2006 UT 45
A M E N D E D

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Aris Vision Institute, Inc.,
No. 20050693
a California corporation, dba
Aris Vision, Inc.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Wasatch Property Management,
Inc., a Utah corporation,
JDJ Properties, Inc., a Utah
corporation; David Skalka,
an individual; Brian Skalka,
an individual; and Dennis Peacock,
F I L E D
an individual,
Defendants and Petitioners.
August 18, 2006
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Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
No. 020900624
Attorneys: R. Stephen Marshall, Erik A. Olson, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff
Richard D. Burbidge, Stephen B. Mitchell, Salt Lake
City, for defendants
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice:
¶1
After Respondent Aris Vision Institute, Inc. (Aris)
fell behind on its rent payment, Petitioners JDJ Properties, Inc.
(JDJ) and Wasatch Property Management, Inc. (Wasatch) retaliated
by refusing to allow Aris to remove its personal property from
the premises for a period of five months. Aris brought a claim
for wrongful eviction, conversion, and forcible detainer. The
district court concluded that JDJ and Wasatch were liable and
awarded treble damages to Aris for loss, damage, and depreciation

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of personal property pursuant to Utah Code section 78-36-10(3).
The court of appeals affirmed. JDJ and Wasatch have asked us to
review the decision of the court of appeals. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2
Aris operated a laser eye surgery clinic on premises
leased from JDJ and managed by Wasatch. Aris owned the furniture
and equipment in the clinic and contracted with four physicians
who performed the surgeries. Following an industry downturn,
Aris informed employees and vendors that it planned to terminate
its business. When Aris failed to make its January rent payment,
and Wasatch learned of Aris's financial difficulties, Wasatch
indicated that it would not allow Aris to remove its furniture
and equipment from the premises.
¶3
Aris attempted to negotiate with the physicians for the
sale of the equipment and the assumption of the lease. During
negotiations, the physicians were permitted to remain on the
premises and continue performing surgeries. Unbeknownst to Aris,
Wasatch was also negotiating with the physicians to move them
into a separate space in the same complex under a more favorable
lease. As a result, negotiations between Aris and the physicians
failed and the physicians moved out of the premises.
¶4
In late January, Aris attempted to remove its personal
property, but Wasatch forbade it from doing so, saying that Aris
had abandoned the premises and defaulted on the lease. On
multiple occasions, Wasatch refused to allow Aris to enter the
building or to remove equipment, despite Aris's repeated offers
to pay the outstanding rent. Twice Wasatch changed the locks and
refused to provide Aris with keys.
¶5
Eventually, Aris was allowed to enter the building to
inventory the equipment under Wasatch's supervision. During one
of these inventories, Aris discovered that several pieces of
equipment were missing and that two of the lasers had been
damaged while in Wasatch's custody. Aris attempted to sell the
equipment to a third party, but Wasatch refused to release the
equipment unless it was given all of the proceeds of the sale.
In late June 2002, after Aris initiated litigation, Wasatch
finally allowed Aris to remove its personal property. Because of
rapid advances in eye surgery technology, Aris's equipment had
depreciated considerably, and Aris was able to sell it for only
approximately one-third of what the value of the equipment would
have been when Aris initially asked for its release in January
2002.
No. 20050693
2

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¶6
The district court found that Wasatch and JDJ were
liable for wrongful eviction, conversion, and forcible detainer
and awarded Aris damages for the depreciation of the property,
for the value of the missing property, and for the damage to the
lasers. The court then trebled damages pursuant to Utah Code
section 78-36-10(3). The appellate court affirmed, and we
granted certiorari.
ANALYSIS
¶7
On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the trial court.1 Whether damages for loss, damage,
and depreciation to personal property may be trebled pursuant to
Utah Code section 78-36-10(3) is an issue of statutory
construction, which we review for correctness.2
¶8
The only issue presented in this petition is whether
the lower court correctly interpreted and applied the forcible
detainer statute. We conclude that it did. We will first
address the meaning of the statute as evidenced by the statutory
language and then the scope of damages available.
¶9
When interpreting statutes, "our primary role is to
give effect to the legislature's intent as set forth in the
statute's plain language."3 In addition, "`we determine the
statute's meaning by first looking to the statute's plain
language, and [by] giving effect to the plain language[,] unless
the language is ambiguous.'"4
¶10
Title 78, chapter 36 of the Utah Code deals with
disputes between landlords and tenants. Section 10 addresses the
remedies available in such disputes and states:
(2) The jury or court . . . shall also assess
the damages resulting to the plaintiff from
any of the following:

1 Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23,
¶ 11, 89 P.3d 155 (citing Mitchell v. Christiansen, 2001 UT 80,
¶ 8, 31 P.3d 572).

