2005 UT 60
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Machelle Canfield,
No. 20040681
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
F I L E D
Layton City, a Utah Municipality,
Defendant and Respondent.
September 16, 2005
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Second District, Farmington
The Honorable Michael G. Allphin
No. 020700620
Attorneys: Brad C. Smith, Benjamin C. Rasmussen, Ogden,
for plaintiff
Stanley J. Preston, Camille N. Johnson, Judith
D. Wolferts, Maralyn M. Reger, Ogden, for defendant
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURHAM, Chief Justice:
¶1
Plaintiff, Machelle Canfield, appealed the district
court's rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of her wrongful termination
action against defendant, Layton City, for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, noting that
adherence to the notice of claim requirement of the Governmental
Immunity Act of Utah (GIA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-101 -802
(2004), is a prerequisite to a court's assertion of subject
matter jurisdiction. Canfield v. Layton City, 2004 UT App 228U,
¶ 2. The court determined that Ms. Canfield's complaint failed
to plead a breach of contract claim, id. at ¶ 3, therefore, the
GIA's notice requirement was not met. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-
301(1)(a)-(b).
¶2
We granted certiorari to review whether the court of
appeals correctly decided that Canfield's complaint was
insufficient to plead a breach of contract claim. We conclude
that the complaint sufficiently indicated a breach of contract

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claim to withstand Layton City's 12(b)(1) motion. We therefore
reverse the court of appeals and remand to the district court to
allow Canfield to amend her complaint to provide a more definite
statement of her breach of contract claim.
BACKGROUND
¶3
Canfield worked for Layton City as a police dispatcher
for over thirteen years. Approximately six months prior to her
alleged wrongful termination, Canfield was assigned a new
supervisor. Her new supervisor often questioned her use of sick
leave, which ultimately led to Canfield's resignation.
¶4
After her resignation, Canfield filed suit against her
former employer in state court. Layton City removed the case to
federal court on the assumption that Canfield was asserting an
equal protection claim. The federal court ordered Canfield to
file a second amended complaint to specifically identify any
federal cause of action she was asserting. Canfield declined to
amend, and her case was dismissed.
¶5
Canfield immediately refiled the same complaint in
state court. The complaint states, in relevant part:
5. [The new supervisor] unfairly and
unjustly scrutinized the work performance of
Plaintiff.
. . . .
13. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and
thereupon alleges, that numerous employees of
[Layton] City have used sick leave in the
same manner as Plaintiff but have not been
subject to any disciplinary proceeding
whatsoever. Accordingly, Plaintiff has been
treated differently from and more severely
than other employees of Defendant, all in
contravention of Defendant's specific written
policy.
14. Officers, employees, agents or servants
of Defendant confronted Plaintiff with the
allegation that Plaintiff misused sick leave
and gave her an ultimatum that she resign
from the City or face termination.
. . . .
No. 20040681
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16. Plaintiff is informed and believes and
thereupon alleges that said individuals have
not been punished as severely as she has,
have not been terminated, or not given an
ultimatum, but instead, were given employee
warnings, probation, and other punishment.
17. Defendant's personnel policy
specifically require[s] that Plaintiff be
treated fairly and that any punishments or
discipline given to her be proportionate to
the offense alleged. Defendant's punishment
of Plaintiff, including its termination of
her, was disproportionate to the acts
alleged, even if the acts were taken as true.
¶6
Upon commencement of the second action, Layton City
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that Canfield failed to
adhere to the notice requirement of the GIA, id. § 63-30d-401,
citing our case law for the proposition that "[c]ompliance with
the [GIA] is a prerequisite to vesting a district court with
subject matter jurisdiction over claims against governmental
entities," Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, ¶ 9, 40 P.3d 632.1
¶7
In opposition to Layton City's motion to dismiss,
Canfield contended that her "complaint alleges a constructive
termination and a violation of Layton City's written employment
rules including rules regarding the proportionality of employee
discipline, rules relating to consistency among termination, and
related matters." Canfield further noted that because her
complaint "sounds in contract," her claim is not subject to the
GIA's notice requirement. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301.2

1 Even though Canfield consistently refers to Layton City's
motion as a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, the
record makes clear that we are reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

2 At the time Canfield filed her complaint, the applicable
provision was found at Utah Code section 63-30-5(1) (2002). The
GIA has since been amended and renumbered. The new provision for
waiving the notice requirement for contract claims is found at
Utah Code section 63-30d-301. In revising the GIA, the
Legislature indicated its intent that the previous version govern
an allegation of injury that occurred before July 1, 2004. Act
of Mar. 3, 2004, ch. 267, § 48, 2004 Utah Laws 1171, 1215.
(continued...)
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No. 20040681

