2006 UT 52
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
Robert L. Davis and Jenean
No. 20040544
Brothers, each on their own behalf
and also as the natural parents,
and Robert L. Davis, as personal
representative of the Estate of
Bryan R. Davis, deceased,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Central Utah Counseling Center,
Dr. Robert Jeppson, D.O., State
of Utah, Juab County, Clark
Holladay, David Dye, John Reeves,
and John Doe Health Care
F I L E D
Providers 1-10,
Defendants and Appellees.
September 12, 2006
---
Fourth District, Nephi Dep't
The Honorable James R. Taylor
No. 010600141
Attorneys: Jeffrey N. Aldous, Arthur Dupre, Provo, Bruce M.
Pritchett, Jr., Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs
Clifford C. Ross, Salt Lake City, for Counseling
Center and individuals
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Brent A. Burnett,
Debra J. Moore, Asst. Att'ys Gen., for the State
Jared W. Eldridge, Nephi, for Juab County
---
PARRISH, Justice:
¶1
Plaintiffs Robert Davis and Jenean Brothers seek
recourse for the tragic death of their son Bryan Davis, who
committed suicide while under the care of Central Utah Counseling
Center ("CUCC"). Plaintiffs filed suit against CUCC, identified
and unidentified employees of CUCC, the State of Utah, and Juab
County. The district court dismissed the State of Utah and Juab

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County because of plaintiffs' failure to state a cognizable claim
against them. It thereafter granted summary judgment in favor of
CUCC and its employees because of plaintiffs' noncompliance with
the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.1
Plaintiffs appeal both orders. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2
Nineteen-year-old Bryan Davis committed suicide on
November 23, 1998, while undergoing treatment at CUCC in Nephi,
Utah. Plaintiffs retained attorney Bruce Pritchett to pursue
claims against CUCC.
¶3
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act ("Immunity Act")
provides that actions against a governmental entity and its
employees may proceed only if a notice of claim is directed and
delivered to specified persons within one year after the claim
arises. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -13 (1998). On December 23,
1998, Pritchett visited CUCC's office and inspected Davis'
medical records. During this visit, Pritchett spoke with a man
"who apparently had authority over the office." Uncertain about
CUCC's legal identity, Pritchett asked this unidentified employee
whether CUCC was "part of the state's mental health system for
this area." The employee answered affirmatively.
¶4
Eleven months later, on November 22, 1999, Pritchett
called the Division of Mental Health of the Utah State Department
of Human Services and received confirmation from an unidentified
employee that CUCC was part of that Department. Pritchett then
telephoned the Utah State Attorney General's office and spoke
with Assistant Attorney General Reed Stringham. After Pritchett
told Stringham that CUCC was a state agency, Stringham instructed
him to direct the notice of a claim against CUCC to the State
Attorney General's office. Pritchett then visited the website
for the Department of Human Services, which listed CUCC among its
"Mental Health offices."
¶5
That same day, Pritchett finalized and directed a
notice to the State Attorney General's office and, "as an
1 Under Utah Code section 63-30-13 (1998), identical notice
requirements govern claims against political subdivisions and
claims against the employees of political subdivisions. As a
result, our analysis of plaintiffs' claims against CUCC applies
with equal force to plaintiffs' claims against the CUCC
employees. For the sake of clarity, we focus our discussion on
CUCC and intend that this discussion similarly dispose of
plaintiffs' claims against the CUCC employees.
No. 20040544
2

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additional precaution," to the Juab County Clerk. Pritchett did
not direct a notice to CUCC. Sometime after the one-year
limitations period had expired, one of the Juab County
Commissioners provided a copy of the notice to CUCC's governing
board.
¶6
In December 2000, CUCC filed a declaratory judgment
action in Juab County, seeking a determination that it was
entitled to the protections of the Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63-30-1 to -34 (1998). CUCC claimed that it had been formed
by an agreement executed on December 31, 1990, by Juab, Millard,
Piute, Sanpete, Sevier, and Wayne Counties. According to CUCC,
the six counties acted pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-13-1 to -36 (1990), and formed CUCC as
an interlocal agency with the intention that CUCC would provide
mental health services to the counties' residents. CUCC was
originally named Central Utah Mental Health Alcohol and Drug
Center. In 1993, the name of the agency was changed to Central
Utah Mental Health Substance Abuse Center. The agency's name was
changed one final time to Central Utah Counseling Center in 1994.
