2006 UT 68
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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State of Utah, in the interest of
No. 20050892
B.A.P., and A.S.P., persons under
eighteen years of age.
_________________________________
C.P. and A.P.,
Petitioners,
v.
State of Utah,
Respondent.
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Seventh District, Moab
The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson
No. 153056
_________________________________________________________________
State of Utah, in the interest
No. 20051035
of T.L. and A.L., persons under
eighteen years of age.
______________________________
J.L.,
Petitioner,
v.
F I L E D
State of Utah,
Respondent.
November 7, 2006
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Seventh District, Monticello
The Honorable Mary L. Manley
No. 453998
Attorneys for both cases:
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Carol L.C. Verdoia,
John M. Peterson, Asst Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City,
for respondent

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William L. Schultz, Moab, for petitioners
Connie L. Mower, Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City,
for amicus guardian ad litem
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice:
¶1
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Petitioners in
these two cases challenged the termination of their parental
rights. Acting pursuant to recently adopted rules of appellate
procedure, the court of appeals affirmed the termination orders
in both cases based exclusively on a review of the records and
the petitions on appeal. On certiorari, Petitioners now argue
that the expedited procedures outlined in the appellate rules,
and applied by the court of appeals, denied them their
constitutional right to a meaningful appeal by precluding full
presentation of legal argument to the appellate court. Because
these two cases present identical legal issues, we address them
both together in this single opinion. We now reject Petitioners'
constitutional challenges to the new appellate rules and affirm
the decisions of the court of appeals.
BACKGROUND
¶2
Both of these cases involve appeals from the
termination of the parental rights of the Petitioners. In the
first case, C.P. and A.P., the natural parents of two minor
children, had their parental rights terminated by court order on
March 25, 2005. The parents have a history of domestic violence,
extramarital relationships, and unstable employment and housing.
In addition, the mother has a history of drug abuse and attempted
suicide, and the father has been incarcerated several times. The
juvenile court found that the behavior of both parents endangered
the emotional and physical welfare of their children and that the
parents' rights should be terminated based on unfitness,
incompetence, neglect, failure to remedy the circumstances for
the children's removal, and failure of parental adjustment.
¶3
In the second case, J.L., the natural father of two
minor children, was convicted of aggravated assault and attempted
murder for domestic violence against the children's mother. He
was subsequently sentenced to one 0-to-5-year term and one 1-to-
15-year term, to be served consecutively. In view of his
violence and incarceration, the State filed a petition to
terminate his parental rights. On July 7, 2005, the juvenile
court entered a termination order based on his extended
Nos. 20050892, 20051035
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incarceration, history of violent behavior, and general unfitness
and neglect.
¶4
The parents in each case timely appealed the
termination order to the Utah Court of Appeals, challenging,
among other things, the sufficiency of the evidence. Pursuant to
rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the parents
then filed a Petition on Appeal, which, similar to a docketing
statement, sets forth the facts, issues, and legal authorities
relevant to the appeal. In each case, the court of appeals,
acting pursuant to rule 58, affirmed the juvenile court's
termination order after reviewing the record and the petition on
appeal, but without ordering full briefing.
¶5
The parents now argue that the rules of appellate
procedure, which prescribe an expedited procedure in child
welfare appeals, denied them their constitutional right to a
meaningful appeal by precluding adequate presentation of legal
arguments to the appellate court. We granted certiorari in these
cases to determine (1) whether the appellate rules governing
appeals in child welfare proceedings are facially
unconstitutional, in that they deny appellants the right to a
meaningful appeal by precluding full presentation of legal
argument and analysis; and (2) whether the court of appeals
applied these rules in a manner that deprived Petitioners of
their right to a meaningful appeal.
ANALYSIS
¶6
On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not that of the trial court. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT
89, ¶ 15, 16 P.3d 540. Constitutional challenges to the validity
of rules of appellate procedure are questions of law reviewed for
correctness. Id.
¶7
The Utah Constitution guarantees a right to appeal.
Utah Const. art. VIII, § 5. Although the federal constitution
includes no such right, the United States Supreme Court has
stated that when a state provides such a right, due process
demands that it be provided fairly and equally. See Smith v.
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 270 & n.5 (2000). In addition, we have
held that to satisfy this right, an appeal must be meaningful.
See, e.g., State v. Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶¶ 17-18, 125 P.3d 874.
Petitioners in these cases argue that the recently adopted rules
of appellate procedure, which prescribe expedited procedures in
child welfare appeals, effectively denied them their
constitutional right to a meaningful appeal. We begin by briefly
explaining the salient features of the new rules, which should
clarify the issues in these cases.
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Nos. 20050892, 20051035

