
specifically exclude from coverage a person
who is a resident of the named insured's
household, including a person who usually
makes his home in the same household but
temporarily lives elsewhere, if:
(a) at the time of the proposed
exclusion, each person excluded from
coverage satisfies the owner's or
operator's security requirement of
Section 41-12a-301, independently of the
named insured's proof of owner's or
operator's security[.]


Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(7) (Supp. 2004).
¶8
Abdul would have us construe this statute as placing a
burden upon the insurer to ensure that the excluded driver
satisfies the requirement set forth in Utah Code section 41-12a-
301 that all vehicle owners in the state "maintain owner's or
operator's security," Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-301(2)(a) (Supp.
2004). However, a careful reading of the statute's plain
language prevents us from reaching that issue because section
31A-22-303(7) applies only to "motor vehicle liability coverage"-
-that is, coverage for a third-party action against the insured--
and Abdul seeks indemnification only for the damage done to his
own vehicle. Consequently, we decline to address the issue of
whether State Farm was required to obtain proof of Altaf's
independent insurance coverage under the driver exclusion
statute, as that statute does not apply to the type of coverage
Abdul seeks from State Farm.1

1 We hasten to note that, by disposing of Abdul's argument
in this manner, we express no opinion on an insurer's obligation
to verify whether an excluded driver "satisfies the owner's or
(continued...)
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No. 20040683

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¶9
The second question before us in this appeal is the
scope of the indemnification established by the language of the
driver exclusion agreement. As quoted above, the agreement
states that "no liability or obligation of any kind shall attach
to [State Farm] for bodily injury, loss or damage under any
coverages of the policy" while Abdul's vehicles are operated by
Altaf. Abdul argues that this language "was only intended to
limit the policy's third-party liability coverage of Altaf; it
was never intended to limit State Farm's first-party obligation
to indemnify Abdul for damage to his Navigator."
¶10
This argument misreads the obvious meaning of the
driver exclusion agreement and disregards the consequent
limitation of State Farm's liability under its insurance contract
with Abdul. It is well established that "the terms of insurance
contracts, as well as all contracts, are to be interpreted in
accordance with their usually accepted meanings." Nielsen v.
O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992). Under such an
interpretation, the driver exclusion agreement clearly removes
all liability from State Farm for Abdul's first-party claim of
damages. Indeed, it is inconceivable how the language of the
agreement that removes liability "for bodily injury, loss or
damage under any coverages of the policy" can in any way fail to
also exclude Abdul's first-party claims for damages. We conclude
that under the plain meaning of the agreement, such coverage is
expressly denied when those damages are incurred while Altaf is
driving Abdul's vehicles.

CONCLUSION
¶11
We affirm the district court's grant of State Farm's
Motion for Summary Judgment. In so holding, we decline to rule
on whether State Farm is required, under Utah's driver exclusion
statute, to verify whether the excluded driver has obtained
independent insurance because that statute only concerns third-
party liability claims, not the type of first-party damage claim
at issue in this case. Rather, our ruling is based on the clear,
unequivocal contractual language of the driver exclusion
agreement, under which State Farm properly denied coverage for
damage to Abdul's vehicle that was caused while Altaf was
driving.

1(...continued)
operator's security requirements," Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
303(7), and, once again, put off that question for another day.
See Calhoun v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 56, ¶ 39
n.6, 96 P.3d 916 (declining to address the same issue for
different reasons).
No. 20040683
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¶12
Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish,
and Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins'
opinion.
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No. 20040683

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