2 State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ¶ 6, 63 P.3d 667.

3 State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, ¶ 9, 999 P.2d 572.

4 Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2004
UT 11, ¶ 17, 84 P.3d. 1197 (quoting Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ¶ 8).
3
No. 20050693

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(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the
defendant's tenancy, if the waste is
alleged in the complaint and proved at
trial;
(d) the amount of rent due, if the
unlawful detainer is after default in
the payment of rent; and
(e) the abatement of nuisance by
eviction as provided in Sections 78-38-9
through 78-38-16.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the
defendant for the rent, for three times the
amount of the damages assessed under
Subsections 2(a) through 2(c), and for
reasonable attorney's fees, if they are
provided for in the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful
detainer after default in the payment of
rent, execution upon the judgment may be
issued and enforced immediately.5
¶11
The plain language of the statute contains no apparent
ambiguities. It clearly states that damages for forcible entry,
forcible or unlawful detainer, and waste shall be trebled.
¶12
However, because of the highly penal nature of the
trebling of damages, this provision is subject to strict
construction.6 It must be interpreted carefully and narrowly.
"While the statute provides for recovery of rents, damages, and
waste, it is damages only that are to be trebled."7 Thus, the
issue becomes whether the term "damages" in the statute is
intended to include damages to personal property. If so, then a
plain reading of section 78-3-10(3) would require that damages to
personal property be trebled.
¶13
Relying primarily on Judge Orme's dissent at the court
of appeals, Wasatch contends that the award of treble damages is

5 Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(2)-(4) (2002) (emphasis added).

6 Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206, 214 (Utah 1930).

7 Id.
No. 20050693
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a severe remedy limited to a possessory interest in real property
and that therefore damages for forcible detainer are limited to
the reasonable rental value of the premises during the time for
which they were detained.8 We disagree. Such a reading would
deprive subsections of the statute of much of their meaning.
This court has held that "[s]tatutory enactments are to be
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful
. . . . We will avoid an interpretation which renders portions
of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative."9 If the
"damages resulting to the plaintiff" were intended to be limited
only to reasonable rental value, the specification in subsection
2(d) that damages be assessed for "the amount of rent due" is
rendered superfluous.10 Additionally, subsection (3) makes a
clear distinction between damages assessed for rent and damages
which may be trebled: "The judgment shall be entered against the
defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the damages
assessed under subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c), and for
reasonable attorney's fees."11 An interpretation limiting
damages to reasonable rental value would eliminate the need for
this distinction. To the contrary, the specific references to
"rent" indicate a legislative intent to include damages beyond
those pertaining to a possessory interest in real property.
¶14
Wasatch further argues that there is no such thing as
forcible detainer of personal property and that, consequently, no
damages may be awarded for the loss, damage, and depreciation of
personal property.12 While it is possible that the statutory
definition of forcible detainer may not be applicable to personal
property,13 the distinction, in this case, is irrelevant since

8 See Aris Vision Inst., Inc. v. Wasatch Prop. Mgmt., Inc.,
2005 UT App 326, ¶¶ 36-37, 121 P.3d 24 (Orme, J., dissenting).

9 Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 2004 UT 15, ¶ 16, 89 P.3d
113.

10 Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(2).

11 Id. § 78-36-10(3) (emphasis added).

12 Whether a forcible detainer did in fact occur was a
question of fact for the trial court on which we have not granted
certiorari.

13 The definition of forcible detainer in Utah Code section
78-36-2 states:
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer
(continued...)
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No. 20050693

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Utah Code section 78-36-10(2) requires only that the jury or
court "assess the damages resulting" from the forcible detainer
of the real property.14 We see no legal or logical reason why
resulting damages may not include damages to personal property.
¶15
The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous.
It contains no exceptions or limitations modifying the term
"damages," therefore indicating that in "assessing the damage
resulting to the plaintiff," the jury or the court should assess
all damages resulting to the plaintiff as a result of any of the
circumstances listed in subsections 2(a) through 2(c).15

13(...continued)
who either:
(1)
by force, or by menace and threats of
violence, unlawfully holds and keeps
possession of any real property, whether
the same was acquired peaceably or
otherwise; or
(2)
in the nighttime, or during the absence
of the occupants of any real property,
unlawfully enters thereon, and, after
demands made for the surrender thereof,
refuses for the period of three days to
surrender the same to such former
occupant. The occupant of real property
within the meaning of this subdivision
is one who within five days preceding
such unlawful entry was in the peaceable
and undisturbed possession of such
lands.