¶7
Because of its status as an interlocal agency, CUCC
argued that it was entitled to the protections of the Immunity
Act. Under the Immunity Act, interlocal agencies are given
protection as "political subdivisions." See Utah Code Ann.
§ 11-13-5.5 (1989) ("The separate legal or administrative entity
created [under the Interlocal Cooperation Act] is a political
subdivision of the state . . . ."). The Immunity Act provides
that an action against a political subdivision may proceed only
if a notice of claim is directed and delivered to "a member of
the governing board, the executive director, or executive
secretary" within one year after the claim arises. Id.
§§ 63-30-11, -13.
¶8
Plaintiffs responded to CUCC's commencement of the
declaratory judgment action by filing a medical malpractice claim
against CUCC, employees of CUCC, the State, and Juab County.
Plaintiffs later amended the complaint to include a cause of
action for wrongful death. The district court dismissed the
State and Juab County for failure to state a claim, granted
plaintiffs' motion for a change of venue from Tooele County to
Juab County, and consolidated the two cases.
¶9
After the consolidation of the cases, CUCC moved to
dismiss plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, asserting that plaintiffs had failed to comply with
the notice requirements of the Immunity Act. The district court
denied the motion. The district court also denied CUCC's
subsequent partial summary judgment motion, finding that there
3
No. 20040544

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was insufficient evidence that CUCC was a governmental entity.
After discovery, CUCC renewed its motion for summary judgment,
which the district court then granted. On the basis of the
undisputed facts, the district court determined that CUCC was in
fact a governmental entity and that plaintiffs had failed to
comply with the notice requirement of the Immunity Act.
Plaintiffs then filed a motion for a new trial, which the
district court denied.
¶10
Plaintiffs timely appealed the summary judgment order,
as well as the district court's earlier dismissal of the State
and Juab County, but failed to serve either the State or Juab
County with its notice of appeal. Plaintiffs did, however, later
serve a copy of their appellate brief on the State and Juab
County. We initially transferred this case to the court of
appeals but subsequently vacated the transfer order and recalled
the case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section
78-2-2(3)(j) (2000).
ANALYSIS
¶11
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's order dismissing
their claims against the State and Juab County, as well as the
summary judgment entered in favor of CUCC and its employees. We
first review and affirm the dismissal of the State and Juab
County. We then evaluate the summary judgment order and affirm
the district court's determination that CUCC was entitled to
summary judgment because it is a properly formed interlocal
agency entitled to the protections of the Immunity Act and
plaintiffs failed to strictly comply with its notice
requirements.
I. THE STATE OF UTAH AND JUAB COUNTY
A. Notice of Appeal
¶12
The State and Juab County contend that we lack
jurisdiction over plaintiffs' appeal of their dismissal because
plaintiffs failed to serve them with a copy of their notice of
appeal. We disagree, concluding that plaintiffs' failure to
serve the State and Juab County with copies of their notice of
appeal was not jurisdictionally fatal.
¶13
Notices of appeal are governed by rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appealing party must file a
notice of appeal with the trial court and serve a copy of the
notice on "counsel of record of each party to the judgment or
order" from which the appeal is taken. Utah R. App. P. 3(a),
(e). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is the act that
No. 20040544
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vests the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal.
Therefore, in cases where an appellant timely files notice but
fails in some other respect to comply with rule 3, the appellate
court may dismiss the appeal but is not required to do so.
Subsection (a) of the rule provides:
Failure of an appellant to take any step
other than the timely filing of a notice of
appeal does not affect the validity of the
appeal, but is ground only for such action as
the appellate court deems appropriate, which
may include dismissal of the appeal or other
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the
award of attorney fees.
Id. 3(a).
¶14
We have applied rule 3(a) to hold that the timely
filing of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional
requirement for appellate review. See, e.g., Gorostieta v.
Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, ¶ 19, 17 P.3d 1110 ("It is clear from the
plain language of rule 3(a) that the timely filing of the notice
of appeal is the only jurisdictional step."). Even where an
appellant files a notice "crippled with defects" and fails to
effectively serve the opposing party, the notice is
jurisdictionally sufficient if it complies with the timeliness
requirement. Harley Davidson of N. Utah v. Workforce Appeals
Bd., 2005 UT 38, ¶ 16, 116 P.3d 349.
¶15
In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiffs
fulfilled this jurisdictional requirement by filing a timely
notice of appeal. Therefore, while we have discretion to dismiss
the appeal due to plaintiffs' failure to serve the notice on the
State and Juab County, we are not required to do so. And we are
disinclined to do so here where there is no evidence that
plaintiffs' failure to serve the notice resulted in any actual
prejudice to either the State or Juab County. Indeed, both the
State and Juab County received actual notice of the appeal
through their receipt of plaintiffs' brief, entered an appearance
in these proceedings, and filed timely briefs addressing the
substantive issues.
B. Dismissal
¶16
Having established our jurisdiction to review the
district court's dismissal of the State and Juab County, we now
consider the propriety of their dismissal. Whether a party was
properly dismissed for failure to state a claim is a question of
law, which we review for correctness. Warner v. DMG Color, Inc.,
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No. 20040544

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2000 UT 102, ¶ 6, 20 P.3d 868. We turn first to the district
court's dismissal of the State and then consider its dismissal of
Juab County.
1. The State
¶17
The State moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Specifically, the State alleged that CUCC is not a state entity
and that the State has no liability for the conduct of CUCC or
its employees. The district court granted the State's motion.
Plaintiffs argue that the dismissal was erroneous because CUCC is
actually an office or instrumentality of the State of Utah
Division of Mental Health. Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that
the State is estopped from contesting CUCC's status as a state
agency because of plaintiffs' reliance on statements made by
state employees, including Assistant Attorney General Reed
Stringham. We address each argument in turn.
a. CUCC Is Not Part of the Division of Mental Health
¶18
Plaintiffs contend that CUCC is actually an office of
the State Department of Human Services, Division of Mental
Health. Plaintiffs point first to the statutory and operating
relationship between CUCC and the Division of Mental Health.
Under Utah Code section 17A-3-602(1) (1998), "county governing
bodies" are "local mental health authorities" and must "provide
mental health services to persons within their respective
counties." These local mental health authorities operate "under
the policy direction of the [Board of Mental Health] and the
administrative direction of the [Division of Mental Health]."
Id. In addition, local mental health authorities receive state
funding and may enter into contracts with the Division. Id.
§ 17A-3-602. These local mental health authorities are expressly
permitted to pool their resources and create interlocal agencies
"to provide mental health . . . services." Id. § 17A-3-602(1).
¶19
In accordance with this statutory scheme, six Utah
counties formed CUCC in 1990. From 1997 to 2000, the Division
contracted with CUCC as part of its statutory mandate to "arrange
for a comprehensive continuum of services." Id.
§ 62A-12-102(2)(g) (1997). According to plaintiffs, CUCC
received eighty-five percent of its funding through these
contracts. In addition to receiving this significant financial
support, CUCC operated under the administrative and policy
purview of the State pursuant to Utah Code section 17A-3-602(1).
In plaintiffs' view, these financial and administrative links to
the State render the State liable for CUCC's actions.
No. 20040544
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¶20
Plaintiffs also assert that CUCC's integration into the
Department of Human Services is evidenced by representations
found in Bryan Davis' medical records. For example, a "Deceased
Client or Employee Report" for clients of the Department of Human
Services was filled out for Davis. The report contained a
handwritten notation listing Davis' service provider as CUCC,
with the division and locale listed as "Div. of MH/Div. of
SA--CUCC, Nephi Office." The report also contained instructions
stating that it was to be filled out upon "the death of any
client or employee of the Department of Human Services . . . and
sent to the Office/Division Director." In plaintiffs' view,
these references to the Department of Human Services evince the
fact that CUCC is actually an instrumentality of the State.
¶21
While it is clear that there is a close statutory and
operating relationship between the State and CUCC, this
relationship does not render the State liable for CUCC's actions.
