COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Elder, Clements and Senior Judge Overton
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

WILLIE JAMES WILSON, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0003-04-1 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
JANUARY 11, 2005
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
Johnny E. Morrison, Judge

William Roots, Jr., for appellant.

Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Willie James Wilson, Jr., was convicted in a bench trial of possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute, in violation of Code 18.2-248, and possession of a firearm while in possession of
cocaine, in violation of Code 18.2-308.4. On appeal, Wilson contends the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police following his unlawful detention and all
evidence flowing from those statements, including the cocaine and firearm found by police in his
home. Finding appellate review procedurally barred, we affirm Wilson's convictions.
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case, and because this
memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and
incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties' understanding of the disposition of this
appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 17, 2002, Sergeant Michael Wright of the Portsmouth Police Department
secured a warrant to search for cocaine at Wilson's residence. The name on the search warrant
obtained by Wright was "James" Wilson. While Wright was securing the search warrant, Detective
R.M. Holley, who was conducting surveillance of Wilson's home, observed Wilson leave the
residence and drive off. Upon Wright's instruction, Holley followed Wilson and stopped him once
he was away from the residence, "in case someone related to the target would have seen it and
thwarted [the police's] efforts." Holley stopped Wilson approximately three miles from Wilson's
home and, thereafter, Wright joined them. After being advised of his Miranda rights, Wilson
informed the officers that he used the name James and that there were drugs and a firearm in his
house. Upon executing the search warrant, the officers found 7.2 grams of crack cocaine in the
kitchen and 7.8 grams of crack cocaine in the bedroom of the residence. They also found a fully
loaded .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver underneath the living room couch cushion.
At trial, Wilson moved to suppress his statements to the police and any evidence flowing
from them on the grounds that Sergeant Wright did not have the search warrant at the time Wilson
was detained and the search warrant incorrectly identified the occupant of the home to be searched
as James Wilson, rather than Willie Wilson. In response, the Commonwealth argued that Sergeant
Wright testified he obtained the search warrant before Detective Holley detained Wilson and that
the defect in the warrant was inconsequential because the search warrant otherwise sufficiently
described Wilson as the occupant of the house to be searched. The trial court denied the motion to
suppress.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Wilson contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. In
support of that contention, Wilson argues solely that his detention in connection with the search
warrant was unlawful because it was effected outside the curtilage of his home. Relying on
Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 21, 553 S.E.2d 539 (2001), and Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692 (1981), Wilson maintains that the police could properly detain him pursuant to the
search warrant only if he was within the curtilage of his home, the place to be searched. The
Commonwealth contends that Wilson's argument, having been raised for the first time on appeal, is
procedurally barred by Rule 5A:18. We agree with the Commonwealth.
Rule 5A:18 provides in pertinent part:
No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for
reversal unless the objection was stated together with the grounds
therefor at the time of the ruling . . . . A mere statement that the
judgment or award is contrary to the law and the evidence is not
sufficient to constitute a question to be ruled upon on appeal.

(Emphasis added).
Pursuant to Rule 5A:18, we "will not consider an argument on appeal [that] was not
presented to the trial court." Ohree v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488
(1998). "Rule 5A:18 applies to bar even constitutional claims." Id.
Under this rule, a specific argument must be made to the trial court at
the appropriate time, or the allegation of error will not be considered
on appeal. A general argument or an abstract reference to the law is
not sufficient to preserve an issue. Making one specific argument on
an issue does not preserve a separate legal point on the same issue for
review.

Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 760, 589 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2003) (en banc), aff'd,
No. 040019 (Va. Sup. Ct. Order of 10/15/04). Thus, "though taking the same general position as
in the trial court, an appellant may not rely on reasons which could have been but were not raised
for the benefit of the lower court." West Alexandria Properties, Inc. v. First Va. Mortgage & Real
Estate Inv. Trust, 221 Va. 134, 138, 267 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1980). In short, we will not consider an
argument on appeal that is different from the specific argument presented to the trial court, even if it
relates to the same issue. See Buck v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 449, 452-53, 443 S.E.2d 414, 416
(1994) (holding that appellant's failure to raise the same specific arguments "before the trial court
precludes him from raising them for the first time on appeal"). The main purpose of this rule is to
ensure that the trial court and opposing party are given the opportunity to intelligently address,
examine, and resolve issues in the trial court, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals. Lee
v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 514, 404 S.E.2d 736, 739 (1991) (en banc); Kaufman v. Kaufman, 12
Va. App. 1200, 1204, 409 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1991).
Moreover, a party "will not be permitted to approbate and reprobate, ascribing error to an
act by the trial court that comported with his representations." Asgari v. Asgari, 33 Va. App.
393, 403, 533 S.E.2d 643, 648 (2000); see also Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 417, 374
S.E.2d 46, 54 (1988) ("No litigant, even a defendant in a criminal case, will be permitted to
approbate and reprobate-to invite error . . . and then to take advantage of the situation created by
his own wrong.").
In accordance with established principles, we review the record on appeal in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party below, the Commonwealth in this case. See Banks v.
Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 539, 543, 586 S.E.2d 876, 877 (2003). At trial, Wilson contested
the legality of his detention under the Fourth Amendment and moved to suppress his statements to
the police and any information flowing from them. In support of his motion, he argued primarily
that the search warrant had not yet been issued when he was stopped and that the search warrant did
not correctly name him as the occupant of the house. While Wilson pointed out below that he was
not stopped within "the curtilage of the home," he did not specifically argue, as he does on appeal,
that his detention was illegal under the Fourth Amendment because he was not detained until after
he had left the curtilage of his home. Indeed, Wilson's counsel specifically told the trial court that it
did not "have to worry about that" particular aspect of the case. "If [the police] issued a search
warrant, they can stop him, but they haven't issued the warrant . . . ," Wilson's counsel informed the
trial court. Thus, the argument Wilson raises on appeal was not specifically raised by Wilson at trial
and the trial court, assured by Wilson that it was not an issue before the court, did not consider or
address it. We hold, therefore, that Wilson is barred by Rule 5A:18 from raising the argument for
the first time on appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm Wilson's convictions.
Affirmed.
* Pursuant to Code 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

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