2005 UT 78
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Glorya Eaquinta, aka
No. 20040582
Gloria Eaquinta,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
F I L E D
Allstate Insurance Company,
Defendant and Appellee.
November 15, 2005
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Fifth District, St. George
The Honorable James L. Shumate
No. 030500689
Attorneys: Richard M. Hutchins, St. George, for plaintiff
Jan P. Malberg and Todd A. Turnblom, Logan, for
defendant
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DURRANT, Justice:
¶1
In this case we must determine whether an insurance
company is required to provide underinsured motorist ("UIM")
coverage to its insured for the death of a person who is not
covered under the relevant insurance policy. The district court
held that neither the UIM provision of appellant Glorya
Eaquinta's insurance policy nor Utah's insurance code required
the appellee, Allstate Insurance Company, to provide UIM coverage
to Glorya Eaquinta for the death of her son because he was not
covered under her insurance policy. This appeal followed. We
now affirm.

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BACKGROUND1
¶2
On February 14, 2003, Glorya Eaquinta's son, Nicholas
Eaquinta, forty-three, died due to injuries he received from an
automobile accident. Immediately prior to the accident, Nicholas
Eaquinta had been driving his girlfriend's car. When he exited
the car to retrieve items from the trunk, he was struck by a
truck. At the time of the accident, Nicholas Eaquinta did not
own a vehicle, was not individually insured, did not reside with
Glorya Eaquinta, and was not a named driver on any insurance
policy covering either of the vehicles involved in the accident
or on Glorya Eaquinta's insurance policy.
¶3
After Nicholas Eaquinta's heirs settled with the
insurance companies of both vehicles involved in the accident,
Glorya Eaquinta made a claim for UIM benefits under her
automobile insurance policy with Allstate. Under the terms of
that policy, UIM coverage was limited to "an insured person [who]
is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by an
insured person." (Original emphasis removed) (emphasis added).
Allstate denied Glorya Eaquinta's claim on the ground that
Nicholas Eaquinta was not an insured person covered by the UIM
provision of the insurance policy because he was not named in the
policy or as a member of Glorya Eaquinta's household.
¶4
Glorya Eaquinta subsequently brought this action
against Allstate. She conceded to the district court that she
was not entitled to UIM benefits under the language of her
policy, but argued that the policy was preempted by the statutory
requirements contained in the Utah Insurance Code. Allstate made
a motion for summary judgment claiming that the Utah Insurance
Code does not require insurers to cover the type of loss
sustained by Glorya Eaquinta. The district court granted
Allstate's motion. The court held that the language of Glorya
Eaquinta's policy did not provide coverage for her son's accident
and that Utah's Insurance Code does not require UIM coverage for
the death of an adult relative who was not occupying the named
insured's vehicle or residing in the named insured's household.2

1 When reviewing a summary judgment determination, we
recite and view the relevant facts in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party below. Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT
36, ¶ 31, 116 P.3d 323.

2 The district court also concluded that Glorya Eaquinta
was statutorily barred from collecting UIM benefits under her
(continued...)
No. 20040582
2

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This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
section 78-2-2(3)(j)(2002).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5
Glorya Eaquinta admits that she is not entitled to UIM
benefits under the terms of her Allstate insurance policy, which
expressly limits her recovery to instances where an insured
person sustains injuries. She argues, however, that this
restrictive language is preempted by the requirements contained
in the Utah Insurance Code. Therefore, the question of whether
Glorya Eaquinta is entitled to recover under the UIM provision of
her policy is a matter of statutory interpretation, a question of
law, which we review for correctness. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48, ¶ 44, 89 P.3d 97.
ANALYSIS
¶6
There is only one issue presented on appeal: Does
Utah's Insurance Code mandate that Allstate provide UIM coverage
to Glorya Eaquinta for the wrongful death of her son, when her
son was not named in her insurance policy and did not reside in
her household, and where no car insured by Glorya Eaquinta was
involved in the accident? We conclude that it does not.
¶7
Utah's Insurance Code requires all liability insurance
policies written in the State of Utah to include certain types of
insurance coverage. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302 (2003). An
insurance policy that does not comply with this requirement is
invalid, and the required coverage will be read into the
insurance policy. Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1995).