As we discuss infra in Part II.A, CUCC is a properly formed
interlocal agency; the State played no part in its creation. And
the State does not operate CUCC. While the State exercises
certain statutory policymaking and administrative control over
CUCC (and other state-funded mental health programs), CUCC's
operations are directed by its governing board. CUCC's bylaws
expressly grant its governing board a wide range of powers,
including the power to "create, maintain and operate all of the
facilities, services or programs operated" by CUCC. We therefore
reject plaintiffs' contention that CUCC is a state agency and
hold that liability for the acts of CUCC's employees and
officials lies with CUCC­-not with the State.
b. Oral Representations by State Employees Do Not Render
the State Liable for the Actions of CUCC
¶22
Plaintiffs alternatively argue that dismissal of the
State was improper because of representations made by state
employees and information posted on the website maintained by the
Department of Human Services. Plaintiffs focus especially on
statements made by Assistant Attorney General Reed Stringham, who
allegedly instructed plaintiffs' counsel to direct plaintiffs'
notice of claim to the State Attorney General's office.
Stringham did so, however, only after plaintiffs' counsel told
him that he "had learned [that CUCC was] a state agency."
Plaintiffs also allege that an unnamed employee of the Department
of Human Services confirmed that CUCC was a state agency. And
plaintiffs claim that they relied on the Department of Human
Services' website, which listed CUCC among the "Mental Health
offices" of the Department.
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No. 20040544

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¶23
Plaintiffs contend that they were entitled to rely on
these representations pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals'
decision in Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App.
1995). They are incorrect. In Bischel, the then-controlling
version of the Immunity Act was "generally silent about how
notice should be filed with the governing body" of a governmental
entity. Id. at 278. Because of this statutory ambiguity, the
plaintiff, who had a claim against Salt Lake County, called the
county commission for clarification. Id. at 276. The plaintiff
was told to direct the notice to a person at the county
attorney's office. Id. The plaintiff then called that person
and received confirmation of the delivery instructions. Id.
¶24
After the notice was served, the county challenged its
validity because it was directed to the county attorney's office
rather than the county commission. Id. The court of appeals
held that the notice was adequate, recognizing the statutory
ambiguity and interpreting the notice requirements "in a manner
consistent with the overall purpose" of the Immunity Act. Id. at
278 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court of appeals
reasoned that the notice was consistent with the purpose of the
Immunity Act because it served to notify the entity that actually
investigated and settled claims against the county--the county
attorney's office. Id. at 278-79. In the court's view, the
plaintiff complied with the Immunity Act because she followed the
instructions provided by "the statute and the County Commission."
Id. at 279.
¶25
This reasoning is simply not applicable here. At the
time Bischel was decided, the Immunity Act contained a glaring
ambiguity. Indeed, the version of the Act at issue in Bischel
did not "prescribe a specific manner or method for filing notice
with the governing body" of a governmental entity. Id. at 278.
This significant gap in the statute was corrected in 1998. As a
result, we rejected the Bischel court's rationale in Greene v.
Utah Transit Authority, 2001 UT 109, ¶ 12, 37 P.3d 1156, where we
stated:
With the 1998 amendment [to the Immunity
Act], the legislature has left little open to
interpretation and has resolved any potential
ambiguities as to whom the Notice must be
delivered . . . . Where, as here, the
statute is clear, readily available, and
easily accessible by counsel, there is no
reason to require anything less than strict
compliance.
Id. ¶ 14.
No. 20040544
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¶26
Furthermore, even if Bischel were controlling, it would
be unavailing to plaintiffs here. In Bischel, the plaintiff
received the erroneous delivery instructions from an agent of the
entity that was allegedly liable for the plaintiff's injury.
Here, however, plaintiffs are attempting to rely on erroneous
advice given by employees of the State, an entity separate and
distinct from the alleged tortfeasor, CUCC. We are aware of no
authority supporting the proposition that the State can be held
liable for the acts or omissions of a third-party entity solely
on the basis of unauthorized oral representations made by state
employees. Such representations by state employees cannot impose
liability upon the State where there is none. We therefore
affirm the district court's order dismissing plaintiffs' claims
against the State.