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¶8
In 2004, this court adopted rules 52 to 59 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure in an effort to expedite child
welfare proceedings. Under the new rules, appellants­-in this
case, parents seeking to overturn the termination of their
parental rights---must file a notice of appeal within fifteen days
of the termination order, Utah R. App. P. 52(a), and have fifteen
days from that time to file the petition on appeal, id. R. 55(a).
Extensions are limited to ten days. Id. R. 59. Appellants must
also order transcripts within four days after filing the notice
of appeal. Id. R. 54(a). Because of these abbreviated time
frames, transcripts of the trial proceedings typically are not
available to counsel by the time the petition on appeal is due.
¶9
Under the new rules, an appellant files a petition on
appeal, which is substantially equivalent to a docketing
statement. The petition on appeal must be prepared by trial
counsel, id. R. 55(b), and is limited to fifteen pages, id. R.
55(c). According to rule 55, the petition on appeal must
include, among other things, (1) a "statement of the nature of
the case and the relief sought"; (2) a "concise statement of the
material adjudicated facts"; (3) a "statement of the legal issues
presented for appeal," which must set forth "specific legal
questions," not "[g]eneral, conclusory statements"; and (4)
"supporting statutes, case law, and other legal authority for
each issue raised." Id. R. 55(d). Any response to the petition
on appeal from an appellee is voluntary but must be filed within
fifteen days and is also limited to fifteen pages. Id. R. 56.
¶10
Finally, under rule 58, the court of appeals, "after
reviewing the petition on appeal, any response, and the record,
. . . may issue a decision or may set the case for full
briefing." Id. R. 58. In both of the cases before us, the court
of appeals chose to render a decision based solely on the
petition on appeal and the record without ordering full briefing.
¶11
Petitioners preface their challenge to the validity of
these rules by arguing that the right to a meaningful appeal
necessarily includes the opportunity to present legal arguments
to the appellate court. Petitioners then argue that the new
rules effectively deny them that opportunity. They claim that
several features of the rules, taken together, prevent an
appellant from adequately presenting an argument. We find that
assertion, however, to be unavailing.
¶12
Petitioners first point out that rule 55, which
outlines what the petition on appeal must include, makes no
provision for an "argument" section. However, rule 55 in no way
forbids the inclusion of an argument, and in fact, as Utah courts
have interpreted that rule, it requires one. In the case of In
Nos. 20050892, 20051035
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re J.E., another parental rights termination case, the Utah Court
of Appeals held that a petition that raised only "broad,
conclusory, and ambiguous, rather than specific and exact,"
issues and that contained "no legal authority or legal analysis"
was "noncompliant with rule 55(d)(6)." 2005 UT App 382, ¶ 18 &
n.9, 122 P.3d 679 (emphasis added). Because rule 58 makes clear
that the court of appeals may render a decision based on the
petition without full briefing, counsel would be remiss to omit
arguments from that petition, albeit argument in specific, exact,
and concise form.
¶13
Petitioners nevertheless contend that although the
rules do not expressly forbid the inclusion of an argument in the
petition on appeal, the restrictive page limits, combined with
the list of items that must be included in the petition, leave
too little space to develop an argument. However, they were
unable, when asked at oral argument, to offer any suggestion of
how to determine what number of pages would be necessary to
vindicate their right to a meaningful appeal. If an appellant
finds fifteen pages to be inadequate, then wisdom dictates use of
some of those pages to persuade the court of appeals that full
briefing is needed. Otherwise, the page limit is just a matter
of convenience and uniformity; it has nothing to do with limiting
the scope of the appeal.
¶14
Petitioners next argue that the condensed time frames
prescribed in the rules allow insufficient time to review the
record and transcript and that the typical unavailability of
transcripts by the filing deadline makes it difficult to
formulate a legal argument. The rules recognize and mitigate
this problem, however, by requiring that the attorney who acted
as counsel at trial also prepare the petition, presumably
ensuring that counsel will be "familiar with the legal file,
trial exhibits, trial testimony, and court rulings relevant to
the appeal." J.E., 2005 UT App 382, ¶ 16. In addition, as
Petitioners' counsel acknowledged at oral argument, audio
recordings of trial proceedings in juvenile court are available
almost immediately at nominal cost. Counsel may easily use these
recordings to refresh their recollection and to review the course
of the trial proceedings.
¶15
It is the prerogative and obligation of this court to
set time limits for appellate proceedings.1 Counsel for
Petitioners candidly admitted at oral argument that, given