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¶8
Rejecting Canfield's argument, the district court
granted Layton City's motion to dismiss based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding
that "[e]ven a liberal reading [did] not permit [it] to view the
complaint as alleging a claim based on implied contract, given
the backdrop of case law suggesting that `public employees'
employment rights generally spring not from contract, but from
legislative policy.'" Canfield, 2004 UT App 228U at ¶ 3.
¶9
On certiorari, Canfield argues that her complaint
sufficiently asserted a claim for breach of an implied employment
contract and that she was therefore not subject to the notice
requirement of the GIA.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10
On certiorari, "we review the court of appeals'
decision for correctness." State v. Finlayson, 2004 UT 10, ¶ 5,
84 P.3d 1193. We must determine whether the court of appeals
accurately reviewed the decision of the district court "under the
appropriate standard of review." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,
¶ 9, 22 P.3d 1242. Jurisdictional questions, such as subject
matter jurisdiction, are reviewed for correctness. Finlayson,
2004 UT 10 at ¶ 5.
ANALYSIS
¶11
The issue before this court is whether Canfield's
complaint stated a claim for breach of an implied employment
contract sufficient to avoid the notice requirement of the GIA.
¶12
The GIA requires notice of a claim to be given to
governmental entities within one year of the claim arising. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-401(2), -402. It is well established that
failure to comply precisely with the notice requirement, where it
applies, deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109, ¶ 16, 37 P.3d 1156.
However, "[a]ctions arising out of contractual rights or
obligations are not subject to the requirements of [the GIA]."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(1)(b). Therefore, a plaintiff who
asserts a contract claim against a governmental entity need not

2 (...continued)
However, because the new provision is substantively identical to
the previous version, we refer to the new provision here for the
sake of convenience.
No. 20040681
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file a notice of claim in order to vest a court with subject
matter jurisdiction.
¶13
Here, Layton City contends that the notice requirement
is applicable because Canfield did not assert a valid contract
claim in her complaint. The City argues Canfield's complaint
fails on its face to identify any contract or contractual
obligation with Layton City and, further, that Canfield's claims
cannot be contractual because her employment relationship with
Layton City was, as a matter of law, governed by statute rather
than contract.3 We disagree on both points.
¶14
A plaintiff is required, under our liberal standard of
notice pleading, to submit a "short and plain statement . . .
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and "a demand for
judgment for the relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(2). The
plaintiff must only give the defendant "fair notice of the nature
and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the
type of litigation involved." Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) (internal quotation omitted).
Furthermore, "when a complaint states a claim in general language
but the factual allegations are so vague and ambiguous that the
defendant cannot draft an answer, the proper course of action is
to move for a more definite statement under rule 12(e), not to
move for dismissal." Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 910
P.2d 1218, 1222 n.3 (Utah 1996). Motions for a more definite
statement, however, are not generally favored, and should only be
granted when the complaint is so "indefinite, ambiguous, or vague
in either [its] factual allegations or [its] legal theory . . .
that the moving party cannot reasonably be required to frame his
responsive pleading." Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 243 P.2d
441, 443 (Utah 1952).
¶15
Here, we conclude that, while Canfield's complaint is
sufficiently vague that an order to amend is warranted, it does
outline a breach of contract claim. We disagree with the court
of appeals' conclusion that because employment rights for public
employees generally spring from legislative policy, not contract,
it is impossible to discern a breach of implied contract claim in
Canfield's complaint.

3 We do not consider Layton City's other arguments (failure
to exhaust administrative remedies and res judicata) because
"[r]eview on certiorari is limited to examining the court of
appeals' decision and is further circumscribed by the issues
raised in petitions." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d
852, 856 (Utah 1998). Moreover, Layton City did not raise these
arguments in its 12(b)(1) motion before the district court.
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No. 20040681