2. Juab County
¶27
Plaintiffs also appeal the dismissal of Juab County.
The basis for their appeal, however, is unclear. We agree with
Juab County that plaintiffs have not adequately briefed their
appeal of the district court's order dismissing Juab County.
¶28
An appellant's brief must comply with rule 24 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under rule 24, the brief must
contain "the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(9). We have on many occasions declined to
address inadequately briefed arguments. See, e.g., Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) (declining to address
an issue on appeal where the appellant's brief lacked any
reference to "legal authority in support of his contention");
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (declining to
address an issue where the brief's analysis was "so lacking as to
shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing
court").
¶29
Plaintiffs' briefing on Juab County's dismissal does
not comply with rule 24. Indeed, plaintiffs fail to articulate
any reason why the district court erred in dismissing Juab County
or any theory as to how Juab County could be liable for Davis'
death. Although we have occasionally addressed inadequately
briefed arguments, we see no reason to do so in this case. See
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ¶ 8, 1 P.3d 1108 (addressing a
criminal defendant's inadequately briefed argument "in the
interests of justice"). Accordingly, we affirm the district
court's dismissal of Juab County.
II. CUCC
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No. 20040544

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¶30
We now turn to plaintiffs' claim that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of CUCC and its
employees. A court appropriately grants summary judgment only
when "there has been a showing that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales King
Int'l, Inc., 2000 UT 92, ¶ 13, 17 P.3d 1100 (internal quotation
marks omitted). We review the district court's "legal decisions
for correctness, giving no deference, and review the facts and
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶31
We first examine plaintiffs' claim that CUCC is not a
governmental entity entitled to the protections of the Immunity
Act. Concluding that CUCC is a properly formed interlocal agency
covered by the Immunity Act, we then consider and reject
plaintiffs' invitation to recognize an exception to our well-
established requirement of strict compliance.
A. CUCC and the Interlocal Cooperation Act
¶32
Plaintiffs challenge CUCC's status as an interlocal
agency, charging that it was improperly formed under the
Interlocal Cooperation Act and thus unable to invoke the
protections of the Immunity Act. In considering plaintiffs'
challenge, we review the requirements of Utah's Interlocal
Cooperation Act and examine CUCC's formation under that statutory
scheme. Because we discern no fatal deficiency in CUCC's
formation, we affirm the district court's determination that CUCC
constitutes an interlocal agency.
¶33
The stated purpose of the Interlocal Cooperation Act is
"to permit local governmental units to make the most efficient
use of their powers by enabling them to co-operate with other
localities." Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-2 (1990). In furtherance of
this purpose, the Interlocal Cooperation Act empowers public
agencies, including counties, to "enter into agreements with one
another for joint or co-operative action." Id. §§ 11-13-5
(1977), 11-13-3(7)(a) (1991).
¶34
Counties may create a "separate legal or administrative
entity to accomplish the purpose of their joint or cooperative
action," which entity is considered a "political subdivision of
the state." Id. § 11-13-5.5(1) (1991). An agreement creating a
separate legal entity must include several items relating to the
organization, purpose, and powers of the entity. Id. § 11-13-6
(1977).
¶35
The legislature has expressly permitted counties to
create interlocal agencies in the mental health arena. Under
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Utah Code section 17A-3-602(1) (1990), counties can "join to
provide mental health prevention and treatment services."
Counties doing so must follow the formation procedures outlined
in the Interlocal Cooperation Act. Id. § 17A-3-602(3)(j).
¶36
Plaintiffs contend that because the six counties that
created CUCC failed to follow these procedures, CUCC is not a
separate legal entity entitled to the protections of the Immunity
Act. Specifically, plaintiffs highlight the counties'
noncompliance with the statutory requirement that participating
counties adopt certain resolutions "before any [interlocal]
agreement may enter into force." Id. § 11-13-5 (emphasis added).
Apparently, only one of the six counties passed the required
resolution before the execution of the 1990 agreement. The
remaining five did not do so for several years; the final
resolution was passed on January 19, 1993. Plaintiffs contend
that this procedural misstep was fatal. We disagree.