14 Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(2) (emphasis added).

15 Utah Code section 78-36-10 provides, in pertinent part:
(2)
The jury or court . . . shall also assess the damages
resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendants
tenancy, if waste is alleged to in the complaint and
proven at trial
. . .
(3)
The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for
the rent, [and] for three times the amount of damages
assessed under Subsection (2)(a) through 2(c)
. . . .
No. 20050693
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¶16
Absent any ambiguity, we "give effect to each term
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning."16 "Damages" is
commonly defined as "the estimated money equivalent for detriment
or injury sustained."17 Additionally, Black's Law Dictionary
defines "damages" as "[m]oney claimed by or ordered to be paid
to, a person as compensation for loss or injury."18 This court
has previously said that the term "damages" is synonymous with
the term "compensation."19 Further, "[d]amages are based on
fault [and] are generally limited only by the findings and
conscience of the jury."20
¶17
Utah Code section 78-32-10 employs only the general
term "damages" without any specification as to the types of
damages that may be awarded under the statute.21 Courts are
bound by the plain language of the statute.22
¶18
The sole qualifier that the statute places on damages
which may be trebled is one of causation. The statute specifies
only that the damages must be "resulting" from (a) forcible
entry, (b) forcible or unlawful detainer, or (c) waste of the
premises.23 As a consequence, we now turn to the question of
what types of damages qualify as "resulting" damages.
¶19
This court has held that "damages . . . are measured by
the rule that they must be the natural and proximate consequences

16 C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ¶ 9, 977 P.2d 479.

17 Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 504 (2nd ed.
2001).

18 Black's Law Dictionary 393 (7th ed. 1999).

19 Fuller v. Dir. of Fin., 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah 1985).

20 Id.

21 Should the Legislature wish to distinguish which types of
damages should be awardable under section 78-36-10, it would be
within its discretion to do so.

22 See Platt v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662
(Utah 1997) ("The judiciary is obligated to interpret statutes as
they are created, not to redesign them.").

23 Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(2)-(3).
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No. 20050693

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of the acts complained of and nothing more."24 In other words,
the damages must be directly traceable to the forcible entry,
forcible or unlawful detainer, or the waste committed by the
defendants. A causal connection that is too attenuated, such as
an unlawful detainer which allegedly results in loss of
consortium, would not justify an award for damages. There must
be a common sense relationship. Whether the damages claimed are
the natural and proximate cause of the forcible detainer is a
question of fact to be determined in the trial court.
¶20
In this case, the trial court was acting within its
permitted discretion when it found that the loss, damage, and
decrease in resale value to Aris's personal property was
proximately caused by Wasatch's forcible detainer of the
premises. Wasatch denied Aris access to its personal property
for a period of five months. During the time that the personal
property was exclusively in Wasatch's custody, several pieces of
equipment were lost, and two lasers were damaged. Also, due to
rapidly changing technology, Aris was forced to sell its
equipment at a substantially lower price than it would have been
able to command five months earlier.
¶21
In all three instances, the damages awarded represent
the difference between the value of the personal property in
January 2002, when Aris originally tried to recover the
equipment, and the value of the property in June 2002, when
Wasatch finally released the equipment. Pursuant to Utah Code
section 78-36-10(3), the trial court was required to treble these
damages.25
¶22
As the party successful on appeal, Aris is also
entitled to attorneys fees and costs incurred on appeal.
CONCLUSION
¶23
The plain language of Utah Code section 78-36-10
clearly requires that damages resulting to the plaintiff from
forcible entry, forcible or unlawful detainer, or waste shall be
trebled. As the statute contains no language limiting the scope
of damages, we hold that all damages directly and proximately
resulting from the forcible detainer are subject to the
requirement that they be trebled. We affirm the decision of the

24 Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206, 211 (Utah 1930).

25 Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3) ("The judgment shall be
entered against the defendant . . . for three times the amount of
damages assessed[.]" (emphasis added)).
No. 20050693
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court of appeals, and remand to the trial court for the
determination of the amount of attorneys fees and costs awarded
to Aris.
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¶24
Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish,
and Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins'
opinion.
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No. 20050693

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