2 (...continued)
Allstate policy. Although it is unclear, this conclusion appears
to be based on the anti-stacking provision of the UM/UIM statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(a)(i) (2003). On appeal,
Allstate argues that Glorya Eaquinta is statutorily barred from
collecting UIM benefits from Allstate because the anti-stacking
provision prohibits her from "stacking" the UIM benefits she
recovered under other insurance policies with any other motor
vehicle insurance policy. Because our decision that Glorya
Eaquinta is not entitled to recover UIM benefits from Allstate is
dispositive, we do not address Allstate's anti-stacking argument.
See Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Bd. of
Equalization, 2005 UT 16, ¶ 25, 110 P.3d 691.
3
No. 20040582

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¶8
On appeal, Glorya Eaquinta takes the position that her
vehicle insurance policy, which limits UIM benefits to situations
where an insured person has sustained a bodily injury, is
preempted by the statutory requirements pronounced in the
"Uninsured and underinsured motorist" statute ("UM/UIM statute"),
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 (2001),3 of the Utah Insurance Code.
In taking this position Glorya Eaquinta siezes upon the language
contained in subsection 9(a) of the UM/UIM statute, which states
that "[u]nderinsured motorist coverage [as required under section
31A-22-302(1)(b) of the Utah Insurance Code] provides coverage
for covered persons[4] who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because
of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death." Id. § 31A-22-
305(9)(a) (emphasis added). Glorya Eaquinta argues that this
language unambiguously requires automobile insurance companies to
provide coverage in cases such as hers. We disagree.
¶9
Though Glorya Eaquinta's interpretation has logical
appeal when we view the language of subsection 9(a) in isolation,
the canons of statutory construction mandate that we do not read
particular statutory language in isolation and that we instead

3 For the purposes of this case, all citations to Utah Code
section 31A-22-305 refer to the version of the statute that was
effective on the date of Nicholas Eaquinta's death, February 14,
2003.

4 A "covered person" includes
(a) the named insured;
(b) persons related to the named insured by
blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship,
who are residents of the named insured's
household, including those who usually make
their home in the same household but
temporarily live elsewhere;
(c) any person occupying or using a motor
vehicle referred to in the policy or owned
by a self-insurer; and
(d) any person who is entitled to recover
damages against the owner or operator of the
uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle
because of bodily injury to or death of
persons under Subsection (1)(a), (b), or
(c).
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(1) (2001).
Both parties agree that Glorya Eaquinta was a covered person
and that Nicholas Eaquinta was not a covered person under the
Allstate insurance policy.
No. 20040582
4

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construe that language in light of the legislature's general
purpose as reflected by the statute as a whole. Lieber v. ITT
Hartford Ins. Ctr., Inc., 2000 UT 90, ¶ 9, 15 P.3d 1030 ("[A]
statute should be construed as a whole, with all of its
provisions construed to be harmonious with each other." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
¶10
When viewed in isolation, the language of subsection
9(a) is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations. On the
one hand, because the language does not expressly limit UIM
coverage to situations where a covered person sustains bodily
injury, it could be interpreted to require UIM coverage in all
situations where there is a covered person who is legally
entitled to recover damages for another's injuries sustained at
the hands of an underinsured motorist.5 On the other hand, the
"bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death" language could
reasonably be interpreted to refer to bodily injury, sickness,
disease, or death sustained by a covered person under the
relevant policy.6

5 A minority of courts have adopted this interpretation.
See Gordon v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 611 S.E.2d 24, 25-26 (Ga. 2005);
Hinners v. Pekin Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 345, 347 (Iowa 1988);
Butterfield v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 860 A.2d 861,
862 (Me. 2004); Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 589 A.2d
944, 949 (Md. 1991) superseded by statute as stated in Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 859 A.2d 279, 284 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2004); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Selders, 190 N.W.2d 789,
792 (Neb. 1971) superseded by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-6408 (2004);
Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 433 N.E.2d 555, 558-59
(Ohio 1982) superseded by statute as stated in Johnson v. Am.
Family Ins., 827 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); see also
Gloe v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 694 N.W.2d 238, 247 (S.D. 2005)
(listing states adopting the minority interpretation).
Interestingly, of the six jurisdictions that have
interpreted their statute as requiring UIM coverage, at least
three of the respective legislatures have amended their statutes
to disallow such coverage. See Gloe, 694 N.W.2d at 247 ("[I]n
reaction to this minority interpretation, [Ohio, Maryland, and
Nebraska's] respective legislatures corrected each court's
interpretation and clarified that [UIM] coverage was not
intended.").