¶37
While it appears that the counties were not exact in
their compliance with this particular requirement, this
inexactness was corrected on February 2, 1993, five years before
plaintiffs' cause of action accrued. Plaintiffs have articulated
no theory as to why this apparent misstep rendered the 1990
agreement irreversibly defective. We therefore reject their
contention that this defect was incapable of correction.
¶38
Plaintiffs also assert that the content of the 1990
agreement did not conform to the requirements of Utah Code
section 11-13-6. Specifically, they assert that the 1990
agreement lacks specification of the "powers delegated" to CUCC,
id. § 11-13-6(2), language to the effect that CUCC's governing
board serves "at the pleasure of the governing bodies of [the six
counties]," id., and provisions relating to the financing and
budgetary management of CUCC, id. § 11-13-6(4).
¶39
Plaintiffs' argument is simply not supported by the
evidence. Our review of the 1990 agreement and CUCC's bylaws,
which were incorporated by reference in the agreement, reveals
that these documents conform to the applicable requirements. The
1990 agreement clearly establishes a "legal and administrative
entity" that is empowered to "operat[e] and maintain[] . . . a
mental health/alcohol and drug service program for the benefit of
the residents of the [six counties]." It also establishes a
governing board, which is given extensive management and
budgetary powers under Article V of CUCC's bylaws. In addition,
the agreement explains that the six counties "agree to
financially support" CUCC. Finally, the bylaws establish that
the members of the governing board serve "pursuant to the
appointment of the county appointing such person." Because our
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review of the 1990 agreement and the bylaws establishes
compliance with the statutory requirements, we have no basis on
which to disturb the district court's conclusion that CUCC is a
properly formed interlocal agency and was therefore entitled to a
notice of claim under the Immunity Act.
B. The Requirement of Strict Compliance
¶40
We now turn to plaintiffs' claim that the district
court erred in applying the notice requirements of the Immunity
Act. We review those requirements in the context of our case law
and reaffirm our well-established rule of strict compliance. We
then consider and reject plaintiffs' request that we excuse their
noncompliance and recognize an exception to those requirements.
¶41
The Immunity Act bars claims against political
subdivisions and their employees "unless notice of claim is filed
with the governing body of the political subdivision . . . within
one year after the claim arises." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13
(1998). The Immunity Act requires, in relevant part, that the
claim be "directed and delivered to . . . a member of the
governing board, the executive director, or executive secretary."
Id. § 63-30-11(3)(b)(ii)(F) (1998). This notice requirement is
jurisdictional. Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,
¶¶ 15-16, 37 P.3d 1156.
¶42
We consistently have interpreted the Immunity Act to
require strict compliance by plaintiffs. See, e.g., Gurule v.
Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 25, ¶ 5, 69 P.3d 1287; Greene, 2001 UT
109, ¶ 14; Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, ¶ 19, 977
P.2d 1201. In Gallegos v. Midvale City, 492 P.2d 1335, 1336-37
(Utah 1972), we explained that the "allowance of a claim against
[a governmental entity] is a statutorily created exception to the
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. Inasmuch as the maintenance of
such a cause of action derives from such statutory authority, a
prerequisite thereto is meeting the conditions prescribed in the
statute." The statutory right to sue a governmental entity "may
be circumscribed by any conditions that the Legislature may see
fit to impose," and compliance with those conditions is an
"indispensable prerequisite" in suits against governmental
entities. Artukovich v. Astendorf, 131 P.2d 831, 833 (Cal.
1942). The requirement of strict compliance, therefore, is a
recognition of the government's sovereign immunity and its right
to dictate the terms and conditions of its waiver of that
immunity.
¶43
Plaintiffs concede that they failed to provide CUCC
with the notice required by the Immunity Act. Under section
63-30-11(3)(b)(ii)(F), plaintiffs were required to deliver a
notice of claim to a member of CUCC's governing board, its
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executive director, or its executive secretary. Plaintiffs
instead delivered the notice to the State Attorney General's
office and the Juab County Clerk. They ask us to consider the
confusing circumstances of their situation and recognize an
exception to the rule of strict compliance. We decline to do so.