1 "The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure . . .
and shall by rule manage the appellate process." Utah Const.
art. VIII, § 4.
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Nos. 20050892, 20051035

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fifteen days to file a petition, he would get it filed within the
fifteen days, and that if he were given sixty days to file, he
would probably start to work on it around day fifty. We are not
persuaded that a fifteen-day limit provides inadequate time to
file a petition.
¶16
Finally, Petitioners assert that the court of appeals
applied the rules in an unconstitutional manner. They base this
contention on the notion that deciding a case on its merits
without an unfettered presentation of legal argument is
equivalent to refusing to fully hear the case. We have made
clear, however, that an appellate court may properly render a
decision in the absence of full presentation of arguments without
offending the appellant's constitutional right to a meaningful
appeal.
¶17
In State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), we
adopted the procedures outlined in Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738, for criminal appeals. Under Anders, counsel who believes
his client's claims on appeal to be wholly frivolous must state
so to the court and request to withdraw, but must also present
the court with the claims and anything in the record that
arguably supports them. The court must then review the record
and independently decide whether the case has any merit. The
Utah Court of Appeals applied these procedures specifically to
child welfare cases in In re D.C., 963 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998), which that court later confirmed in light of the new
appellate rules in In re J.E. We agree. In proper
circumstances, a complete articulation of legal theories and
analysis that litigants believe to be important to the case may
actually have little impact on the decision dictated by law.
¶18
As in the cases before us here, an appellate court may
decide a case on the merits with only a presentation of the
issues along with an appropriate examination of the record.
Furthermore, if an appellant in a termination case wishes to
claim ineffective assistance of counsel, the petition on appeal
may effectively become an Anders-type brief, asking the court of
appeals to appoint new counsel and order a full briefing on the
claims under rule 58.
¶19
We recognize that the appeal process is rarely perfect
for the appellants. In any given case, if counsel is neglectful
or incompetent and if the party fails to recognize that fact in
time to correct it, their situation is even less satisfying.
Such problems, when they exist, may be exacerbated by the
expedited time frames, page limits, and other features of these
rules. However, as a constitutional matter, and as a matter of
rule interpretation, these rules do nothing to preclude either a
Nos. 20050892, 20051035
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presentation of appropriate legal arguments or a meaningful
appeal.
CONCLUSION
¶20
We find Petitioners' challenges to the
constitutionality of the rules governing child welfare appeals
to be unpersuasive. While we acknowledge that the expedited
procedures outlined in the rules impose certain burdens on
appellants to meet shorter deadlines and page limits, those
restrictions are consistent with the policy of providing children
and parents with swifter resolution and permanency in their
family relations. There is nothing in the rules that precludes
an appellant from presenting cogent, concise legal arguments to
an appellate court or that precludes a meaningful appeal. We
thus affirm the decisions of the court of appeals.
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¶21
Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish,
and Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins'
opinion.
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Nos. 20050892, 20051035

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