6 The vast majority of courts have interpreted their
respective UM/UIM statutes as only mandating coverage if an
insured person sustains bodily injuries. See Valiant Ins. Co. v.
Webster, 567 So. 2d 408, 411 (Fla. 1990); Gloe, 694 N.W.2d at
(continued...)
5
No. 20040582

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¶11
Only the latter interpretation, however, is supported
by the language of the UM/UIM statute when that statute is viewed
in its entirety. The meaning intended by the language of
subsection 9(a) is clarified by other subsections of the UM/UIM
statute. Specifically, subsection 10(a) of the UM/UIM statute,
as it existed at the time of the accident in question stated, in
pertinent part,

6 (...continued)
247; London v. Farmers Ins. Co., 63 P.3d 552, 555 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2002); See, e.g., Delancey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 918 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Mississippi
statute as not compelling coverage for a person who is not an
insured under the terms of the policy); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Wainscott, 439 F. Supp. 840, 844 (D. Alaska 1977) (holding
that a UM/UIM statute does not compel coverage for a person who
is not an insured under the terms of the policy); Bartning v.
State Farm Fire & Cas., 793 P.2d 127, 129 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)
(same); Smith v. Royal Ins. Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 239, 243 (1986)
(same); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Chacon, 939 P.2d 517, 522 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1997) (same); Temple v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2000 Del.
Super. LEXIS 439 at *19 (same); Valiant, 567 So. 2d at 411
(same); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. George, 762 N.E.2d
1163, 1165-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (same); Spurlock v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 448 So. 2d 218, 219 (La. App. 1984) (same); Gillespie
v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 467, 470-71 (Miss.
1977) (same); Livingston v. Omaha Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 927
S.W.2d 444, 446 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (same); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hammonds, 865 P.2d 560, 564 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)(same); Ledman
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,601 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1999) (interpreting insurance policy that tracked
statutory language as not compelling UIM coverage); see also 74
Am. Jur. 2d Automobile Ins. § 314 (stating that "insured
relatives of a decedent may not recover on their uninsured
motorist policy for the wrongful death of the decedent . . .
where the decedent herself was not insured under the policy.");
Couch on Insurance 3D § 171:7 ("[A]n insured cannot recover under
the [UM] clause of an automobile policy for the wrongful death of
a relative, since the surviving insured suffered no bodily injury
or wrongful death . . . . [I]nsured relatives of a decedent could
not recover on their [UM] policy for wrongful death of the
decedent killed in an automobile collision where the decedent . .
. was not an insured under the policy; [UM] coverage would be
triggered only by the death of the insured, and . . . not . . .
by virtue of the insured's statutory right to seek wrongful death
damages on behalf of someone not insured under the policy.").
No. 20040582
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Underinsured motorist coverage under this
section applies to bodily injury, sickness,
disease, or death of an insured while
occupying or using a motor vehicle owned by,
furnished, or available for the regular use
of the insured, a resident spouse, or
resident relative of the insured, only if the
motor vehicle is described in the policy
under which a claim is made, or if the motor
vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement
vehicle covered under the terms of the
policy.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(a) (emphasis added). From this
language, it is apparent that the legislature did not intend to
require automobile insurance companies to provide UIM coverage to
insureds in situations where a third party, not covered by the
applicable insurance policy, is injured or killed.7
¶12
This construction of the UM/UIM statute is in harmony
with the vast majority of jurisdictions that have interpreted
language similar or identical to the language contained in
subsection 9(a). See supra n.5.
¶13
Furthermore, although it is unnecessary for us to
consider public policy considerations to discern the meaning of
the UM/UIM statute, see Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah
1996), we note that such considerations also weigh heavily in
favor of our interpretation of the UM/UIM statute. An
interpretation that would allow an insured to recover UIM
benefits under her insurance policy for the death of a third
party who is not covered under that policy would impose an unfair
risk on insurance companies without the attendant consideration
in the form of a premium and, possibly, increase the cost of
insurance for all consumers. Such an interpretation would
mandate an insurance company to provide UIM coverage to a
wrongful death beneficiary simply because that beneficiary has an
automobile insurance policy and the decedent happens to be a
relative for which the beneficiary is legally entitled to
maintain a wrongful death action. To judicially extend UIM
coverage to include members of the family who are not residing
with the insured would, in effect, require automobile insurance
companies to insure any lineal descendant from whom an insured
may inherit for hazards associated with the operation of

7 This interpretation does not prevent parties from
contracting to include UIM coverage for the injuries sustained by
relatives who are not residing with the insured.
7
No. 20040582

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vehicles. Livingston v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co,, 927 S.W.2d
444, 446 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). If the legislature had intended
such a momentous expansion of UIM coverage, it would have made
that intent explicit in the UM/UIM statute. Instead we conclude
that the intended purpose of the UM/UIM statute was to require
UIM coverage only in instances where a person covered by the
relevant insurance policy sustains bodily injury, sickness,
disease, or death.
CONCLUSION
¶14
The district court did not err when it concluded that
Glorya Eaquinta was not entitled to UIM benefits under her
Allstate insurance policy for the death of her son. The terms of
Glorya Eaquinta's policy limit her UIM coverage to situations
where the insured sustains bodily injuries. The policy's
restrictive language is consistent with the statutory
requirements contained in Utah's UM/UIM statute. We therefore
affirm.
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¶15
Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Durrant's
opinion.
No. 20040582
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