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¶16
It is true that, generally, employment of public
employees is "governed by statute, not contract." Buckner v.
Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 32, 99 P.3d 842 (citing Knight v. Salt
Lake County, 2002 UT App 100, ¶ 9, 46 P.3d 247; Hom v. Utah Dep't
of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). However,
this court has recognized that circumstances may exist where "the
government voluntarily undertakes an additional duty" beyond its
normal obligation to the employee, "in which case an implied
contract arises." Id. (citing Piacetelli v. S. Utah State Coll.,
636 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Utah 1981)).
¶17
We have previously observed that an implied contract
may "arise from a variety of sources, including the conduct of
the parties, announced personnel policies, practices of that
particular trade or industry, or other circumstances." Berube v.
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (emphasis
added). Additionally, other jurisdictions have found that
employee manuals may create contractual obligations not subject
to the governmental immunity notice requirements because
"employees may reasonably rely on the document's provisions and
may expect the employer to conform to the procedures it
outlines." Whittington v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 100 P.3d
209, 212 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). It is thus theoretically possible
that the personnel policy promulgated by Layton City created such
expectations on Canfield's part.
¶18
The court of appeals' reliance on Knight for the
contrary proposition is misplaced. At issue in Knight was
whether Salt Lake County could force its employees to show up to
work ten minutes early without pay. 2002 UT App 100 at ¶ 2. The
employees introduced a series of documents as evidence of an
implied contract, including an excerpt from the Salt Lake County
Deputy Sheriff's Merit Service Commission Policies and Procedures
Manual. Id. at ¶ 11. The court of appeals concluded that these
documents did not alter or amend the terms or conditions of their
employment. Id. at ¶ 18.
¶19
In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals
reviewed the impact of the County Personnel Management Act
(CPMA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-33-1 to -15 (2001), which "sets
forth [a] [c]ounty's responsibility to establish an office of
personnel management." Knight, 2002 UT App 100 at ¶ 12. The
CPMA states that the office of personnel management shall "design
and administer a county pay plan that includes salaries, wages,
incentives, bonuses, leave, insurance, retirement, and other
benefits." Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-1(c)(i). Based on the
specific directions provided by this language, the court of
No. 20040681
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appeals concluded that any employment-related policies set forth
in county documents were "required or controlled by the Personnel
Management Act and its implementing regulations." Knight, 2002
UT App 100 at ¶ 15. Thus, the county did not voluntarily
undertake any obligation that was not mandated by state law. Id.
at ¶ 14.
¶20
Here, the relevant statute, Utah Code section 10-3-815,
differs significantly from the CPMA in that, rather than imposing
specific obligations on cities in regard to their employees, it
grants cities broad authority to set forth their own
requirements. The statute states as follows:
The governing body of each municipality shall
prescribe rules and regulations which are not
inconsistent with the laws of this state, as
it deems best for the efficient
administration, organization, operation,
conduct and business of the municipality.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815 (2003).
¶21
Unlike the CPMA, this provision does not specifically
refer to personnel management, but instead empowers a municipal
government to enact any rule or regulation it deems necessary in
conducting municipal affairs. Essentially, this statute serves
as an enabling provision, authorizing municipalities to set forth
rules and regulations regarding their employees that may
potentially create obligations towards employees in addition to
those imposed by state law. Thus, Canfield may reasonably argue
that Layton City voluntarily undertook additional obligations
through its personnel policy.
¶22
Canfield alleges in paragraph thirteen of her complaint
that other employees were treated less severely than she was, in
contravention of Layton City's written policy. She also alleges,
in paragraph seventeen, that Layton City's personnel policy
requires employees to be "treated fairly and that any punishments
or discipline given to [them] be proportionate to the offense
alleged." In the same paragraph, Canfield claims that she was
not treated in the manner required by the City's own personnel
policy. Thus, Canfield's complaint may fairly be construed as
claiming that Layton City voluntarily undertook an additional
duty--to ensure Canfield was punished in proportion to the
offense alleged and in uniformity with the treatment of other
employees--and that Layton City breached that duty. Although
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No. 20040681

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inartfully drafted, the complaint thus contains a bare-bones
outline of a breach of implied contract claim.4
¶23
We therefore conclude that Canfield's allegations
sufficiently state a claim for breach of an implied employment
contract, and that the GIA's notice requirement therefore does
not apply. However, in order to provide Layton City with more
specific notice regarding Canfield's contract claim, regarding,
for example, which provisions of Layton City's personnel policy
create the alleged obligations, we believe it appropriate to
direct the district court to order Canfield to amend her
complaint to provide a more definite statement of her claim.
CONCLUSION
¶24
We hold that, under the applicable law, a municipal
employer may create an implied employment contract through its
personnel policies. Since Canfield's complaint alleges that
Layton City acted in contravention of its personnel policies, we
conclude that the complaint stated a claim for breach of contract
sufficient to survive a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. We therefore
reverse the court of appeals on that point. However, because
Canfield fails to specify which policies she believes were
violated, we direct the court of appeals to remand to the
district court with instructions to order Canfield to amend her
complaint to provide a more definite statement of her claim.
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¶25
Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring
concur in Chief Justice Durham's opinion.
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WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting:
¶26
I dissent. I believe that the court of appeals
correctly affirmed the ruling of the trial court dismissing Ms.
Canfield's complaint against Layton City for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
¶27
A careful reading of the refiled complaint upon which
Ms. Canfield relies to raise a cause of action for breach of
contract fails to disclose any hint of such a claim. Notice

4 We express no views, of course, on the availability of
other defenses to the claim that may be raised before the
district court.
No. 20040681
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pleading, as practiced here, requires a short and plain statement
of the claim. Ms. Canfield's complaint provides neither element
of notice to Layton City. It is impossible, in my view, to parse
the language of the complaint and conclude in any rational way
that Layton City was given the required "fair notice of the
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication
of the type of litigation involved." Williams v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982).
¶28
The lead opinion, in a Herculean effort to find a hint
of notice, works mightily to uncover the necessary plain
statement of a contract claim, while at the same time noting that
the complaint is "sufficiently vague" to warrant an order to
amend. I concur that the complaint is sufficiently vague to
warrant rewriting and re-submission. However, in addition to
being vague, it also totally fails to make out any claim sounding
in contract. The complaint is more than inartful. It is
insufficient, even under our liberal interpretation of the
requirements of pleading.
¶29
The trial court was correct to dismiss the complaint as
it did, and the court of appeals was also correct to affirm the
action of the trial court. I would do the same.
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No. 20040681

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