¶44
As we stated in Gurule, we have allowed for "less than
strict compliance [only] in cases which depended upon ambiguities
in the [Immunity] Act; ambiguities clarified by the 1998
amendments." 2003 UT 25, ¶ 7; see, e.g., Larson v. Park City
Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998) (upholding the
validity of a notice sent to a city recorder where the then-
controlling version of the Immunity Act failed to state "how or
in what manner a notice of claim should be filed with [a] city
council"). Barring statutory ambiguity, we have consistently
declined to relax the requirements of the Immunity Act.
¶45
For example, in Greene, we refused to create an
exception to the strict compliance rule where a claims adjuster
employed by a state entity allegedly misdirected the plaintiff as
to where to send the requisite notice. 2001 UT 109, ¶ 17.
Though we expressed concern about the "intentionally misleading
behavior" alleged by the plaintiff, id. ¶ 19, we nevertheless
affirmed the dismissal of the case:
Even assuming [the claims adjuster] made the
statements [the plaintiff] alleges he made,
his delivery instructions cannot override the
requirements set by the legislature. Because
[the plaintiff] failed to strictly comply
with the Immunity Act, the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her
claim.
Id. ¶ 17.
¶46
We understand that claimants may face byzantine and
confusing bureaucracy when dealing with governmental entities.
Indeed, government employees and officials may even intentionally
mislead plaintiffs in some cases, as was alleged in Greene.
Certainly, plaintiffs and their attorney in this case faced a
difficult task in navigating the communication channels of an
interlocal agency that serves six counties and receives
substantial funding and supervision from the State.
Jurisdiction, however, does not hinge on the difficulty of that
task or the earnestness of plaintiffs' efforts. Jurisdiction
instead springs when a claimant has effected full compliance with
the Immunity Act. Barring statutory ambiguity, "we will not
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disturb explicit legislative requirements" and abrogate the
government's sovereign immunity. Id. ¶ 15.
¶47
Plaintiffs point to no statutory ambiguity that could
serve to excuse them from strict compliance in this case. As we
noted in Gurule, the 1998 amendments to the Immunity Act resolved
the ambiguities at issue in Larson v. Park City Municipal Corp.,
955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998), and Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). The controlling version of the Immunity
Act unambiguously instructed plaintiffs and their attorney to
serve the requisite notice of claim on a member of CUCC's
governing board, its executive director, or its executive
secretary. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(3)(b)(ii)(F).
¶48
Plaintiffs must exercise the diligence necessary to
effect strict compliance with the Immunity Act. And the
plaintiffs in this case failed to do so. After conducting an
initial investigation on December 23, 1998, plaintiffs' attorney
apparently did nothing until November 22, 1999-­one day before
the limitations period expired. On that date, plaintiffs'
attorney spoke with an unidentified employee of the Division of
Mental Health, called Assistant Attorney General Reed Stringham,
and finalized the notice of claim. What plaintiffs' attorney
never did­-and had one year to do-­was contact an identified
person of authority at CUCC. Instead, he spoke with unidentified
employees of CUCC and the Division of Mental Health and relied on
inferences and assumptions in directing the notice. Reliance on
inferences and assumptions does not constitute due diligence.
Because plaintiffs failed to exercise due diligence, we decline
to recognize an exception to the requirement of strict
compliance.
¶49
We reaffirm our statement in Greene that "[w]here, as
here, the statute is clear, readily available, and easily
accessible by counsel, there is no reason to require anything
less than strict compliance." 2001 UT 109, ¶ 14. Because
plaintiffs did not strictly comply with the Immunity Act by
directing a notice of claim to CUCC, we affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CUCC.
CONCLUSION
¶50
We affirm the district court's dismissal of the State
and Juab County for failure to state a claim. We also affirm the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CUCC and
its employees and reaffirm our oft-repeated instruction that
claimants must strictly comply with the Immunity Act when they
bring claims that trigger its protections. Because CUCC is an
interlocal agency that may invoke those protections, plaintiffs
No. 20040544
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were required to strictly comply with the Immunity Act. They
failed to do so and are therefore precluded from bringing suit
against CUCC and its employees.
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¶51
Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Nehring, and Judge Lindberg concur in Justice Parrish's
opinion.
¶52
Having disqualified himself, Justice Durrant does not
participate herein; District Judge Denise P. Lindberg sat.
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